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Books carry the names of their editors and authors. This book being the culmi-
nation of Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient’s research programme from 2008 to 
2019, the names in this book only reflect some of the outcomes. Behind them 
were years of animated academic debate, intense research and multiple cooper-
ations. Consequently, this volume is a collective effort by ZMO colleagues as 
well as the academic contributors to the conference from which it emerged. 
Beyond the academic contributors, not all of whom are represented in this 
volume, there was a dedicated group of people without whom this book might 
never have been completed. We are particularly grateful to Hannah Newbury for 
her careful language editing. Nele Brunner and Berenice Brüggemann were 
indispensable when it came to standardising the different styles of citation. We 
are very grateful to Dr. Sophie Wagenhofer for her support at De Gruyter. How-
ever, without Svenja Becherer’s dedicated support, effective oversight and or-
ganisational talent, this book would perhaps never have seen the light of day. 
We thank the Federal Ministry for Education and Research for the funding of the 
Research Programme and gratefully acknowledge a grant by the Leibniz-
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Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds 
Introduction 
The contributions to this volume examine different ways in which Muslims have 
laid claim to, and shaped their worlds in the 20th and 21st centuries. While the 
negotiation of identities and the ordering and reordering of societies is a com-
mon process, why do we choose ‘Muslims’ as a ‘field’ of enquiry? Would we ask 
similar questions about Christians or Buddhists?1 
Thus, the very choice of the field of research raises a number of fundamen-
tal questions which arose in the very particular historical context of the first two 
decades of the 21st century, when the devastating and highly symbolic attacks 
on the World Trade Centre by the Islamist organisation al-Qaʿida in September 
2001 triggered what was termed the ‘Global War on Terror’. Of course, the iden-
tification of Muslims as the Christian (and Western) ‘Other’ goes back almost to 
the inception of Islam. The long history of mutual relations and perceptions 
underwent many permutations, which need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to 
say that the Age of Imperialism, where this book takes its starting point, coin-
cided with an often violent reconfiguration of these relations. While the 20th 
century itself witnessed multiple shifts, which we reflect on below, at the time 
of planning the research on which the book is based, mutual perceptions had 
taken another distinct turn for the worse. Since the end of the Cold War, some 
political scientists and area studies specialists have become adherents of a 
school of thought that promotes the notion of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’.2 With the 
|| 
1 “We” refers primarily to the editors of this volume and reflects, more generally, the orienta-
tion of the ZMO research programme between 2008 and 2019. We are grateful for the feedback 
received from many colleagues at ZMO, and would like to specifically acknowledge the com-
ments of Kai Kresse and Sarah Jurkiewicz. 
2 The classical post-Cold War shift occurred with Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’, which was presented as a lecture in 1992, published as an article in Foreign 
Affairs (72;3, 22–49) in 1993, and appeared as a book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster) in 1996. The term is said to have been 
derived from Bernard Lewis’s 1990 essay “The Roots of Muslim Rage”. Other prominent authors 
who contributed to this trend are Bassam Tibi (Krieg der Zivilisationen: Politik und Religion 
zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1995) and Martin 
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transformation of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union into an insurgency 
aimed at Western regimes and their allies, the emergence of al-Qaʿida, and the 
attack on the World Trade Centre, being identified as ‘Muslim’ has become high-
ly problematic in Western contexts. At the same time, and partly sparked by 
these developments, but also partly in response to internal dynamics, debates 
among Muslims about identity and what it means to be a ‘proper Muslim’ also 
gained traction, often in ways that mirrored the encounter with the non-Muslim 
‘Other’. 
What gets lost in such politically volatile contexts are the self-attributions, 
conceptualisations, and practices by which ordinary people constantly envi-
sion, create, and remake their lifeworlds. Twinning the discursive potential of 
‘claiming’ and ‘making’, we wanted to restore a voice to the myriad ways in 
which ‘Muslimness’ is manifested, while at the same time unmuting marginal 
voices that are excluded from the hegemonic discourse within Muslim commu-
nities. Such internal differences, constitutive to Shahab Ahmad’s approach to 
Islam, are evidenced, for example, in the chapters by Haniffa or Frede.3 While 
this is one important reason for this book to highlight multiple Muslim ‘worlds’ 
rather than claiming the unity of one ‘world of Islam’, another is the observation 
that factors other than Islam can be just as constitutive for local perspectives, as 
shown in the chapter by Scheele.  
So, how are plural Muslim lifeworlds and conceptual world-making inter-
woven? And how are these imbricated with etic group concepts such as that of 
the umma, the community of believers? The chapters of this book provide an-
swers which are specific to certain regions, places and times. This is very much 
linked to the epistemological stance uniting the authors of this volume regard-
ing the regions and people they study: While most subjects appearing in these 
studies profess Islam or are classified as Muslims, this does not per se explain 
much about their lives. Instead, we ask how people who either declare them-
selves to be Muslims or who are, in specific contexts, labelled as such by non-
Muslims, understand and use or do not use Islam in their daily lives and in dif-
ferent contexts.4 We also ask how states and individuals in Muslim majority and 
minority contexts actively refer to Islam in a global setting where ‘Islam’ – or 
rather particular variants thereof – has become synonymous with fanaticism, 
and worse, for many non-Muslim governments since the end of the Cold War? 
|| 
Kramer (Ivory Towers on Sand: The failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, Washington: 
The Washington Institute 2001). 
3 The plurality of Islam is one of the main topics of Ahmad 2016 and McBrien 2017. 
4 Otayek and Soares 2007. 
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This negative equation is quite irrespective of earlier Western support for ji-
hadists when it seemed expedient, as in the case of the Soviet-Afghan War in 
the 1980s.5 Worse, still, current Western support is often made conditional on 
cooperation in the ‘fight against terrorism’, which, as shown in the chapter by 
Frede in this book, has further fuelled contestations about ‘moderate Islam’, 
thereby at times suppressing other urgent debates about good governance.6 In 
this complex setting it is essential to pay minute attention to who uses which 
labels, and in which contexts they become relevant. Because of this, we insist 
on speaking of plural worlds rather than of one ‘world of Islam’. The importance 
of Islam needs to be explained in each and every case, notably as we are dealing 
with people and contexts that are quite far apart in time and space.  
In this introduction we will further explore some of the conceptual ques-
tions just indicated. We begin with a brief discussion of how we understand and 
approach Islam. Furthermore, we engage with the question of different scales in 
the study of Muslim worlds, and then consider some of the theoretical and 
methodological challenges involved in this endeavour. Finally, we highlight the 
sections and topics on which this volume focusses. The selection of case studies 
combines historical, anthropological, political, and literary perspectives. In 
doing so, this volume reflects a long-standing multi- and interdisciplinary en-
gagement with translocal and globalising practices in the overwhelmingly Mus-
lim societies of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner 
Orient (ZMO) and its scholarly context. The contributions to this volume thus 
represent a selection of papers presented at a conference held at ZMO in early 
April 2019 entitled “Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds: Across and Between 
the Global and the Local”. The volume can be considered one of the major out-
comes of the ZMO research programme between 2009 and 2018, entitled “Mus-
lim Worlds – World of Islam? Tracing Connections, Practices and Crises of the 
Global in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East”.7 
|| 
5 Mitchell 2002, Lansford 2003, especially chapter 4. 
6 Fisher and Anderson 2015. We thank Frédéric Madore for suggesting this reference. 
7 This research programme was generously funded by Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung. For more information on the programme, see: https://archiv.zmo.de/forschung/
projekte_2008_2013/Forschungsprogramm%2007-09-07.pdf. An overview of the projects con-
ducted within this framework can be found here: https://archiv.zmo.de/forschung/index_e.
html. 
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Studying Islam 
The notion of Muslim worlds is arguably a construct that warrants some expla-
nation. Islam is but one, and oftentimes not even the most evident, category 
with which people identify or from which they draw their motivations. Never-
theless, even where Islam is explicitly evoked by the actors themselves, it often 
serves as a unifying device. It is at such junctures of explicit reference that we 
speak of Muslim worlds, as we could, in similar instances, speak of Christian, 
Buddhist, or other worlds. At the same time, Islam can serve as a smokescreen 
that masks divisions and contradictions within societies. The complex nature of 
human engagement and interaction rarely, if ever, allows for a labelling under 
one single signifier such as religion. What this volume offers is the study of a 
multifaceted Islam and its interrelatedness with other aspects of cultural and 
politic life, by demonstrating multiple ways of being Muslim and relating to 
one’s own ‘Muslimness’ and to that of others. 
The contributors to this volume start from an empirical observation, namely 
the existence of people professing Islam and forming the vast majority popula-
tion in much of the Middle East, as well as large parts of Africa and Asia, in 
addition to larger or smaller minority populations elsewhere. ‘Muslim worlds’ 
nevertheless remains a complicated heuristic category in terms of common 
assumptions, debates about Islam and religion, as well as questions regarding 
notions and definitions of ‘worlds’.8 The spread of Islam from the first hijri cen-
tury (7th century C.E.) has certainly created a common mould that has been 
termed ‘Islamicate World’ by Marshall Hodgson, a term that accepts Islam as a 
holistic complex which shaped cultural and social thoughts and practices, irre-
spective of individual religious identities within this complex.9 It is equally 
certain that within this very general mould, a multitude of variations have 
emerged. Rather than following Hodgson’s ‘World’, however, we opt for the 
plural and thereby not only emphasise the internal differentiation, but also aim 
to counteract an inherent Arabocentric impetus as well as an essentialising 
generic perception and presentation. 
Ever since the rise of a more distinctive notion of ‘religion’ in the late 19th 
century European tradition, the question of how to fit ‘Islam’ into that category 
has troubled scholars. Bergunder argues that this results from the fact that even 
|| 
8 For a more extensive discussion of these issues see Freitag 2013 and the commentary by 
Meyer 2014. 
9 Hodgson 1977, 56–60. 
 Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds | 5 
  
within the discipline of Religious Studies, the concept has hardly been subject-
ed to rigorous reflection, resulting instead and implicitly from the European 
experience of secularisation, for which religion became the ‘Other’. This was 
enhanced by the encounter with other systems of meaning-making in the 19th 
century.10 The obvious question is how Islam fit such a model arising from a 
specifically European experience? Western scholarship, some of which Tayob 
engages with in the final chapter of this book, often reflected this difficulty. 
A number of attempts have been made to disentangle the resulting concep-
tual problems. To give but two examples: Talal Asad – critical of the European 
tradition but remaining quite close to the concept of religion – has famously 
framed Islam as a “discursive tradition” in order to account for quite diverging 
interpretations of doctrine and practices in different regions and periods.11 Sha-
hab Ahmad’s recent approach is considerably wider: he defines Islam as “mean-
ing-making for the self in terms of hermeneutical engagement with Revelation 
to Muhammad”.12 Such “meaning-making” can lead to hugely varying and at 
times contradictory understandings and actions, which are, in Ahmad’s read-
ing, fully in line with ‘Islam’. Significantly, his emphasis on the “Balkans-to-
Bengal complex” moves away from an Arabocentric view of Islam, even if it 
does not include sub-Saharan and Southeast Asian Muslims (and self-
consciously marginalises Islam in the Arab lands).13 
Ahmad’s inclusive notion is an explicit answer to, and criticism of, a con-
cept of ‘religion’ that implies a specific conceptual divide between a ‘religious’ 
and a ‘secular’ sphere.14 While some authors, such as Tayob, have been striving 
to reform or decolonise the study of religious studies in order to define a more 
comprehensive and thus globally comparative applicable field of study – an 
effort also reflected in his chapter in this volume – others, such as Schulze, have 
suggested to remove “the classical cultural terminology (…) from our scholarly 
toolbox”.15 
Varisco has suggested that there “is so much debate about the methodolog-
ical problems in past sociological models of religion that borrowing contested 
terms may simply beg the theoretical questions”.16 However, it is important to 
|| 
10 Bergunder 2011, for some of the basic discussions Segal 2016, c.f. Masuzawa 2005, 18f and 
passim. 
11 Asad 2009 [1986], 10ff. 
12 Ahmad 2016, 405. 
13 Ibid., 73–85. 
14 Ibid., 176–245. 
15 Schulze 1998, 197, Tayob 2018. 
16 Varisco 2005, 138. 
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reflect on the prevalent and rather narrow definitions of religion in order to 
understand that neither does Islam neatly fit into what might be intuitively 
understood to be ‘religion’, nor is such a notion of ‘religion’ at present a particu-
larly helpful category. The aim of this volume is not to define Islam or who is a 
Muslim.17 Rather than assuming the existence of Muslim worlds, or indeed con-
sidering Islam as the primary signifier for the identity of Muslims, we investi-
gate, on the basis of specific cases and situations in different parts of the world, 
when, and in which contexts Islam is being invoked, used, or contested.18 
World claiming and making – Islam and  
the everyday 
‘Claiming’ and ‘making’ can thus be read as two approaches towards conceptu-
alisations of Muslim worlds that emphasise ‘living Islam’ (Marsden 2005) and 
Muslim subjectivities rather than normative agendas, state institutions, and 
political elites. The terms also highlight the processual character of engaging 
questions of identity and memory politics without considering Muslims as pri-
marily, if not exclusively, determined by their religion and its canonical 
sources. 
Some chapters in this book trace and explore mundane practices which are 
claimed to be ‘Islamic’ or are linked to Islam. They consider how these practices 
become integrated into the lives of the respective actors and activities at all 
levels between the local and the global. This is one important aspect of the 
chapters by Haniffa and Stephan-Emmrich. We are further curious to better 
understand how meanings of ‘Islam’ circulate, including the practical commu-
nicative and technological infrastructures of circulation. Do ideas change or are 
adapted when they are moved to another context or presented in a different 
form? Prominent examples are the evolution of ‘Islamic Socialism’ by the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt in the late 1950s, the development of a Third 
Worldist ‘Progressive Islam’ in contexts as diverse as Egypt and Malaysia, and 
some of the Islamic leftist trends calling for the Iranian Revolution.19 Likewise, 
and more recently, themes like ‘Islamic environmentalism’, animal rights, 
‘Islamic feminism’, or assisted reproductive technologies have garnered atten-
|| 
17 Schielke 2010, Kresse 2013, 77f. 
18 Schielke and Debevec 2012, 1–12, Soares and Osella 2010, 12. 
19 Abaza 1998; Abrahamian 1989, 105–25, Bakhtiari 1989. 
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tion, sparked popular and academic debates, and brought activists to the 
streets.20 
Beyond individual actors, political movements and states have, in different 
ways, either drawn on Islam (or Islamically inflected rhetoric) or defined their 
position in explicit response to decidedly Islamic positions. Thus, controversies 
can occur both at the level of the confrontation of (non-Muslim) states with 
Muslim minorities, as in the case of Sri Lanka, discussed by Haniffa, but also 
when it comes to (Muslim) statist attempts to define an authoritative version of 
Islam against competing interpretations, as in the case of Mauretania, discussed 
by Frede. The nation-state, which became a standard political entity during the 
first half of the 20th century, is increasingly confronted with competing political 
models in an Islamic garb. One such example is the recent caliphate declared by 
the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014. Even where Islam is 
evoked, regional affiliations can provide powerful motivations to challenge the 
state, as shown in the chapters by Scheele and Sounaye. Such influences of 
‘Muslim politics’ challenge both relations between states and dynamics within 
states.21 Casini’s chapter illustrates how the changing notions of Muslimness 
and political Islam are reflected in Arabic novels in Egypt and Kuwait, while El 
Guabli demonstrates their explicit exclusion in the Moroccan process of nation-
al reconciliation. As is evident from these examples, the individual ‘worlds’ 
invoked can be of quite different scales, and the relationship between different 
localities can be of very different orders, which raises the question of how we 
understand and approach such ‘worlds’. 
Muslim worlds: Localities, spaces, scales,  
and temporalities 
If we speak of ‘Muslim worlds’ in the plural, this recognises the necessary atten-
tion to historical and spatial contexts instead of assuming some uniform kind of 
‘globality’.22 Arguably, the nature of this plurality has itself changed and trans-
|| 
20 Hancock 2018, Foltz 2000, 2005, Islam and Islam 2015, Badran 2005, Cooke 2001, Inhorn 
2011, Inhorn and Tremayne 2012. 
21 Hoeber Rudolph, 2008, Mandaville 2007, 4. 
22 Freitag and von Oppen 2010, 13–16. For the emergence of the ideas, c.f. Aydin 2017. A living 
example is the title of the leading German periodical of Middle Eastern Studies, Die Welt des 
Islams (The [sic!] World of Islam) even if the content of the journal reflects more plurality than 
the (rather old) title suggests. 
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formed in the context of post-modernist pluralisation and relativism, as Schulze 
has argued with special reference to contemporary Islamist groups.23 As Bamyeh 
asserts, Islam oftentimes forms more of a “reserve discourse” which “remains 
available when everything else fails”, even if such Islamic discourses have be-
come more present since the late 1960s for a variety of reasons.24 
Beyond the understanding of what might be considered theological or intel-
lectual positions and debates, and of how Islam is integrated into the everyday, 
we are interested in the actual interactions of Muslims. We argue that – beyond 
the largely theoretical notion of one community of believers (umma), enacted 
most prominently during the annual pilgrimage (hajj) – Muslims live in differ-
ent geographic, political, linguistic etc. contexts. These they connect at specific 
moments in specific ways. They thus contribute to and are influenced by multi-
ple processes of translocal (ex)changes, which are commonly termed ‘globalisa-
tion’, and which are here understood to consist of a multitude of intersecting, 
competing, and multi-directional processes. In addition to the increasing eco-
nomic (inter)dependence, the frequency and depth of international exchanges 
on all levels has palpably intensified since the latter half of the 18th century, and 
received the latest boost through new communication technologies.25 Such ex-
changes can be facilitated, but in no way naturalised by the common idiom of 
Islam.26 This, then, creates historically specific translocal and, nowadays, 
transnational Muslim spaces or worlds. These often evoke specific tensions or 
questions between different ways of being Muslim, as emerges, in different 
ways, in the contributions by Mato-Bouzas, Scheele, Haniffa, and Stephan-
Emmrich. Thus, we argue that Muslim worlds on this more spatial level, too, 
need to be identified and historically situated, rather than considered a perma-
nent, objectifiable entity.27 Thus, any attempts at mapping them to better under-
stand the “erasing and redrawing [of] boundaries” in globalising processes will 
need to take this historicity into account.28 
In an earlier work concerned with conceptualising translocality, Freitag and 
van Oppen engaged particularly with global history and emphasised the differ-
ences between the more nuanced approach of translocality and much of global 
history writing and globalisation studies. Used descriptively, translocality de-
|| 
23 Schulze 1998. 
24 Bamyeh 2019, 218, see also Ahmad 2019. 
25 Bayly 2004, Osterhammel 2009, 1010–55, Mandaville 2007, 322–27. 
26 For a telling anecdote illustrating this point, see Ahmed 2016, 4, 
27 On the political genealogy of the notion of “one Muslim world” in the West, see Aydin 2017. 
28 Such mapping is suggested by Vásques and Marquardt 2006, 318. 
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notes “the sum of phenomena which result from a multitude of circulations and 
transfers”.29 As a research perspective, translocality aims at highlighting the 
diverse and at times contradictory outcomes of the interactions and movements 
of people, goods, ideas, and symbols. It calls for attention to the spatial, social 
and temporal ruptures, limitations, and exclusions as much as to the described 
connections and entanglements. This offers a very differentiated way of looking 
at globalisation phenomena, recognising their limitations, conditions as well as 
the teleological tendencies often inherent in globalisation discourses.30 Translo-
cality also allows for very different scales of engagement, while terms like 
‘transnational history’ already naturalise the (Western model of the) nation 
state as a crucial referent.31 While we of course recognise the current salience of 
this state model, as is evident especially from section two of this book, we aim 
at historicising it, thereby recognising it as a historically recent (and not teleo-
logically predetermined) development.32 Methodologically, the study of translo-
cality benefitted particularly from the suggestions made by Werner and Zim-
mermann regarding the need to bring together different archives and scales of 
entanglement in what they have called ‘histoire croisée’.33 This resembles in 
many ways anthropological approaches to multi-sited fieldwork which have 
called for observing the processual relations between places instead of concen-
trating on a single, preferably marginal, locality.34 Finally, the study of translo-
cality sharpens the need for a reflexive approach. 
In history, the conversation about how to bring together global and micro-
history – which in turn has many points of contact with historical anthropolo-
gy – has been particularly fruitful.35 There are many different ways of how mi-
cro- and global history can be brought into conversation, for example by 
juxtaposing contemporaneous (micro)stories from different settings or by trac-
ing translocal connectivities.36 The shift in “conceptual topology”37 has taken 
many directions since, from travelling with labour migrants, pilgrims, pastoral-
|| 
29 Freitag and von Oppen 2010, 5. 
30 Ibid., 5–16. 
31 E.g. Struck, Ferris, and Revel 2011. 
32 For a useful sociological perspective on a different concepts of statehood, see Schlichte 
2018, particularly 49–52. Herren’s (2018) insistence on the multiple and interweaving (or “net-
worked”) layers of statehood at the international scale is also important. 
33 Werner and Zimmermann 2006. 
34 Marcus 1995, Coleman and Hellermann 2011. 
35 See the contributions in Past & Present 242, Supplement 14, November 2019. 
36 For two different approaches e.g. Zemon-Davis 2011, c.f. Ghobrial 2019, 15f. 
37 Coleman and Hellermann 2011, 2. 
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ists, and heritage tourists to tracing the biographies of translocal families or the 
flow of concepts, fashions, and consumer goods.38 In that sense, it has widened 
the scale and at the same time redirected the focus of interest. It also engen-
dered a conceptual shift towards an approach which is focussed on close col-
laboration between researchers and interlocutors who at times become co-
researchers. The authors in this volume differ not only in their disciplinary ap-
proaches but also in the focus and scale of their engagement, which is taken up 
in a more empirical manner in the first section of this book.39 
One major insight of Global History, at least in its more recent forms, has 
been the critique of nation-centred historiography and of Eurocentrism in the 
context of globalising experiences.40 The universalist agenda of global history 
has encountered an interesting counterforce: interest in its research agenda is 
unevenly spread, as Ghobrial has argued with reference to Arab historians, who 
are still preoccupied with the writing of national(ist) historiographies. He is also 
critical of a pitfall of a globalist agenda which might neglect local events, con-
texts, and sources in its drive to widen geographical units.41 While one would 
probably need to somewhat nuance Ghobrial’s concern in light of new ap-
proaches to global history, his empirical finding about a regionally very dispar-
ate interest in global history remains valid. It would be interesting to further 
investigate to what extent the interest in global scales in history and translocal 
anthropology can be correlated with the stakes that different countries and 
regions have in the current wave of political and economic globalisation.  
An interest in connectivities and entanglements must, of course, be sensi-
tive to inequalities and hierarchies within and without the relevant ‘worlds’ or 
units of observation.42 This means that it might reveal more layers of differential 
power and influence than the standard Saidian critique of Orientalist writing 
would suggest. It is probably more appropriate to think of 
globalization as a set of contradictory bundles of social and discursive practices of he-
gemony, rather than a uniform and ubiquitous process that simultaneously haunts the 
whole world. Globalizations, in the plural, then include top-down projects and processes 
|| 
38 See, for example, Schramm 2020, Stephan-Emmrich and Schröder 2018, the contributions 
in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 45;3, 2019, Schielke 2020. 
39 De Vito 2019. 
40 Conrad 2016, 1–6; 162–84, for a broader definition of global history ibid. 62–89. 
41 Ghorbrial 2019, 9f. This means by no way that he would subscribe to views that Global 
history is “a ruse of the mighty and powerful”, Conrad 2016, 189, but simply that he and others 
are pointing to other priorities in history writing. 
42 Conrad and Eckert 2007, 23–24. 
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put forward by multi-located and conflicting elites, as much as multiple ‘counter-global 
networks’ emerging from below.43  
How, the contributors to this volume ask, do Muslims shape translocal spaces 
with or without religious connotations, how do they envisage Islam in political 
contexts, and how do they react to, adopt, or appropriate new internationalising 
norms and ideas in different contexts? They thus take the discursive and prag-
matic agency embedded in the term Muslim worlds, i.e. the ways and potentiali-
ties of diverse world-making, as an angle of analysis, rather than the homoge-
nising notion of an ‘Islamic world’ that centres on religion at the expense of all 
other aspects of life.44 
This becomes clear, for example, in the very different contexts of the chap-
ters by Kempen, Frede, Haniffa, Scheele, and Sounaye. They show in an exem-
plary way how international power differentials, cultural and religious labels, 
but also different locations of economic and political power within and beyond 
states shape the relevant Muslim ‘worlds’. At the same time, they also highlight 
that we cannot conceive of such Muslim ‘worlds’ without taking into account 
what happens beyond their Islamically connoted horizon, however small or 
large the cases are. This holds true whether we are talking about very small and 
localised case studies, or larger transnational contexts.45 
Although not thematised in this volume, it is important to realise that the 
observation that Muslim ‘worlds’ can never be considered in isolation also holds 
true in the inverse sense, i.e. what occurs in Muslim ‘worlds’ also impacts those 
who would not consider themselves to belong to this realm. This is as true for 
religious actors taking cues from one another in their competition for audiences 
as it is for political relations or for definitions of the self and the ’Other’.46 It 
should be clear by now that ‘Muslim worlds’ are, in such a scenario, a heuristic 
device, rather than referring to objective and static entities. They are designed 
by the theoretical interest of the observer, not by some absolute reality.47 
|| 
43 De Vito 2019, 370. 
44 For a deeper discussion of this see Schielke 2010. 
45 De Vries 2019, 24. 
46 Ibrahim 2017, McBrien 2017, Green 2011, Bunt 2018. 
47 On this see Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2020 and Kauppi 2020, 46–47. 
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Towards a non-hegemonic approach 
By foregrounding local perspectives and interpretations, this volume goes 
against the grain of predominant conceptual, historical, and geographical re-
search repertoires that assume the centrality of the global North in the historical 
process since the 19th century, which is often described as ‘globalisation’. Its 
authors take local perspectives and conceptualisations seriously, rather than 
assuming a singular and homogenous Muslim world.48 
So how can we speak about Muslim worlds? Ever since the call for ‘provin-
cialising Europe’, i.e. for considering the European experience as one among 
many strands of human experience and thus for no longer considering Europe-
an experiences and concepts as paradigmatic, this question has gained in 
acuteness. This was not merely a recognition of the impact of colonialism but, at 
a much more profound level, deeply linked to fundamental questions regarding 
the production of knowledge about non-Western societies (and ultimately, 
about knowledge production in general) within a global postcolonial scenario.49 
This begins with the ways in which not only notions of the religious and the 
secular, but whole academic disciplines, and particularly those dealing with 
non-Western and non-Christian societies, were formed. In the process of order-
ing scholarly disciplines in Western academia in the 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, anthropology was given the task to deal with the sociology of societies 
deemed to be lacking literate traditions, while Oriental Studies dealt with lit-
erate non-Western societies, and sociology with Western societies.50 These dis-
ciplines produced the major approaches and concepts which are still in use to 
describe and analyse societies today. This raises fundamental philosophical and 
political questions about the adequacy of Western concepts for non-Western 
societies, or about the context in which concepts coined for non-Western socie-
ties were developed, resulting in questions about their adequacy and concerns 
about hegemony.  
The multiple inequalities between and within different knowledge systems, 
from status and recognition to available means for research and language, place 
|| 
48 See some of the points in more detail in Freitag 2013. 
49 See Chakrabarty 2000. 
50 Masuzawa 2005, 19 and Mignolo 2009, 171, and for International Relations Derichs 2017, 
14f. For the debate about history, see in particular Chakrabarty 2000, but also the critical chal-
lenges to his position, e.g. by Argyrou 2001, Kaiwar 2014, notably 156–222, and 301–75, respec-
tively. 
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very real obstacles to meaningful engagement on an equal footing.51 Essentialis-
ing categories stand in the way of exchanges between researchers from different 
systems. They threaten to overshadow debates about Islam among Muslims, 
notably in geopolitically charged contexts such as the West African one dis-
cussed in the chapters by Frede, Sounaye, Scheele, or in diasporic contexts 
such as that of Asian communities in Dubai, as discussed by Mato Bouzas and 
Stephan-Emmrich.52  
Not only proponents of decolonial theory argue that the choice of terminol-
ogy and concepts already assumes a hegemony of (Western) knowledge, which 
is deeply rejected by proponents of a delinking from Western epistemology.53 
Connell argues that far beyond a quest for “indigenous knowledge systems” 
which might boost specific postcolonial identity politics, there exists an enor-
mous wealth of conceptual, methodological, and theoretical thought which is 
normally ignored in Western – and often also in ‘Southern’ – academia.54 Nu-
merous authors have emphasised the importance of heightened reflexivity 
when conducting field- and archival work, not only on one’s own positionality, 
but also with regard to the categories we use, the choice of objects of knowledge 
and research practices.55 In this demand, both social scientists and micro-
historians concur.56 In anthropology, fieldwork has for a long time become as-
sociated with a “self-conscious shifting of social and geographical location”, 
enabling researchers to engage in precisely this kind of fundamental rethinking 
by engaging with the situatedness of knowledge and building bridges between 
different types of knowledges.57 This is, in a next step when it comes to academ-
ic practice, then also linked to questions about the ‘ownership’ of knowledge, 
access to research outcomes and the need for a much humbler approach to 
knowledge by academics. Indeed, the widespread study in Western universities 
and the international systems of accreditation, often performed by specialised 
institutions or universities in the West on a global scale, result in an increasing 
standardisation on the basis of Western approaches and, often enough, sources 
at the cost of neglecting local resources for knowledge production. For example, 
it is striking to observe that a large number of non-Western theses about local 
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51 Amir-Moazami 2018, 13–19. 
52 On such internal debates e.g. Hirji 2010. 
53 E.g. Mignolo and Walsh 2018, 105–52. 
54 Connell 2017, 8, for “South” as an exclusively relational category, see Comaroff and Co-
maroff 2012. 
55 Santos 2018, 28f, De Vito 2019, 360f. For International Relations, see Derichs 2017, 162f. 
56 Schmidt-Wellenburg and Bernhard 2020, 18, De Vito 2019, 371f. 
57 Gupta and Ferguson 2008, 97f. 
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histories are exclusively based on imperial documents, instead of attempting to 
locate and use local sources.  
While the call for a serious integration of local knowledge into our concep-
tual repertoire is well-taken, the case of the project of the Islamisation of 
Knowledge demonstrates some of the difficulties that may be encountered. 
Abaza reminds us that this project was very much linked to the rejection of Ori-
entalism, by which it was hence strongly, albeit adversely, influenced. What is 
more important is that the project, which itself has a postcolonial and global-
ising agenda with particularly strong proponents in Malaysia and the US, is 
fuelled by Gulf money. Thus, it has itself become an expression of hegemonic 
ambitions within Islamic thought. Furthermore, proponents of this project over-
look or deny that Islamic knowledge is itself deeply embedded in global interac-
tions. Inadvertently, it thus resembles the very Western epistemology which it 
rejects, in perplexing ways by its search for an exclusivist identity.58 Wedeen’s 
dictum that “scholarly work and policy exist in the same semiotic world”, for-
mulated in the context of a critical study of US political science pertaining to the 
Middle East, certainly could be as much applied to the project of Islamisation of 
knowledge as to her initial object of study.59 
Is there a way out of the conundrum to either stick to the current social sci-
ence and humanities tools, to replace them by an entirely new system or possi-
bly to even accept that there will be many divergent scientific approaches? This 
would mean to abandon attempts at arriving at understandings which trans-
cend particular societies or even groups. This question goes to a central issue in 
the debate about post- and decoloniality which in itself is extremely heteroge-
neous.60  
There are no ready answers, given the different levels at which these prob-
lems are situated and how difficult it is to rethink our analytical toolbox.61 In 
order to at least mitigate the problem of conceptual Eurocentrism, we attribute 
particular importance to local concepts and categories in full awareness of the 
fact that these are, as demonstrated with regard to the ‘Islamisation of 
Knowledge’ project, themselves often contested.62 Far from reducing them to 
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58 Abaza 2000, c.f. Marfleet 2000, 29, Derichs 2017, 25, and 33–59. 
59 Wedeen 2016, 59, c.f. Anderson 2016, 233. 
60 Beyond the debate on Chakrabarty, mentioned earlier, see also the intervention by Butler, 
Laclau, and Žižek 2000. 
61 The notion of an abyssal line separating North and South was first formulated by Frantz 
Fanon and then taken up again by Santos who speaks of epistemicide by “the Eurocentric 
modern sciences”, Santos 2018, 20f. 
62 Riecken 2019, 328–36 on conceptual Eurocentrism, c.f. Derichs 2017, 167. 
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“native epistemologies”,63 in our understanding, more systematic attempts need 
to be made to, first of all, grasp local (emic) concepts and categories. Some au-
thors have decided to focus on similar practices which might have yielded com-
parable results, for example when it comes to understandings of how people 
can accommodate strangers in their midst.64 A careful consideration of how 
such practices relate to, are in tension with, or can be fruitfully aligned with the 
established (Western) academic vocabulary can help us to globalise, expand 
and modify our analytical vocabulary. Obviously, this demands a careful, his-
torically sensitive process of epistemic translation in order to “reveal their con-
textual embeddedness”.65 Appiah has aptly called this “thick translation” in 
reference to Geertz’ call for a “thick”, i.e. analytically enriched, description.66 In 
a slightly different take, Diagne argues that we might not be able to express the 
universal in a common conceptual language.67 Like Appiah, he promotes the 
idea of translation as a way towards an understanding of “the universal in a 
world liberated from the assumption of a universal grammar and the narrative 
of a unique telos”.68 In his work on Swahili Muslim Publics, Kresse convincingly 
demonstrates how such a culturally sensitive process of what might be called 
approximative translation can be imagined, which would also have to include 
reference to conventions of intonation, but also to social practices.69 
Most of the practitioners of different disciplines in this volume do not ad-
dress these fundamental conceptual questions, even though most would proba-
bly be able to agree on the existing tensions and on universality as an aspira-
tional horizon which recognises the existing particularities.70 They do, however, 
share our belief in the importance of close and sustained cooperation between 
academics from different scholarly traditions and with diverse linguistic and 
regional backgrounds and expertise, as well as in exchanges between activists 
and academics. Only such exchanges, we argue, can contribute to overcoming 
or at least mitigating some of the epistemological blockades and limitations 
evident in older approaches to the study of humankind. This requires many 
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63 Conrad 2016, 195. 
64 Freitag 2020. 
65 Derichs 2017, 3, ibid., 1–7, for a succinct discussion of the problem at hand. 
66 Appiah 1993, particularly 817–19, Hermans 2003. Again, a wide variety of approaches in 
practice emerge, see, for example, the more action-oriented approach in Santos 2018. 
67 C.f. Jackson 1–26. 
68 Diagne 2013, para 23. 
69 Kresse 2018, 10–27, a similar approach, albeit on a more explicitly comparative scale, in-
forms Freitag’s discussion of cosmopolitanism (Freitag 2020). 
70 Zerilli 2002. Vatin, 2015, formulates one such quest to move forward. 
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instances of un- and re-thinking, and a distinct willingness to engage critically 
with central tenets of academic methodology.71 
The composition of contributors to this volume mirrors this approach which 
is also at the heart of research at ZMO. Sustained cooperation built on reciproci-
ty, trust, communication and fairness, based on rules of good academic prac-
tice, can contribute to a research agenda reflecting interests of researchers of 
different backgrounds.72 Such cooperation, we argue, helps to continuously 
challenge many of the naturalised assumptions, theoretical conceptions and 
practices of academics from different environments while, at the same time, it is 
also building research alliances beyond traditional research environments. 
Anderson relates a crucial moment in her academic career which illustrates the 
fundamentally important dimension of such cooperation: She recalls how her 
Tunisian adviser questioned some of the underlying assumptions which had 
prompted her to propose the study of peasantry, thereby revealing the close 
connections between this project and wider US political concerns at the time. 
She also emphasises the importance of the encounters with Tunisian and Liby-
an colleagues for altering her perspectives, and making her take note of what 
she alone “would never have seen”.73 Her experience mirrors that of many of us 
who had the good fortune of similar encounters and collaborative undertakings. 
The sections of this book 
The contributions to this volume are organised into three sections, namely 
‘Making translocal Muslim spaces’, ‘Defining and controlling Islam in the na-
tion-state’, and ‘Claiming and translating norms and ideas’. As will become 
evident in the brief introduction of the contributions that follows, these sections 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather focus on what we consider to be the arti-
cles’ core contributions. 
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71 Even if one does not follow Santos 2018, 107–207 in everything, the call for a re-examination 
of methodology is well-taken. 
72 This list is inspired by Messner, Guarín, and Haun 2013, 15–22, which is used by Derichs 
2017, 176f. The issue at stake here is not global cooperation but fruitful collegiality in a small 
and relatively sheltered research environment, their criteria describe well the ground rules for 
cooperation, even though their translation into practice can prove challenging. 
73 Anderson 2019, 442. 
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Making translocal Muslim spaces 
Global intellectual, spiritual, and labour networks (have) manifest(ed) them-
selves in a plethora of translocal Muslim spaces. Even though Islam was, and is, 
not always at the centre of these interactions, it remains a latent resource for 
building trusting relationships, claiming authority, and negotiating identity and 
Muslimness, as the four chapters in this section explore. They engage with the 
actual formation and maintenance of translocal spaces, which are historically 
contingent and, we argue, need to be based on concrete practices. 
The case studies investigated by Mato Bouzas and Stephan-Emmrich illus-
trate the making of translocal spaces by investigating distinct practices of mi-
gration, support networks, and the circulation of thoughtful charitable gifts. In 
these cases, translocality results from labour migration to the Gulf; in Mato 
Bouzas’ case from the Baltistan region in north-eastern Pakistan, and in Stephan-
Emmrich’s from Tajikistan. In both instances, Islam emerges as an important 
emotional and ideational bond that strongly enhances and gives meaning to the 
practices described. Mato Bouzas’ case, namely that of development aid, is 
based on specifically Shi’i networks. In Stephan-Emmrich’s case, the Tajik mi-
grants’ perception of the Gulf as an ideal space of Sunni Islam crosscuts ethnic 
and linguistic affinities and, at the same time, forges bonds that veil unequal 
work relations. 
Mato Bouzas’ article differentiates between the translocal Muslim connec-
tions by exploring the intricacies of intra-Shi’i interactions with ‘the Other’.74 
One of its dimensions is the clash, within the translocal Shi’i network, of re-
gionally different notions of morality. Thus, beyond creating bonds, this coop-
eration also enhances notions of difference, hierarchy, and – eventually – op-
portunity. In this particular case, the relevant units are Baltistan and Kuwait 
(and/or ‘the Gulf’). An obvious cause of hierarchy is the wealth differential — 
possibly bolstered by a claim to more authentic religious knowledge on the side 
of the Arab nationals on the Peninsula.75 While this is – to some degree – specu-
lative in the case of Mato Bouzas’ paper, it comes out very clearly in the one by 
Stephan-Emmrich. She deals with the gifting of high-quality copies of the Quran 
by Gulf charities (in her case mostly from Dubai) to migrants from Central Asia. 
This missionary work not only carries spiritual rewards, it also helps to estab-
lish a hegemonic understanding of an Arab Islam among a population that 
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74 For a comparable case study, in this case referring to Kerala, see Osella and Osella 2010. 
75 This can be linked to the strengthening of a more Arabocentric identity in Gulf societies, for 
this see Onley 2005, 62. 
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seemingly easily shifts between the Persianate and the Arab ‘culturescapes’. 
This almost quintessential manifestation of ‘material religion’ also transmits a 
project of political influence and the ideal notion of a socio-economic hegemon-
ic project, the model of Dubai.76 Quite obviously, both the hegemonic message 
as well as the reminder of the migratory process also hints at the many painful 
processes and experiences involved in labour migration — a reminder that 
translocal linkages are not, in and of themselves, a positive phenomenon. 
Wien’s chapter moves us to consider a quite different situation, namely that 
of two transnational migrants. Nur Hamada, the main female protagonist, was a 
Syrian Druze feminist who, together with her brother Amin, perhaps best de-
scribed as an impresario with poetic inclinations, travelled the US and Europe 
before, and disappearing from the records by 1940. Wien investigates how these 
two characters that he – following Goebel and Brubaker – describes as ‘ethno-
political entrepreneurs’, managed to play on American and European imagina-
tions of Islam, both by converts and by Christians or agnostics. This illustrates 
yet a different context, namely that of Western societies in which Muslims were, 
at the time, still a more or less exotic minority attracting a specific group of 
admirers and followers among the artistically inclined bourgeoisie while, at the 
same time, starting to build a basic infrastructure of faith.77 Wien makes an 
important point which links his contribution to those by Mato Bouzas in this, 
and Kempen in the last section, namely that Muslimness was very much defined 
in interaction both with other Muslims and with non-Muslims. 
Defining and controlling Islam in the nation-state 
While translocal space continues to play a certain role in this second section, its 
focus shifts to the often-uneasy relationship between nation-states, Islamic 
institutions and ordinary Muslims. In the current international order, the natu-
ralised – albeit by no means natural – nation-state remains the internationally 
condoned unit of political organisation. The four chapters illustrate in different 
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76 On the strong influence of Dubai as an iconic model, see chapters 2, and 18–21 in Wippel, 
Bromber, Steiner, and Krawietz 2014; for the notion of and importance of ‘material mediation’, 
see Meyer 2003. 
77 Famous examples of such converts in Europe are Muhammad Asad (orig. Leopold Weiss), 
Esad Bey (orig. Lev Nussimbaum, aka Kurban Said) and Hugo Marcus. Studies about the latter 
by Windhager 2002, Reiss 2005 and Baer 2020 also reveal something of the imaginations linked 
to Islam, whereas the contributions in Nordbruch and Ryad 2014 concentrate more on the 
religious and scholarly aspects.  
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ways how difficult it is to contain and discipline the potentially universal claims 
of an imagined affective community as well as those of powerful international 
organisations and players such as the European Union.  
The first three contributions are set in the West African Sahel (Sounaye) 
and, more specifically, in Mauritania (Frede) and Mali (Scheele). As Sounaye 
shows, current contestations in the region unfold in a context of increased 
transnational Jihadism and, in response, a securitisation strongly supported by 
France and the European Union. The latter has been coupled, on an ideological 
level, with programmes of de-radicalisation supported by international organi-
sations that target jihadists as radicalised, misguided individuals. These are 
persecuted and, when arrested, sometimes offered programmes of re-education 
and reintegration. 
The contributions by Frede and Scheele engage with the same context. 
Frede demonstrates how the wider perspectives on Islam in the Sahel translate 
into a contestation over a particular Mauritanian institution, the mahdara, a 
local version of an (advanced) Quranic school. She traces how an established 
institution of Islamic learning, which is more socially inclusive than state insti-
tutions, has found itself at the centre-stage of state and public debates around 
Islam, and inspired attempts by different sides to influence the curricula. As a 
consequence, Frede argues, Islam becomes ever more politicised and divorced 
from its spiritual foundations. Scheele draws even nearer in scale of observation 
by moving to the local level of northern Mali – and indeed beyond Mali – as the 
national boundaries on the very fringes of the Sahara are not the only ones that 
are important, since many of the actors concerned hold multiple nationalities. 
Here, the “horizon of affect” or, perhaps more aptly, horizons of kinship and 
genealogy seem far more relevant than state bureaucracies in which the local 
actors have few stakes.78 Similar to Stephan-Emmrich’s case study in the last 
section, Islam, in Scheele’s perspective, is one idiom in which regional and 
transregional struggles are couched, but also an idiom which allows to over-
come genealogical and ethnic divisions. 
El Guabli engages, like Frede, with a context in which the state attempts to 
domesticate Islam and monopolise its interpretation. The chapter is set in the 
period when the so-called ‘Years of Lead’, i.e. of authoritarian rule in Morocco, 
were finally discussed critically in public (ca. 1998–2018) and an official process 
of reconciliation was institutionalised through the work of the Equity and Rec-
onciliation Commission between 2004 and 2006 to establish the facts about 
state violence, and compensate its victims and their surviving relatives. El Guabli 
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notes how Islamist victims of this violence have been almost systematically 
overlooked in the formal process as well as in public debates. In a discursive 
process of ‘compensating’ for this absence of a group which is still at odds with 
important tenets of the state-defined version of Islam, there has been an attempt 
at ‘Islamising’ some of the existing memories. Guabli identifies a hitherto un-
tapped archive of Islamist memory and calls for further critical examinations of 
these politically distinct visions discernible in national memory. 
Taken together, the contributions call for a more structured reflection on 
the many overlapping political and affective geographies. What is the role of the 
nation state in a constellation where international governmental actors (such as 
the EU, UN, Islamic organisations, or external nation states), and formal non-
governmental actors (such as development agencies, but also religious associa-
tions of various kinds) rival the nation state, and where the latter is also chal-
lenged by local or regional actors such as ethnic or kinship groups which might 
or might not be bounded by the borders of the nation-state? The question of the 
state’s legitimacy and ability to mediate or intervene as well as different models 
of participation and deliberation, seem to play an important role for the ways in 
which these relations play out, both in the Muslim majority and Muslim minori-
ty contexts discussed. Recent debates about governance in areas of limited 
statehood seem to offer a range of possible insights not only into the conflict 
constellations but also into historical modes and current conditions of mediat-
ing at least some of the effects. While “limited statehood” already takes the 
normative model of the state as its starting point, the recognition of non-state 
‘civil’ actors and an extension of the notion of governance offer some prospects 
with regard to rethinking politics in such contexts.79 In view of the multitude of 
translocal and transnational Muslim actors and organisations, the nation-state’s 
attempts to define and control ‘Islam’ are likely to be transient at best, unless 
that state arrives at achieving wide-spread legitimacy while, at the same time, 
imposing (its version of) Islam as the most relevant affective community. Given 
Scheele’s insistence on how ‘Islam’ has become discursively superimposed on 
and entangled with other possible ways of constructing community, such a 
development would seem very far off indeed, notably given the often authoritar-
ian nature of states which are engaged in such enterprises.80 
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79 See the contributions in Risse, Börzel, and Draude 2018, notably sections III, IV, and VI. 
80 For a current example, see the attempts in Saudi Arabia to impose ‘moderate Islam’. To 
what extent the somewhat idealistic principles outlined in Bamyeh 2004 would offer an alter-
native, goes beyond the scope of this work. 
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Claiming and translating norms and ideas 
The last section explores the intersections of hegemonic, globalised norms and 
local sense-making or indigenisation of concepts, especially when contradicting 
values are at stake. Casini’s chapter takes us to a modern genre — the novel. By 
introducing three major works, he discusses not only developments in the genre 
since the early 20th century, but also how the genre’s evolution mirrors changing 
concepts of political and religious order. This historicises, in an important way, 
notions of permanence – notably in connection with religion – and thus opens 
the view onto visions of world and order by the authors. The notions range, in 
brief, from a socio-political modernisation framed in an Islamic vocabulary of 
shari’a to religion as a social force in the novels of Tawfiq al-Hakim and Naguib 
Mahfuz. The last novel is set in Kuwait. It mirrors the concerns of some of the 
earlier chapters with translocally connected Muslim sectarianism that seems to 
challenge the nation state. Beyond demonstrating the literary development in 
its wider Arab and international context, the reflection of current concerns in 
these novels points to the wider circulations of models, arguments, and ideas. 
In a somewhat disturbing manner, it also seems to reflect the dangers of partic-
ular postcolonial approaches which tend to emphasise the separate identities of 
disadvantaged groups. 
Haniffa takes us to the context of the Muslim minority in Sri Lanka after the 
long-lasting Civil War (1983–2009). She shows how the Muslim community is 
struggling at two fronts: While a process based on global notions of post-
conflict reconciliation was initiated between the Sinhalese majority and the 
defeated Tamil population in the North of the island, the Muslim population, 
dispersed across most regions and not really a party to the war, has been con-
fronted with a growing anti-Muslim sentiment. The image of Muslims is that of a 
militant minority, leading once again to a discourse of securitisation. Internally, 
the Muslim community is torn in many different directions, quite in line with 
developments in the wider Muslim discursive and organisational universe.81 
Haniffa critically discusses how the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema has tried to 
establish a unified discourse in order to secure its own leadership and the 
recognition of Muslims on the national scale. This process, however, occurred at 
the cost of imposing rather rigid and conservative politics which had dire con-
sequences, for example for women’s rights  
Kempen’s chapter takes us to a very new phenomenon, or rather one which 
is new in terms of its framing and public articulation, namely the LGBTQIA+ 
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community in Jordan and in the wider Arab world and diaspora. The Amman-
based online magazine, My.Kali, explicitly serves a translocal, Arabophone 
queer community, and adopts positions formulated in a clearly globalised con-
text. It is itself an expression of how gay rights’ activists are challenging hege-
monic gender norms and concepts in the Middle East. Beyond local resistance, 
this LGBTQIA+ community is also confronted with Western perceptions of Mus-
lim homophobia which are shared by LGBTQIA+ activists in the West. On the 
basis of selected articles, Kempen outlines how, in such a complicated constel-
lation, activists insist on their right to appropriate the discourse on LGBTQIA+ 
rights as well as Islam. They thus show one more facet of an Islam which is 
subject to different interpretations, internal struggles over interpretation, and 
can absorb of social questions and problems which might have long-existed 
without being framed, or conceived, as challenging the existing moral order. 
The final chapter of this book is by Abdulkader Tayob and engages, once 
again, explicitly with Islamic Studies. He expresses a distinct unease with post-
colonial readings of Islam which, he argues, tend to gloss over international 
inequalities and structures of domination. For example, Tayob demonstrates 
how attempts to stress Muslim agency tend to overshadow old and new hege-
monies. Engaging with recent scholarship by, who he calls, ‘insider exiles’, 
scholars who are part of the Islamic tradition but at the same time master the 
Western academic repertoire, he argues in favour of a strand of scholarship 
which puts an emphasis on ethics. Moreover, he makes an important point 
about the need to forego the distinction between ‘objective outsiders’ (i.e. non-
Muslim scholars of Islam) and ‘committed believing scholars’ by stressing the 
crucial contribution of the latter. He thereby also lays bare one of the many 
blind spots common among Western academic practitioners: While an 
acknowledgement of positionality by now is the standard lore of scholars, heg-
emonic reflexes still distinguish between the positionality of ‘objective outsid-
ers’ and ‘believers’. If we want to advance truly in our understanding of the 
manifold facets of Islam and Muslim worlds, we do not only need to put them in 
a broader and comparative perspective, we also have to form a scholarly com-
munity which transcends these (and other) false boundaries. 
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Antía Mato Bouzas 
Framing Religion in a Transnational Space 
Migration, Development Cooperation, and Faith Solidarity 
between the Gulf and Pakistan 
Abstract: This chapter examines the role of religion in a transnational space, 
shaped mainly by migrant and development actors between the region of Bal-
tistan, in north-eastern Pakistan, and Kuwait. Migration from Baltistan to the 
Gulf, and to Kuwait in particular, is strongly connected to a specific socio-
economic context determined by the existence of the Kashmir dispute, but also 
to a shared religious belonging to the Twelver Shia faith of Islam. Development 
aid from Kuwait in north-eastern Pakistan is framed in socio-economic terms 
and in terms of the religious duty in Islam to share and distribute wealth, alt-
hough this charity activity does not require that the recipients follow the same 
faith. By addressing the understanding of the religious among actors involved 
in this transnational space, such as migrants, employees, and donors of eco-
nomic aid, the chapter discusses the interrelations between the religious and 
the political (as the realm of the public sphere) in the context of this transna-
tional space. While noting that religion helps to structure specific collectives 
beyond existing sovereign borders and therefore has an ordering character that 
amounts to a political dimension, the understanding of the religious in transna-
tional spaces cannot be divorced from existing power hierarchies in which reli-
gion is inscribed. 
Introduction 
Social scientists working on religion have long debated the methodological 
relevance of providing a definition of the concept. This discussion becomes 
even more entangled if we consider the role of religion in politics, as politics 
deals with religion as part of the social field, while religion is understood by 
believers as all-encompassing. On the one hand, the political use of the reli-
gious situates religion within specific boundaries or a sphere, a way of reassign-
ing the meaning of the religious. On the other hand, believers and political sci-
entists alike agree on the immanent character of religion, even though they may 
differ in distinguishing the manifestations of the religious. These considerations 
make it difficult to agree on a conceptualisation of religion in the field of inter-
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national politics which is relevant for the study of transnational spaces. Al-
though religion ‘orders’ (the community of believers, international religious 
organisations, etc.), religion is not per se an order separate from politics, and in 
an ideal type religion requires enforcement at the social level. 
Social scientists who focus on religion in the field of sociology and political 
science are perspectivists, that is, researchers who rely on observations (mani-
festations) of religions and their influence in politics.1 This approach invariably 
raises both the question of from where these observations are made and the 
debate about religion versus secularisation/post-secularisation. As Bader re-
minds us in his critique of Habermas’ post-secularisation thesis, there are no 
completely secularised states or societies, and religion “is not generally subjec-
tivised or privatised, and the state and (organised) religions are not strictly sep-
arated.”2 In this respect, Bader relates the study of religion in the post-secular 
context to a debate about liberal-democratic constitutionalism and this ap-
proach is strongly shaped by the experience of the development of the Western 
European state. The question remains if the same can be said of the differentiat-
ed trajectories of the Global South. 
In order to address this question, I discuss the role of religion in the making 
of transnational spaces as a way to study international politics, and I do so by 
analysing a case of transnationalism between Kuwait and Pakistan. Specifically, 
I explore the role of religion in what I call a migration and development network 
between Kuwait and Baltistan, an autonomous territory in north-eastern Paki-
stan. Baltistan is one of the two administrative divisions of Gilgit-Baltistan and 
the most homogeneous in terms of language, Balti, and religion, with the preva-
lence of Twelver Shia Islam. For the analysis of the role of religion, I consider 
this network within the broader transnational interactions between South Asia 
and the Gulf. This network is characterised by the reciprocal relationship be-
tween migrants from the Baltistan region working in Kuwait, members of the 
Kuwaiti merchant class supporting development projects in Baltistan, and reli-
gious leaders from Baltistan strengthening their position as power brokers in 
the political context of Baltistan through their involvement in educational work 
and as a result of their preaching and fundraising activities in the Gulf. Religion 
is initially conceived in terms of belonging to the same faith, since the majority 
of the members of this network adhere to the Twelver Shia sect of Islam, alt-
hough the meaning of the religious is redefined through practice. I examine the 
role of religion in terms of its non-territorial character and based on the assump-
|| 
1 Bader 2012, 6–11, Luhmann 2000, Owen 2000, 173, Haynes 2016. 
2 Bader 2012, 13. 
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tion that religions contain worldviews about the organisation of social life on 
earth. Through existing religious structures and organisations, religious actors 
(leaders and the community of believers) work to influence world society in 
specific ways, and in most the cases this has political consequences. 
Part of the problem in grasping the religious lies in the gap between top-
down approaches, that is, between an organised (or recognised) religious sys-
tem and the existence in society of a wide array of actors who also have their 
own assumptions about the religious and may display them for specific purpos-
es. In this sense, Schwarz and Lynch propose to examine religion as practice in 
order to challenge fixed, historicised categories of the religious.3 This exercise 
implies considering the religious dimension as an attempt to incorporate the 
insider-orientated endeavour into social analysis in order to understand the 
reality of a particular worldview.4 Bottom-up approaches must therefore be 
included, but they should be contextualised by the structures in which actors 
operate and the deterritorialised element of religion vis-à-vis the territorialised 
nation state.  
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with some general considera-
tions on the role religion plays via historical and migration processes between 
South Asia and the Gulf, exploring the relationship between the religious and 
the political (the realm of the public sphere). Then the second section moves 
within the general context of Pakistani migration to the Gulf, to describe migra-
tion from north-eastern Pakistan to Kuwait and how it is intertwined with the 
activities of religious actors with transnational links with the Gulf. Finally, the 
last section addresses the religious dimension of Kuwaiti development coopera-
tion in north-eastern Pakistan as understood by donors and migrants. By ex-
ploring the meanings of the religious in this migrant and development network, 
I advance some considerations about the role of the religious in these transna-
tional spaces and the potential overlapping of the religious with the political. 
This study is based on fieldwork carried out in Baltistan (north-eastern Paki-
stan) and Kuwait in 2017, 2018, and 2019 for a total period of about three 
months. Fieldwork activities consisted of interviews and participation in some 
activities involving this migrant community. 
|| 
3 Schwarz and Lynch 2016. 
4 Sheikh 2015, 136. 
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The religious and the political in the transnational 
context of South Asia and the Gulf 
Contemporary political developments in the Gulf region and in South Asia at-
tach great importance to religious identity politics because of the mobilisation 
of actors who claim themselves to act on behalf of religion or according to reli-
gious principles, and due to state politics who directly or indirectly interfere 
with the religious sphere. This is the case of the Shia-Sunni sectarian differenti-
ation in the Gulf region, which is represented in the state version as a matter of 
rivalry politics between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In South Asia, the developments 
in state politics play a major role. In India, the recent Citizenship Amendment 
bill of December 2019 questions the basis of Indian secularism because it clearly 
discriminates Muslims’ access to citizenship. While scholars working in the field 
of international politics recognise the increasing importance of religion in influ-
encing world affairs, they admit the difficulties of thinking about religious 
worldviews or, for that matter, approaching religion as an object of inquiry.5 The 
question is: What are we referring to when we discuss the role of religion in 
international politics? This is particularly true if, as Halliday observed, we as-
sume that religious actors have not proposed any new form of political space 
and they normally, as the case of Iran illustrates, operate within the framework 
of existing institutions.6 
The political use of the religious has received more attention in the study of 
political developments outside the most-developed parts of the world (with a 
few notable exceptions), while the question of the immanent character of reli-
gion has invited less scholarly reflection – except for the cases of India, which 
embraced its own version of secularism after decolonisation (religious pluralism 
in a religiously neutral state), China, and a few others. The immanent character 
of religion has often been regarded as a matter of degree, that is, in terms of how 
much/less religious a given society is, and what a ‘good religion’ is. Cesari, for 
example, considers ‘civil Islam,’ a concept she borrows from Robert Hefner, but 
one that she uses to indicate “the common reference for the public expression of 
all citizens under the same political rule”.7 She analyses ‘civil Islam’ in the Mus-
lim majority societies of Indonesia and Senegal (each of them with different 
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articulations of national identity) as a framework for a wide range of freedoms.8 
She refers to ‘civil Islam’ as articulations of Islam that are based on social organ-
isations that interact with state institutions as part of a consensual political 
culture, which is, in my opinion, connected with the functioning of liberal de-
mocracy.9 
In order to examine what counts as religious in the transnational space 
formed by migrant and development actors between the Gulf and South Asia, I 
consider the actors who engage in activities deemed religious – such as educa-
tion, preaching, performing rituals, fundraising for socially religious oriented 
purposes – as Sheikh pointed out,10 but I also problematise the boundaries of 
religion. It is important to understand genealogical issues (why a believer fol-
lows a specific religious leader or tradition and whether a believer hails from a 
certain religious family), how they are acknowledged by the actors participating 
in these networks, and the motivations of these actors. The boundaries of reli-
gion are analysed through the actors’ own understanding of the subject and 
through their activities.  
An analysis of the role of religion in transnational spaces appears, in the 
first place, determined by two apparently contradicting issues: the deterritorial-
ised character of religion as a system of beliefs and communication (religion has 
no borders), and its localised manifestations that tend to coincide with existing 
state boundaries (in the sense of an identification of Iran as a Shia majoritarian 
state, or Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as Sunni majoritarian states and their acting 
with a religious dimension in international politics). Religious transnational 
actors such as political parties, whether in Europe, the Middle East, or South 
Asia, maintain transnational synergies inherent to universalistic values, but at 
the same time their focus and agendas remain within the boundaries of the 
states in which they operate.11 Although religion shapes transnational spaces, it 
cannot be said that these spaces are homogenous or primarily religious, as they 
are strongly embedded in the realities of a given regional, state, or local context. 
Moreover, they are also an expression of globalisation processes.12 In her work 
on Shia transnational networks, Laurence Louër recognises how initially deter-
ritorialised actors, such as representatives of Shia Islam, have come to terms 
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with the politics of the nation state, while at the same time taking on a global-
ised character.13  
Islam plays an important role in ongoing processes of transnationalisation 
between the Gulf and South Asia. The Gulf has influenced religious life in the 
Indian subcontinent for centuries, and South Asia has been home to revivalist 
movements that have expanded elsewhere, including to the Gulf.14 Islam 
spreads through the activities of organised religious actors, through the actions 
of individuals shaped by specific life trajectories, and through economic rela-
tions (such as trade in the past and migration in the present). By crossing state 
boundaries, Islam becomes the object of agendas at various levels (governmen-
tal, regional, local) in a process that may lead to transformations in society. 
Islam travels, but also often experiences a process of adaptation to the local 
context, that is, it also becomes localised.15 
The Gulf remains the territorial epicentre of Islamic traditions. However, for 
decades, political scientists dealing with social mobilisation have not consid-
ered religion to play a central role in major political developments, except in the 
Iranian revolution.16 After the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hus-
sein’s regime in 2003 there came a turning point in the consideration of the 
religious question. Although preserving its territorial integrity, but not a sover-
eign state anymore, the power vacuum in Iraq was filled with a mobilisation of 
religious groups with diverse agendas. In particular, the previously oppressed 
Shia majority rose up, mobilised by religious clerics, and characterised by fac-
tionalism. More broadly, religious movements preoccupied with the renewal or 
purification of Islam have become important political actors, which in turn 
reinforce sectarian belonging. These developments have caused scholars work-
ing on the Gulf to increasingly examine the region through the lens of sectarian 
divisions between Sunni and Shia and the role of the petro-monarchies in fund-
ing religious movements elsewhere.17 Religion in this sense is tantamount to 
identity, as a factor of mobilisation for purposes that can sometimes be opposi-
tional, and for addressing existing oppressions. For example, it is used to ad-
vance claims for justice for religious minorities, i.e. the Shia in Saudi Arabia, 
but also as an instrument of autocratic rulers to undermine political demands 
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for justice, as in the case of the ruling monarchy in Bahrain against the de-
mands for rights by the Shia majority population. 
Muslim majority societies in the Gulf do not necessarily mobilise along reli-
gious lines, although there are groups with specific religious agendas that took 
part in the mobilisations connected to the ‘Arab spring’. Furthermore, Gulf 
monarchies do not follow an explicitly theocratic agenda, neither in their do-
mestic nor in their foreign policy. Saudi-Iranian rivalry, for example, has an 
important religious dimension in terms of competing for a hegemonic religion 
(Sunni vs Shia Islam) that is no different from other ideological movements and 
often confronts the realities of religiously plural societies. Gulf monarchies do 
not act differently from other dominant actors in the state system: while they 
agree with the principle of state sovereignty and the sanctity of state boundaries 
at home, they try to exert influence elsewhere, often ignoring the principle of 
territorial integrity, as illustrated by the case of Saudi Arabia’s intervention in 
Yemen. 
Like any other religion, Islam is thus inclusive of the community of believ-
ers, but as a political project, Islam will always encounter the problem of Mus-
lims who belong to the faith but on unequal terms, e.g. because of being cultur-
al minorities, deprived social groups, or individuals who make new demands on 
the community, etc. This is similar to Rancière’s understanding of politics as la 
part sans part (2009), that helps to reconfigure the relationship between the 
religious and the political in the sense that religious subjects, considered as 
non-political subjects, become political agents when they make claims in the 
public sphere.18 
The former can be exemplified in the case studied for purposes of analysis, 
and can be termed a transnational Shia space. Participants in the development 
and migrant network between north-eastern Pakistan and the Gulf belong to 
this faith and operate following channels connected to Shia groups and organi-
sations. However, this labelling does not imply that there is a specific political 
aim connected to this religious dimension. Migrants from north-eastern Paki-
stan travel to the Gulf in search of work and the prospects of improving their life 
conditions, and whilst they certainly prefer to work for families or companies of 
the same faith, some of them commented in interviews that they would have 
preferred to go to Europe if they had the option. Religion per se is not a driving 
force for their activities, and they are often critical of Gulf regimes who treat 
them as foreigners, and often discriminate them on the basis of their lower so-
cial status. Instead of feelings of attachment due to shared religious faith, the 
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Gulf experience is often framed in critical terms. However, on the whole, the 
activities of these transnational networks have a political impact because some 
actors gain power and influence with the reorganisation of social boundaries 
(i.e. empowering Shia communities in north-eastern Pakistan or empowering 
Shia merchant classes in Kuwait). In other words, they become visible in the 
political system and their religious identity constitutes an important marker. 
Religious ideas continue to flow via religiously motivated actors (ranging 
from individual students to organisations) pursuing religious agendas, but es-
pecially through migrants’ experiences which depend very much on their own 
engagement with their homeland and with the receiving societies.19 This en-
gagement can be motivated by integration or acquisition of knowledge in the 
host society, or by a sense of exclusion, reinforcing their beliefs about a per-
ceived hostile environment in the host society. However, migrants’ religious 
experiences as a distinct social group (those who have worked and lived abroad 
for a period of time) have, in general, limited possibilities to effect a radical 
change in the political system in their homeland regarding the religious orienta-
tion (for example, at the state level). They can certainly influence political 
agendas through their economic power or knowledge by supporting actors or 
groups with certain religious orientations. The same applies to religious trans-
national political parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, which are often involved in 
providing knowledge transfer for mobilisation purposes, charity work, and 
receive funding to develop their political agendas in a transnational context. In 
most of these cases, religion or the religious in transnational processes between 
South Asia and the Gulf functions as a reinforcement of existing transnational 
ties, as a non-territorial relationship that shapes collective identity – and also 
individual identity. This relationship structures socio-spatial relations (address-
es inequalities, provides support, and promotes specific religiously-oriented 
actions) and creates specific geographies of knowledge, but has little influence 
on the international system. 
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Migration from Baltistan to Kuwait: 
Contextualising religion 
Different communities in present-day Pakistan have a long tradition of settle-
ment in the Gulf that precedes the discovery of oil in the region, and the for-
mation of the Pakistani state in 1947.20 However, the development of the oil 
industry and subsequent modernisation of the Gulf States after the 1930s trig-
gered large-scale migration from what are today the territories of Pakistan. Pa-
kistanis are at present among the largest migrant populations in many Gulf 
States. The Gulf functions as a destination for the excess labour unable to be 
absorbed into the Pakistani labour market. Pakistani migration is constituted 
mainly of unskilled or semiskilled workers, but there is also a significant pres-
ence of highly qualified professionals and technical expertise, attracted by 
competitive salaries. The boom in Pakistani migration to the Gulf occurred in 
the 1970s and 1980s during the governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul 
Haq. While both leaders saw migration as a source of remittances for the coun-
try and as a way to gain influence in the Gulf States, they adopted very different 
approaches. Bhutto favoured a policy of sending highly skilled workers (doctors 
and teachers) to countries such as Oman, while Zia ul Haq strengthened the 
military cooperation by sending military personnel and advisors to Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. 
It was under the rule of Zia ul Haq – who initiated the Islamisation policy of 
the state – that Gulf migration began to be associated with a religious overtone. 
This does not mean, however, that the Islamisation policy of Pakistan and the 
rise of religion in its institutions (especially that of the texts and traditions of the 
Sunni sect of Islam) is the result of a bottom-up transformation at the societal 
level; on the contrary, it was a top-down policy driven by geopolitical considera-
tions. The triumph of the Shia revolution in Iran and the Pakistani collaboration 
with the US, to support the Afghan mujahideen against the pro-Soviet govern-
ment in Kabul, were important factors that mobilised religion from above.21 In 
this broader context, migration channels were natural means through which 
migrants became socialised and familiarised with Gulf traditions. However, they 
were also channels employed by other actors (sometimes religiously motivated) 
with specific political agendas, such as the recruitment of mujahideen for the 
Afghan war, or the dissemination of more intolerant religious views. 
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Pakistani migrants in the Gulf States are confronted with different varieties 
or interpretations of the Islamic tradition and these experiences affect their 
trajectories once they return to Pakistan. Sometimes they would adopt these 
traditions, inducing changes in their most immediate home contexts, at other 
times, they would remain unaffected (if not hostile) to these influences. The 
Arabian Peninsula, as the birthplace of Islam, plays a moral role for Pakistani 
Muslims, but migrants’ religious views while working in the Gulf States are also 
moulded by their own immediate experiences and encounters, often character-
ised by open discrimination due to unequal social relations. During my research 
in Baltistan among migrants to the Gulf States, they often defined Gulf societies, 
and Saudi Arabia in particular, as being dominated by ‘non-good Muslims’. 
They would relate this assessment to personal experiences of abuse, fraud, and 
a perceived lack of respect for other human beings in these wealthy societies. 
Characteristics of migration from Baltistan to Kuwait 
The transnational space – formed by migrant networks from Baltistan to Ku-
wait – is shaped by three main characteristics. First, the territory of Gilgit-
Baltistan, to which Baltistan belongs, is part of the Kashmir dispute. Although 
migrants from this region are indistinguishable from other Pakistani migrants 
abroad – because they carry normal Pakistani passports – they are not full state 
citizens at home. This affects these migrants’ strategies while abroad. Second, 
migrants from Baltistan operate mainly through strong personal networks that 
get them work permits, with links to the Gulf, and are therefore less reliant on 
the often abusive recruitment agencies. Third, the majority of these migrants 
belongs to the Twelver Shia faith of Islam (a minority in Pakistan but a majority 
in Gilgit-Baltistan), and religious marking seems to play a role in this migration 
channel; many migrants are employed by Shia families who, in the case of Ku-
wait, belong to the traditional merchant class and share nationalist values more 
than, for example, the more Islamist-militant views of the nouveau Shia riche. 
Thus, in order to understand this transnational space, we need to pay attention 
to the respective contexts that favour this transnational engagement, the per-
sonal element in the establishment of relations, and the role exercised by reli-
gion. 
The legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan is linked to the Kashmir dispute, but the 
region is gradually being integrated into the Pakistani state.22 By ‘being inte-
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grated’ we refer to the fact that the Pakistani executive and judicial powers en-
act decisions and laws that display sovereign competences over this territory. 
However, parts of the Pakistani Citizenship Act do not apply to Gilgit-Baltistan 
in full, and therefore there are important restrictions on the political and legal 
rights of people. Baltistan is the administrative division located in the south, 
bordering the Line of Control with Ladakh, India. The social landscape of Gilgit-
Baltistan is culturally and linguistically diverse, partly due to it being a high-
mountain region with deep valleys, which has historically favoured isolation 
and privileged some channels of communication channels over others. 
Being part of the Kashmir dispute determines many aspects of social life in 
Gilgit-Baltistan – political freedom, rights, development – but potential integra-
tion into the Pakistani state also raises some uncertainties in the society. The 
specifically Sunni, identitarian dimension of the Pakistani state is seen by some 
scholars as an obstacle to the incorporation a Shia-majority area.23 More recent-
ly, the viability of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – a megaproject that 
involves the creation of a large amount of infrastructure in Pakistan with Chi-
na’s support – has also added some real concerns due to its dramatic impacts 
on the local populations and its more general geopolitical implications. China 
has demanded that Pakistan integrate Gilgit-Baltistan in order to develop pro-
jects there, and Beijing is already providing services such as the internet.24 The 
Sino-Pakistani collaboration is a source of irritation to political and defence 
circles in India, who believe that China is actually in control of the territory. 
In this context, migration from Baltistan to other parts of Pakistan and to 
the Gulf is strongly linked to the lack of economic opportunities associated with 
political uncertainties. The border with Ladakh is closed and communications 
with the rest of Pakistan are limited to a daily flight (subject to weather condi-
tions), a wretched road to Islamabad, via Gilgit, and a seasonal road through 
the Deosai plain that connects the region during the summer. Although it is not 
accurate to say that Baltistan is a fully landlocked territory, it is certainly pe-
ripheral in terms of communications. The existence of the dispute favours in-
vestments (infrastructure) related to military needs, and the army occupies a 
large amount of land that could be used for other productive activities. Periodic 
cross-border skirmishes make it difficult for rural populations to tend their 
fields. Moreover, except for a few entrepreneurial agricultural initiatives sup-
ported by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), there are no possi-
bilities to develop small industries, with the only exception of tourism. Indeed, 
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tourism has experienced a boom since 2014 and some migrants in the Gulf are 
investing in this sector. In sum, migration to the Gulf is determined by economic 
considerations connected to the political status of Gilgit-Baltistan. Significantly, 
the largest group of migrants from Baltistan in Kuwait are from the border areas 
near the Line of Control. 
The second aforementioned characteristic of migration from Baltistan to the 
Gulf is its organisation around strong personal networks and the only occasion-
al use by migrants of the riskier recruitment agencies. The origins of migration 
to Kuwait, which consists of some 1,400 adult males at the time of research in 
2018 and 2019, can be traced to one man, Sheikh Hassan Mehdiabadi, a former 
religious student from Baltistan in Iraq who ended up in Kuwait in the 1970s. He 
left Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s massive expulsion of Shias on the accusation 
of the latter being the fifth column of Iran. Once in Kuwait, he began to preach 
in the hussainiyas (Shiite congregation halls, mostly known in South Asia as 
imambargahs) about the condition of people in Baltistan and, through this ac-
tivity, he met with influential members of the Kuwaiti Shia merchant class 
whilst raising funds for his own charity activities at home. He provided an ac-
count of the political situation of Baltistan to promote support for his fundrais-
ing, as members of these families still recall. Migrants who travelled to the Gulf 
state through the mediation of Sheikh Hassan, and whom I interviewed in Feb-
ruary 2019, also identified Sheikh Hassan as a mediator who, in the context of 
his own charity activities, asked the Kuwaiti families to employ people from his 
home region. At present, other religious figures from Baltistan continue to be 
related to this migration network, although it is unclear if their activities are 
limited to religious and charity work or if they have a specific role in facilitating 
migration. 
The importance of strong personal connections for migrants stems from 
their role in building stable and lasting connections between participants in a 
context characterised by the vulnerability of living abroad for the first time. 
These connections also serve to articulate a form of belonging to this transna-
tional space, characterised by expectations of help and mutual support, but also 
by coercion, with the reputation of the community also resting on the individu-
al’s behaviour. Migrants from Baltistan are organised as an association in Ku-
wait. The association has rented rooms in the city, which are used for migrants’ 
gatherings (and sometimes to perform prayers and minor religious services) and 
for short-term accommodation (when losing a job or before leaving the country). 
Each room, a total of seventeen in 2019, is used by migrants from a specific vil-
lage or area and each member contributes to the rent (renting a room in Kuwait 
is extremely expensive). Large religious gatherings, such as the celebration of 
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festivals like Muharram or other preaching activities, take place in the hussaini-
yas. Migrants also visit mosques for prayers. Shared religious belonging by mi-
grants and by the Kuwaiti Shia community helps those migrants to gain access 
to the latter’s resources, mosques, hussainiyas, and patronage. Not only the 
Shias from Baltistan benefit from this access; the entire migrant community 
from this region of Pakistan is positively affected. Access, however, does not 
mean access on equal terms. Migrants’ access to praying in mosques and at-
tending hussainiyas follows different time schedules from those of Kuwaitis. 
Although migrants have access to the same religious spaces as the national 
community, this access follows the existing segregation between citizens and 
non-citizens. Moreover, there are also elements of differentiation related to the 
structure of Shia Islam that are reproduced by migrant groups. Other communi-
ty activities include the participation in the cricket league formed by migrants 
from Baltistan and Kargil, with eleven teams. The cricket league takes place on 
Fridays for several months and it is part of a larger urban landscape, formed by 
migrants from other South Asian countries who also play this sport in the open 
spaces in the city. In this context, as the head of the community mentioned to 
me, “it is impossible that there is a Balti in Kuwait whom we do not know.” 
A third aspect that determines this transnational space is its specifically re-
ligious dimension, which is exemplified by the role played by religious actors 
and the practices and activities of migrants in Kuwait. Although migration is the 
main (economic) activity, there are religious actors (students and sheikhs) who 
seem to play the role of middlemen owing to their privileged access to religious 
networks and the entrepreneurial class in the Gulf. These religious actors are 
part of transnational communities characterised by a high degree of social co-
hesion.25 Moreover, religious aspects are reinforced by a number of activities 
and connections. Many Shia migrants work in companies owned by wealthy 
Shia families, yet these families also employ Sunnis and Nurbaskshis (a minori-
ty group distinct from both Shia and Sunni) from Baltistan. Although migrants 
have access to the same religious spaces as the national community, this access 
follows the existing segregation between citizens and non-citizens. Moreover, 
there are also elements of differentiation related to the structure of Shia Islam 
that are reproduced by migrant groups. 
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Belonging to Shia Islam: The grand and the ‘small’ mullahs 
Shia Islam is organised around the structure of the marjaiyya (the supreme reli-
gious authority based in Iran and Iraq) and believers decide which marja or 
grand ayatollah to choose. Grand ayatollahs have their own doctrinal differ-
ences and one of these concerns the role of religion in politics.26 Khomeini’s 
defence of an Islamic government (wilayat al-faqih) in the 1970s provoked a 
schism in the religious leadership because other grand ayatollahs, such as Abu 
al Qasim al-Khoei, and his successor Ali al-Sistani, did not share this view and 
adopted a more quietist position.27 Further differences have accentuated the 
fragmented religious landscape, which is characterised by strong competition 
between the followers of eminent, established religious figures and aspirants. 
Moreover, this religious landscape, which in principle has no definitive territo-
rial basis, but which is connected to the context in Iran and Iraq, is fully trans-
planted to the microcosm of Kuwait.28  
Migrants in Kuwait, in their condition as followers, become acquainted with 
this polarised religious context and some of them align with one group or the 
other. A few migrants I interviewed acknowledged at first that there were no 
differences between followers of one or another marja as all are Shia. However, 
during our conversations they would state their preferences to regularly attend 
certain mosques and identify themselves as belonging to a specific group, 
whether as ‘Shirazis’ (followers of the grand ayatollah Sadiq al-Shirazi, com-
monly known as Shiraziyyin) or as ‘al-Sistani’ (in reference to the grand ayatol-
lah Ali al-Sistani), the latter being probably the most prominent group in Bal-
tistan. In fact, these networks appear to be ordered according to these two 
marjaiyya. Migrants’ positioning in this dynamic religious spectrum of Shia 
Islam depends on their established relations in Baltistan and seems to be unaf-
fected by the religious scene in the Gulf or the wider spectrum of Shia Islam at 
large. This is the case of a migrant in his late fifties with whom I met up in 2018 
and 2019 in Kuwait. He first moved to Kuwait in 1982 and travelled widely in the 
region (Iran and Iraq). He identified himself as a Shirazi and articulated his 
religious belonging in the following way: 
Shirazi, Sistani, Khomeini... all of them are the same. All of them do good. Khomeini, now 
Khamenei, they do well in Iran but they are ‘too much religious’ [emphasis of the author]. 
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There are no differences. Some of them are more open than others. Iran is a developed 
state (…). In Baltistan some mullahs are very educated such as Sheikh Mohsin, Sheikh Jaf-
fari [present imam of the Skardu great mosque, the capital and main city in Baltistan]; 
they have studied many years abroad in Iran and Iraq and they have seen the world. They 
are open-minded and they support female education. Other mullahs have no education 
and they do not know the world. These mullahs, I call them chhote mullah [small mul-
lahs], studied a few years but they did not finish their studies. They just wear turbans but 
there is nothing in their heads. They are constantly saying to people, ‘do not do this’, ‘do 
not do that’. 
This man’s understanding of religion as being a Shia can be related to a person-
al trajectory characterised by relative economic success and access to religious 
and economic circles in Kuwaiti society, as well as by his experience of having 
married a stateless woman in Kuwait – born in Iraq as the daughter of a former 
religious leader from Kargil who left before independence and never returned to 
this home area – and having children (of Pakistani nationality) raised in a con-
sumerist and modern Gulf society. His views on religion in the context of Bal-
tistan, also found in similar comments made by other migrants, were strongly 
connected to ideas of progress and modernity, implying a knowledge of broader 
societal transformations. Notably, he distinguished between those religious 
leaders in Baltistan educated abroad for many years (and part of broader net-
works) and those who were educated locally (or with limited international ex-
posure). In any case, he attributed an influential role in guiding the predomi-
nantly rural society of Baltistan to those religious leaders with less education. 
He provided the example that while foreign-educated religious leaders were in 
favour of female advancement and did not oppose vaccination campaigns, 
‘small mullahs’ did not share these views. Indeed, anti-polio vaccination cam-
paigns in Baltistan and other parts of Pakistan have often raised suspicions 
among some religious leaders who consider them as a way to spread ‘Western’ 
diseases or sterilise the population. 
A sense of shared religious belonging is important in this migrant network. 
This is an element openly acknowledged by migrants, who say that Kuwaiti 
families from the Shia merchant class are ‘helping’ them by providing them with 
jobs. Members of this merchant class, however, do not explicitly refer to a sense 
of religious shared belonging, but rather reference Islam to explain their com-
mitment to philanthropic activities.29 Kuwaiti families see charity as part of the 
Islamic precept to share wealth with the less socially advantaged, irrespective of 
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their creed.30 Even so, for this Kuwaiti Shia merchant class, an influential minor-
ity in the country, the support provided for development activities in Baltistan 
in the fields of health and education is framed in non-religious, and certainly 
non-political, terms. The developmental activity carried out in Baltistan, which 
is articulated and publicised via local information panels on the spot, bro-
chures, and videos, does not mention religion as a field of intervention. During 
an interview, members of the Marafie family referred to their contribution to the 
building of mosques, for example, and said that this was a personal contribu-
tion which was carried out by other NGOs and that they saw it as separate from 
their developmental work. To recapitulate, we could agree that the views of 
both the migrants and the Kuwaiti merchant class on the role of Islam in society 
contain specific values that can be described as political. 
Development assistance from Kuwait in Baltistan: 
International cooperation or faith solidarity? 
The Gulf has a philanthropic tradition of involving the engagement of promi-
nent families from the merchant classes in foreign regions, with which they 
have traded for centuries. This developmental cooperation abroad is preceded 
by a tradition of charity work at home that favoured the modernisation of Gulf 
societies in fields such as health and education.31 As in the case of charitable 
activity from the global North, support for the needy by these actors from the 
Gulf, mainly in east Africa and South Asia, has often been shaped by religious 
values and combined with support for religious-specific interventions such as 
donations to build mosques, contributions to the activities of religious actors, 
and the boosting of religious education.32 
Developmental work in Baltistan supported by Kuwaiti organisations and 
individuals is acknowledged, by these organisations themselves and by the 
migrants from Baltistan, as having both a religious and a not specifically reli-
gious dimension in the sense that both fields are identified as separate. These 
two descriptions are distinguished in ways that show the interplay of religion 
with modernity and with the question of the often-assumed sectarian identity. 
In March 2018 I had an interview with members of the Marafie Foundation, 
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which is an NGO funded along the lines of the previous philanthropic work by 
Mohammad Rafie Husain Marafie in Kuwait, an influential family from the 
country’s traditional merchant class. The Marafie Foundation is at present run 
by the son and other descendants of the Marafie family, therefore it is a family 
foundation, and concentrates its developmental work abroad, mainly in Paki-
stan, but also in Iraq, India (the state of Kerala), and China, among other coun-
tries.33 During the interview, they mentioned that their decision to support de-
velopmental activity in Baltistan in mid-1987 was connected to their 
relationship with the preacher Sheikh Hassan Medhiabadi, and the fact that 
they had travelled to the region to assess the situation. Views about develop-
ment held by the members of the Marafie expedition to Baltistan differed from 
those of the sheikh and the local people. In the interview, they spoke about their 
disagreement on funding a school only for boys and the strong opposition to 
female education in Baltistan at the time, something which they saw as ‘back-
ward’. They did not express this difference in religious terms, however; they 
only mentioned that the role of the religious leader in the community at the time 
was not in tune with what religious teachings – according to the religious com-
munity of Kuwait – would say about female education. The Marafie justified 
their disposition as a wealthy family to support the needy on the basis of reli-
gious duty (khoms and zakat). Religion in this case was thus understood as 
ethics,34 a relationship of the individual in the world as part of a specific context 
in which religious belonging was not at stake.35 In fact, the Marafie Foundation 
targets non-Muslims as well, although it is unclear how they select their pro-
jects. It seems that this developmental activity is strongly guided by existing 
personal acquaintances. As other merchant families, the Marafie also support 
religious specific interventions, such as the building and restructuring of 
mosques, but this is channelled through other charities and the Marafie Foun-
dation is not involved in these specific actions. 
The Marafie Foundation in Baltistan mainly deals with infrastructure – 
schools, dispensaries, etc. – functioning alone or in partnership with the gov-
ernment of Pakistan (which provides, for example, the teachers and the materi-
al for the schools). The work of this NGO is different from the AKRSP, the largest 
NGO in the region, in scope and orientation. The Marafie Foundation is limited 
to the specific fields of health and education, and is only involved in providing 
infrastructure and specific actions, such as bringing doctors to operate in a 
|| 
33 See www.marafiefoundation.org. 
34 Lynch 2014. 
35 On giving as an individual obligation, see Lowi 2017, 568–69. 
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hospital in the summer, providing sums of money for families caring for orphan 
children, etc. It is too early to observe if their activities can be sustained over 
time because some more fieldwork is needed to understand the scope of their 
developmental activity. Compared to the AKRSP, which draws its employees 
from the regionally educated intelligentsia of Gilgit-Baltistan, the Marafie 
Foundation relies more on local networks in Baltistan, sometimes connected to 
specific families. In sum, the Marafie do not see their philanthropic activity as 
religiously oriented, although it is guided by religious principles, and they dis-
tinguish their religious specific interventions – which they support through 
outsourcing funds to other NGOs and through donations to religious actors – 
from their non-religious developmental work. 
Nevertheless, some migrants see the activities of the Marafie Foundation as 
having something to do with religion. A young semi-skilled worker in Kuwait, 
probably in his early thirties, described to me his plan to set up a small NGO in 
Baltistan with other migrant friends upon their return to the region. He ex-
plained very detailed aspects that showed his social commitment, unlike com-
ments I had often heard from other migrants when I mentioned my interest in 
knowing about how migrants contribute to development. As there were already 
many NGOs in Baltistan, I asked him about the difference between his project 
and others at work, such as the Marafie Foundation. He answered: “We are not 
doing religion”. On hearing this, I asked him to explain his words. Unlike the 
Marafie, he and his friends wanted to do ‘small work’, that is, to use petty mon-
ey to help poor people to buy medicine, no matter what their religion was or 
where (which village) they came from in Baltistan. In his view, the Marafie 
Foundation had a religious orientation that favoured the Twelver Shia over 
other groups and, although he was himself part of that community, he said that 
the culture in Baltistan was ‘different’. He claimed that, with his project, he 
wanted to support poor people, irrespective of their religious affiliation, be-
cause this was more reflective of society in Baltistan. Other migrants expressed 
similar opinions, underlining a gap between the apparently religiously-driven 
focus of developmental work and a home society that, in their view, does not 
need such a religious orientation, at least from the perspective of the low- to 
middle-income families to which the migrants belong. 
The views mentioned during the interview with the Marafie family and this 
migrant (shared by a few other members of the community that I met with) 
show that there is no consensus on what is religious or non-religious in the 
transnational developmental field under study. There is, however, a shared 
perception, often implicit but other times explicit, that belonging to the same 
branch of Islam plays a crucial role in participation in this transnational space 
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and can facilitate access to resources. At the same time, religion is perceived by 
those participating in this network as a quite organised affair, that is, as one 
that follows certain procedures – in fundraising and financial obligations – and 
that considers certain practices as universal. However, what is perceived as 
neutral in religious terms by some members of the network – such as the 
Marafie Foundation, the religious leaders, and a section of the migrant commu-
nity – may not be shared by others, such as the migrant (himself a Shia) men-
tioned above. This differentiation shows, on the one hand, that when we inves-
tigate religion as an empirical object of research, we are implicitly limiting the 
scope of religion, a fact not shared by believers. On the other hand, we observe 
that members of these majority Muslim societies (in this case, the Shia majority 
society of north-eastern Baltistan) also place religion in a certain context or 
sphere. For the latter, religion can be connected to the activities of actors and 
organisations, as organised religion, but not necessarily extended to the rest of 
the society. 
The role of religion in transnational spaces: Some 
final considerations 
The analysis of the role of religion in the transnational space formed by migra-
tion and development networks from north-eastern Pakistan and Kuwait shows 
how the religious question is mainly framed in hegemonic terms (whose reli-
gion?). Despite sharing the same religious belonging, religion, when associated 
with developmental activities, is perceived by migrants from Baltistan as some-
thing external to their own religious (or for that matter, multi-religious) context. 
In other words, religion as a link to developmental activities is seen as introduc-
ing a differentiating character in that society. Religion in this sense can be seen 
as a form of spatial organisation that emerges from above (or from outside) and 
is distinct from existing forms of local organisation that are also seen as reli-
gious by the society. This understanding differs from the study of religion in 
post-secular (developed in economic terms) contexts, which, as Bader points 
out, should be framed as a debate about liberal-democratic constitutionalism. 
Assuming that Western developed societies have not been fully secularised, one 
can equally consider that other societies with a religious definition of the state 
have never been fully religious. 
Although religion in this transnational space refers to ‘organised religion’, 
in the sense of a line of action in which religion grasps the all-encompassing 
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field of the social, this does not mean, as some migrants asserted by questioning 
this religion ‘from above’, that religion should be placed in the sphere of the 
individual, in the sense of one’s own behaviour and understanding of the world. 
On the contrary, migrants sense that their own religiosity does not lead them to 
categorise human beings by religion. In this context, religion amounts to a form 
of ethics. The role of religion in the context of Kuwait (and the Gulf in general) 
sponsored development activities in Baltistan is perceived as critical in an exist-
ing religiously plural society. In this view, religion, when associated with devel-
opmental activities, is acknowledged as essentially ordering because it (through 
developmental activities) redraws the boundaries of the religious community 
(Shia Islam). Although it is not possible to speak of the existence of religious 
pluralism in those societies, there are forms of social organisation that do not 
follow religious lines, and religion is sometimes understood in a more ‘flexible’ 
context than that described in many academic writings about these societies. In 
other words: What is understood as religious depends very much on how and 
which questions are being asked about the subject.  
Members of the Kuwaiti merchant class who support development activities 
in Baltistan operate by following a sense of religious duty. They claim, at least 
in the case of the Marafie Foundation, that they do not discriminate on religious 
grounds while doing their development work. They fund non-religious, or reli-
giously neutral, interventions (such as building a health clinic, bringing doctors 
to the region under medical campaigns), but they also support the religious and 
charity work of religious actors, such as the sheikhs. Through this development 
activity, the role of these religious actors as benefactors in Baltistan’s society is 
reinforced. These interventions comply with the general regulations of the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan, which is an Islamic republic. While this support is per-
ceived by the donors and recipients as a form of solidarity, outsiders to this 
network, as well as some migrants, maintain that this aid is linked to geopoliti-
cal issues. 
Developmental cooperation generally has an altruistic element when it is 
not completely driven by political aims, but it certainly has political conse-
quences most of the time. In the sectarianised spectrum of the Gulf, and in that 
of Pakistan, the fact that this transnational space is predominantly constituted 
by actors belonging to Shia Islam raises many questions about the very nature 
of its functioning. In Shia Islam, personal relations in a decentralised context 
play an important role through the marjaiyya system and these networks seem 
to be related to the al-Shirazi and al-Sistani groups. Religious actors have access 
to resources and, depending on this access, may become influential community 
leaders. Their role, however, is not limited to the religious sphere, because even 
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when these actors advocate for the view that religion should not play a political 
role – as some trends in Shia Islam indicate – they are still making a political 
statement. Development and migration networks between north-eastern Paki-
stan and Kuwait thus share a ‘Shia character’ in the sense that ideas and prac-
tices of Shia Islam are part of this transnational space. Yet, these religious ideas 
and practices are not always easy to differentiate from a specific socio-
economic, political, or cultural context such as those of Kuwait and Baltistan. In 
other words, the role of the religious in transnational spaces cannot be under-
stood without paying attention to the power hierarchies in which religion is 
inscribed. Religion can be seen as a form of solidarity by some of the participat-
ing actors, but also as something potentially divisive by others. 
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A Material Geography of ‘Dubai Business’ 
Making and Re-Making Muslim Worlds across Central Asia and 
the Gulf 
Abstract: Tracing the circulation of Korans donated by Saudi Arabia across 
multiple migratory contexts in the United Arab Emirates, Tajikistan, and be-
yond, and understanding their transfiguration from a sacred text into a prestig-
ious consumer good, this chapter explores the materialities and immaterialities 
of Tajik migrant religious, economic and social worlds that meet and intertwine 
in the context of ‘Dubai business’. Giving impetus to a stronger consideration of 
the material turn in the research on translocality and transregionality, the chap-
ter illustrates how cultural imaginaries, while travelling via prestigious com-
modities across geographical regions, and socio-economic contexts mesh with 
spatial ideas of urbanism, cosmopolitanism, and piety. In the worlds of Dubai’s 
transregional trading business, tourism and charity, an exclusive notion of 
‘bourgeois Islam’ is fabricated – a contested assemblage of knowledge, lifestyle 
aspirations, cultural hegemony, and social distinctedness, through which Tajik 
migrants re-fashion an elitist Muslim self along different notions of mobility, 
work and belonging. 
Charitable gifts that matter: Korans donated by 
Saudi Arabia 
Twenty-nine-year-old Maruf from Dushanbe was working as a sales manager for 
men’s fashion in a medium-sized shopping mall in Dubai when we met in win-
ter 2013. Since his employment contract was linked to a multi-year residence 
permit, Maruf was able to buy an apartment for his wife and two children in the 
neighbouring emirate of Sharjah, which he shared with his older brother and 
his family. Maruf arrived much too late and visibly annoyed for our lunch meet-
ing in a Persian restaurant near his office, where I had been waiting for him for 
quite some time. Looking stressed, he welcomed me with the words “Unfortu-
nately, I can’t stay long either”, while simultaneously waving at the waiter for 
the order and starting to complain about the working conditions at his work-
place: “We employees are not treated fairly. We always have to work longer 
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than agreed in the contract and have far too few breaks. But he can do this to us, 
he is the boss”, he explains and – after a short hesitation – adds: “He is Arab!”. 
While we wait for our palav-i shīrīn, a Persian-style sweet rice dish with chicken, 
his favourite one in the restaurant, he digs around in a big and heavy bag under 
the table and hands me two copies of the Koran he brought from the awqāf-
centre1 (religious endowments) in Dubai, which he visits regularly to take Ko-
ranic lessons and receive advice on religious questions. The book is a beautiful, 
golden decorated, high-quality edition entailing a parallel German translation 
and published by the King-Fahd-complex in Medina, Saudi Arabia.2 Heavy in 
my hand, the Koran obviously mattered, as it caused a change of mood in 
Maruf. Still annoyed about the feeling of superiority that resonates in the ‘Arab-
ness’ his boss displays at the workplace, Maruf, while looking at the Koran in 
my hand, begins to tell me with enthusiasm about the philanthropic spirit in the 
centre. For him, the generosity he experienced in the centre stands in sharp 
contrast to the narrow framework within which the secular Tajik state is willing 
to serve the religious needs and sensibilities of its Muslim citizens. Praising the 
variety of different Koran translations that are freely distributed there – even in 
Russian – Maruf directs my attention to the special aesthetics of the edition that 
he had just given me: “What a great edition! Praise be to Allah! You can look for 
such editions in Tajikistan for a long time, right?”. “What are you going to do 
with the other Koran copies in your bag”, I ask him, and add “Do these copies 
also contain translations?”, “Yes, in Russian. They are for my brother”, is 
Maruf’s answer, “He is going to Moscow next week, for his business”. 
As this small and rather random episode from my multi-sited field research 
in the United Arab Emirates (henceforth UAE) and Tajikistan in 2013 and 2014 
shows, Korans donated by the Saudi royal family (henceforth: Saudi-donated 
Korans) travel as much as Maruf and his brother do. Moreover, both migrants 
and Korans share social lives, that are interwoven, translocal and, as such, 
marked by mobility, multiplicity, transition and circulation in and across the 
multiple and intersecting worlds of what this chapter is about, and what I ana-
lytically determine as ‘Dubai business’. In Arabic language or provided with a 
|| 
1 Awqāf, the plural of the Arabic term waqf, designates charitable endowments that operate 
under Islamic law. While Gulf charities cover a wide range of philanthropic activities run by a 
multitude of state- and non-state organisations and private actors, the majority of charitable 
endowments Tajik migrant visit in Dubai are assigned to The General Authority of Islamic Af-
fairs and Endowments (GAIAE), a legal authority close to the government. The emirate of Dubai 
alone actually runs 700 registered awqāf-centres. 
2 The King-Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Koran produces 10 Million copies per 
year and translates the Koran in 39 different languages.  
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Russian translation, Saudi-donated Korans travel from Dubai’s multiple chari-
table foundations (awqāf), which are regularly visited by Tajik migrants for 
various religious services, into the apartments of Tajik migrant families residing 
in the UAE. There, they are used for daily prayers and family rituals. Korans of 
this kind can also be found in the bookshelves of the neighbourhood mosques 
in Dubai or other parts of UAE, where I accompanied Tajik migrant women to 
Koranic recitation (tajwīd) circles. Moreover, Saudi-donated Korans were shared 
in migrant accommodations, where many male bachelor Tajiks live temporarily 
and get to know their future business partners in the fur coat trade and tourism 
business. I also encountered Korans of this type in fur coat show rooms in Du-
bai, in which Tajiks worked as managers and were involved in daʿwa3 activities 
among their business partners. Besides, Saudi-donated Koran copies also cross 
nation-state borders. At the time of my fieldwork, they were part of the ritual 
equipment of so-called ‘Arab mosques’, sponsored by rich Dubai businessmen 
especially in rural regions of Tajikistan. Eventually, Saudi-donated Korans en-
tered migrant households in Tajikistan; as prestigious souvenirs, gifts, and as 
religious objects whose semiotic power and aesthetics fire the social imagina-
tion about the ‘Dubai business’ as a notion for economic success, religious pro-
gress and social mobility. 
‘Dubai business’ 
In post-soviet Tajikistan, migration has become a way of life that integrates 
Tajik Muslims as creative and mobile actors in processes of economic and cul-
tural globalisation. Labour migration to Russia is still the dominant livelihood 
strategy in the country. However, since the 1990s, the Gulf has developed as an 
alternative migration destination for Tajiks. Like Maruf and his older brother, 
those Tajiks who were able to establish themselves in the field of ‘Dubai busi-
ness’ in the 2010s formed a small group of university-trained, urbanely social-
ised, multilingual and religiously aspirated younger and middle-aged Tajiks 
driven by their aspiration to pursue Islamic life projects in a Muslim country 
abroad.4 A religious revivalism, which has affected Tajikistan since the 1980s 
|| 
3 “Calling to Islam” or “Calling to God” is a central component of Islamic mission directed at 
non-Muslims as well as Muslims. At the core of religious programmes of modern Muslim revi-
talisation movements, daʿwa is especially directed at Muslims to turn back to God and to orien-
tate one’s life according to Islamic principles. 
4 Stephan-Emmrich 2017a, Stephan-Emmrich 2017b. 
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and then especially after independence, brought about a stronger orientation 
towards the wider Muslim world, particularly to the Near and Middle East. The 
increase in religiously motivated work and study migration, tourism and pil-
grimage, particularly to places in the Arab world, confirms established sacred 
geographies that places ex-Soviet Tajik Muslims at the periphery of the Muslim 
world. Meanwhile, the model of Gulf urbanism that materialises in circulating 
spectacular media images, high-prestige commodity goods, migrants’ narratives 
and that is being carried to Tajikistan via infrastructural investments, had 
brought about a reconfiguration of space, spatial narratives and social imagina-
tion.5 Accordingly, in Tajikistan, Dubai has become a preferential migrant des-
tination not only as a new regional hub in the Gulf with geographical proximity 
to Mecca, the major pilgrimage destination for Hajj and Umrah. In migrant nar-
ratives Dubai has also become a trope for a ‘Muslim-cum-business-friendly-
place’ that flourishes due to an Islamic form of governance and aristocratic 
leadership that promotes social justice, as well as Sharia-compliant economic 
activities that are corruption-free, and allows for combining work and piety. 
Followed by the lure of the Gulf boom that reached Tajikistan in the early 
2000s, Maruf and his brother got involved in the ‘Dubai business’, hoping to 
combine their desire for economic success with spiritual and moral progress 
and social upward mobility. With Maruf’s employment in retail and his broth-
er’s combined work as both a manager in an SUV car showroom in the emirate 
of Adjman and as a middleman in an auto parts business that spanned Dubai, 
Dushanbe, Moscow and Istanbul, the brothers found their place in the complex, 
exclusive and volatile socio-economic worlds of the ‘Dubai business’. While 
Gulf migration opened up many worlds of work and business for them (formal 
and informal, trade, tourism, retail), it simultaneously created a new horizon for 
the two brothers to imagine being and becoming a better Muslim, as well as to 
strive for a ‘good Muslim life’. 
This chapter employs the term ‘Dubai business’ to analytically grasp the 
complex and entangled relationship of people, things, ideas and places and the 
multiple economic, social and religious worlds, in which these entangled rela-
tionships are embedded. Thus, the analytical scope of the term is multifold: 
While the term encompasses the place where Tajiks go to find work, as well as 
the type of work they pursue there, it also speaks to the market mechanisms of 
place-branding in which Tajik migrants are involved. As business is done not 
only in but also with Dubai, Dubai is being transformed into a brand that is sold 
and consumed in and outside the emirate. In addition, and in a more metaphor-
|| 
5 Mirzoev and Stephan-Emmrich 2016. 
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ical sense, the term has the capacity “to refigure a larger conceptual field, to 
bring material (social) and mental worlds into closer conjunction”,6 as well as 
connecting compartmentalised fields of knowledge in area studies, anthropolo-
gy and migration studies. A dynamic time-space configuration of material and 
immaterial flows, transfers and transformations, ‘Dubai business’ conflates 
labour migration, continental and maritime trade in luxury goods such as fur 
coats, SUV cars or smartphones with the fields of Russian middle-class tourism, 
Muslim pilgrimage, Islamic education and Gulf charity. In this quality, I under-
stand ‘Dubai business’ as providing “a transregional platform” of connectivity, 
interaction and exchange that is dynamic and “intermediate in scale”.7 This 
platform assembles a plurality of actors, practices, places, things, ideas, identi-
ties, and multiple worlds across Central Asia, China, South Asia, Europe and the 
Near and Middle East. ‘Dubai business’, however, also encompasses social reali-
ty, human experience and the inhabiting of migrant lifeworlds – all are shaped 
by the resonance and mutual relationship of neoliberal capitalism and Muslim 
piety.8 Like Dubai itself, it is a production site for migrant hopes, middle-class 
dreams and aspirations, for emotional attachment and elusive belongings. In 
the multiple worlds of ‘Dubai business’, an exclusive notion of ‘bourgeois Islam’ 
is fabricated – an assemblage of movement, social imaginaries, and experiences 
that offer migrants a resource for reshaping the self along various notions of 
migration, work, and belonging. 
Tracing the circulation of Saudi-donated Korans across multiple places in 
the UAE and Tajikistan, as well as understanding their transfiguration from a 
sacred text into a prestigious consumer good, this chapter explores the material 
reality of migrant religious, economic, and social worlds that meet and inter-
twine in the context of the ‘Dubai business’. In addition, the chapter aims to 
provide an impetus for greater consideration of the material turn in the research 
on translocality and transregionality, showing how religious imaginaries travel 
within and across geographical regions and different migratory contexts, and 
how these ‘immaterialities’ intertwine with notions of place, modernity, pro-
gress, future, and the pious Muslim self. 
|| 
6 Daniels 2011, 182. 
7 Ho 2014, 888. 
8 Atia 2012, Tobin 2016, Schielke 2015. 
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Exploring Muslim worlds through mobile things: 
Connectivity, mediation, transition 
In the context of transregional questions, research into the mobility of material 
objects is beginning to gain importance, albeit slowly at the moment.9 Following 
the trajectories of Saudi-donated Korans and their ‘social, yet mobile, lives’10 
through practices of gift exchange, consumption, usage, collection and repre-
sentation, the focus of this chapter moves beyond Korans as things themselves, 
to the multiple Muslim worlds and world-making processes these religious ob-
jects co-shape and that span distances across places, regions and continents. 
Thus, attention is given to the interconnectivity and co-constitution of Korans as 
things, their materialities and geographies, with the places and spaces they 
move through, and the religious ideas they carry with them.  
Integrating the material turn into area studies allows for a differentiated 
understanding of ‘Muslim worlds’, their plurality, and their making and re-
making, that links spatial notions of ‘area’, ‘region’, or ‘trans-region’ with phe-
nomenological notions of ‘everydayness’ and ‘lifeworlds’. Both concepts draw 
attention to “the paradox of plurality and the ambiguity of intersubjective life”11 
that shapes the lived experience and their existential significance for migrants 
and other actors. Meanwhile, the question of how migrant lived experiences and 
the knowledge whereby migrants live an everyday life that is “plural, complex, 
and essentially unsystematic [in] nature”,12 can be empirically grasped is also 
relevant for the ‘Dubai business’ as a social reality. Being fluid and elastic, 
transregional entities cannot be fixed. They have no clear and continuing 
boundaries and ‘keep slipping away’ when explored.13 Such a combined under-
standing of Muslim worlds complicates any neat compartmentalising of histori-
ographical and geographical categories, as it also demands a transregional 
methodology that produces ethnographies which are “thick, socially and histor-
ically”.14 Back to the materiality, sensuous presence, aesthetic dimension and 
mobility of ‘things’, Saudi-donated Korans matter, as argued in the chapter’s 
methodological intervention, as they allow to link spatial and existential ap-
|| 
9 Juneja 2019, Ho 2014. 
10 Appadurai 1996. 
11 Jackson 2013, 9. 
12 Schielke and Debevec 2012, 3. 
13 Verne 2019, 85. 
14 Ho 2014, 885. 
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proaches to explore multiple Muslim worlds through the three conceptual 
lenses of ‘connectivity’, ‘mediation’, and ‘transition’. 
Firstly, the term ‘connectivity’, with its processual, transformative dimen-
sion, is preferred to the more static term ‘connection’ in order to “focus on en-
tanglements, spaces of transactions and translations, as well as on the ‘brokers’ 
that operate in therein, thus actively shaping, as well as being shaped by con-
nections”.15 Tajiks act in different ways as brokers within and between the mul-
tiple worlds of ‘Dubai business’. In economic terms, in their position as mid-
dlemen they link different business fields (trade and tourism), while in cultural 
terms, Tajiks rely on multi-lingual competencies and cosmopolitan orientations 
to be mobile within and across – and thus connect – different worlds, that is the 
Arabophone and Persophone worlds of trade and business with the Russophone 
world of tourism and conspicuous consumption. 
Secondly, according to Verne,16 transregional entities like the ‘Dubai busi-
ness’, although they cannot be fixed, have effects that can be experienced (and 
empirically researched) in human and non-human relationships, places, prac-
tices, and migrants’ senses of self. As such, effects are materially mediated, for 
example through things that act as medium. Following Meyer and Houtman17 in 
their plea for rematerialising scholarly approaches to religion, things such as 
Saudi-donated Korans are “instances and instantiations of the ‘everyday’”. 
Their materiality forms the “texture of lived, embodied experience”. Moreover, 
visible and tangible, things both form and mediate the living and enabling con-
ditions of “the religious”.18 Since media rely on indexicality to produce symbolic 
representations, religion and religious experience cannot be analysed “outside 
the forms and practices of its mediation”.19 Even more so, “the modes of media-
tion are part of the religion’s configuration”.20 
Thirdly, migration is a transformative process providing symbolic capital as 
well as promoting multiple forms of change.21 Just as Tajiks’ religious experi-
ence and their Muslim self are re-configured in the context of ‘Dubai business’, 
the Saudi-donated Korans and their material properties need to be thought 
through their transformative states, as they “transform, mutate, morph, and 
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thus continue in dynamic circulations”.22 Accordingly, the concept of transition 
emphasises Tajik migrants’ creativity and potentiality to re-shape and re-create 
the social and material world they live in,23 as it allows to “unravel the processes 
of transformation and reconfiguration” that take place in the multiple contexts 
(worlds) of ‘Dubai business’, and that “interrupt existing matrices of geography 
and aesthetic practice”.24 
A tense homeness: Migrant accommodations 
Entry into the multiple worlds of Dubai’s trading and tourism business happens 
in the private migrant apartments or low-budget hostels in the Creek area, 
where Tajik migrants mostly reside and share rooms with Sunni Iranians, Af-
ghans, and sometimes also Arab migrants. Operated and managed by members 
of Dubai’s Afghan diaspora, which has successfully positioned itself in the real 
estate market, Tajiks appreciate these accommodations for the cultural ‘nested-
ness’ they experience there. Equipped with an Afghan janitor who takes care of 
the security of the migrants’ private belongings and is often also the cook who 
prepares a culturally familiar hot meal once a day, Afghan migrant apartments 
or hostels create trust and provide a sense of home. As an exclusive Muslim 
space, migrant accommodations foster conviviality and friendship, and they 
provide a platform for building business relations. By sharing their living space 
with Afghan, Baluch and Sunni Persian-speaking traders, brokers and business 
professionals, Tajiks gain access to established commercial networks in the 
luxury car, spare part, mobile phone or jewellery trade businesses. They are 
thus able to expand their business networks in Dubai beyond ethnic networks 
bases on kinship, peer-group (in Tajik hamsinf, hamkurs), or neighbourhood 
affiliation (in Tajik hamsāya). This interweaving of life and work is articulated 
in the statement “We prefer to stay with Iranian or Afghan guys, as we are one 
family. We speak the same language, we trust each other, we are brothers that 
share not only living space but also our businesses”. Thus, Tajiks cultivate a 
sense of ‘Persianness’, which is also articulated in the preference for Afghan 
and Iranian restaurants. Associated with this ‘Persianness’ is a repertoire of 
cultural knowledge, experience, and imagination that Tajiks draw on to mediate 
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creatively between different business worlds (tourism and trading business) as 
economic middle-men or to be mobile as brokers in transcultural contexts.25 In 
this intermediary role, Tajiks connect to the cosmopolitan trade networks in the 
Persian Gulf, and thus to a world that links Muslims, markets, and households 
across the Gulf, the broader Near and Middle East, South, Central, and East 
Asia, and Eurasia through a complex set of knowledge, skill, work ethics, and 
social relationship.26 
Tajiks’ notion of the Ummah as a business community emphasises moments 
of equality, solidarity, and the sharing of a common set of cultural knowledge 
and practices. When Tajiks act out their ‘Persianness’ as a cultural conscious-
ness articulated in terms of language practices and cosmopolitan lifestyles, they 
transcend local, national, and regional identifications that assign them the 
status as ‘peripheral’ Muslims (in the rigid secular environment at home, in 
majority Turkic-speaking Central Asia, and in the wider Muslim world). Such 
post-national narratives of sharing and belonging, however, obscure the plural-
ity and difference of the Muslim worlds Tajik co-make, appropriate, and cohab-
it. With their preference for Afghan and Sunni-Iranian roommates, Tajiks in 
Dubai articulate their refusal to live or do business with Turkish-speaking Mus-
lims from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and even with Tajiks from Uzbekistan. 
Due to differences in language, cultural traditions and the history of mobility 
and migration that connect other Muslims in Central Asia with Dubai, Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz migrants make their own business worlds in Dubai, based on 
transregionally operating Turkophone trading and migration networks. 
Differences can also be found within the Persian-speaking business com-
munity itself. The following episode shows how difference materialises in hier-
archical business relationships. Lunch at the accommodation, which is includ-
ed in the monthly rent Tajik migrants pay to the Afghan owner, is the only time 
of the day when all roommates get together to eat, socialise, and relax. Once, I 
was invited by two Tajik street brokers to join then for lunch with their room-
mates. After the meal, when tea and cake were served, we remained sitting and 
talked with two Baluchi car dealers and an Iranian mobile phone shop owner. 
After lunch, the conversation sluggishly shifted from family and business mat-
ters, food prices in local supermarkets to the politic situation at home, and then 
moved on to religious matters. When the conversation switched to questions 
about Sharia-compliant work, the Iranian roommate named Iskandar got up, 
brought a copy of the Koran, which looked similar to the one Maruf had brought 
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for me from his favourite endowment, and spontaneously started to engage in 
daʿwa. After we followed Iskandar’s speech for a while, one of the two Tajik 
brokers apologised politely and left the room as inconspicuously as possible. 
Later he explained to me, “He (Iskandar) does daʿwa all the time. It is a deed of 
merit (in Tajik kār-i savāb) and he speaks well, but I can’t always bear it, be-
cause he uses daʿwa to praise Iranian civilization. In Islam, all Muslims are 
equal, Iranians are not superior. But he is my business partner, I depend on 
him. So, I ain’t saying nothing, [and] just leave the room”. 
While Iranians and Afghans cultivate a cultural and religious superiority, 
Tajiks are assigned the inferior position of ‘the little brother’. Due to the Soviet 
past, Tajiks are perceived by their roommates as insufficiently educated in both 
religion and the history of Iranian culture and civilization, as they were largely 
cut off from Islamic discourse, religious knowledge flows and cultural educa-
tion over a long period of time. Accordingly, Koran copies such as those spon-
sored by Saudi Arabia and available in Dubai’s many charitable endowments, 
when used, or when circulating within migrant accommodations, pass mainly 
from Iranian and Afghan roommates to the new Tajik business partners, and not 
vice versa. Used for daʿwa, or in the gift economy of Muslim charity, Koran do-
nations ‘sign’ an a-symmetric business relationship that translate Tajiks’ subor-
dinate position as economic newcomers and peripheral Muslims to the ‘Dubai 
business’ into their position of learners in religious matters. 
Muslim elitism: Doing daʿwa at the workplace 
The multiple ways in which religion intersects with Dubai’s business worlds can 
be further traced through the way Tajik migrants themselves use Saudi-
sponsored Koran copies for daʿwa activities at the workplace. One of the two 
Tajik brokers who invited me to join lunch in their accommodation works for 
fellow-countrymen Bahodir, a and manager of a fur coat show room at the time 
we met. Fluent in Russian and Arabic, Bahodir held a mediating position be-
tween Russian clients, the Afghan shop owner and his Emirati sponsor (kafīl), 
as he often operated as a translator between the two. He also supervised the 
Tajik street brokers attracting tourists to visit the fur coat shop. Additionally, to 
bridge the time between client visits, his management duties and that of the 
street broker’s supervision, Bahodir run his own transregional trading business 
with care spare parts, in which partners in Dubai, Tajikistan and Russia were 
involved. 
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On the day I visit him in his shop, there is not much going on. We drink tea, 
he shows me the latest collection of furs, and while we wait for customers, a 
Tajik enters the room, whom he calls his business partner. He is a surgeon who 
emigrated to Russia from his neighbourhood in Dushanbe in the early 1990s. He 
regularly comes to Dubai for holidays and meetings with his business partners. 
Lounging in the representative black leather armchairs, in which Bahodir usual-
ly holds his customer conversations, and drinking tea, the two men first discuss 
the prices of car spare parts in Russia, Dubai and China, before the surgeon asks 
Bahodir for religious advice. His son wants to do a job pleasing God in Russia 
and asks Bahodir what the criteria are for his decision. As the conversation 
draws to a close, Bahodir goes to the desk, takes two copies of the Koran, deco-
rated with gold, out of the drawer and hands them over to his partner, who 
stows the books in his bag and leaves. Some days later, when visiting Bahodir 
again, I found him behind his desk involved in the religious instruction of some 
newly arrived migrants from Tajikistan, who were sitting around his desk listen-
ing to him. What I immediately noticed was, that he recited from a Koran of the 
same type that he had given to his partner from Russia a few days earlier. Strik-
ingly, the semiotics of the prestigious religious object Bahodir used for daʿwa 
not only confirmed his religious authority, which he gained through his studies 
of Islamic law (fiqh) at al-Azhar university, but was also expressed in the honor-
ific title shaykh. As we will see later, it is the aesthetic authority of Saudi-
donated Korans, through which Tajik newcomers are integrated into Dubai’s 
business worlds, inculcated with work ethics based on Islamic principles and 
equipped with a cultural repertoire that allows them to position themselves in 
Dubai’s superdiverse migrant world. Simultaneously, prestigious religious ob-
jects that travel between Dubai, Russia, and also Tajikistan, materially mediate 
the appreciation and affirmation of transregional business relations. Thus, mi-
grant networks also provide an infrastructure for the circulation of religious 
ideas; here a Muslim elitism that builds on the idea of being part of Dubai as a 
regional hub, where lived realities of a religious economy in the trading and 
tourism business intersect with representative and spatial politics of urban 
hypermodernity.  
An elitist notion inherent to Tajiks’ self-understanding as Muslim business-
people is also articulated through statements such as “We are businesspeople, 
not migrants!”.27 Such positioning points to the strong socio-economic and cul-
tural differentiation within the Tajik migrant community, but also from Central 
Asian and other Asian migrant communities in the Gulf, along the lines of eth-
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nicity, race, religion, class, and the valuation of migrant work. Such elitist self-
positioning goes hand in hand with specific translocal lifestyles and a new pub-
licly displayed piety. Cultivating specific housing and eating practices in Dubai 
and Tajikistan, preferring particular Muslim fashion styles, consuming religious 
tourism offers to Saudi Arabia, or using prestigious religious signs such as Saudi-
donated Korans or Arab language styles, Tajik migrants both in Dubai and at 
home participate in globalising discourses on the ‘right’ and ‘authentic Islam’, 
which are central to the cultivation of new Muslim middle-class sensibilities in 
wider Asia.28 With their identity as Muslim businessmen, Tajik middlemen dis-
tinguish themselves from the new generation of unskilled, educationally disad-
vantaged rural migrants (in Russian migrantyj29) from their home country who, 
due to their lack of business knowledge, urban skills and experiences of work-
ing in convoluted economic fields in a superdiverse urban environment abroad, 
are perceived as a threat to the good reputation Tajiks enjoy with their Afghan 
and Iranian business partners in Dubai.  
Tajiks’ self-fashioning as businesspeople also draws a distinction from In-
dian, Pakistani and other Asian migrants in Dubai, who work under precarious 
conditions in the low-wage sector.30 Jobs as hotel employees, street cleaners, 
construction workers, laundry boys, or porters at the Dubai Creek harbour, were 
considered inferior and “dirty work” (in Tajik kār-i nāpāk) because of the mi-
grants’ dependence on the kafāla sponsorship system, and thus their vulnera-
bility as economic actors. In contrast, the ‘Dubai business’ offers great flexibility 
to move between informal and formal work, to be mobile ‘under the radar’ of 
the emirate’s strict migration policy, and to realise social careers. 
The strong emphasis on an exclusive Muslimness coincides with the strik-
ing invisibility of Tajiks in Dubai’s public space and goes in line with their rejec-
tion or even denial of any form of publicly displayed ‘Tajikness’. This stands in 
sharp contrast to Russia, where Tajik migrants run numerous ethnic restaurants 
and thus co-shape the urban landscape, and further to Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Uy-
ghurs and Tatars, who run restaurants and bistros in the Dubai Greek area. 
Since the other ethnic groups from Central Asia and the Caucasus are newcom-
ers in Dubai to the same extent as Tajiks are, the desired invisibility is rather 
explained by a transnational migration regime based on political mechanisms 
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of racial profiling and discrimination, that has a strong impact on Tajiks’ self-
perception as ‘second-class’ Muslims, citizens and migrants. Performative affili-
ations via religion, which, as seen, are always multiple, can thus be interpreted 
as an attempt to overcome this peripheral and negatively connoted sociocultur-
al position. This is reflected not only in the decision of many Tajik street broker 
in Dubai to wear Arabic clothing but also in the refusal to speak Tajik with me, 
favouring English or Arabic. 
Fostering hegemony: Dubai’s charitable 
endowments (awqāf) 
Meanwhile, Tajik migrants’ re-positioning and re-configuring as ‘peripheral’ 
Muslims cannot be understood without considering the material and immaterial 
circulations that take place in the field of Gulf charities in and beyond the UAE. 
This goes in particular for the sense of ‘Arabness’ displayed by Tajik migrants 
and the cultural and political hegemony that is fostered through this performa-
tive concept of elusive belonging. Like other states in the Gulf, the UAE have 
dispensed their charitable activities in parallel with Western humanitarianism 
and therewith gain a significant share in the modern expansion of Islamic phi-
lanthropy made possible by the oil boom in late 20th century.31 This becomes 
obvious in the 700 existing religious endowments in Dubai, that were frequently 
visited by Tajik migrants for the purpose of religious education and counselling. 
Through these endowments, The General Authority of Islamic Affairs and En-
dowments (GAIAE)32 promotes multiple philanthropic projects to increase reli-
gious awareness, spreading Islamic culture, and developing mosques and Ko-
ranic centres.33 When Tajiks visit charitable endowments in Dubai to ask for 
religious guidance or take Koranic recitation classes there, they simultaneously 
consume the endowments’ core values, such as belonging to the nation, or loy-
alty to the ruler. 
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Moreover, the endowments offer the otherwise rare opportunity for Tajiks to 
socialise with Arab Muslims. These encounters produce highly ambivalent no-
tions of ‘Arabness’. At the same time, they confirm a hierarchical relationship 
between the two groups that builds on a religiously superior status of Arabs 
who are perceived by Tajiks as ‘better Muslims’ due to their proficiency in Ara-
bic as a sacred language. Besides, the exotic image that Tajiks have among Arab 
Muslims in Dubai as ‘ignorant ex-Soviet Muslims’ makes them a sought-after 
target group for missionary work (daʿwa). In Maruf’s words: “When you go back 
home from Dubai, you are a religious person (in Tajik dīndār). The knowledge 
about our religion is literally lying around on the streets here. As former Soviet 
Muslims we have an exotic status here. Because our religious education is so 
poor, we get free lessons everywhere, at the workplace, at the market, in the 
endowments”. However, encounters with Arabs are shaped by ignorance and 
stereotyping on both sides. Visits to charitable endowments are often accompa-
nied by uncertainty when Tajiks are identified by Arab staff as Shiite Muslims 
because of their Persian first names, such as Firdaus, Mahdi, Irfan and others. 
But Dubai’s pious endowments also provide a space to experience moments 
of sameness. Against the background of a booming Muslim volunteer service in 
the region, Gulf charity co-produces a mobile, cosmopolitan class of aid work-
ers.34 Tajiks in the ‘Dubai business’ share with Arab and other Muslim volun-
teers working in Dubai’s endowments the spirit of ‘pious neoliberalism’ in the 
new Middle East middle classes that drives them to pursue Islamic life projects 
that conflate economic rationales, professional careers, and upward social mo-
bility with the pursuit of spiritual advancement, moral self-perfection, and pie-
ty.35  
As circulating charitable gifts, Koran copies matter here in two ways. First-
ly, they involve Tajiks in commoditised social relations as they are reinforced in 
the context of Gulf charities. In their quality as prestigious goods, or “inaliena-
ble possessions”,36 Saudi-donated Korans, when given as a pious donation, 
enable the construction and overcoming of hierarchy by establishing a source of 
lasting social difference.37 Accordingly, Korans are things endowed with sym-
bolic power that cannot be separated from their owners. Through the act of 
donation, Korans are transfigured from a sacred text into an ambiguous com-
modity that points to the antagonistic structure inherent in its function as a gift, 
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forcing the recipient to “confirm a subjugation”.38 Following this interpretation, 
Koran donations to Tajik migrants are embedded in the socio-political context 
of Gulf charity. Thus, they instil and reinforce “the common sense of hegemonic 
relationships” that cements demonstrative aristocratic hierarchy and neo-
traditional authoritarian structures.39 This logic of gift-giving makes Emirati 
nationals and other Arabs working in Dubai’s endowments active agents in 
maintaining their status as “a dominant wealthy population group amid the 
influx of rapid immigration and multiculturalism”.40 
In this sense, and as a second argument, Koran donations involve Tajik mi-
grants in the circulation and exchange of prestigious consumer goods. By em-
bedding them in mechanisms of place-branding, Saudi-donated Korans are 
provided with an exclusive commodity value that goes far beyond their religious 
authority as a sacred text. Labelled as just another consumer good brought from 
Dubai as dubaiskyj (in Russian ‘made in’ or ‘from Dubai’), the Korans mediate 
the process of transforming Gulf cities like Dubai into brands and thus “into an 
easily readable object of consumption”.41 In their quality as a medium, circulat-
ing Saudi-donated Korans reconfigure migrants’ religious experience, as they 
index the cultural and political hegemony of the Arabian Gulf, and thus a socio-
economic project of urban development with a political, programmatic, and 
brandish agenda that feeds Arab nationalism in the region. The Arabian Gulf as 
an idea, a utopia, that “claims reversal of the cultural hegemonic order in the 
region”,42 is spectacularly represented in the hyperreality and hyper-exclusivity 
of Dubai’s urban landscape. These representations are not uncontested as they 
simultaneously epitomise success and progress and dominance and arro-
gance.43 However, Tajik migrants consume this ambivalent idea of the Arabian 
Gulf when visiting iconic buildings, tourism sites and shopping malls, but also 
when going to charitable endowments and praying in Dubai’s spectacular 
mosques. Using, gifting, or circulating Saudi-donated Korans, Tajiks engage in 
a sense of ‘Arabness’, through which they attach themselves to the Arabian Gulf 
as an exclusive modernisation project in the region, from which they are explicit-
ly excluded because of their temporary migrant status. 
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Conclusion: A material geography of ‘bourgeois 
Islam’ 
Tracing the mobility of prestigious religious objects through multiple socio-
spatial contexts and the process of their consequent transfiguration into an 
indexing consumer good, this chapter explored ‘Dubai business’ as a fluid and 
dynamic spatiality that transcends taken-for-granted spatial orders and conven-
tional unitary area frames such as ‘Central Asia’, ‘the Middle East’, or ‘the Gulf’. 
An assemblage of migration, trading and tourism business, and Islamic life 
projects, ‘Dubai business’ evolves as a dynamic transregional platform of mate-
rial and immaterial exchange and circulation that connects, creates, and forms 
multiple entangled Muslim worlds (economic, social, and religious, Perso-
phone, Arabophone, Russophone, post-Soviet, among others). These Muslim 
worlds are appropriated, inhabited, shaped, and experienced by Tajik migrants 
in multiple ways.  
In line with Enseng Ho’s44 methodological advocacy for “thick transregion-
alism”, this chapter suggested a phenomenological approach to understand the 
existential dimension of transregional spatial entities. Focusing on connectivity, 
material mediation, and transition, the chapter has shown how ‘Dubai business’ 
shapes migrants’ lifeworlds in multiple ways. As illustrated, Tajiks are involved 
in Dubai’s tourism and trading business world via Persian-speaking networks. 
While ‘Persianness’ provides an important cultural repertoire for economic 
development and spiritual advancement, Tajik migrants’ display of ‘Arabness’ 
articulates their strong longing for attachment to the more prestigious, but ex-
clusive, Arab world of business, commerce, and cultural hegemony. Obviously, 
the Muslim worlds that Tajik migrants inhabit in Dubai are simultaneously real, 
experienced, and sensed, and thus materially existing and imagined. At the 
same time, these worlds are contested. When claiming to belong flexibly to both 
the Persian Gulf, with its historically grown cosmopolitan trading culture, and 
the Arabian Gulf, a political project that promotes an Arab nationalism that 
seeks to overwrite the cosmopolitan and transcultural heritage of long-
established economic and cultural connectivities across the Indian Ocean,45 
Tajiks situate themselves in the actual political and cultural discourses on re-
gional supremacy.  
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Through their involvement in transregional networks of Muslim mobility, 
trade, and connectivity, Tajik migrants creatively participate in processes of 
economic and cultural globalisation, as they are re-worked in intermediate 
regions such as the Gulf. Although Saudi-donated Korans are not the only Ko-
rans used by Tajik migrants and their families, their multi-local presence points 
to Saudi Arabia’s external reach and the country’s influence to shape globalised 
cultural and political fields through international religious donations. Global-
isation has revitalised the idea of the Ummah, as a postcolonial form of imagi-
nation for Muslims, particularly in migrant and diasporic contexts. Migrant 
narratives of the Ummah as a business community that creates moments of 
sharing, solidarity, as well as a sense of belonging to something larger that 
promotes post-national orientations, confirms Appadurai’s diagnosis that “im-
agination is today a staging ground for action, and not only escape”.46 At the 
same time, different conceptions of what the Ummah is, are worked out in com-
plex interactions of every day Muslim sociabilities, that emphasise diversity, 
difference, fragmentation, and reproduce existing notions of ‘centre’ and ‘pe-
riphery’. 
Tajiks’ positioning within the Ummah is framed through their sensed ‘pe-
ripheral’ status among Muslims in Central Asia and the wider world. Fashioning 
an exclusive migrant identity as Muslim businesspeople articulates their desire 
to overcome ethnic, regional, and national concepts of identity, inherent to the 
notion of ‘Tajikness’. This observation is in line with the refusal to share busi-
ness and living spaces with Turkish-speaking groups from Central Asia. Addi-
tionally, a sense of an elitist ‘Muslimness’ indexes Tajiks’ socio-economic posi-
tion in the highly pluralised and hierarchical migrant world in the Emirates, 
where they operate as ‘free’ businesspeople independently from the Emirati 
kafāla sponsorship system. Tajiks, in that way, reproduce racial discourses 
about low-wage labour Asian migrants, mainly from South Asia. The latter 
group of migrants, as shown, was not perceived as part of Dubai’s Muslim busi-
ness worlds by Tajiks. As a form of cultural and political situatedness, Kresse47 
has argued that peripherality can favour a cosmopolitanism that grounds on 
flexibility, openness, adaptability, and creativity to engage in multiple dis-
courses, debates, and cultures on different scales. This offers a repertoire of 
knowledge, experience, and skills, Tajiks can draw upon while abroad to fash-
ion their intermediary status as economic middlemen and cultural brokers. This 
goes hand in hand with the experience of both superiority and subordination. 
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This social reality complicates the common understanding of centre and pe-
riphery and creates ambivalent narratives of belonging and the imaginary no-
tion of the Ummah as a normative entity. 
With their aesthetic authority and mobile biography, Saudi-donated Korans 
operate both as a medium and as ‘icons’, through which processes of socio-
economic, religious and cultural positioning and re-positioning of Tajik mi-
grants can be traced as well as embedded in translocal and transregional fields 
of mobility, connectivity, and exchange. So, how do ideas (religious experienc-
es, ideals, and ideas of place) travel between the Gulf and the home of Tajik 
migrants? The blueprint of Gulf urbanism is being increasingly adopted in other 
parts of the Muslim world, in the course of transforming post-colonial urban 
landscapes into globalising places of living, working, and leisure that serve the 
new needs of the middle class and the demands of both local and international 
visitors.48 In Tajikistan, the aspirational world of ‘Dubai business’ finds its way 
into private households mainly through prestigious goods that travel in the 
pockets of migrants. Thus, Saudi-donated Korans play a role in terms of their 
indexicality for an exclusive ‘bourgeois Islam’. An aspirational migrant project 
oriented towards middle class lifestyles and social mobility, the notion of ‘bour-
geois Islam’ is inseparable from ‘Dubai’ as a brand that epitomises progress and 
success in the context of a hypermodernity that is highly exclusive.49 When 
Tajiks use Saudi-donated Korans from Dubai for their daily prayers or individual 
Koran recitations, during ritual gatherings or as a travel souvenir visibly dis-
played in the wall unit, they consume the exclusivity attached to the notion of 
‘bourgeois Islam’, and thus participate in this project while they themselves 
stay at home. Moreover, Saudi-donated Korans are passed around in private 
gatherings where the wives of returned migrants flaunt Dubai’s lifestyle among 
relatives and neighbours as they show off the latest Islamic fashion, modern 
kitchen appliances and trendy tableware that their husbands brought from 
Dubai. Thus, Saudi-donated Korans become a marker of social distinction and, 
in this capacity, a commodity whose symbolic value is created by desire, as the 
Korans also index the taste, cosmopolitanism, and exclusive urbanity of their 
owners.  
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Exile as Liminality 
Tracing Muslim Migrants in Fascist Europe 
Abstract: The chapter is a case study of the success and failures of Muslim mi-
grants to claim space for themselves in the Western world before and during the 
Second World War. Members of the Druze-Lebanese Hamada family tried to 
stabilise their lives under the precarious conditions of exile in light of their host 
societies’ projections of Muslim foreignness and Arab exoticism, which they 
tried to exploit for their own benefit taking on roles and enacting personae to 
satisfy expectations between France, the United States, Switzerland, and Italy. 
Mussolini’s pretentious showcasing as a “protector of Islam” opened up distinct 
possibilities for the Hamadas in an environment where tricksters and opportun-
ists met attention seekers and careerists in the fascist system. In particular, this 
chapter shows how Nur Hamada went to great lengths to prove her authenticity 
as a representative of modern Muslim womanhood.  
Coping with liminality 
Around June 20, 1940, a man stepped into the offices of the Italian Embassy in 
Madrid to “pay a visit of courtesy.” He said that his name was Amin Hamada. 
His nephew worked for the Italian-Arabic language propaganda radio station 
Radio Bari, and his grandnephew attended the renowned Convitto Nazionale 
boarding school in the city of Teramo, a two-hour drive from Rome. He also 
claimed to have good rapport with the Italian government. When asked about 
the reasons for his stay in Madrid, he said that he had been invited by Franco’s 
Foreign Minister Juan Luis Beigbeder, whose competence in Arab questions and 
sympathy for the Arabs he praised. He was also going to visit Morocco, where he 
had already made contact with leaders in the Spanish and French zones. The 
Spanish, he said, were trying to foment trouble in the latter, to have a pretext for 
intervention. When reporting this encounter to Rome, the embassy called 
Hamada a “fuoruscito,” a refugee or exile, and a “Syrian agitator.”1 
|| 
1 Archives of the Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome [henceforth MAE Rome], AffPol, Siria, 
Busta 24: Ambasciata d’Italia, Telespresso N. 3925/1166, Indirizzato a R. Ministero degli Affari 
Esteri = Roma – A.E.M. Uff.- IIIo, e, per conoscenza: R. Consolato d’Italia = Tetuan, Oggetto: 
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Agitator, refugee, migrant, wanderer – Amin was a bit of all. Madrid was 
just one station of an odyssey he and his older sister Nur had been on for several 
years, starting from their home country Lebanon with stations in France, the 
United States, Switzerland, and Fascist Italy. This chapter traces their migrant 
and exile experiences with a particular focus on their Italian episode. Exile, 
migrant, refugee – the Arabic equivalents for these words stand for semantic 
nuances. Based on their verbal roots, the word manfa emphasises flight and the 
place one is evicted to, mahjar is a sanctuary, it denotes the place for which one 
leaves another place, and ghurba or ightirab stress the estrangement from one’s 
own country, the experience of being a foreigner. The semantic differences con-
tain different degrees of agency that also reflect different degrees of deliberate-
ness in the denotation of absence. Migration can be forced, can bring relief, can 
be done with a purpose, but it always constitutes estrangement from both the 
place of origin and the destination. The terms are open ended, they depict more 
than journeys or travellers’ sojourns. Also, migration into exile is not necessari-
ly bipolar. Some exiles moved liberally, though not necessarily deliberately, 
across a multitude of borders, not just between two countries. This chapter in-
vestigates the refugee-migrants’ agency. Nur Hamada, Amin’s sister, plays a 
central role in this investigation due to her renown as a transnational activist on 
behalf of Muslim feminism. Her story highlights how a migrant could exploit a 
specific social and discursive location for personal interests. Being a Muslim 
woman in a western, non-Muslim context turned her into a mirror of stereotypes 
and expectations, which she in turn could bend and shape in an act of deliber-
ate mimesis.  
According to the social theorist Arpad Szakolczai, “mimesis,” or “imita-
tion,” describes a kind of action that is available for a person in a “liminal” 
state.2 “Liminality,” to start with, is a concept used for the analysis of rites of 
passage in ethnographic research. The liminal phase denotes the period, or 
passage “betwixt and between,” to use Victor Turner’s classic phrase, between 
segregation and re-aggregation, when a person ritually leaves a stable status in 
society and, respectively, re-enters society moving into a new stable status. 
Rites of this sort are universal, as they accompany the entry of youth into adult-
hood, or marriage. Arguably, the person who is in a state of liminality is de-
prived of structure that would ordinarily offer orientation for decision making, 
which is why the individual resorts to mimesis as a course of action. In other 
|| 
Amin Hamada, [dated:] Madrid, addi 22 giugno 1940 Anno XVIII, [signed: illegible]. The docu-
ment falsely introduced the grandnephew in Teramo as Amin Hamada’s son. 
2 Szakolczai 2009, 154. 
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words, a person’s agency in a transitory state is limited to the imitation of other 
people’s actions or to responding to their expectations as he or she is still unfa-
miliar with the rules of the new game they are supposed to enter. Another pos-
sible synonym for mimesis is “simulation,” which arguably leaves more room 
for individual decision-making when the person grows familiar with the rules of 
the game, yet is still in a volatile position on the playing field. Liminal situations 
can evoke a specific need for creative action, too, offering new answers to prob-
lems with a lasting, structural impact on a person, group, or entire society. So-
ciologists started to adopt the concept of liminality in the 1970s applying it to 
wider social contexts where not only individuals but entire social groups or 
societies, if not civilisations, enter liminal states. In the realm of literary criti-
cism, Homi K. Bhabha has argued that the term applies to the positionality of 
migrants “gathering on the edge of ‘foreign’ cultures,” and to the processes of 
nation formation in an imperialist context where metropolitan nationalism 
produces a permanent tension between the master text of the national narrative 
and the variety of the experiences of those who live within the national commu-
nity, including migrants. According to Bhabha, the migrants mimic gestures in 
a “mere imitation of life and labour” but without a chance to escape “the life of 
the double,” or stand-in. Migrants thus occupy a liminal space between absorp-
tion and rejection by the host society. Their position is not static, but they re-
main in a constant state of transitioning.3 
For this chapter’s period of inquiry, Paris has received particular scholarly 
attention as a node for international migration, and as an incubator of global-
ism and radical anti-colonialist activism among migrants, who formed a dis-
course community despite their diverse origins. Michael Goebel’s work draws 
attention to the wanderers between the colonial realm and the metropolis and 
the crucial role they played in the formulation of anti-imperialist nationalist 
ideology.4 Other places like London, Geneva, and New York City come to mind 
as hubs for migrant and exile activism. However, it remains an open question 
how deep the ideological convictions gained in exile went. When the precarious 
existence and specific unreal in-between-ness of life in the exile community 
gave way to the concrete issues that were at stake after the migrants’ return 
home, the convictions gained abroad had to be re-inserted into the thicket of a 
|| 
3 Szakolczai 2009, 154, Turner 1967, 93–111; Thomassen 2009, esp. 14–20, Horváth, Thomas-
sen, and Wydra 2015, 1–8, Bhabha 1990, 291–322, esp. 303, quotes on 291, 316. An example for 
the application of the liminality paradigm on contemporary migration can be found in Kirk, 
Bal, and Janssen 2017, 2771–87. 
4 Goebel 2015, passim; for “wanderlust” see 15. 
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local context, after leaving un-structured liminality. This is a particularly perti-
nent question when the focus shifts to fascist metropoles like Berlin or Rome as 
migrant spaces. They raise questions about ideological “contamination” or the 
“culpability of exile,” and the extent to which Arab and Muslim exiles and mi-
grants in Nazi Germany, voluntary or involuntary, became implicated in the 
deeds and ideology of the host country when the liminality of the migrant exist-
ence created conditions where the migrant was forced to cosy up, adapt, and 
subject him or herself to the standards of the host community. The arguments of 
this chapter build on more than two decades of research at the ZMO about such 
Muslim encounters with Nazi and fascist ideology, politics, and society. The 
knowledge gained in this effort carries the question about migrant experiences 
into a dark place where ideological and practical contingencies interact. How do 
migrants behave in highly ideologised societies, how are they received in places 
such as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Spain under Franco, or France under Pé-
tain, and what do these encounters have to contribute to an inquiry about the 
rise of postcolonial nationalism?5  
For the creative potentials of liminality to have a lasting impact, the liminal 
state cannot last indefinitely. A reconstruction of society needs to follow its 
deconstruction that initially opened the liminal phase, such as during a revolu-
tionary period, or for the duration of a devastating war. If the in-between-ness of 
the liminal status persists, people resort to narrow-minded imitation as they are 
trying to cope with instability and disorientation. According to Szakolczai, this 
is when they turn to tricksters and demagogues for leadership and emulation, 
who are experienced with life on the margins. In a status of permanent revolu-
tion, the trickster politicises and institutionalises his position and becomes a 
dictator skilfully perpetuating the liminal situation.6 This chapter makes use of 
the trickster as a trope, but in a slightly different way, arguing that migrants 
could use liminality to enter into a role-play themselves responding, as alluded 
before, to stereotypes of their host societies and playing to the expectations of 
their audiences. They did this to achieve a semblance of stability in their lives. 
As tricksters and jesters, or, to reiterate Bhabha’s words, as “doubles,” they 
tried to claim back some of their agency. The traces they left in the archives offer 
|| 
5 I have conceptualised the dilemma in Wien 2011, 332–58. The article investigates the in-
volvement of Arab exiles and students in the German propaganda apparatus before and during 
the Second World War. It presents this involvement in the light of the pressures they were 
exposed to in a racialised society where those had to make a living for whom returning home 
was not an option because they were political exiles, had family in Germany, or opted to finish 
university degrees. 
6 Thomassen 2009, 21–24, Szakolczai 2009, 154–59. 
 Exile as Liminality | 81 
  
images of resilience, despair, shrewdness, convergence, and ingratiation. The 
Hamada family offers a particularly dazzling example for such shrewd survival-
ism paired with the brazenness of impostors. They got involved with members 
of the political establishment in their host countries who considered them as 
potentially useful or exotic enough to attract attention. Thus, they moved aston-
ishingly close to the centres of power, while they remained economically mar-
ginalised at the same time, and with little recourse. Nur Hamada developed an 
intricate persona as a representative of Muslim womanhood in a cross-over 
between an oriental princess and a proponent of a limited version of women’s 
rights. In this she, together with her brother, tried to act as the kind of “ethno-
political entrepreneur” that Goebel identified in the Parisian interwar context, 
shaping and labelling migrant communities inwards and outwards.7 Arguably, 
Nur Hamada’s story therefore offers a glimpse at the image-making dynamics of 
the Western encounter with Muslim migrants in general. 
The following presentation of the travels and travails of the Hamada family 
is based on a reading of archival records in Italy and information available in a 
handful of secondary sources. The chapter, however, offers only a partial an-
swer to the broad question of the long-lasting impact of migrant experiences, 
beyond the migrants’ re-insertion into their home societies. A comprehensive 
rendering of the Hamada story, including the time after their return to Lebanon, 
will have to rely on further materials in Syrian, Lebanese, French, and US ar-
chives. 
A transnational feminist and undocumented 
migrant 
When Amin Hamada presented himself to the Italian embassy in Madrid, he did 
not disclose that he was only tagging along with his sister, Nur Hamada, who 
was without a doubt the more interesting of the Hamada exiles. She had a name 
in Arab Muslim reformist circles as a champion of women’s rights and Arab 
nationalist affairs. Nur was born between 1887 and 1898, the daughter of 
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Qasim ibn Husayn, who according to “family materi-
als” was “the first Sheikh of a united Druze community.” She attended universi-
ty in Beirut and spoke several languages. Her older brother Shaykh Husayn 
Hamada succeeded his father in his position, and she had a close relationship 
|| 
7 Goebel 2015, 58; his usage of the concept is based on Brubaker 2002, 166–68. 
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with her younger brother “with whom she shared an interest in the promotion 
of Arabic language and literature.” She was married without children to a dis-
tant Hamada family member, who served as a military officer in the Syrian 
Mandate army. By 1932, she was a widow and received a military pension. Her 
husband had apparently supported her unveiling.8 
There is little further information about Nur Hamada’s life in the existing 
historiography. It presents her as a pioneer of women’s organization in Syria 
and the broader Arab world. According to Elizabeth Thompson, Nur was already 
a leading young voice of Syrian and Lebanese feminism when she gave a speech 
at the first conference of the Lebanese Women’s Union in 1928. She played a 
crucial role in the organisation of the two Eastern Women’s Congresses of 1930 
in Damascus and 1932 in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran. However, other than 
the first generation of Syrian feminists of the early 1920s, who had advocated for 
women’s suffrage, her form of feminist activism stood for a shift away from a 
primacy of political equality to one of social equality in marriage and inheri-
tance rights as well as equal pay with an emphasis on the values of “patriotic 
motherhood.”9 
Nur Hamada elaborated on her role in the organisation of the first women’s 
congresses in the Middle East in a speech that she gave to the Tehran session of 
the Second Eastern Women’s Congress in 1932. As a founder and board member 
of various women’s charities in Lebanon she had been instrumental in forming 
Muslim and inter-religious Arab women’s associations active in Lebanon and 
Syria. With the support of the famed Egyptian women’s activist Huda Sha‘rawi 
she had organised the two Eastern Women’s Congresses, personally convincing 
the French High Commissioner to give his consent, and with the endorsement of 
the London based International Alliance of Women, of which she was a mem-
ber, and of the League of Nations.10 Most of this information about Nur Hama-
da’s life up until 1933 is also confirmed in Nova Robinson’s recent doctoral dis-
sertation on the transnational activism of Syrian and Lebanese feminists in the 
first half of the 20th century.11 
Nur Hamada’s ambitions went beyond mere local community activism. Prob-
ably, regional contacts with fellow Muslim women’s activists and with members 
of European sister organisations awakened her desire to develop her potentials 
|| 
8 DuBois and Emrani 2008, 107. 
9 Thompson 2000, 141–51. 
10 The speech is published verbatim in DuBois and Emrani 2008, 113–21. 
11 Robinson 2015. A relevant part is available in print in Robinson 2020, 121–37, and Robinson 
2021, 168–84. 
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as a figurehead, outside the boundaries of the patriarchal society of notables 
she lived in.12 In 1933, she embarked on a grand tour of the Western hemisphere 
to propagate herself as a proponent of ‘Oriental feminism.’ In October, she gave 
an interview to Maria Vérone, President of the French League for the Rights of 
Women (Ligue Française pour le Droit des Femmes) while passing through Par-
is. Vérone bemoaned the scarcity of knowledge about the women’s liberation 
movement in the Orient. In a patronising manner typical for the relationship 
between a Western and an ‘Oriental’ activist, Vérone remained fixated on ques-
tions of the veil. Nur showed her photos from the women’s congresses she had 
organised, but her French counterpart only noticed the different degrees of 
unveiling on the group pictures, from face veils in 1928, to headscarves in 1930, 
to a group of women in 1932 who were “completely liberated from the veil, sym-
bol of ancient serfdom (symbole de l’antique servage). (…) An immense progress 
has been achieved.” When asked about the outcomes of the conferences, Nur 
outlined a vision of patriotic motherhood, which apparently did not satisfy Vé-
rone, who noted dismissively that her demands were appropriate for “Islam or 
the countries with a purely oriental civilization.” Nur found out that it was diffi-
cult for a Muslim feminist to prevail even in the eyes of a Western combatant.13 
The interview, which took place shortly before Nur Hamada’s departure for 
North America, gave her a taste of the objectification that she and her brother 
would be exposed to, and that was partially of their own making. It foreshad-
owed the formation of an Oriental Muslim persona. In November 1933, the New 
York Times noted the arrival of the 36-year-old “Mme Nour Hamade” as a nota-
ble passenger disembarking the Ocean steamer Berengaria. She was “recog-
nised as the foremost feminine leader in Syria,” who had been a delegate to the 
“International Women’s Alliance at Geneva” and was now traveling “to attend 
the meetings of the International Committee for Peace,” to be followed by a half 
year stay and lecture tour. Upon arrival, she told the New York Times about 
women’s progress under the French mandate which could not have happened 
under “Turkish rule.”14 
Hamada arrived in New York with high hopes and great credentials, but she 
miscalculated and consequently entered the liminal zone of an exile existence. 
|| 
12 For the deconstruction and reconstruction of the paternal order in Syria and Lebanon 
during World War II and the French Mandate period, see Thompson 2000, 15–90. 
13 L’Oeuvre, October 28, 1933, 5: “L’Oeuvre des femmes: Le Féminisme en Orient.” Compare 
Robinson 2021, 174–275, Weber 2001, 125–57. 
14 New York Times, November 8, 1933, 32: “Mme. Nour Hamade here. Sister of Grand Sheik of 
Druses to attend Peace Meeting.” This reference is also in DuBois and Emrani 2008, 107, see fn 1. 
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This is probably where she joined her brother Amin, even though his activities 
in the United States are difficult to determine. The only trace that is available so 
far is his involvement with a certain Colonel Don Rockwell, who had some local 
fame in New York City as an Orientalising romantic poet and convert to Islam.15 
Short reports and classifieds in the New York Times listed some publications and 
speaking engagements that Rockwell had at gatherings of local women’s socie-
ties, suggesting that he was active in a milieu that provided a fitting context for 
interactions with the Hamada siblings.16 The immediate link between Rockwell 
and Amin Hamada is a book of poetry, the Bazaar of Dreams, that Rockwell 
published in 1934, full with Orientalising clichés, but also with references to 
current topics such as Arab nationalism and Islamic unity, as well as with dedi-
cations of poems to leading contemporary men of politics and culture in the 
Arab world. One poem, “The Rise of Islam’s Star,” is dedicated to the “Grand 
Sheikh Amin Hamada Bey,” who also provided Arabic translations of a selection 
of the poems, which are printed at the end of the book. There is also a biograph-
ical sketch in Arabic of “al-sha‘ir al-amirki al-Kulunil Muhammad Faisal Dun 
Rukwal” that has been the only identifiable source of information with some 
data about Rockwell’s life. Born in the US in 1895 he stemmed from a family 
that, Hamada assured, went back to William the Conqueror. After college, he 
worked as a publicist and undertook extended international travels, but it was a 
trip to the Muslim East and the Arab lands in 1925 that influenced him to con-
vert to Islam. Aside from that, Hamada did not even offer an explanation on 
what basis Rockwell used the title Colonel. The claim of a royal lineage can be 
read, however, as an indicator for the role that imaginary ancestries may have 
played in the Hamadas’ US circles.17 For Rockwell, as for many a European or 
North American bourgeois, conversion was just one step in the fulfilment of an 
exoticising Orientalist dream, which was in itself a liminal manoeuvre. The 
Hamada siblings seemed to be the perfect foil for such desires.18 
|| 
15 The internet still references him as an exemplary convert. See for example https://www.
islamreligion.com/articles/107/colonel-donald-s-rockwell-poet-and-critic-usa, accessed Febru-
ary 14, 2020. 
16 New York Times, November 24, 1935, BR14: “Books and Authors;” February 4, 1937, 19: 
“Events Today;” April 11, 1937, A16: “Books and Authors;” March 31, 1940, 54: “Activities 
Among Women’s Clubs Scheduled for This Week in the Metropolitan Area;” April 28, 1940, 46: 
“Week’s Activities Scheduled by Women’s Clubs in the Metropolitan Area.”  
17 Rockwell and Hamada 1934, 117; 167. 
18 Compare the remarks about the literary figure of the “Gentleman” in Bhabha 1990, 296. For 
a particularly intriguing example for conversion and liminality see the recent Baer 2020, pas-
sim. 
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Signposts of Nur Hamada’s remarkable American travel history appear in 
the files of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (USINS) as 
documented by Ellen Carol DuBois and Haleh Emrani, as well as in articles of 
the journal Equal Rights, which they cite. Hamada had received a US visa in 
1933. Her brother had been in the country since 1929, and Nur had contacts in 
the American women’s movement. In November 1933, she participated in the 
Ninth Annual Conference of the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War in DC 
and became an affiliate of the National Women’s Party to learn about organis-
ing. She decided to stay in the US and live with relatives in Detroit for a couple 
of years to learn English and teach Arabic, and to be with her brother who wrote 
for the Arabic newspaper al-Bayan in New York City. Apparently, she never took 
care to secure a residency permit and therefore started to be actively prosecuted 
for deportation in 1935. She fought back for two years with the support of the 
National Women’s Party and some of her Detroit Arabic students who sent peti-
tions to the USINS. When she was eventually detained for deportation in Febru-
ary 1936, a US citizen of Syrian background visited her and claimed to be her 
fiancé, but the immigration officials believed that it was a hoax. The Syrian 
community of Detroit came to her rescue once more and bailed her out, but after 
overstaying the grace period that had been granted to her, she lost that support 
as well and was even accused of fraud. Nur and her brother escaped in June 
1937, embarking on a ship bound for France as proper refugees with merely 20 
Dollars in their pockets. According to the USINS files, the ship’s captain let her 
on board when she assured that family members would cover the rest of their 
third-class passage upon arrival, but when the ship arrived in France, neither 
the Hamadas nor their family could be found.19 
Nur Hamada surfaced again in Geneva in 1938. Robinson’s dissertation of-
fers a detailed and somewhat distressing account of her sojourn in the Swiss 
metropole. It coincided with the creation of the Committee of Experts on the 
Legal Status of Women at the League of Nations as a nod to women’s rights 
issues in response to lobbying by international women’s groups. Robinson doc-
uments how the League of Nations archives recorded Nur Hamada’s efforts to 
use the committee’s foundation as an opportunity to reinsert herself into inter-
national women’s activism. In more negative terms, she exploited the situation 
in an attempt to secure an elevated position and a sizable income to finance her 
life style. This drive may be understandable in the light of the humiliations she 
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had suffered in America, but the means she used make her look not only like a 
trickster, but like a charlatan.20 
Hamada’s outward concern was respectable. Eight members constituted the 
committee, half of whom were men, and all of whom veered from either Europe 
or North America. Their selection was based on nominations by League of Na-
tions member states, which excluded states under colonial or Mandate rule per 
definition. International women’s organisations, primarily from Latin America, 
lobbied the League to accept additional, non-European women experts. In Jan-
uary 1938, the Secretariat of the League of Nations received letters from several 
women’s organisations that claimed to be active in Beirut and Damascus, but 
also from a so-called Orient-Occident League in New York City, nominating Nur 
Hamada as a representative for Eastern women. Later in the month Nur ap-
peared at the League of Nations offices in person. Over the course of the year 
until January 1939, she led a campaign to secure a seat at the table for herself. 
She used a Geneva hotel as headquarters, claiming that a Lebanese-Syrian 
women’s organisation had named her President for Life, and that she was 
speaking for the Geneva mission of the Orient-Occident League. She did not 
know that the Secretariat had requested information about her in the meantime, 
with disastrous results. An anonymous report, prepared by a Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA) associate in Beirut, conveyed that her law degree 
was fake, and that people in Beirut had not heard of the organisations that had 
recommended her. One letter had been sent from a relative’s address in Beirut, a 
signature on another letter had been provided by a woman of allegedly ques-
tionable reputation. The condescending and orientalist tone of the report not-
withstanding, it argued rather convincingly that Nur Hamada was a trickster. 
According to the damning remarks of a Druze shaykh residing in Beirut, she 
habitually sought pretexts to get her travels financed. No one had heard of her 
since she had left Beirut for America five years earlier. 
Nur Hamada seemed desperate, but she had staying power. She sent out in-
vitations to a conference on women’s rights that she said she was organising, 
and got a newspaper to report on an event, where, however, all attendants but 
herself and an acquaintance were corresponding participants only. It is hard to 
avoid the impression that Nur Hamada was very eager to perform an act of sim-
ulation to become a female counterpart to Shakib Arslan, the well-respected 
representative for Arab-Muslim affairs at the League of Nations, who was also a 
fellow Druze from Mount Lebanon. Arslan was the scion of an aristocratic Druze 
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20 The assessment of Nur Hamada’s motives for her actions in Geneva are the author’s. They 
are not a direct reference to Robinson’s analysis. 
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family and had a career as an Ottoman administrator, Muslim intellectual and 
poet, and as a delegate in the Ottoman Parliament before World War I. He be-
came an exile after the war due to his continuing support for Ottoman sover-
eignty, taking up a liminal existence until shortly before the end of his life when 
he returned to Lebanon. He resided in Geneva from 1921 to 1946, detached from 
the intricacies of local politics in the Arab lands, but at the same time, in con-
trast to the Hamadas, he remained deeply connected through a closely-knit 
international network of contacts and supporters. He therefore retained consid-
erable influence, though largely on a discursive level. It is more than likely that 
Nur Hamada met Arslan in Geneva, but he did not mention her in the contem-
poraneous issues of his largely self-authored journal La Nation Arabe.21 
In Mussolini’s Rome 
When Nur Hamada travelled to Italy in late 1939, her reputation had been shat-
tered twice, once in America, and once during her failed bid for leadership in 
Muslim women’s international affairs. She was clearly hungry for recognition, 
worried about her increasing marginalisation, and probably also financially 
strained. While direct references to Islam had not been prominent in her state-
ments in Geneva, the way she was inserted, or inserted herself into Rome’s Mid-
dle Eastern exile community after the Geneva episode clearly marked her as a 
signifier in the Oriental Arab-Muslim imaginary of her fascist hosts. The follow-
ing report about her and her brother Amin’s engagement with Fascist Italy 
should not be read as a judgment over her morality and the sincerity of her fem-
inist commitment, however. Rather, it illustrates in a remarkable way how the 
Hamadas’ liminality as exiles created the conditions for their brief career as 
Fascist collaborators. This particular kind of migrant mimesis thus framed their 
culpability. 
The Hamada siblings’ journey to Italy had a pragmatic reason, too. Their 
nephew Mahmud Hamada had been living there since August 1939 when he and 
his wife undertook a trip to visit their children who were attending school in 
Italy. His Italophile and, supposedly, pro-fascist leanings were notorious in 
Beirut, so that he was barred from returning to Lebanon after the outbreak of 
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21 Robinson 2015, 248–321. See also Robinson 2020 and 2021, esp. 178–80, which, however, do 
not reference the critical Beirut report. On Arslan, see Cleveland 1985. For La Nation Arabe see 
Adal 2002.  
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World War II in September. His fascist connections probably helped him find 
employment with the Ministero della Cultura popolare (MinCulPop) and Radio 
Bari as a translator and propagandist.22 He may well have been the one to invite 
his aunt and uncle to his personal fascist paradise. 
Whatever Amin’s and Nur’s actual commitment was, they lost no time and 
inserted themselves into the Arab exile community in Rome and its bonds with 
the fascist state. Nur Hamada gave a radio speech on the occasion of the end of 
Ramadan in November 1939. She addressed the “[s]ons of my country and my 
nation…” on the occasion of the feast “in our beloved language, the language of 
the letter dâd, the language of the great prophet and of the gracious Qur’an, 
from the Bari station, from Rome, the great city of the arts.” Aside from greet-
ings and well-wishes the speech was free from ideological allusions. However, it 
was exceptional that an Arab woman spoke on a station where women were 
otherwise largely absent, not as objects of deliberations, but as subjects with 
agency. To give her time on the air was probably a decision of opportunity, in 
line with the improvisational character of Radio Bari’s programming altogether. 
Usually, the speakers were male Arab students who, like Nur Hamada, hap-
pened to be around, without experience or specific capacities.23 The monthly 
Arabic magazine Radio Bari (“Radyu Bari”), published by MinCulPop, intro-
duced Hamada as an “Arab women’s leader” (“al-za‘ima al-niswiyya al-
‘arabiyya”), President of the “International Women’s Society Orient Occident” 
(“ra’isat al-jam‘iyya al-nisa’iyya al-duwaliyya al-Sharq wa-l-Gharb”), in the 
name of which she also extended her greetings in the speech. Apparently, she 
did not shy away from promoting the same persona that had crumbled so quick-
ly in Geneva.24 
|| 
22 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 25, Folder: 1941, AEM 3o, Amin Bey Hamada e sorella – Sitt 
Nur Bey – Stessa posizione 1940, Siria 1/1: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Gabinetto, 1/04806, 
Appunto per la Direzione Generale A.E.M.-III, [dated:] Roma, 25 November 1941 XX, [signed:] Il 
Capo di Gabinetto [illegible]. Transmits the following, enclosed letter by Mahmud Hamada, 
living in Rome at Piazza Adriana 12, with a request to examine and give notice. [attached:] 
(handwritten letter, three pages) [dated:] Roma 27 Ottobre 1941 XIX, [signed:] Lo Sceicco Mah-
maud Hamada (Piazza Adriana 12), All ‘Eccellenza il Comm. De Cesare, Segretario Particolare 
del Duce, Roma. See also Marzano 2015, 91; 135. 
23 Marzano 2015, 90; 199–201. 
24 Radyu Bari, January 1940, 18–19: [Section] “Mir’at al-Sayyidat [Mirror of Ladies]: Al-Amira 
Nur Hamada, ra’isat al-jam‘iyya al-nisa’iyya al-duwaliyya al-Sharq wa-l-Gharb.” 
 Exile as Liminality | 89 
  
 
Fig. 1: Nur Hamada speaking on Radio Bari. The picture appeared in the magazine Radyu Bari, 
January 1940, 18. 
Nur received a more prominent platform on January 20, 1940, when the Par-
tito nazionale fascista invited her to give a speech on the occasion of the cele-
brations of ‘Id al-Adha, organised by the Gruppi universitari fascisti as an event 
for foreign students. As this was apparently the first occasion of its kind in Italy, 
diplomatic representatives of “Muslim Oriental states” such as the Iraqi ambas-
sador, as well as Italian students of Oriental studies and Roman orientalists 
gathered in the Palazzo Braschi, a significant fascist landmark in Rome.25 Nur, 
who introduced herself once more as president of the Orient-Occident League 
(“Lega Oriente-Occidente”), clearly intended to massage the vanities of her 
audience. First, she laid out her commitment to interreligious and international 
partnership that had been so important for her projections in Geneva. Rome was 
the seat of the vicar of Christ, “salute su di Lui,” she said, using what was prob-
ably in Arabic the Muslim honorific “peace be upon him.” The beautiful feast of 
sacrifice was a tangible proof for a union between the Crescent and the Cross, a 
prelude to peace, unity, and brotherhood among all descendants of humankind, 
she said. “From this foundation, a gigantic and flourishing civilization will arise 
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25 Today, it houses the Museum of Rome: http://www.museodiroma.it/en/sede/palazzo_
braschi, accessed February 12, 2020. At times, during Fascist rule, a large rendering of Mussoli-
ni’s face famously adorned its façade: https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Palazzo_braschi_
1934.jpg, accessed February 12, 2020. 
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that will collect from the beauties of the Orient and the Occident the fruits of a 
mature civilization, infusing in the hearts of the children of these two worlds 
truth, justice, and virtue.” 
She explained that during the feast, millions of Muslims commemorated the 
day when God told Abraham not to sacrifice his son Isaac: “Oh, how beautiful is 
this anniversary, which today arrives twice as solemnly, that is twice as much 
because of the honor that you bestow through your participation,” she told her 
audience. Her speech, which had been quite innocuous so far, now turned into 
flattery: “We pray to the Lord on high that he may make all your days as festive, 
and that you could always be happy under the shield of the great imperator 
Vittorio Emanuele III, and protected by His government, on top of which is the 
Duce, whose wisdom equals that of Solomon. Certainly, all of you will join me in 
exclaiming: ‘Long live the great king and the head of his government, the Duce, 
long live the noble Italian nation! Long live the Arab and Muslim monarchs, 
along with their monarchies and all Arab and oriental populations, and also, 
long live all nations whose motto is Truth, justice, and peace!’.” 
She concluded, addressing the students in the audience to “[c]lose your 
ranks, raise your heads, and renew your glory, oh children of the Arabs!”26 
Nur’s speech was certainly not a political statement, nor was it meant as 
propaganda for the Arab students. Arguably, it was mostly self-serving in that it 
was a verbal prostration in front of the men who embodied Fascist Italy’s state-
hood. It was a praise of monarchism, because Italy was a monarchy, and it 
closed with a reference to nationalist youthfulness and discipline, which Nur 
Hamada may have picked up as core elements of Fascist self-fashioning. The 
reference to “Truth, Justice, and Peace,” on the other hand, sounds more like an 
atavism from her League of Nations episode. It did not fit in a time when Italy 
was quite unpopular in the Middle East for its cruel imperialist policy in Libya 
and the conquest of Ethiopia.27 Just months earlier, Mussolini had ordered the 
occupation of Albania, and only a few months later he would try to reap the 
benefits of the Axis alliance with Germany invading southern France in June. 
In a more subtle way, Nur’s appearance at the celebration illustrates how 
the liminality of her situation made her mimic the stereotypes of an orientalist 
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26 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: Ministero della Cultura Popolare, Direzione generale per 
il servizio della stampa estera, Telespresso N. 532/43, Indirizzato a R. Ministero degli affari 
esteri, e per con.: Direzione Generale della Propaganda Sede, (Oggetto) Sitt Nur Bey Hamadah, 
Roma 26 Gen. 1940 Anno XVIII. (signed: [illegible]), (contains a cover letter and a translation of 
the speech); Marzano 2015, 200. 
27 Gershoni and Jankowski 2010, 16–17 et al., Erlich 2014, 271–88. 
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romance between East and West, Islam and Christianity, that had been haunt-
ing her and her brother since the days in America. It was the religious holiday 
that secured her a spot in the limelight. Moreover, the topos of motherly care for 
the sons of the country was typical for the Muslim feminist discourse in Arab 
lands at the time, but also sat well with her fascist hosts.28 A report on the gath-
ering in Radio Bari’s magazine sheds light on the channels that Nur Hamada 
likely used to ingratiate herself with the authorities. Among the people in the 
audience were two leading women’s rights proponents with close connections 
to the Fascist regime, Contessa Daisy di Robilant and Maria Castellani. The for-
mer was an advocate for mothers’ and children’s rights and held leading posi-
tions in national and international women’s organisations, who, however, had 
grown more distant from Mussolini in the second half of the 1930s, yet remained 
a well-known public figure. Castellani, in turn, was a prominent US-educated 
mathematician, who headed an important Fascist women’s professional organi-
sation. As both women had no obvious connection to the Arab community in 
Rome, their presence must have been due to former links with Nur Hamada 
from international women’s organisation circles, but they also confirm that Nur 
tried to establish herself as a tool of Fascist propaganda.29 
The Hamadas had an obsession with status. Nur’s kowtowing to Italian and 
Arab royalty was an effort to pull herself out of the twilight of insignificance. In 
Italy, they presented themselves as members of the Druze upper nobility. Radio 
Bari called her “Princess Nur Hamada,” a business card her nephew used 
introduced him as “Le Cheikh Mahmoud Hamada: fils du Grand Cheikh des 
Druzes.”30 Nur Hamada had referenced family connection to her brother, 
Mahmud’s father, when she arrived in the United States already (“sister of the 
Grand Sheik of the Druses of Labanano and Mount Hermon in Syria”).31 The 
same honorific titles appear in the Italian foreign policy documents, except for 
one, in which the Italian Consul in Damascus, Castellani, replied to Rome’s 
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28 On the topos, see for example Pollard 2005, 139–49; 152–63. 
29 Radyu Bari, March 1940, 64–65: “Ahamm Akhbar al-‘Uruba: Al-Ihtifal bi-‘Id al-Adha al-
mubarak fi Ruma.” On di Robilant and Castellani see De Grazia 1992, 91; 178; 184–85; 241–42; 
258–59; 280. See also the biographical entry on the Robilant on https://www.encyclo
pedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/di-robilant-daisy-countess-
fl-1922–1933, accessed February 12, 2020. 
30 Contained in MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 25, Folder: 1941, AEM 3o, Amin Bey Hamada e 
sorella – Sitt Nur Bey – Stessa posizione 1940, Siria 1/1: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Gabinetto, 
1/04806, Appunto per la Direzione Generale A.E.M.-III, [dated:] Roma, 25 November 1941 XX, 
[signed:] Il Capo di Gabinetto [illegible]. 
31 New York Times, “Mme. Nour Hamade here…”, see fn. 4. 
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request for information about the dazzling couple. Castellani wrote that the 
Hamadas indeed belonged to the Druze of Lebanon. Amin, however, was hardly 
known in Damascus in spite of several sojourns. His name was known in the 
Druze mountains, but he could not be counted among the most influential 
leaders. Castellani also questioned Amin’s assertion that he had fought in the 
1925 Syrian Revolt as a combatant. It contradicted another of his claims, that he 
had left Syria because of allegations that involved him in an attempt on General 
Gouraud, the French High Commissioner’s life. This attempt took place on June 
24, 1921, long before the start of the revolt.32 
In the meantime, the Hamadas tried to build channels to the highest eche-
lons of Italian politics and society. The French embassy seems to have been 
particularly suspicious of these activities. Correspondence with Paris mentions 
that the Hamadas had been received by the Pope – an information that could 
not be verified separately – and might be received by the Duce and the King. 
The diplomats also reported that Nur Hamada propagated the opening of an 
Islamic Centre in Rome, divided into sections for politics, culture, and religion, 
containing a mosque and a lecture hall, comparable to the mosque in Paris. She 
also suggested that MinCulPop should open an Arab information centre, similar 
to the ones in other European capitals, to promote Italian and Arab collabora-
tion. With the help of Italian orientalists, it should make information for the 
press available to confirm that a new civilisation had emerged between Italy 
and the Arab world. Nur even requested a meeting with CulPop Minister Ales-
sandro Pavolini, who passed the request on to another official to discuss the 
plans. It seems that, as in Geneva, she did not succeed in securing any ap-
pointments.33 The same is true for her attempts to meet with royalty. In Decem-
ber 1939 and January 1940, the foreign ministry advised the royal family’s cere-
monial office against granting the Hamadas audiences with the King and 
Queen. The report mentioned that Nur Hamada posed as a champion of femi-
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32 Castellani’s report in MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: R. Consolato d’Italia, Telespresso 
No. 113/28, Indirizzato a R. Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, A.E.M. = Uff. IIIo Roma, (Posizione) 
Ind., (Oggetto) Amin bey e sorella Sitt Nur Bey Hamadah, (Riferimento) Teles di V.E. 25 Dicem-
bre u.sc. No. 13/244988/C., Damasco, addi 16 Gennaio 1940 Anno XVIIIo. (signed: Castellani); 
the claim about the Revolt is in an undated note in ibid.: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, A.E.M. 
IIIo, Appunto per la Direzione Gen. Affari Generali IVo, [no date, unsigned]. On the attempt on 
Gouraud’s life see Le Figaro, June 25, 1921, p1: “Un attentat contre le général Gouraud,” and 
Khoury 1987, 154. 
33 Marzano 2015, 200, see references on 246. 
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nism in the Orient and quoted the aforementioned less than complimentary 
information by the Damascus consulate.34 
The Hamadas’ conspicuous consumption patterns did not help to mitigate 
unfavourable impressions either. When they arrived in Rome they chose repre-
sentative accommodation in hotels near the Villa Borghese. Already in March 
1940, Amin Hamada was in financial distress and notorious for frequenting 
luxury establishments. The “Direzione Generale di P.S.” (Pubblica Sicurezza, 
the Directorate of Police in the Ministry of the Interior) had developed an inter-
est in Amin, so that the foreign ministry felt compelled to inquire and confirm 
that there were reasons to support his residency and work permit in Italy, cer-
tainly in reference to work at MinCulPop. The ministry even asked how much it 
might cost to bail the Hamadas out financially.35 
Financial instability was a leitmotif of the relationship the Hamadas main-
tained with the Fascist state. In January 1940, Nur Hamada received an invita-
tion from several Moroccan Muslim dignitaries, including the nationalist leader 
Makki al-Nasiri, to visit the Spanish zone in the country’s north and consult 
them on the organisation of elementary school education for girls. The Spanish 
authorities had given their consent, and later it was confirmed that Amin would 
accompany his sister on the trip. How she secured this invitation remains un-
clear, but the Italians did not question her qualifications as an Islamic educa-
tionist. Apparently, everyone was happy to accept her role play for reality. Some 
did express concerns about her brother Amin, though, who had lived a precari-
ous life in Paris and New York before coming to Italy, whose financial situation 
was desperate since he had squandered his fortune, yet who was still a spend-
thrift, who did not know to use ordinary resources, and whose affairs were no 
reason for confidence, as the documents in the archives spell out.36 
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34 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, A.E.M.III, 00698/L3, Ap-
punto per il cerimoniale, [dated:] Roma, li 7 Gennaio 1940.XVIII, [signed:] Guarnaschelli. 
35 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, A.G.IVo, 34/R 03816/279, 
Appunto per la Dir. Gen. A.E.M. Uff.IIIo, [dated:] Roma, li 12 Mar 1940 Anno XVIII, [signed: 
illegible]. 
36 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Riservato, Telespresso N. 
13/03981, Indirizzato a R. Consolato Tetuan, e per conoscenza R. Ambasciata Madrid, RR. 
Consolati Gen. Tangeri, Rabat, R. Consolato Casablanca, Posizione Siria 1/1, (Oggetto) Sitt Nur 
Bey Hamadah, Roma adde 30 Gen 1940 Anno XVIII. (signed: Butt [?]); Consolato di S.M. il Re 
d’Italia, Riservato, Telespresso N. 16 PR/48, Indirizzato a R. Ministero Affari Esteri Roma, e p.c. 
R. Ambasciata d’Italia Madrid, Oggetto: Sitt Nur Bey Hamadah, Riferimento: Telespresso minis-
teriale n.13/03981 del 30 gennaio u.s., Tetuan, Addi 12 marzo 1940 Anno XVIII [signed: illegi-
ble]; Ministero degli Affari Esteri, A.E.M. IIIo, Riservato – Personale, Appunto per il Comm. 
Leonini, [dated:] Roma, li 1 Maggio 1940 XVIII [unsigned]. 
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It is not clear on the basis of the Italian documents if Nur Hamada ever 
made it to Spanish Morocco. Amin, however, did not get further than Madrid, 
where we met him first, walking into the Italian embassy claiming that he was 
on an official mission from the Spanish government. More than two weeks after 
this visit, in early July, Amin was still in Madrid and expressed his desire to the 
embassy to return to Italy by airplane. No one in Rome seems to have been too 
keen on having him back, though. When the embassy inquired whether to give 
him a visa despite the fact that he had a French passport from his earlier exile in 
the country, Rome replied that on principle, persons with French passports 
were not given access. After all, Italy had declared war on France in June. The 
foreign ministry recommended to treat Amin Hamada with politeness, while 
maintaining careful circumspection.37 The last trace of Amin Hamada is a tele-
gram the Italian ambassador sent to Rome less than a week later to report that 
the Spanish foreign ministry had asked if Amin Hamada should not be accom-
panied across the Pyrenees, given the circumstance that the propaganda activi-
ty, for which he had claimed he was in Spain, was called off. Otherwise, it might 
become prohibitively expensive to extend his stay at the Ritz in Madrid. Neither 
the Italian nor the Spanish fascist authorities seemed to be in the light about 
Amin Hamada’s plans, but nevertheless he had been able to convince them to 
cover his bill for luxury accommodation. Now they were debating who would 
pick up the scraps and see to his departure from the country.38 
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37 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Uff. AEM III, 19748, Tele-
gramma in Partenza N. 1944688/308 [?] (Filo-Cifra), Indirizzato a R. Ambasciata Madrid, [dat-
ed:] Roma, li 10/7 1940 ore 19.45, Spedito da Veschiol. [?], [signed:] Guarnaschelli [?], (Testo) 
Vostro 325; [attached:] Telegramma in Arrivo, Decifrato da BG/Freschi, Cifra N23861 PR., (ini-
tials) Il Capo dell’Ufficio Cifra, Mittente: R. Ambasciata Madrid, [dated:] Madrid 8.7.40 XVIII ore 
15.-, Roma, li idem ore 19.30, Assegnazione: A.E.M., Oggetto: Hamada Arnin [sic] – Siriano, 
[signed:] Zoppi. 325 – Per Ufficio III Dir. Gen. Europa Mediterraneo. 
38 MAE Rome, AffPol, Siria, Busta 24: R. Ambasciata d’Italia, Telespresso N. 4494/1317, Indi-
rizzato a 1) R.Ministero degli Affari Esteri = Roma, A.E.M. Ufficio IIIo, e, p.c.: 2) R.Consolato 
d’Italia = Tetuan, 3) Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna, Madrid, Posizione: Marocco.-, Ogget-
to: Amin Hamada, Referimento: 1) Telespresso ministeriale n.13/19673/C -Pos.Siria 1/1 – 
dell’11us. [July 11], 2) Telespresso di quest’Ambasciata n. 3926 del 22 giugno u.s., [dated:] Ma-
drid, addi 16 luglio 1940 Anno XVIII, [signed: illegible]. 
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Conclusion 
At this point, the traces of Amin and Nur Hamada disappear, though future 
research might make it possible to tell a more complete version of their story. 
According to “family history” as relayed in DuBois and Amrani’s article, Nur 
later returned to Lebanon to live with her brothers. She died in Lebanon in 
1962.39 Apparently, the family tradition was silent about the Italian sojourn. The 
only author who has made a passing reference to it so far is Arturo Marzano in 
his history of Fascist Italian radio propaganda.40 
Until today, migrants, refugees, and exiled people like the Hamadas live 
under precarious circumstances at the margins of one, sometimes several socie-
ties. They show up in unexpected places, in localities where they should not be. 
Yet despite, or maybe because of the liminality of their existence, they leave 
traces in the archives. Like Nur and Amin Hamada, they are exploited, get in 
trouble with the authorities, become desperate for money and therefore have to 
enter alliances they otherwise would not have chosen. For the Hamadas this 
meant that they relied on their charms and the receptiveness of their audience 
for orientalist allure to gain attention and secure financial support. In an act of 
simulation, they created doubles of their hosts’ expectations. After her experi-
ence in the US, Nur was willing to go the extra mile to avoid a recurrence of the 
humiliation she had experienced, without being all too particular about her 
choice of partners, whether they were the League of Nations or Fascist Italy, 
which had derided and left the League in 1937. 
The Hamadas’ experiences as exiles have been at the centre of this chapter 
as they were filtered through the archives of their host countries. Other archival 
researchers have certainly had similar chance encounters with individuals who 
stand out from the rest, not least because the document-generating authorities 
had a hard time categorising them and administering them away as Muslims, 
refugees, spendthrifts, or troublemakers. Many of these cases are tragic, yet 
some of them are not devoid of charm and humour. Nur and Amin Hamada’s 
story belongs in the latter category, and while it represents a pronounced case 
of opportunism, it is also a remarkable document of resilience and staying power 
in difficult times, coping with being stuck, betwixt and between. 
|| 
39 DuBois and Emrani 2008, 110. 
40 Marzano 2015. 
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Governing Muslim Subjects in the Sahel 
Deradicalisation and a State-Led Islamic Reform in West Africa 
Abstract: This chapter focuses on deradicalisation, a concept and a practice that 
has become popular in initiatives that seek to govern Muslims in the Sahel. A 
key element in the vocabulary of the state and international organisations oper-
ating in the region, deradicalisation emerged in the last decade as a major social 
engineering project intended to reform Muslims and to rebirth them to positive 
values and norms. To this end, the deradicalised subjects are expected to “clean 
up”, “be treated”, “relax their views”, and embrace responsible citizenship. 
Espousing a developmentalist agenda and philosophy, deradicalisation trans-
lates into a strategy that tackles Jihadism and restores good Islam. Both curative 
and preventive, it is understood as the clinical intervention on both an ailing 
social body and a lunatic individual subject. That is why it targets individuals 
and specific groups, such as Imams, preachers, disenfranchised youth, and 
jihadi prisoners who are perceived as the social base and the main agents of 
radicalisation. What is the content of this curative intervention? How did this 
social engineering programme come to represent one of the main lenses 
through which Muslims are perceived today and in turn experience state poli-
cies? What is the interest of examining deradicalisation for an anthropology of 
Islam and Muslim life in the region? The chapter contends that Sahelian states 
have embarked on an Islamic reform project through deradicalisation pro-
grammes. 
Introduction 
On December 7, 2019, the evening news on Télé Sahel, Niger’s National televi-
sion channel, devoted about 15 minutes to a graduation ceremony held in the 
town of Goudoumaria, in the south-east of the country. For the last few years, 
Goudoumaria and the region in general has been experiencing a jihadi insur-
gency led by the organisation Boko Haram1. The ceremony was held to celebrate 
|| 
1 Boko Haram also known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād is a jihadi group 
that was founded in north-east Nigeria in 2002. It is also referred to as the ‘Islamic State in West 
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the end of a deradicalisation training programme for some of the insurgents 
who repented, but most importantly to show how a programme funded by the 
Niger Government and its partners (EU and USA in particular) has been success-
ful in driving young people out of an insurgency that has marred the whole 
Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria). The graduates were 
mostly young men who had joined Boko Haram to fight state rule and establish 
Islamic law and order in the region. After they repented, they were offered the 
opportunity to join a deradicalisation camp set up in December 2016 and where 
they enrolled in a vocational training programme intended to keep them from 
relapsing, after they were pardoned by the government and their communities. 
The reportage shows the graduates standing by their stalls displaying the vari-
ous products and tools they made during the training. In the congratulatory 
greetings and gestures of the Niger Minister officiating the ceremony, one could 
read the satisfaction of an administration that claims that its initiatives to coun-
ter Islamic radicalisation are working and should be both supported and ex-
panded. Ideologically ‘clean’, well dressed, and equipped with professional 
skills and a toolkit, the former insurgents looked ready for a fresh start in their 
respective communities. In the words of the Minister, 
the effectiveness of this deradicalisation programme is right here in front of us, with 110 
young people now ready to go to their communities and restart a normal life (…). They will 
all receive a certificate attesting that they have successfully completed a deradicalisation 
programme and for that reason constitute no major risk for the society. On their part, they 
will commit to stay away from any terrorist activities, to contribute to peace and security 
within their communities (…) and they will respect state laws and regulations. They will 
make this commitment by taking oath on the sacred Qur’an.2 
Among the graduates were also 57 former insurgents from Nigeria, the neigh-
bouring country where Boko Haram has represented an even greater threat to 
social cohesion and the rule of state law. 
As the Minister’s statements show, deradicalisation has become a political 
concept, and a critical part of a government strategy designed to solve a radical-
isation crisis inspired by Jihadism. I will argue that it has also become one of the 
powerful references in current policies that have sought to counter Jihadism in 
|| 
Africa’. It is often viewed as the exemplar of extremism in the region and to which both the 
concepts of radicalisation and deradicalisation are applied. 
2 Discours, M. Bazoum: Télé Sahel, December 7, 2019. 
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the Sahel3. It illustrates how governments now concern themselves with Islam 
while facing an ideological, economic, and political process that has unravelled 
across the region and threatens the very foundations of the state. Furthermore, 
the idea, as the TV reportage shows, was to transform individual subjects who 
have radicalised, became ill-mannered, and dangerous for their communities 
and social order. 
A concept increasingly used to account for developments and dynamics 
that involve Islam and claims of being Muslim, radicalisation is usually, if not 
equated, at least paired with ‘violent extremism’, another concept that made its 
way into the analytical frame used to understand the life conditions, trajecto-
ries, and experience of individuals fighting the central state and other social 
institutions. Those who radicalised and called for alternative governance and 
politics have found an important mode of expression and an avenue for both 
social and political action in the most recent Sahelian jihads. In those contexts, 
as the theory of radicalisation put it, various youth formations, ethnic groups, 
and socio-religious organisations have relied on violence to push for and 
achieve societal change.4 
Interest in radicalisation, especially in religious contexts, has resulted in an 
expanding body of literature. Not surprisingly, in an era of war against Islamic 
terrorism, some of the most significant contributions to this literature come 
from the study of Islam and Muslim societies.5 From this perspective, radicalisa-
tion offers an opportunity to critically examine how Islam becomes entangled 
with local6 and global politics7, state institutions, and various socioeconomic 
processes characteristic of our times8. 
In the way it has been thought of and used to characterise sociohistorical 
processes, radicalisation hardly stands alone. In most contexts, it has invited its 
twin sister: deradicalisation. While governments and international organisa-
tions stamp radicalisation with a negative connotation, seeing in it attitudes 
|| 
3 The Sahel refers to the vast geographical area that extends from Djibouti to Senegal. Most of 
my discussion, though, will focus on the central part of the Sahel, i.e. Niger, Burkina Faso, and 
Mali. 
4 Anonymous 2012, Sagramoso 2012, Harmon 2014, Rabasa et al. 2010a, 157–80, Olomojobi 
2015, Koehler 2016. 
5 Kenney 2019, MacEachern 2018, Aghedo 2017, Aning 2017, Khosrokhavar 2017, Hentz and 
Solomon 2017, Perouse de Montclos 2017, Neumann 2013, Porges 2010. 
6 Idrissa 2017, Seck 2010 and 2009, Launay and Soares 2009, Otayek and Soares 2007. 
7 DeLong-Bas 2007, Meijer 2009 
8 Meagher and Mustapha 2020, Ehrhardt and Umar 2020, Umar 2020, Harmon 2014, Scheele 
2015. 
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and actions that disrupt and unsettle social order and political institutions, 
deradicalisation is thought of as a restorative response and a cure aimed at 
creating normality, or at least mitigating the potential of radicalisation to lead 
to crisis. 
In this contribution, I offer a discussion on the attempts by governments in 
the Sahel region – mainly Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso – to respond to what 
they view as an Islamic radicalisation, to counter its subjects or to quell their 
influence all at once, and to “restore normal law and order”, as an official in 
northern Nigeria put it.9 Politics, government policies, and non-governmental 
interventions in the Sahel are now heavily shaped by a discourse that empha-
sises the urgency to counter radicalisation and find its antidote. As a conse-
quence, deradicalisation has emerged as a key governance concept and a politi-
cal agenda around which local governments, international organisations and 
agencies, the EU, and the USA are constantly rallying. 
With the emergence of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region in 2010 and the 
rise of jihadi groups in northern Mali in 2012, deradicalisation took the form of a 
state-led curative intervention, gaining currency in the regional discourse about 
Islam and Muslims, but also with initiatives that seek to govern Muslims in the 
Sahel region.10 In response to radicalisation, deradicalisation becomes a social 
engineering enterprise intended to reform Muslims and re-birth them to positive 
societal values and norms. To this end, the deradicalised subjects are expected 
to “clean up”, “relax their views”, and embrace responsible citizenship. Espous-
ing a developmentalist agenda and philosophy, deradicalisation initiatives 
intend to counter violence and Jihadism and, in that sense, constitute a pro-
gramme to restore good Islam. Both curative and preventive, deradicalisation is 
framed as the clinical intervention on an ailing social body and a lunatic indi-
vidual subject with the aim of reasserting the authority of the state. That is why 
its programmes target primarily Imams, preachers, disenfranchised youth, and 
jihadi prisoners, the suspected subjects and agents of radicalisation. What is the 
content of this intervention? What does it say about governing Islam and Mus-
lims today? What interest does the study of deradicalisation policies have for an 
anthropology of Islam and Muslim life in the region, and more generally for 
anthropology as an analytic endeavour? These are key questions that will inter-
est a scholarly examination of Islam today. 
Overall, I argue that while deradicalisation is changing the conditions of 
social and political governance in the region, it reads as a state-led Islamic re-
|| 
9 Ali, Zaria, interview by author, February 18, 2018. 
10 Idrissa 2017, 2018. 
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form project that seeks to produce a Statist Islam11 as opposed to jihadi Islam. In 
fact, in their efforts to alter the terms of the theological debate that led to the 
emergence of jihadi radicalisation and anti-state groups, and by resorting to 
ideological warfare12, the empowerment of a specific socio-religious institution 
(Imams), a reorientation of religious cooperation (with Morocco), governments 
in the region are producing an Islamic reform of their own. State interventions 
give shape and substance to what in Francophone terminology one could call 
un Islam d’état. How this is happening is a question scholars of contemporary 
Islam should find interesting to ask in relation to the region, but also beyond. 
In the first section, I offer a quick look at the background that helps to con-
textualise the discussion. Then, I move on to examine the ways in which both 
radicalisation and deradicalisation have become significant concepts in the 
politics of Islam in the Sahel. The third section discusses how the deradicalisa-
tion programmes seek to affect subjectivities and govern Muslims. The subse-
quent section relates this initiative to the state agenda to reform Islam, an act 
that would supposedly inspire convenient practices and understandings of 
Islam. In the last part, I draw some conclusions for the anthropology of Islam 
and the Sahel as the region becomes a key site of theorisation of Islam. This 
contribution builds on material collected mostly in the last three years as derad-
icalising jihadis became the main initiative to counter Islam-related violence 
and terrorism in the Sahel. 
Background: A history of jihadism, turmoil and 
securitisation 
For anyone familiar with the Sahel, this vast semi-arid region that extends 
roughly from Djibouti to Senegal, it should not be surprising that Islam serves 
as an ideological basis for the ongoing armed struggles in the region. Much like 
Marxism or Christianity in many other parts of Africa, Islam has been a major 
source of inspiration for various socio-political agendas. Political imagination in 
the region is significantly shaped by Islamic norms, references, and morality, 
|| 
11 Cf. Olaniyi 2011. 
12 “Guerre idéologique” is the term officials have often used to characterise the narratives of 
Jihadism, but also to frame their own responses. Cf. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-
02496930, accessed December 28, 2020, http://www.marianne.net/debattons/tribunes/com
ment-le-salafisme-pu-prosperer-au-niger, accessed June 13, 2020. 
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especially with regard to governance.13 The Sokoto Caliphate14, the African Cali-
phate15, the Umarian Jihad16, or the jihad revolutions17 are wordings scholars 
have used to characterise periods and historical processes of radical change that 
saw Islam become a dominant discourse and source of norms in the region. 
Over the centuries, Islam proved to be an ideological resource for both social 
cohesion and the struggle for regime change.18 Thus, contemporary jihadi 
claims to revolutionise the socio-political order by using Islam is not a new 
phenomenon in the Sahel. On the contrary, one only has to look at the jihads of 
the 19th century that transformed the moral economy of the region and estab-
lished a number of emirates. From Cameroon to Senegal, for example, many of 
these political entities emerged after kings and local chiefs converted to Islam or 
after jihads arose to impose their political structures and modes of governance.19 
Northern Nigeria, Central and Upper Niger, Senegambia and the Lake Chad 
regions, were all zones where jihads left their marks on political cultures, insti-
tutions, and communities.20 
Today, and much like the 19th century movements, Ansar Dine in northern 
Mali, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, and Ansaroul Islam in Burkina Faso, 
seek to rule by the law of God, illustrating a recurring political preoccupation 
and historical continuity across the region. From the millenarianist movement 
Maitatsine in 198021 to the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat 
(GSPC), which later became Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, Islam was not only inspi-
rational but also a mobilising force shaping social order.22 In a more formal 
constitutional politics and elective governance, the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) 
of Algeria and the Sharianisation of Northern Nigeria remain powerful refer-
ences for local groups and organisations that envisage Islam as the norm of 
|| 
13 Holder and Dozon 2018, Gomez 2018, Idrissa 2017, Scheele 2015, Diouf 2013a, 1–35, Holder 
2009, Lecocq 2010, Otayek and Soares 2007, Gomez-Perez 2005, Hunwick 1985. 
14 Last 1967. 
15 Sulaiman 2009. 
16 Hanson and Robinson 1991, Hanson 1996, Lovejoy 2016, Pirio 2007. 
17 Sulaiman 1986, Lovejoy 2016, Sounaye 2017. 
18 Sanneh 2016, Hiskett 1994. 
19 Idrissa 2017, Hamani 2007, Robinson 2000, Curtin 1971, Echenberg 1969. 
20 Olomojobi 2015, Hiskett 1994, Djata 1996, Lovejoy 2016, Pirio 2007, Last 1967. 
21 Maitatsine is an insurgent Muslim leader who gave his name to a millenarianist movement 
that rose up in 1980 to challenge the northern Nigerian society, and in particular the Muslim 
leadership, by claiming he was the Mahdi. A Boko Haram-like insurgency, the movement 
managed to gain support among disenfranchised migrants and youth before facing a military 
reaction that claimed thousands of lives. 
22 Campana and Jourde 2017. 
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political order and the solution to the ills of society, including the corruption of 
the state system and its secularisation.23 
Though limited, this appeal of Islam to provide a new moral space and po-
litical opportunity became even stronger in the recent democratisation con-
text.24 In addition to what was referred to in many francophone contexts as in-
tégrisme, new trends and forms of presence of Islam in the public arena 
emerged, complicating the appropriation and therefore the management of 
Islam and Muslim actors in the public space.25 From Senegal to Niger, Islam took 
centre stage, prompting structural reconfigurations, ideological appropriations, 
and political articulations, which in certain cases have transformed the socio-
political dynamics.26 
While these references tend to insist on the local and regional dynamics, 
more global influences must be noted, particularly from the 1990s onwards, 
when Islam became a major factor in global politics. In particular, the democra-
tisation processes in the region opened up the possibility for a civil Islam27 that 
was eager to play a role in the new political and religious dispensations.28 The 
vivid and dynamic presence of Islamic organisations, Islam-inspired political 
activism (Niger, Mali, and Mauritania in particular), and the democratisation of 
Islamic authority, so to speak, added another layer to the already complex con-
nections between religion and politics in the region.29 Obviously, this trend is by 
no means specific to the Sahel, as parallels can be drawn with other regions of 
the (Muslim) world where similar dynamics have developed.30 
However, as far as the Sahel is concerned, I would argue that the appeal of 
Jihadism as an ideology that denies legitimacy to state secularism needs to be 
read against the backdrop of both the continuous challenge to the state’s moral 
order and the constitution of alternative and non-state enterprises across the 
region, especially with the inability of the state to provide public services and 
the erosion of its authority. The rise of new anti-state forces and ideologies 
|| 
23 Holder and Dozon 2018, Holder and Sow 2014, Sounaye 2010. 
24 Schulz 2011, Seck 2010, Souley 2007, Zakari 2007, Samson 2005, Brenner 2001. 
25 Mesa 2017. 
26 Vitale 2018, Samson 2005, Diouf 2013a, LeBlanc and Gosselin 2016, Kendhammer 2016, 
Miran 2006, Kobo 2012, Idrissa 2017, Madore 2016, Mesa 2017. 
27 Cf. Hefner 2000. 
28 LeBlanc and Gosselin 2016, Diouf 2013b, Souley 2009, Holder 2009, Sounaye 2009, Gomez-
Perez, LeBlanc, and Savadogo 2009, Miran 2006, Gomez-Perez 2005. 
29 Meagher and Mustapha 2020, Hernandez 2019, Lecocq and Niang 2019, Lecocq 2010, 
Bonnecase and Brachet 2013. 
30 Campana and Jourde 2017. 
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(cf. Boko Haram, Islamic State in west Africa, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb) has 
opened a window not only to “a strong antagonistic collective political will,” to 
use Gramsci’s words,31 but also to actors whose influence has challenged the 
state in its territorial markers and prerogatives to maintain order and stability. 
Decolonial politics, especially towards the former colonial power France, which 
still exerts a major influence in the region, the desire among a growing segment 
of the population to free themselves from secular elites and Western models of 
social development (family planning, education), and the activism of Salafi 
entrepreneurs seeking to remedy the moral corruption of the society, their main 
battleground, have fuelled current developments in the region, in particular 
Jihadism.32 
The wider context of the Sahel should also be read in relation to Libya, es-
pecially since 2011 and the regional implications of its civil war. Once a major 
influence in the region through Gaddafi’s hate-love relationships with the re-
gional governments and armed groups, Libya has remained a key factor in so-
cio-political developments across the region even during times of crisis. “Tout a 
commencé avec la chute de Khadafi”,33 as an official at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Niger argued. While this genealogy may be contested for dismissing 
other socio-political factors, it clearly draws attention to the impact the strife in 
Libya has had on the region. Both the ideas of a Sahelistan and Africanistan,34 
for example, are tied to what many have referred to as the Libyan chaos, the 
political and institutional instability that resulted from the civil war.35 
Certainly, these links and evocations need to be further historicised, exten-
sively probed, and critically established. For now, it suffices to note them and 
emphasise the ways in which developments in the Sahel involve Islam and its 
jihadi appropriations, but are also affected by the intricate connections between 
these jihadi movements and regional politics, in particular in relation to Algeria 
and Libya.36  
A perspective on the people and the country must also highlight the fact 
that ‘crisis’ has been a recurring condition of the socio-political life of the re-
gion. Perhaps nothing has been more normal. From Tuareg and Tubu rebellions 
to civil war, draughts and economic hardship, to demands of autonomous 
|| 
31 Gramsci 1971, 211. 
32 Leblon 2019, Idrissa 2018, Thurston 2017, Sounaye 2017, Madore 2016, Kone-Dao 2005. 
33 “All began with the fall of Gaddafi.” (M. Ba, interview by author, February 2016). 
34 The suffix suggests that both the Sahel and Africa are turning into troubled zones. 
35 Laurent 2013, Michailof 2018. 
36 Both President Deby of Chad and President Issoufou of Niger have used the argument of the 
responsibility of NATO in the quasi-statelessness of Libya to rush in European military support. 
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governance, the region has experienced critical developments that have chal-
lenged the authority of the state as the guarantor of the social contract. For 
example, while armed groups may certainly have their own specific political, 
economic, and ethno-religious goals, they have regularly contested the state’s 
monopoly of violence. As a result, non-state armed groups and actors have car-
ried alternative governance37 in many areas and sustained economies of war 
and smuggling.38 
In response to this challenge and this clearly disruptive dynamic, state au-
thorities have opted for the militarisation of order by imposing a state of emer-
gency, as is the case in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and deploying armies to 
fight jihadi radicals. At the regional level, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
and Niger teamed up to create the G5 Sahel, a joint force supported mainly by 
France and the EU to fight armed groups, usually claiming to be jihadis. Around 
Lake Chad, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria set up a similar military 
force to face the Boko Haram insurgency. New models of military cooperation 
emerged, aimed at sharing information and mutualising resources to create 
coordination between armies in their fight against terrorism and the disruptive 
effects of radicalisation. A key consequence of these developments has been to 
polarise communities and demonise groups, ethnic or religious, adding to the 
already tense intercommunal relations resulting from competition for resources. 
With Sahelistan39 and Africanistan40, the suggestions of a resemblance to Paki-
stan and Afghanistan, where governing Islam has become a major challenge, 
are clear; and as developments in the Sahel region have shown, these two sug-
gestive references have resonated as an imperative for effective policies and 
concrete initiatives. 
In general, and though a major part of the current Africa in Crisis narrative, 
the Sahel can hardly be imagined as a quiet land before the ongoing security 
issues and reconfigurations of the political order. It has a history of insurgencies 
and rebellions that have shaped social interactions, livelihoods,41 politics, and 
governance across the region, particularly in Niger and Mali.42 The formation of 
new state elites and ‘nouveaux riches’ through the state co-optation of former 
|| 
37 Lawel 2010, Lecocq 2010, Djibo 2002. 
38 Scheele 2015. 
39 Laurent 2013. 
40 Michailof 2018, Pérouse de Montclos 2016. 
41 See https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/responses-to-boko-haram-
in-the-lake-chad-region-policies-cooperation-and-livelihoods, accessed February 10, 2021. 
42 Leblon 2019, Lecocq and Niang 2019, MacNeil 2019, Raineri 2019, Rosato 2016, Boonecase 
and Brachet 2013, Lecocq 2010. 
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rebels and leaders of armed groups in the 1990s, for example, has remade the 
sociology of the state. On the fringes of the governments of Niger, Mali, and 
Burkina Faso, quasi-governmental institutions emerged and offered former 
rebels a place and a ‘piece of the pie’. For many of these political entrepreneurs, 
rebellion has paid off, because it offered them an opportunity to become part of 
the system and expand forms of patronage that give new meanings to state 
administrative authority, but also to rebellion and insurgency. In Niger, for 
example, after the 1995 peace agreement, disgruntled groups of the Tuareg re-
bellion of the 1990s formed the second Tuareg Rebellion in 2005 to impose a 
renegotiation intended for additional provisions for these groups. This strategy 
of being part of the system has led to new practices of state power, including 
trafficking, in which many former rebels now in positions of power appear to be 
involved. Warlords a decade ago, they have turned into drug lords, affecting 
both the moral and the political economy of governance in the region. 
Radicalisation to deradicalisation in the Sahel 
Academic and political discourses have applied the term radicalisation to social 
and political processes or even individual life trajectories, often to characterise 
attitudes and modes of action that seek to force change through violence and 
terrorism.43 This use may be highly contested, but remains popular in reference 
to the Sahel and even beyond.44 In the Sahel, it is now used to account for politi-
cal contestation, revolts, and rebellions against established orders, as is the 
case with the religiously motivated insurgencies in the tri-border area (Niger-
Mali-Burkina Faso), in northern Mali, and the Lake Chad region. As part of the 
lexicon of the study of social movements – and often paired with violent extrem-
ism – radicalisation has become a major trope in referring to the Sahel. This is 
partly because contemporary Jihadism in the region manifests itself through 
physical violence and armed struggles carried out by groups targeting political 
and state institutions. Imposing “the rule of Islam” and promising “a just or-
der”, Jihadism appeals to youth, and rests primarily on a theological mobilisa-
tion that targets specific state institutions (the administration, the military, the 
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43 Higazi and Brisset-Foucault 2013, Neumann 2013, Sommier 2012, Crettiez 2016, Kundnani 
2012. 
44 Marchal and Salem 2018, Crettiez 2016, Crone 2016, Montclos 2016, El-Said 2015, Neumann 
2013, Forstenzer 2012, Kundnani 2012, Sommier 2012, Rabasa et al. 2010a, Otayek 2000. 
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school system)45 and authorities. Associated with a “war on education”,46 it is 
then equated to a social, religious, and political process that threatens state 
governance and rule.47 
In the regions where I have conducted extensive research, in particular Ni-
ger and Northern Nigeria, the association between Jihadism, radicalisation, and 
violent extremism illustrates a key development in Muslim politics48; but most 
importantly, it reflects the intricate relationship between local politics and con-
temporary appropriation of Islam in the region. What radicalisation means and 
how it is used may be debatable; applying the concept to Muslim groups and 
Islam in general may be reductive and raise other theoretical and conceptual 
issues; but its prevalence in the language used to speak and think about Islam-
related processes in the region today is striking. This topicality has obviously 
given it a right to exist as an analytical concept, despite its pitfalls49 and hence 
the need for social theory to address it. This is important to note because radi-
calisation also serves as a discourse that helps states in the region justify their 
policies, notably towards Islam and Muslims. In this context, and as the vi-
gnette at the beginning of this chapter shows, radicalisation calls for deradicali-
sation. 
As the minister’s address suggests, in both its philosophy and deployment, 
deradicalisation is understood as both preventive and curative by the state and 
its supporters. In this case, and once applied to the region, it is part of a govern-
ance idea that focuses on the management of a threat with the goal to securitise 
Islam50 and sanitise Muslims. In a context of war against Islamic terrorism, de-
radicalisation then offers legitimation to state’s disciplinary measures and pro-
grammes to counter insurgencies and prevent further radicalisation, as the 
narrative goes. A particular feature of these programmes is that they remain 
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45 In 2019, UNICEF reported that school closures affected more than 400.000 students, partly 
due to the insecurity resulting from jihadi groups’ attacks on the school system. Cf. 
https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/school-closures-sahel-double-last-two-years-due-
growing-insecurity-unicef, accessed February 10, 2021. 
46 Cf. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/05/26/their-war-against-education/armed-group-at
tacks-teachers-students-and-schools, accessed February 1, 2021. One may add the schools and 
the child victims of Boko Haram in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. 
47 Last 2020, Umar 2020, Meagher and Mustapha 2020, Thurston 2018, Perouse de Montclos 
2017, Sanusi 2007. 
48 For more on the concept of Muslim politics, cf. Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 3–24. 
49 Pérouse de Montclos 2016, Harmon 2014, Marchal and Salem 2018, Anonymous 2012, Olo-
mojobi 2015, Otayek 2000. 
50 Cf. Mavelli 2012. 
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state-centred and as in other contexts, tend to emphasise that deradicalisation 
is not simply a “radicalisation in reverse”, but a long and challenging process 
“of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and 
embracing mainstream values.”51 Renouncing violence and embracing respon-
sible citizenship, as the words of the Minister emphasised, and as it is expected 
from the deradicalised, is not a mere individual decision, especially because it 
has implications for the community. Since group dynamics are a factor and 
patronage and allegiance also play a role in radicalisation, deradicalisation 
programmes tend to consider diverse dimensions of communal life.  
Consequently, the programmes take diverse forms, from ideological train-
ing,52 which is often understood as a cleansing process that focuses on affecting 
the character of the radicalised subject, to economic initiatives and the promo-
tion of moderate views.53 Geared toward combatting Islam-driven violent ex-
tremism and terrorism, deradicalisation programmes in the Sahel rely on public 
figures and influencers – mainly preachers and Imams – in their attempts to 
offer rebuttals of radical views and “exit strategies” to radicalised youth. In 
Mali, for example, with the support of the United Nation mission MINUSMA 
(The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) 
in the North, the government designed a preaching manual to help prevent 
radicalisation and violent extremism.54 The document was intended as a vade 
mecum to Muslim preachers some of whom have been blamed for inciting radi-
calisation, violence, and terrorism, but whose support is also urgently needed 
in deradicalisation campaigns. A major step in the deradicalisation policy in 
Mali, the manual became a key component of a strategy that has inspired gov-
ernments in the region.55 Similar examples have been developed in Nigeria,56 
Niger, and Burkina Faso, often with a narrative that insists on the fact that 
“Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, and those who challenge this view 
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51 Rabasa et al. 2010a. 
52 Cheick Boureima Daouda, a prominent public figure in Niger and northern Mali, teams up 
with local and state institutions, but also with international organisations to provide training 
in deradicalisation, as his profile shows: https://www.linkedin.com/in/cheikhboureima/, 
accessed October 23, 2020. 
53 Baylocq and Hlaoua 2016. 
54 See http://maliactu.net/mali-lutte-contre-lextremisme-violent-et-le-terrorisme-le-mali-vers-
un-guide-de-preche-et-dadaptation-de-sermons/, accessed October 23, 2020. 
55 Politique Nationale de Prévention et de Lutte contre l'Extrémisme violent et le Terrorisme 
au Mali. 
56 Cf. Development Initiative for West Africa: http://diwafrica.org/donation/spreading-peace-
in-multi-cultural-environment/, accessed June 13, 2020. 
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are lost.”57 The connection with Islam is even more pronounced in the narratives 
of deradicalisation programmes where both Boko Haram and the Jihadi of 
Northern Mali usually feature as the exemplars of radicalisation, because of 
their strict anti-state stands and the sharia rules they impose in the areas they 
conquer. 
Accounts of radicalisation in Muslim contexts have insisted on the role 
played by the cadres in propagating radical views and even promoting vio-
lence.58 Recognising the social position and the ideological influence of these 
actors, deradicalisation programmes in the Sahel have mobilised Muslim theo-
logians and preachers to promote moderate views (mostly quietist), and there-
fore deradicalise. As the literature emphasises, this strategy59 is not specific to 
the deradicalisation programmes of the region (Ashour 2009). In the Sahel how-
ever, governments have regularly pointed to the deficiency and the failure of 
Muslim leaders to “counter the use of Islam to radicalize.”60 Both state officials 
and lay Muslims have blamed them for being too quiet, failing to oppose radical 
voices and defend Islam.61 The remedy for deradicalisation programmes is there-
fore to “better train and provide them with the communication tools to do their 
work.”62 One expert on the training of Imams goes so far as to argue that they 
need to be taught the Qur’an, theology, astrology, and communication skills so 
they can face the challenges of their time and environment.63 Such views have 
contributed to several countries in the region developing cooperation with Mo-
rocco, a country that is now well positioned in deradicalisation programmes in 
the Sahel, as the next section of this chapter will show. 
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57 Issa, interview by author, May 2017. 
58 Cf. Hegghammer (2010, 139), who points to recruitment by sermon in Saudi Arabia when, 
for example, scholars became engaged in Afghanistan after hearing a radical sermon. Deradi-
calisation programmes point to the role of Islamic scholars in radicalisation processes. Along 
the same line, deradicalisation programmes try to build on the influence of these cadres to 
combat radicalisation. 
59 NB, The Netherlands’ programme for training Imams in the 2000s. The first cohort of 
Imams graduated in 2003. Similar programmes exist now across Europe and Asia. 
60 Issa, interview by author, May 2017. 
61 “Nous devons défendre l’islam.” Issa, interview by author, May 2017. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-pvcSbVt14, accessed June 13, 2020. 
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A state-led Islamic reform: A theology of 
moderation 
The way human subjects, social movements, and political actions are under-
stood has consequences on the ways they are dealt with. That also goes for be-
ing Muslim, especially in the Sahel today. From its inception, the state in the 
region has been concerned with Islam and Muslim subjects, often devoting 
resources to formulate policies conscious of Islam and Muslim scholars, espe-
cially their potential to oppose or actively fight its agendas.64 Both French and 
British colonialisms in the region have illustrated the permanence of Islam as a 
major factor in attempts to govern Muslims. 
In promoting a “moderate Islam” or Moroccan Wassatiya65, as opposed to 
Saudi Salafism, through active and institutional interventions aimed at chang-
ing the power relations within the Islamic sphere, deradicalisation policies are 
leading to an Islamic reform intended to empower moderate views, if not to win 
the ideological war (la guerre idéologique), then at least to minimise the social 
impact of a radicalisation process associated with Jihadism. Again, as the vi-
gnette illustrates, this reform relies on programmes that focus on youth mo-
bilisation strategies; but it also stresses the training of Muslim scholars (ulama). 
As Umar (2020) argues, ulama have been instrumental in radicalisation pro-
cesses, whether by providing a “climate of opinion” that helps to legitimise 
radical views, creating and rising tensions between groups, tapping into con-
spiracy theories and Muslim victimhood, or demonising others, Muslim scholars 
have played a major role in radicalisation processes. As key social influencers 
and cadres of Islam, it is understandable that deradicalisation strategies also 
target them. 
With such a perspective on deradicalisation, it appears that the state is no 
longer willing to stay off a stage where its own existence seems to be at stake. 
That is in fact the policy line that should be read in the words of the Minister of 
Religious Affairs of Mali,66 where he blames previous regimes for vacating the 
Islamic sphere, leaving it to its own arguments, competitions, rivalries, and 
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64 Seck 2010, Hanretta 2009, Umar 2006, Soares 2005, Robinson 2000. 
65 Wassatiyya refers to an Islam away from the extremes and which praises itself for its bal-
anced views. In the region, it is now referred to as an “Islam of the middle ground” (un islam 
du juste milieu). 
66 See https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/316679/societe/imams-maliens-formes-maroc-lis
lam-tolerant-face-wahhabisme-rigoriste/, accessed February 10, 2021. 
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agendas, including those that subvert peaceful coexistence. Suggesting more 
involvement, he goes on to claim that the government will now fully engage the 
Islamic sphere and Muslim leaders to promote a tolerant Islam. Similar dis-
courses have also become common in Niger and Burkina Faso, where, as in 
Mali, the issue was how to regulate Islam. This engagement with Islam then 
resonates as a positioning that is eager to trigger new dynamics that would 
promote a Good Islam. By investing in their deradicalisation initiatives, gov-
ernments no longer seem intent on protecting the citadel of the secular from 
religious influence, a position that has been a major governance stance, espe-
cially in the Francophone countries of the region. Instead, governments are 
devising rules of engagement and developing strategies to treat “the jihad 
madmen”, the “lost subjects who have strayed from peace and good citizen-
ship”.67 
It is worth noting that as these developments unfold, and unlike 20 years 
ago for example, governments in the region are now ready to accommodate 
religious views in the political arena;68 but only the “good ones”.69 As they pro-
mote learned leadership and fund training programmes, they also note that they 
“will work to unify and reconcile [Muslims] and train other [Imams to promote] 
a peaceful Islam; an Islam of peace that respects others (…); a tolerant and open 
Islam”70 because “the goal is a behavioural change among practitioners of the 
religion that has been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (PUH) and which has 
been soiled by the isolated acts of extremists who have nothing to do with Islam,  
a religion of peace.”71 
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67 “Les fous du jihad”, M. Ali., paper presented at “Forum sur Boko Haram”, University of 
Diffa 2016. Indeed, the characterisation of Boko Haram insurgents as madmen has been one of 
the talking lines used to disown them and counter their mobilisation efforts, especially among 
youth in the Lake Chad region. 
68 It must be noted that despite this move, it has not always translated into a significant influ-
ence on the Islamic sphere. The recent developments with the Conseil Islamique in Mali are 
telling. The president of this institution, Mahmoud Dicko, has become one of the fiercest critics 
of the government and democratisation policies. In the last few years, he managed to establish 
himself as a ‘counter-government’ force. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/749997/societe/
mali-mahmoud-dicko-la-democratie-representative-quon-nous-impose-ne-fonctionne-pas-
chez-nous”, accessed October 23, 2020. 
69 See https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/316679/societe/imams-maliens-formes-maroc-lis
lam-tolerant-face-wahhabisme-rigoriste/, accessed October 23, 2020. 
70 See https://niarela.net/religion/formation-des-imams-maliens-au-maroc-les-cent-premiers-
stagiaires-font-le-point, accessed October 23, 2020. 
71 “L’objectif est de parvenir à un changement de comportements chez les pratiquants de la 
religion révélée du Prophète Mohamed (PLS) qui est aujourd’hui entachée par les actes isolés 
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With a religious diplomacy that positioned itself as a promoter of a moder-
ate Islam (al wassatiya), Morocco emerged as a key ally of governments in the 
Sahel in their search for a reformed Islam. In fact, the Institut de Formation des 
Imams Mohammed VI of Rabat has trained several thousands of preachers and 
Imams from across the Sahel since 2012.72 In 2018 alone, the Institute trained 
500 Imams and preachers from Mali. Thus, part of the continuities, the influ-
ence of Morocco has taken a new institutional form. While traditionally, the 
relationship between the Sahel and Morocco has been nurtured through infor-
mal networks and Sufi organisations whose connections date centuries, today, 
however, deradicalisation initiatives have opened another avenue of coopera-
tion, offering official channels between the two partners, repositioning the 
Kingdom as the key partner in the theological offensive needed to deradicalise 
the Sahel. 
Morocco’s branding of its ‘middle ground’ Islam (islam du juste milieu) has 
apparently made an impact on local governments and initiatives as they dis-
tance themselves – at least to some extent – from Islamic cooperation partners, 
such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia. Radicalisation inspired by Salafi-Jihadi ideas 
costing these two influencers some of their reputation, especially in Mali, Chad, 
and Burkina, the repositioning of Morocco is important enough to note, as it 
points to the configurations of the Islamic sphere, affects policy lines, and at the 
same time alters the terms of the debate on both radicalisation and the strate-
gies to combat it. For one, with the involvement of Morocco, deradicalisation 
relies on equipping key and influential actors such as Imams73 with the theolog-
ical tools they need, if not to win arguments against radicals, but at least to 
counter some of their views that have become popular mainly through Saudi 
Salafism. In this context, the Islamic reform that Sahelian governments now 
promote is about embracing what officials themselves have called islam du juste 
milieu, a concept that conveys both the avoidance of extremes and the cultiva-
tion of a middle and common ground. 
Generally speaking, when scholars discuss Islamic reform, they usually fo-
cus on the religious actors, concentrating primarily on the internal dynamics 
and analysing theological debates and arguments. Although they recognise that 
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des extrémistes qui n’ont rien avoir avec l’Islam qui est une religion de paix.” See http://info-
matin.ml/formation-des-imams-maliens-au-maroc-les-stagiaires-sexpliquent-sur-futur-mission/, 
accessed October 23, 2020. 
72 See http://www.eurasiareview.com/28112016-moroccos-religious-diplomacy-in-africa-well-
timed-royal-initiative-oped/, accessed June 13, 2020. 
73 See https://www.bladi.net/maroc-formation-imams-maliens,51154.html, accessed April 15, 
2020. 
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some external factors and actors might play some role, their perspectives show 
that the impetus for reform comes from within the Islamic sphere.74 As I have 
shown, one must add to these studies of Islamic reform in the region the state-
sponsored Islamic reform that is unfolding in the Sahel today mainly through 
deradicalisation programmes. 
An anthropology of (Islam in) the Sahel 
Paying scholarly attention to radicalisation and deradicalisation in the Sahel 
could be theoretically stimulating, conceptually rewarding, and certainly offers 
an opportunity to re-examine Islam in light of the new reconfigurations of pow-
er and authority at work in the region. The remapping and recalibration of the 
role of the state as a religious actor in its own right with the aim of promoting a 
particular religious trend not only affects the concepts of Islam and being Mus-
lim, but also creates political categories that assign specific identities and sta-
tus, some of which are unwanted, rejected, and even violently combatted. 
Whether promoted or demonised, such categories end up calling for particular 
governing strategies while producing subjectivities that political authority or 
simply historical contingencies might pitch against each other. Thus, what the 
ongoing radicalisation processes and deradicalisation initiatives have offered us 
is both an opportunity to observe a reconstruction of an object called Islam, but 
also a terrain of and for anthropology, since this process affects human beings. 
Here, it goes without saying, that both radicalisation and deradicalisation are 
processes centred on ideas and the transmission of values that can be uprooting 
for the individual and destabilising for the community and the state. 
Obviously, it takes more than a few paragraphs to systematically and satis-
factorily address the epistemic implications of these developments for our aca-
demic perspectives. However, I felt compelled at this juncture to at least point to 
some of the possible ways in which scholars of Islam and academics, who have 
developed interest in the region, can think of the (anthropological) study of 
both Islam and the Sahel. Elsewhere, I have already referred to the category of 
Sahelian Islam,75 which arises from the demand to consider contemporary local 
appropriations of Islam, but also from the influence of new articulations between 
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74 Loimeier 2016, Iddrisu 2012, Kobo 2012, Samson 2005, Niezen 1987, Kane 2003. 
75 See https://blogs.alternatives-economiques.fr/florence/2010/11/15/islam-au-niger-de-la-
contestation-a-la-normalisation-12, accessed April 15, 2020. 
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Islam and the state in the region. The assumption here is that this process has a 
major impact on how we theorise the region, but also how we factor in Islam-
related dynamics, especially in a world where Islam and being Muslim have 
become major signifiers for individual subjects, authorities intending to govern 
them, but also for geopolitical reasons. Islam playing a key role in the geopoli-
tics of our time, the significance of Jihadism as a social factor and an influencer 
in government strategies cannot be overlooked. 
The academic engagement I evoke here is also an additional avenue for un-
derstanding Muslim arguments and therefore for theorising the dynamics of the 
Muslim Worlds, starting from the Sahel. In this specific case, the engagement 
opens a window onto the politics of religion, in particular how certain logics 
and policies shape Islam and produce not only political concepts but also sub-
jects.76 In this respect, and especially because radicalisation and deradicalisa-
tion are problematic and resonate as processes and initiatives that produce 
subjects, they should be welcome in an anthropology of the Sahel, as a recent 
publication on Boko Harma has shown.77 What kind of Islam or Muslim does the 
state produce in that context? Deradicalised ones? How do people react to these 
constructs? How is Islam constituted in this process? But most importantly, 
what interactions and subjects result from these definitions and conceptualisa-
tions of Islam? 
As we contextualise them, we may realise that these preoccupations are not 
only problematic for an anthropological engagement with contemporary Islam; 
they are very much part of the story of the state as a government idea, an insti-
tution that seeks to govern and establish regimes and order. Indeed, deradicali-
sation programmes help us uncover modes of policing Islam that rests primarily 
on reforming individual subjects, groups, and communities. What happens to 
these entities then? Placing such a question at the centre of our inquiry helps us 
to advance a critical anthropology of the state, an institution that has proven to 
be an authoritative force, a maker of law and order, and a normative idea. Pick-
ing up the title of a recent publication,78 I would point out that the various forms 
that jihadi radicalisation and state deradicalisation policies are taking in the 
Sahel are part of the state at work; not so much how the state bureaucracy 
works or functions, but what personal, social, and political experiences the 
state leads to and imposes on its subjects. Its current contestations by jihadis 
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76 Holder and Dozon 2018, Luizard 2006, Cantone 2005, Sounaye 2005, Sow 2005. 
77 Ehrhardt and Umar 2020, Last 2020, Meagher and Mustapha 2020, Umar 2020. 
78 In particular Bierschenk 2014, Bierschenk and Olivier De Sardan 2014a, Bierschenk and 
Olivier De Sardan 2014b; Blundo 2014; Hamani 2014. 
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must then be read as part of an ongoing argument about the social contract on 
which it theoretically rests, and how it ought to operate and perform as a public 
institution. 
Contemporary Salafi-Jihadism defined as a modality of radicalisation, as the 
literature has put it, has made the nexus of Islam and the state in the Sahel even 
more intricate, illustrating the connections and specially the conflicts between 
normative orders. Until recently, the main orders competing with each other 
were those inspired by the state and those informed by the so-called traditional/ 
customary rule. Among the current orders today, one has to count the emerging 
ones ushered by both Jihadism and rebellion, in particular those led by Tuareg 
and Tubu groups in Mali, Chad, and Niger. As a radical critique of the state and 
its order, Jihadism offers a fresh opportunity to examine the politics of the state, 
but also the political economy that has prompted such an institution, which has 
made it appealing to some, but also a symbol of violence and domination for 
others. Before it was armed, rebellious, and terrorist, Jihadism, for example, 
was quiet and quietist. Of course, today, the very understanding of Jihadism 
and quietism in social and political contexts make them exclude one another. 
What ideological conditions and developments have made this possible, and 
how both established and emerging authorities are dealing with such develop-
ments, are central questions that need to be asked if one wants to understand 
the reconfigurations resulting from state governmentality and Jihadism. 
This is relevant because when states in the Sahel region design and support 
deradicalisation programmes that pit one group against the other (Moderates/ 
Radicals, Sufi/Salafi, Quietist/Violent), we must ask what political, social, and 
religious dynamics emerge from these interventions? When securitisation poli-
cies target specific socio-religious categories, behaviours and practices, which 
political subjectivities do they favour, alter, or inform? Where does the promise 
and the commitment of the state lie? What happens to its social contract? Obvi-
ously, these questions are not only pertinent to the Sahel, but also for other 
parts of the (Muslim) world where radicalisation has called for deradicalisation. 
The point is that when it comes to analysing Islam-related radicalisation 
and deradicalisation programmes, the Sahel now offers the opportunity for a 
cross-cultural comparison with other regions such as the Middle East, South 
East Asia, Central Asia, but also Europe, where state sponsored deradicalisation 
programmes have become part of the practice of dealing with dissent, contesta-
tion, and political struggles. Before the Sahel, deradicalisation programmes 
were well established in Europe, especially in France, the United Kingdom, and 
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the Netherlands.79 Building on this historical reference, an anthropology of 
deradicalisation might contextually ask how people actually radicalise or derad-
icalise themselves? The structure and the content of the deradicalisation pro-
grammes, as well as the strategies they use, here again offer a window onto the 
perceptions of radicalisation and the means of countering it, or at least mitigat-
ing its impact.80 In that regard, by proposing a policy-oriented anthropology of 
Boko Haram, Mustapha and Meagher (2020) illustrate a continuity in the aca-
demic engagement with the Sahel. Indeed, they have contributed to a subfield 
of the anthropology of development that has recorded important work, some of 
which have been shaping the interventions of the state and international agen-
cies across Africa for decades.81 
When reflecting on the added value of the recent examinations of Islam and 
Muslim life in the Sahel,82 perhaps one of the key questions is then: How do 
these contributions help us refine both our representations of this region and 
the theorisations of its social and political dynamics, including Jihadism? This 
is an important question in a context where the region has become a site from 
which scholars and politicians have sought to think and rethink Islam, often 
giving it an African flavour and distancing it from say the Middle East, which 
has allegedly produced an Islam of contestation and jihad. 
There is no doubt that scholarly engagement with the region has exploded 
in recent years, in part due to its current experiences of Jihadism, but also due 
to renewed interest in Islam and Muslims across academic disciplines. The con-
junction of these factors has made conceptualisations of Islam part of the social 
theory of the Sahel, a development that has also been gradually reconfiguring 
the way the region is thought of and repositioned in geopolitical terms.83 A con-
cern with the value of these contributions – and the forms of scholarship they 
produce – can hardly go without also asking the question of who is defining 
Islam and who is producing this scholarship. 
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79 Rabasa et al. 2010c. 
80 Meagher and Mustapha 2020. 
81 Hoechner 2018, Michailof 2018, Flynn and Tinius 2015, Juris 2015, Bompani and Frahm-Arp 
2010a, Bompani and Frahm-Arp 2010b, Graveling 2010, Olivier de Sardan 1995.  
82 Hill 2018; Renne 2018, LeBlanc and Gosselin 2016, Schulz 2011, Masquelier 2009. 
83 We can mention here how the Sahel has become part of the US strategy to combat terror-
ism, but also Europe’s efforts to quell the migration trends that have affected its countries in 
the last decade. 
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Conclusion 
In emphasising the ways in which deradicalisation prompts the imagining of a 
particular Muslim category that needs to be dealt with and sanitised, this con-
tribution wanted to point to an aspect that has often been overlooked in the 
accounts of Islamic reform in the region:84 Islamic reform as a state agenda and 
project. This is important to highlight, especially because in most Sahelian 
countries and following the colonial model, the state has systematically defend-
ed secularity, making itself the prime servant and guardian of this normative 
framework. In the past, in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, despite diverg-
ing political trajectories, the state has regularly claimed secular principles and 
logic, leaving religion to churchmen and Imams. In contrast, state interventions 
today challenge this line, as governments seek to produce not only citizens, but 
subjects with particular religiosity. The time of standing its secular ground has 
apparently ended, as deradicalisation programmes and the desire to restore the 
authority of state institutions prompt proactive religious policies and the asser-
tion of a statist Islam. This process, as I have argued, illustrates how states are 
engaging in an Islamic reform project, a new reality that should be of interest to 
the anthropology of the Sahel, but also of Islam and Muslim life today. 
This contribution intended also to draw attention to the experience of Islam 
and Muslims in the Sahel and how this experience feeds the construction of 
Islam. In other words, through various academic and political engagements, the 
Sahel becomes a site of theory that connects anthropology as a discipline in-
volved in theorising human experience, and Islam as a source of normative 
socio-political order. How then do scholars engage with this relationship and 
situate the region within the intellectual history of anthropological endeavours? 
Translated into the historical context of this contribution, the concern then is 
how would this way of interrogating social science shape the future of academic 
engagement with Islam and the Sahel? With these questions, one really sees 
how both the Sahel and anthropology become academic terrains. 
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In an Era of Terror Threats 
Negotiating the Governance of a (Trans)Local Islamic Heritage 
in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
Abstract: This chapter scrutinises the negotiation of various actors about the 
governance of the Mauritanian Islamic heritage. In the context of hopes for 
democratisation and the war on terror, social frictions are fuelled and lead to a 
quite confrontational mode of negotiating identity and citizenship. The tradi-
tional Islamic educational institution, the maḥḍara, plays a crucial role within 
these debates. Being perceived as an institution for (re)producing local tradi-
tion, the maḥḍara and its visions become the focus of conflict, praised by politi-
cians and the ʿulamaʾ (Islamic scholars) as a driver of social peace, feared by 
security experts as a breeding ground for terrorism, and finally, wished to be 
reformed by human right activists. The war on terror goes hand in hand with the 
threat of terror, producing more rumours than facts and spreading feelings of 
insecurity that foster violent action. 
Introduction 
[T]he places of worship and their related institutions, in particular the maḥḍara-s, which 
are made for the dissemination of knowledge, meditation, and prayers of the faithful must 
benefit from a sustained interest to consolidate (the fibre of) the unitary fabric and the so-
cial segments of the country. It is in these institutions where sentiments of the purity of 
the soul, Islamic brotherhood, social cohabitation and national solidarity between the cit-
izens of the same country are raised and developed. 
In fact, Islam must continue to be a constant source of inspiration for our way of thinking 
and acting. Islam condemns in its discourse as well as refutes in its practice obscurantism, 
intolerance, and extremism that spreads doubt and violence among the Muslim communi-
ty, totally foreign to our traditions. Instead, Islam advocates social peace and peaceful co-
existence between human beings. 
Islam must continue to serve as a basis not only for our education and for our culture, but 
also for our youth, to avoid ostentatious excesses and fantasies of temptation. Islam must 
further serve as an irreplaceable legislative framework, a moral which organises our vision  
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of life and regulates our well behaving by imposing on us a passion for work, respect for 
the neighbour, (…).1 
Islam in Mauritania is an important issue in public discourse. Seen as the glue 
that holds the plural society together, Islam has often been interpreted as the 
only common reference point on which an idea of national unity could be built 
on.2 In such kind of debates, Islam serves as a container, as a term with which 
various ideas within the country’s political landscape are promoted. Despite 
being a religious practice, embedded in this case within a Sunnī Mālikī Ashʿarī 
doctrine with which most Mauritanians are raised, Islam has become a highly 
politicised topic, especially since the ‘global war on terror’ has drawn Maurita-
nia into the circle of US allies fighting ‘Islamic extremism’. As illustrated in the 
citation at the beginning of this chapter, the author El Haycen – a Mauritanian 
political scientist – defines Islam as beneficial for the Mauritanian society. Ac-
cording to his view, it brings peace and harmony to the society while preventing 
the youth from making serious mistakes. He sees Islam as the regulative meas-
ure for a good society. It has produced institutions, like the maḥḍara (Arabic: 
traditional institution of Islamic education),3 that consolidates the society by 
educating the people to become good Muslims and citizens alike. The values 
taught by such an institution stand, that is what El Haycen claims, in stark con-
trast to the bad citizen, the one who is obscurantist, intolerant, extreme, and 
spreads doubts and violence. If we read his lines against the background of the 
violent actions justified with reference to Islam, we understand that his text 
does not only define Islam in a certain way, it also defines what Islam is not 
about, and that activists who use violence in the name of Islam do not belong to 
Mauritanian traditions, they are foreign. 
In this chapter, I will have a closer look at the Mauritanian Islamic heritage 
and the public negotiation about what this might be. A special focus is laid on 
how the Mauritanian Islamic heritage should be governed in the Era of a ‘global 
war on terror’. The chapter aims at illustrating how the threats of terror produce 
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1 El Haycen 2016, 232. Translated from French into English. 
2 Pazzanita 1999, 44. 
3 The term ‘traditional Islamic education’ as a descriptive terminology for the maḥḍara under-
stands ‘traditional’ as a dynamic process. The maḥḍara is a practice that claims to have its 
roots in the Prophetic past. This past is mediated into the presence to build up the future. This 
process of mediating ideas and spiritual practice into the presence is a transformative process 
adapting to its cultural, social, and historical setting. Therefore, the term ‘traditional’, in my 
understanding, claims a static authenticity, yet it is also a highly dynamic and transformative 
practice. 
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substantial debates concerning identity issues and local hegemonies. The gov-
ernance of the Mauritanian Islamic heritage is hereby understood as a complex 
and multi-layered process of regulation.4 Such a process is not limited to state-
implemented regulations only. Rather, various processes of self-regulation with-
in the Mauritanian society are the focus of this chapter. These processes are 
fostered by diverse social actors negotiating definitions of a Mauritanian Islamic 
heritage. Moreover, such processes contain hegemonic struggles between state 
authorities, various religious authorities, and social activists. I will argue that 
the dynamics of the intra-Mauritanian negotiations on the definition of Mauri-
tanian Islamic heritage are gradually evolving towards a more confrontational 
discourse in the context of socio-political activists’ and intellectuals’ hopes for a 
transition to democratisation and Mauritania’s integration into the ‘global war 
on terror’. It would not be in the interest of this chapter to define ever ambigu-
ous and contested terms such as terrorism, or to classify various acts of violence 
committed or defined as such. Instead, I look at the phenomena of terrorism 
from the perspective of the threat it poses. It is not the terrorist act itself that 
proves so powerful, but the threat posed by its occurrence, which in turn creates 
a certain atmosphere of tension and fear that fosters debates about the nature 
and defining characteristics of Mauritanian Islam. It appears that under the 
threats of terror more resolute arguments are raised that either serve to weaken 
a Mauritanian Islamic heritage in order to overcome traditions that are per-
ceived as preventing democracy and social equality; or to strengthen it in order 
to achieve stability by defining Islam in contrast to destabilising measures that 
contradict local traditions. By an examination of representations of, positions 
towards, and regulations about the maḥḍara as one of the most representative 
example of the Mauritanian Islamic heritage, I will show how social frictions in 
Mauritanian society are becoming increasingly tense in the context of hopes for 
a democratic transition and the threat of terror. 
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania – a successful 
regional leader of counter-terrorism 
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania lies on the western edge of the Sahara and 
borders the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco, and Algeria to the north, Mali to the east, 
and Senegal to the south. The country’s population is composed of various ethno-
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4 Maussen, Bader, and Moors 2011, 15–18. 
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lingual groups, the Ḥassāniyya speakers (an Arabic dialect) of Arab and Berber 
origins often called Moors, or in the local vernacular bīḍān. Further, the society 
comprises sub-Saharan African minorities, such as Wolof, Soninke, Pulaar, and 
Bambara speakers. In addition, the ethno-linguistic divide intersects with the 
identities of social status groups. Such identities might have been fluid in pre-
colonial times but have become more fixed entities during the late 19th century 
and led to an emphasis on predominantly patrilineal kinship within structures 
of social inequality.5 However, in post independent Mauritania, the emergence 
of elites cannot be understood exclusively along the lines of kinship. Individual 
biographical trajectories of contemporary political elites, for example, demon-
strate that social positioning in contemporary Mauritania is much more in flux 
than public discourse of some academics, activists, and human right organisa-
tions might suggest.6 Still, educational reforms have favoured certain ethno-
lingual and social status groups, especially the Arab zwāyā (Ḥassāniyya: social 
status group of Islamic scholars) from the Adrar, Trarza, and Brakna region 
(south-western Mauritania) to maintain a strong influence within Mauritania’s 
political, cultural, and economic elite.7 Social tension of varying degrees 
between Ḥassāniyya speakers and sub-Saharan African minorities have been 
reported in the past and present, as have tensions between social status groups, 
especially among the Ḥassāniyya speakers, their elites, especially the zwāyā, 
and their former slaves called Ḥarāṭīn.8 Social inequality, expressed in struc-
tural and institutional discrimination that limits the share of economic or poli-
tical participation and public resources, affects these two groups in particular, 
according to numerous national and international human right associations: 
Ḥarāṭīn and sub-Saharan African minorities. 
Nevertheless, as this brief introductory sketch on Mauritania already em-
phasises, the heterogeneous Mauritanian society contains several potential 
socio-political lines of conflict that complicate the analysis of socio-religious 
and socio-political transformation processes. Economic and ecological chal-
lenges as well as a political struggle to overcome the authoritarian rule by the 
military are also prominent themes in Mauritania’s recent history.9 Since its 
independence in 1960, the country has witnessed a number of coups. A coup in 
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5 Villasante-de Beauvais 1998, Villasante-de Beauvais 2000, 286, Villasante Cervello 2004. 
6 Ould Ahmed Salem 1998. 
7 Ould Cheikh 1998. 
8 Diallo 1993, Fleischmann 1994, Boye 1999, Ciavolella 2010, McDougall, Brhana, and Ruf 
2003. 
9 Ciavolella 2009, Foster 2011. 
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1978 ended seventeen years of presidential rule and put Mauritania under military 
rule until 1992, when the country's first multi-party elections were held. However, 
the introduction of a multi-party system in the country did not lead to substantial 
political change, especially as the military elite maintained its grip on political 
control in the country. Examples include President Ould Taya remaining in power 
until his removal in August 2005. A military council that oversaw a transition to 
democratic rule took over for another two years, and in April 2007, a first demo-
cratically-elected government under President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdal-
lahi was inaugurated.10 However, after sixteen months in power, the President 
was overthrown again by a military coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel 
Aziz. One of the justifications was Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s alleged incapacity to 
maintain security in the country.11 Ould Abdel Aziz was elected president in July 
2009 and directly declared that he would focus on concerted counter-terrorism 
measures. He remained in power until August 2019, when the president Mohamed 
Ould Ghazouani, again a former general, won the elections with an absolute ma-
jority. Both generals – Ould Abdel Aziz and Ould Ghazouani – were implicated in 
both previous coup d’états. They represent a faction of old networks of the mili-
tary regime that is mainly committed to the reintegration of the country into inter-
national politics after Mauritania’s isolation due to its support of Saddam Hussein 
during the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003.12 
The political turbulences of the last fifteen years were accompanied by a 
number of violent attacks allegedly attributed to GSPC (Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat) and after 2005 to their successor organisation AQIM (al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb). Between 2005 and 2011 various smaller attacks 
were carried out on the Mauritanian territory. These include clashes with the 
army, hostage-taking and the killing of Western foreigners, and attempts to 
attack symbolic public places, in particular the French embassy, whose com-
pound also includes the French Cultural Centre and a French school. There have 
been no attacks attributed to terrorism since 2011, but the threat of terror looms 
large. The sudden discontinuity and lull in terrorist attacks has, on the one 
hand, created rumours about a secret agreement between the regime of Abdel 
Aziz and al-Qaeda13 and, on the other hand, allowed the regime to celebrate its 
successes and its efficient counter-terrorism strategies. Human rights organisa-
tion protest that this strategy contained arbitrary arrest without due processes 
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10 For the awakening of the civil society during his rule, see Ciavolella and Fresia 2009. 
11 Jourde 2011, 5. 
12 Bisson 2013, 168. 
13 Hosenball 2016. 
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of young suspects from poor social classes.14 They further reported that the con-
fessions of the detainees were often obtained through torture and other forms of 
coercion.15 In 2018, the head of the DSE (Direction de la Sûrété de l’État), Sidi 
Ould Baba al-Hacen, praised the success of Mauritania’s counter terrorism 
strategies in a public interview. He emphasised that the success was due to the 
combination of military and security measures as well as ideological, religious, 
legislative, and socio-economic ones. According to him, this strategy has – after 
nearly ten years of implementation – led to positive results: the control of Mau-
ritania’s vast desert borders, securing the territory and population, the disman-
tling of all ‘sleeping cells’, arresting 650 suspects and their prosecution before 
courts of law, the reintegration of repentant terrorists, and the curbing of fur-
ther attacks on national territory since 2011.16 A month after this interview, the 
Mauritanian general Hanena Ould Sidi took over the head of the G5 security 
force. The G5 is a regional multilateral organisation established in 2014, consist-
ing of Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania, working together with 
the support of international donors with the aim of improving governance, 
infrastructure, agriculture, youth employment and, above all, security in the 
Sahel region.17 
The threats of terror 
Until the 1980s, terrorism was more or less absent in the Mauritanian criminal 
code. On July 9, 1983, a law was enacted that aimed at preventing coup d’états. 
This law condemned in a general manner any acts against state authorities and 
the integrity of the national territory. It was this law that was modified in July 
2005 and adapted to fight terrorism along new, globally envisioned lines. There-
fore, the term ‘terrorism’ was introduced into the legal text and defined in a 
vague way that theoretically takes no consideration for violations of human 
rights. It literally allowed for a definition of a flexible broad range of ‘anti-state’ 
activities as terrorism. Moreover, the law went beyond proscribing attacks 
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14 For the reports on torture, see Amnesty International 2013. For the social composition of 
detainees in Mauritanian prisons imprisoned for terrorism, see Ould Ahmed Salem 2013, 161. 
15 Ould Ahmed Salem 2013, 161. Torture practice for confessions of terrorism has been report-
ed already from the period 2005–2008, see i.e. Amnesty International 2008, Foks, Laurion, and 
Messaoudi 2007. 
16 Aidara 2018. 
17 Airault 2018. 
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against the nation-state but included activities such as recruiting, training, and 
planning of terrorist acts on the national territory that hints at targets within the 
country or abroad.18 The anti-terrorism law of 2005 eventually proved to be inef-
fective, therefore, in 2010, this law was replaced by a new version enlarging the 
capacity of the state to fight terrorism, but its vague definition of terrorism re-
mained the same.19 
Nevertheless, even though anti-terrorism laws are employed against social 
activists as well, the violation of human rights and restrictions to free speech 
and social activism did not start with the introduction of these laws in Maurita-
nia. According to Freedom House, an organisation that has a special focus on 
civil liberties and political rights, Mauritania is classified as “not free” since 
1973, and only during the two short periods of 2001–03 and 2006–08 its status 
raised to “partly free”.20 Therefore, it is not surprising that other social activists 
experienced detentions during the last decades. The most famous example is 
Biram Dah Ould Abeid (b. 1965), the head of the IRA (Initiative pour la Résur-
gence du mouvement Abolitionniste) who ran as presidential candidate in the 
elections in 2014 and 2019 with increasing success.21 In 2015, Ould Abeid and 
two fellow human rights defender, Brahim Bilal and Djiby Sow, were “charged 
under the anti-terrorism laws for belonging to an illegal organisation, leading 
an unauthorised rally, and violence against the police”.22 Still, I would like to 
argue that the problem of the terror threats is not simply the establishment of 
legal frameworks to counter terrorism. The main problem is the vague frame 
that the nebulous existence of terror produces. A terror whose actors cannot be 
easily identified, whose motivations are not clearly understood, and whose 
beginning and ending is ill definable. Since 2011, no violent attack happened on 
the Mauritanian territory but the Mauritanian government continuously informs 
its population through state-controlled media about threats of terror. Such infor-
mation is especially given after 2009, so after the high number of terror attacks on 
Mauritanian territory. This climate of impeding threats of terror is further main-
tained by the international media that regularly refers to the insecurity within 
Mauritania. It was only in 2018 that France and other countries began to lift the 
travel advisories that has discouraged tourists from visiting since 2007, when 
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18 Foks, Laurion, and Messaoudi 2007, 13. 
19 Tamburini 2018, 1241–43. 
20 Freedom House 2012. More about the pros and cons of such measurement of democracy and 
the specific methodology of Freedom House, see Högström 2013. 
21 Topona 2019. 
22 The Guardian 2015. 
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French travellers had been shot on the road near Aleg (Brakna, southwest Mau-
ritania).23 Jourde warns against oversimplifying the complexity of the problem of 
insecurity in the Sahel, where local, national, and regional dynamics often in-
tersect.24 This is not to say that there are no security threats at all, but as Jourde 
convincingly argues, we need to keep in mind that the role of security is often 
played out by local elites to uphold their rule.25 The ‘security argument’ can 
serve the regimes in power to command greater authority.26 In the meantime, it 
seeks and leads to the establishment of international support for such authori-
tarian rulers in the Sahel.27 
From vague information about the reality of the terror threat to the unde-
fined and steadily shifting boundaries between ‘moderate Islamists’ and ‘ex-
tremists’, the destructive power of terror threats lies in the state of insecurity 
they create in people’s minds. Vium looks at the effects of fear spread by the 
possible existence of terrorism in Oualata, an oasis town in eastern Mauritania 
that lies within what the French government has defined as a “red zone” of high 
risk border regions.28 He emphasises that the “nebulous nature of AQIM and the 
way ‘it’ produces terror in the minds of the local population represents a – if not 
the most – significant threat, which may progressively undermine the fabric of 
society itself”.29 Such fear is not only present in regions classified as being at 
high risk but also in the rest of the country. From 2005 to 2008, when a series of 
violent incidents happened that were classified as terrorist attacks, most people 
were not yet convinced about the capacity of AQIM on Mauritanian territory. 
There were numerous rumours circulating that hinted at the regimes’ interest in 
deliberately overestimating the terror threat in order to gain access to interna-
tional assistance funds.30 This changed after the summer of 2009, when a sui-
cide attack was carried out in front of the French embassy in Nouakchott. 
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23 France 24 English 2018. 
24 Jourde 2011, 2. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 4 
27 Ibid., 5. 
28 For the “red zones”, see Fig. 1. 
29 Vium 2013, 110. 
30 Such doubts were not only mentioned in personal conversations, but also in international 
media (i.e. Copnall 2008), by think tanks (i.e. International Crisis Group 2005), and academics 
(i.e. Jourde 2005 and 2007). The doubts in the reality of the terror threats are not only prevalent 
in the Mauritanian context. Even in Algeria, where all signs began to point to the opening of a 
second front in the war of terror, such rumours about the involvement of US and government 
secret services in the production of local terrorism can be found, see i.e. Keenan 2007, 131. 
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Between 2006 and 2014, I had regularly completed short fieldwork visits of 
three to eight weeks in the country. In the beginning, an alternative story to the 
official terrorist attack was created for any violent incident, dismantling it as a 
mere criminal act without jihadist involvement. However, after the suicide at-
tack at the French embassy in August 2009, the critical voices denying the prob-
lem of AQIM on the territory of Mauritania became increasingly silent. After 
2010, I was all of a sudden asked by friends to wear a malaḥfa (Arabic: a long 
fabric wrap, to cover head and body) when visiting certain quarters in Nouak-
chott. They were afraid that I could be in danger if I was easily identifiable as a 
foreigner by jihadists. Another time, when I spent a weekend in the desert of 
Adrar (northwest Mauritania) with a Mauritanian friend, we stopped close to a 
village to cook some tea under a tree. After a while, people approached us with 
great caution and were relieved when we started chatting with them. Soon they 
admitted that they were scared when they saw a stranger with a European 
woman thinking that this might be a terrorist holding a hostage. The feeling of 
insecurity in Nouakchott became additionally fuelled by cases of robbery, drug 
trafficking, and rape, leading to fundamental changes in socialising habits. 
While until 2009 it was common in Nouakchott to have the door of the house 
open and to find strangers sitting in your salon, drinking a cup of tea and chat-
ting, this has since stopped. People started locking their houses even when they 
were at home and the custom of serving tea in your salon to strangers who just 
dropped by to say hello has disappeared. 
The maḥḍara and its propagation of a Mauritanian 
Islam 
As vague as the threats of terror are, the definition of what describes Maurita-
nian Islamic heritage is not clearly definable, but is constantly negotiated 
among various groups within Mauritanian society. I argue that the perception of 
insecurity, the fear of terror that originates from within the society and the con-
tinuous sentiments of exclusion and marginalisation among certain social sta-
tus groups fuels public debate about the nature and the position of the Maurita-
nian Islamic heritage within national identity. Even though Mauritania is called 
“Islamic Republic of Mauritania”, the legal framework of the country is a brico-
lage of Islamic and French law, and does not exclusively conform to sharia law. 
Nevertheless, the Mauritanian ʿulamāʾ have an important influence on govern-
ment decisions. In other, formerly colonised, Muslim countries, traditional 
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Islamic education as represented by the maḥḍara have been marginalised by 
post-independent governments. This is different in Mauritania. With the foun-
dation of the ISERI (Institut Scientifique des Etudes et Recherche Islamique), 
funded by Saudi Arabia in 1978, students from maḥḍara-s were enabled to con-
duct higher education without ever having entered state-affiliated schools be-
fore. These students later become teachers in state schools, work in the field of 
jurisprudence, state administration, state media, or in the now growing field of 
administrative posts in various ministries and agencies dealing with ‘Islamic 
affairs’. The influence of the maḥḍara on the fabric of Islamic heritage is as 
strong as it is in government institutions in general. 
The dynamic of the fabric of Mauritanian Islamic heritage becomes forma-
tive for the reality of social order. It not only supports the trend towards ‘Arab-
isation’ which leads to conflicts with sub-Saharan non-Arabophone communi-
ties, but also fosters the Islamic framing of political arguments and social 
grievances as a common form of expression, especially among members of the 
Ḥassāniyya-speaking communities in Mauritania.31 It is especially among this 
ethno-linguistic setting that Islamic heritage is hotly debated and numerous 
etiquettes restrict critical statements, especially when touching on issues that 
fight social inequality due to matters of kinship (i.e. tribalism, social status 
group), gender segregation, and jihadism. The maḥḍara, as an important reli-
gious institution, has been promoted as contributing to national unity, the fight 
against illiteracy and thus poverty.32 However, during the era of war on terror, 
Islamic education has become increasingly scrutinised due to its alleged role in 
spreading doctrines that justify violent actions in the name of Islam. The Mauri-
tanian government has been actively involved in setting up a (re)evaluation of 
the cultural heritage. Since the military came to power in 1979, the ‘Arab’ nature 
of the Mauritanian cultural heritage has been emphasised and its ‘Islamic’ na-
ture amplified.33 There were two bigger projects launched during the military 
rule reminding us that the domain of cultural heritage is, just like the global war 
on terror, projected within the framework of international funding programmes. 
The first project for the safeguarding of the old caravan towns in the desert 
(Chinguetti, Ouadane, Tishit, and Walata) was launched in 1979 with UNESCO, 
and in 1999 the second project for the safeguarding and valorisation of the Mau-
ritanian cultural heritage was financed by the World Bank (PSVPM, Projet de 
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31 Ould Ahmed Salem 2013, 16. 
32 Frede 2016. 
33 Ould Cheikh 2017, 282–83. 
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Sauvegarde et de Valorisation du Patrimoine Culturel Mauritanien, 1999–
2003).34 
Both projects encompassed a mixture of policies, diversifying the country’s 
economy through cultural tourism and defining what the Mauritanian heritage 
is about, how much weight to lay on its Islamic and Arabic aspects, and what 
kind of values it represents. The maḥḍara is of course not missing from this 
debate. When the PSVPM was launched, it was represented as an institution 
that promotes freedom (liberté), democracy, and equality (démocratie et éga-
lité), while being free of charge (gratuité).35 Moreover, the methodology of mem-
orisation as the main pedagogical emphasis was classified as the authentic way 
of Islamic learning, in contrast to the Graeco-Roman methodologies that were 
later adopted in most parts of the Muslim world.36 Finally, the maḥḍara, while 
found throughout Mauritania among all social and ethnic contexts, is an im-
portant institution for building unity among the various ethno-linguistic com-
munities.37 The presentation ended with a security argument, reminding us that 
the later 1990s were already a prelude to the ‘war on terror’: 
This is how the maḥḍara will radiate by reconciling authenticity and modernity, making 
the maḥḍara a tool for development, a means for the maintaining of populations and the 
preservation of their moral and spiritual values, characterized both by centrism and bal-
ance away from extremism and overstatement. It should be noted that the followers of the 
maḥḍara cannot, under any circumstances, become terrorists even if they need to become 
Mujahideen [combatants] that is to say that the teachings of the maḥḍara alone are suffi-
cient to instil such spirit, not only in our dear country but beyond and throughout the 
north and west of Africa to contribute greatly to the advent of an enlightened, authentic 
and open spirit.38 
The international recognition of the maḥḍara: 
Perspective of knowledge seekers 
The Mauritanian maḥḍara is obviously a projection surface for quite contradict-
ing visions: from the driver for democracy and tolerance, and a propagator of 
‘moderate’ Islam, as seen in the quotation from the PSVPM launching event in 
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36 Ibid. 
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1999, to the evaluation of the maḥḍara as a breeding ground for terrorism, by 
some experts of counter-terrorism in Arab media.39 Based on the little substan-
tial research done on the institution and its role in past and present Mauritania, 
everybody seems to project whatever they want into this institution. Neverthe-
less, one has to admit that the maḥḍara as an institution does encompass very 
diverse projects. The curriculum of education is not strictly regulated and varies 
from institution to institution, the financial support is organised by the scholars 
running the institutions, and state control remains superficial.40 Further, the 
maḥḍara is entangled in translocal networks and cannot be understood as a 
static institution immune to any transformation. On the contrary, the maḥḍara’s 
pedagogical methodology as well as its curriculum has developed through the 
intellectual exchange between scholars from the Mauritanian desert with schol-
ars in North Africa and the Middle East. Such exchanges have not been a one-
way project that transferred knowledge from ‘centres’ of learning in North Afri-
ca and the Middle East to the Sahara, but took place and still takes place in all 
networked directions. As much as texts, pedagogies, doctrines, and ideas had 
been imported, Mauritanian ʿulamāʾ have contributed substantially to the de-
velopment of Islamic education at least since the 19th century, e.g. at al-Azhar in 
Egypt or at educational institutions in Saudi Arabia.41 Mauritanian ʿulamāʾ have 
been and still are prominent among Sufi movements like the Qādiriyya, the 
Tijāniyya, within the Arab Nahḍa, or the development of Salafi doctrine. We 
find them too among jihadist groups, most infamously, the religious scholar 
Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, who acted as the religious adviser for Osama bin Laden 
for a while. Still, as much as Mauritanian ʿulamāʾ have actively imported global 
trends in Islamic doctrine and conversely contributed to its development, they 
have even attracted international students. During the 19th century, these stu-
dents mainly came from the Sahel region. Since the later 20th century, students 
increasingly came from various parts of the world: North Africa, the Gulf States, 
North America, and Europe. Especially in contemporary Mauritanian maḥḍara-s, 
run by ʿulamāʾ of various doctrinal orientation, students join from all corners of 
the world, and only a small percentage of these students later join jihadist 
movements in Libya, Sudan, Algeria, or other regions.42 
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41 For al-Azhar, see Bensaid and Ladjal 2019, 152–53; for Saudi Arabia have a look at Ahmed 
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I would like to contest the evaluation of the maḥḍara as a breeding ground 
for terrorism per se, even though biographies indicate that studying in a 
maḥḍara was part of most life paths of the inmates jailed for terrorism.43 More-
over, there is a kind of study tourism going on in the Islamic world in general, 
attracting students who are searching for Islamic knowledge. Places like Mauri-
tania, that has preserved traditional educational institutions of Islamic learning 
like the maḥḍara, appear to be especially attractive to these contemporary 
knowledge seekers. A few among them are vulnerable and at risk of being re-
cruited by jihadist movements, others are simply looking for alternatives to take 
their lives in a new direction. The promise of detachment from Western influ-
ences and instead deep immersion in the study of Islamic knowledge and piety 
in a way that is perceived as authentic is remarkably attractive to contemporary 
knowledge seekers if they choose to go on the riḥla (journey). Some Mauritanian 
maḥḍara-s have become very prominent in a global trend of knowledge-seeking 
Muslims. Former students propagate the experience of their riḥla to Mauritania 
via Youtube, and other channels. Listening to one of these reports, like the one 
by the American convert Abdul Haqq, discussed in the following, reveals that 
the Mauritanian maḥḍara-s are well-connected within the Muslim world and 
attract all sorts of people. 
Abdul Haqq runs the Youtube channel Manhaj al-Tulaab and regularly re-
ports on his study experiences in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and finally in 
Mauritania in 2018. In Mauritania, he studied in a small village, named Nouba-
ghiya, in one of the most prestigious contemporary maḥḍara-s run by a Tijānī 
scholar. On funding websites like Patreon44 and GoFundMe45, Abdul Haqq solic-
its funding for his journey and presents himself and his aims to become a schol-
ar to teach American Muslims the ‘right Islam’ and to fight against ‘extremism’. 
He also broadcasts his ideas from his ‘knowledge journeys’ via Facebook and 
Twitter and gives private lessons via WhatsApp and Telegram. He is an arche-
typical contemporary seeker of Islamic knowledge. He describes the nature of 
Muslim plurality within the Mauritanian maḥḍara institutions as following: 
[T]o say that you can’t go to study in Mauritania for this reason or that is complete bāṭil 
[Arab., false]. Al-Muhimm [Arab., the important point is], when you go to Mauritania you 
will meet every type of individual and ideology, because the maḥḍara accepts everyone, 
except they don’t accept people who cause issues. When you come into a maḥḍara they 
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accept you so you will meet [people following ideas] from this ideology and that ideology 
and it is the common rule in the maḥḍara that the people don’t enter into matters of khilāf 
[Arab., dispute]. So, for example, we mentioned before that the maḥḍara is known to mas-
ter ʿulūm al-ʿālā [Arab., advanced sciences, here methodology], the tools and order to un-
derstand the Qurʾān and Sunna. So, when they teach, everybody comes there and studies 
that same thing. Conversations begin and end with Arabic Grammar. So, you might not 
know what this one’s ʿaqīda [Arab., creed] is or that one’s ʿaqīda except if you talk with 
him about it privately.46 
The religious training conducted while studying at a maḥḍara attracts Muslim 
students of any doctrinal orientation, whether the teaching scholar is Sufi or 
not. The common agreement not to cause problems is an important aspect of the 
behaviour taught along with the content at these institutions. Such behaviour at 
least allows for the co-existence of multiple worldviews and interpretations of 
Islam, among these there may be some followers of jihadist doctrines as well as 
Sufis or Salafis. 
Doubting in Mauritania’s Islamic heritage: Could 
it breed terrorism? 
Generally speaking, going to study religious knowledge (of any kind and level) 
is perceived as something good and beneficial in Mauritanian society. There-
fore, if young members of the family state that they are going to study in a 
maḥḍara in the desert, the elders will be proud, but not worried. In the film 
“The Disappeared Friend” (“Mon ami disparu” by Zine el Abidine Ould Mo-
hamed), screened at Nouakchott’s film festival in 2009, the purely pious inten-
tion of studying in a maḥḍara was openly questioned for the first time. The plot 
of the film tackles the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism. The film pro-
voked public anger in the aftermath of the premiere. Especially religious elites 
accused the film makers of having defamed the maḥḍara in a scandalous way.47 
The film is an Arabic-French fictional short film, that is made in a documentary 
style, tells the story of a young student who has gone abroad to study and, after 
some time returns and sets out to find his friend from his neighbourhood be-
cause he had lost his traces. Asking other friends and the mother of his friend 
what happened, the story develops as follows. The friend became interested in 
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religious studies. After a while, he approached his friends with some books 
about Wahhabi doctrine and tried to convince them to join the group he is going 
to. From one day to the next, he left his friends and family and told them that he 
was going to study in a maḥḍara out in the desert. He comes back once briefly 
for a visit but seems to have changed his personality completely. Shortly after 
his return, he leaves again for his ‘study’ and disappears without traces. The 
film ends with the suicide attack on the French embassy in Nouakchott impli-
cating that the young man of the film had been the one who conducted the 
attack.48 
The main message of the film is that the international phenomenon of ji-
hadism spared no-one. It is not only the violence conducted by strangers that 
had arrived in the capital – no – it is the home-grown youth that never travelled 
abroad that was recruited by a global terrorist organisation. What the plot of the 
film debunks is that at this point Mauritania faced the same problems as Muslim 
communities did elsewhere: young people from ordinary families and neigh-
bourhoods were being recruited by jihadist organisations. Families and friends 
were left behind in a state of shock and grief, asking themselves what they 
could have done differently to avoid their son, daughter, or friend to disappear. 
The film had marked a turning point in the public perception of the threats of 
terror in Mauritania and what had been largely perceived as a foreign problem 
brought into the midst of society. The anger that arose as a first reaction after 
the screening was settled shortly afterwards by the intellectual head of Maurita-
nia’s Muslim Brothers, Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew (b. 1963), who discussed 
with the filmmakers, mediated between the ʿulamāʾ and artists, and finally 
judged the film as “important and useful.”49 
In the very same year of the suicide attack in front of the French embassy, 
the Ministry of Islamic Affairs started conducting a general survey (2009–10) for 
registering and counting institutes of Islamic education all over the country. 
The survey indicated the date of their establishment and the number of students 
enrolled in the institution. The number of foreign students were counted and 
the GPS data of the institution’s location was noted. The timing of the survey is 
interesting, as it reveals that Mauritania’s engagement within counter terrorism 
did not spare the maḥḍara-s. A first step undertaken by the government to steer 
Islamic education in new directions was the opening of a second Islamic univer-
sity on the eastern edge of the county: the Islamic University of Aïoun, inaugu-
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rated in January 2012.50 Interestingly, it is exactly this Islamic university where a 
centre for Islamic extremism studies was inaugurated in the autumn of 2019, 
illustrating the ruling regime’s emphasis on security issues.51 The establishment 
of a new Islamic university in 2012 went hand in hand with the threat to close 
down ISERI in Nouakchott, which led to an immediate halt in enrolment of first-
year students.52 This attempt to restructure Islamic education by closing down 
ISERI in favour of a newly set up university far from the capital provoked nu-
merous protests for a couple of weeks, some of which turned into violent clash-
es with police forces. Finally, at the end of February 2012, the ministry for Islam-
ic orientation declared that a complete closure of ISERI had never been envis-
aged and that they did not want to call into question ISERI’s outstanding 
position as a centre for Islamic studies in the country.53  
Towards the end of 2015, a first direct involvement in regulating maḥḍara-s 
by the government was undertaken. Around forty maḥḍara-s were closed in the 
eastern part of the country. The reason given was that they lacked operating 
permits from the respective ministry. Again, the governmental intervention 
provoked angry reactions in the Mauritanian media. The teaching of Islamic 
knowledge is considered a duty for pious Muslims and was widely viewed as not 
requiring a licence from the government.54 The closing of maḥḍara-s by the 
government was perceived as “crossing a red line”, as Mohamed Mahmoud 
Ould Ematt from the RFD (Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques) said.55 
However, the most intense response came from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
country: Mohamed Jemil Mansour (b. 1967), still the leader of the Tawassoul 
Party (RNRD, Rassemblement national pour la réforme et le devéloppement, 
known as Tawassoul) in 2015, declared the undertaking as an attack on the 
centrepiece of Mauritanian fame in the Muslim World, and that it equalled an 
attempt to erase Mauritania from the international Islamic intellectual history.56 
Ould Dedew called for protests against the government’s attack on maḥḍara-s 
stating that: 
It is impossible to make these Qurʾānic institutions disappear in a country like Mauritania 
(…). The Qurʾānic schools, which have been disseminated in the country since the fifth 
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century AH, reflect the identity of Mauritania and no one can easily erase the identity of a 
people or a nation.57 
The protest did not help. However, interestingly, these maḥḍara-s had not been 
closed due to an accusation of spreading ‘extremism’. Two and a half years 
later, the first educational institutions were shut down because of terror threats. 
In September 2018, the Markaz Takwīn al-ʿUlamāʾ` in Nouakchott was closed on 
the grounds that it spreads ‘extremism’.58 Established in 2009 by Ould Dedew, 
the Markaz was not a classical maḥḍara, but a traditionalist institution inspired 
by the maḥḍara. Financed privately by numerous conservative merchants, the 
Markaz financed the study of around 500 students by stipends. A significant 
number of students came from abroad. With forty-five teachers and a curricu-
lum of eighteen years, the Markaz, organised like a boarding school, quickly 
rose to successful fame and was well-known throughout Islamist circles in the 
Muslim world. Via Facebook and Twitter, the Markaz promoted Ould Dedew and 
his institution effectively on a global scale. Yet, another educational institution 
of Ould Dedew was shut down: the Ibn Yacine University.59 
Questioning the maḥḍara’s curriculum: Social 
grievance and the quest for equality 
The struggle about the question of regulating Islamic education tells us much 
about the drama of the threats of terror. By accusing Islamists openly of spread-
ing ‘extremism’ while leaving the maḥḍara-s out of the ‘extremism’ debate, the 
ruling regime navigates the complex entanglements of Islamic education with 
processes of identity making. The centrality of the debate on Islamic heritage 
becomes even more evident when looking at the human rights movements with-
in the country. One of the main problems are contradicting legal codes: the 1981 
and 2007 secular law, which forbids slavery, and the constitution of 1992, which 
places Islamic law above secular law, allows slavery. Ould Abeid, the leader of 
the antislavery organisation IRA, therefore calls to attack the ʿulamāʾ who he 
accuses of spreading teachings of inequality as guardians of Islamic law.60 Ac-
cusing the religious elite of teaching and spreading discrimination through 
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Islamic texts, the anti-slavery movement was the first to openly attack the cur-
riculum of the maḥḍara. In this curriculum, Mālikī law texts constitute an im-
portant foundation. One of the most common texts taught is the Mukhtaṣar al-
Khalīl, a comprehensive work on Mālikī law. On Friday, April 27, 2012, the IRA 
under the leadership of Biram Dah Ould Abeid, organised a public burning of 
pages of this text as a symbolic act in order to free Islam from the institution of 
slavery. This open attack of a revered Mālikī text taught throughout all 
maḥḍara-s of the country provoked public anger and hundreds took to the 
streets in the following days to demonstrate against such actions. The burning 
of Mālikī texts was condemned by the general public, including by all political 
parties.61 Just like the government’s intervention into issues of Islamic educa-
tion, as described above, the attack of the maḥḍara’s curriculum by human 
right activists crossed a ‘red line’ of acceptance by a majority of ʿulamāʾ, politi-
cians, and intellectuals.62 
However, despite the noisy protest, the anti-slavery activists have recruited 
a broad range of sympathisers from various social layers of the Mauritanian 
society as well, who took to the streets demanding the release of IRA activists 
imprisoned after burning religious texts allegedly threatening state security.63 
Among these sympathisers, who obviously did not feel offended by the critic on 
the maḥḍara’s curriculum, is Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mkhaitir (b. 1986). He grew 
up in Nouhadibou and originates from a family of blacksmiths, a social status 
group often marginalised and associated with Jewish linages. He received reli-
gious and secular education and successfully studied economy at the University 
of Nouakchott. He worked in the mining sector after receiving his diploma. In 
December 2013, he published a text online called “Ad-dīn wa-t-tadaiyun wa-l-
mʿallimīn” (the religion, the religiousness and the blacksmith) signed with 
Muḥammad ash-Shaikh b. Muḥammad.64 In this text, he invokes events from 
the Battles of Badr, Yathrib, and Banū Quraiẓa in the 7th century and describes 
how the Prophet Muḥammad treated converts, who had killed Muslims in these 
battles, differently. According to his interpretation, the different treatment had 
to do with the origin of the enemies. While the Prophet pardoned members of 
the Quraish, he could not have the same mercy with Abyssinians and Jews. He 
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then turns back to the entry statement where he had distinguished the human 
nature of religiosity from divine religion and reminded us that this difference is 
superficial, it is religion that acknowledge social difference. He then turns to the 
situation in Mauritania stating that Ḥarāṭīn, the small minority of Imraguen, 
and blacksmiths are suffering from discrimination due to the teachings of the 
local ʿulamāʾ. In his opinion, this needs to be changed urgently. 
The public reaction to Ould Mkhaitir’s text was furious. He was accused of 
blaming the Prophet himself and was eventually charged with apostasy. His 
wife was forcibly divorced, Ould Mkhaitir was sentenced to death in the first 
instance. A sentence that was later reduced to two years of jail in 2017. Never-
theless, he was only released in September 2019 after almost six years in prison 
and was soon sent into exile to France.65 The lawyer who represented him was 
threatened with death.66 Public intellectuals and their families who took a stand 
for him also had to fear death.67 Moreover, rumours doubted the originality of 
Ould Mkhaitir’s text and suspected an Israeli mission behind it.68 There were 
many public demonstrations and numerous ʿulamāʾ calling for the prompt exe-
cution of the accused. The violent reaction of the religious public was putting 
pressure on the ruling regime to carry out the sentence while international hu-
man right organisations actively campaigned for his immediate release. This 
sandwich position of the ruling regime illustrates that the Islamic heritage is not 
exclusively governed by the ruling elite in power, but is negotiated by various 
actors who envision a broad range of goals, from the demand for reform of Islam 
for social emancipation to the demand for a consistent implementation of the 
Mālikī sharia law.  
Ould Mkhaitir’s text can also be read as an attack on the maḥḍara’s curricu-
lum, as early Islamic history from the core curriculum is taught in lessons on the 
sīra, the prophet’s life path. Since arriving in France in autumn 2019, he has 
returned to social media platform, posting critical statements on Twitter and 
Facebook criticising the ruling regime’s harsh policies against feminists, homo-
sexuals, and anti-slavery activists. But his criticism does not end there, as he 
also criticises the ʿulamāʾ who justify the marginalisation due to gender, sexual-
ity, and ‘caste’, and the international community that silently tolerates the in-
justice to follow their own interests in the region. On January 22, 2020 he tweeted 
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about a conference in Mauritania attended by numerous African ʿulamāʾ to 
promote the ‘real moderate Islam’ to counter ‘extremism’69: 
The conference for peace, religious reform, and peaceful coexistence has been held in 
Mauritania. Nothing new. The conference has ended with the following results: – A death 
sentence for the one who leaves Islam and doubt in the validity of Islam; – A detention of 
five years in prison for the one who does not obey the Sunnite order in his private life. Like 
the usual habit, the international organisations and the European diplomats have partici-
pated and assisted financially and morally.70 
This statement sums up very well the social frictions that fuel the threats of 
terror in Mauritanian society. The disappointment among activists fighting for 
democratisation and social justice faced with a conservative religious trend that 
rejects emancipatory quests from human right activists combined with policies 
that criminalise their political engagement and international donors that sup-
port these policies. The case of Ould Mkhaitir illustrates that even other social 
status groups, like blacksmiths and griots among the Ḥassāniyya speakers, 
increasingly complain about societal disadvantages. They speak out loudly 
against the hegemony of Arab ideology and the conservative ʿulamāʾ, who are 
accused of acknowledging social inequality with reference to religion.  
Negotiating the maḥḍara in an era of terror 
threats 
In contrast to other Sahelian countries, Mauritania has not been heavily affect-
ed by terror attacks during the last decade. However, the terror threats have 
unleashed their impact on the public negotiation of Mauritania’s Islamic heri-
tage, especially on the local institution of traditional Islamic education, the 
maḥḍara. As Sounaye outlines in his chapter, Islam in the Sahel “has been a 
major source of inspiration for various socio-political agendas.”71 Policies of de-
radicalisation link to these traditions of policy making within the framework of 
Islamic arguments. The Mauritanian government has developed into an im-
portant player within the Sahelian fight against terrorism. Moreover, in the 
Mauritanian case, Islam is also an important element in the creation of a na-
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tional identity that seeks to break away from the established ethno-linguistic 
hegemonies and social stratifications that form an obstacle to national unity. A 
discourse about ‘good’ Islam in Mauritania and foreign Islamic ‘extremism’ 
therefore helps to intervene in the landscape of (trans-)locally established reli-
gious elites. It defines citizenship along a government-approved concept of 
Islamic norms and values. In agreement with some conservative ʿulamāʾ, the 
ruling regime has set up an argument against ‘extremism’ to maintain the status 
quo of elites, in politics, economics, and public debate. 
Mauritania’s ʿulamāʾ have been drawn into the state’s administration 
through the integration of students of the maḥḍara into state institutions like 
schools and ministries, the creation of state-affiliated counselling, the regula-
tion of organisations like the Islamic High Council (IHC, 1991–2017), which dis-
solved in 2017 into the High Council for Fatwa and Administrative Appeals 
(Haut Conseil de la Fatwa et des Recours Gracieux) created in 2012,72 and 
ʿulamāʾ led programmes for social reintegration of former jihadists. In the era of 
the terror threats, Islam is increasingly drawn into politics, not only by Islamists 
and jihadists, but also by actors who counter them. The public debate about the 
preservation of a Mauritanian Islamic heritage creates distrust among the social 
strata that feels marginalised and deprived from their human rights by the rul-
ing regime, the Islamist opposition, and the state incorporated ʿulamāʾ alike. As 
a consequence, Islam is increasingly alienated in public discourse from its orig-
inal essence: the spiritual relationship between the believer and the divine. 
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Fig. 1: French Government advice for travels to Mauritania. Source: France Diplomatie 2020. 
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Islam as World Religion in Northern Mali 
Abstract: In 2012, northern Mali seceded from the rest of the country under the 
leadership of secessionist and Islamist groups. This, and subsequent events, 
have been interpreted, broadly speaking, in two ways. First, as a result of the 
unchecked influence of external actors representing ‘global jihad’ on a country 
whose Islamic practice had until then been described as ‘moderate’. Second, 
allegiance to Islamist groups was seen as a strategy in local power struggles. 
Without wanting to invalidate the latter interpretation, this chapter asks what 
would happen if we took the Islamic rhetoric put forward by various actors in 
northern Mali seriously. This implies understanding Islam in the region both in 
local and in transregional terms, and placing it within a narrative not of radical 
rupture, but of continuity. Contemporary tensions between local conflicts and 
universal notions of justice, legitimacy and belonging, have in fact a long and 
variegated history in the area.  
Introduction 
When large parts of northern Mali seceded from the country under the leader-
ship of Islamist groupings in early 2012, there was an immediate tendency in the 
European media to blame this on external influences that had, in the space of a 
decade or less, apparently led to the ‘radicalisation’ of the ‘traditionally moder-
ate’ Islam practiced in the area.1 As a widely-cited and generally well-informed 
analysis of events stated in 2013, the “open sore” of conflict-ridden and poorly 
governed northern Mali had become “infected by foreign Salafi ideas and muja-
hideen, and by trans-national networks of organised crime”.2 Others soon pro-
posed an alternative reading. They suggested that the reference to ‘radical  
Islam’ was best understood as a cover for other political struggles, opposing 
dominant political groups and their former dependents, and whose primary 
stakes were control over trade routes and access to pastures. Or they were seen 
as attempts to compensate for youth disaffection, the shortcomings of the state, 
|| 
1 For critical comments on the concept of ‘radicalisation’, see Marchal and Ould Ahmed Salem 
2018. 
2 Lecocq et al. 2013. 
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or indeed the effects of state corruption.3 While there can be no doubt about the 
much greater pertinence of these latter explanations, in both readings, ‘radical 
Islam’ risks being ultimately explained away.4 It appears either as foreign ‘cor-
ruption’ of local ‘moderate’ Islam, or as a smokescreen that can be overcome by 
the elimination of foreign fighters, military intervention, state building, and 
enhanced border control. In other words, experts might squabble over which 
level of analysis really matters – whether we are dealing with essentially local 
conflicts hiding behind an Islamic façade, or with another instance of the un-
checked global march of religious fanaticism – but the basic terms of the debate 
are set, as is an implicit distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ Islam.5 
This chapter asks what would happen if we stepped back from this reading 
and took seriously the Islamic rhetoric put forward by various actors in northern 
Mali, situating it within a narrative not of radical rupture, but of continuity: 
within the tension between local conflicts and universal aspirations that have 
long shaped notions of justice, legitimacy, status, and belonging in the area, but 
that by definition can never be resolved. This is an undertaking beyond the 
scope of this chapter, or indeed the evidence at my disposal.6 Four tentative 
points emerge nonetheless: (i) Islamist activism in northern Mali situates itself 
neither on an exclusively local nor on a global scale, but derives its primary 
references, terms of debate, and recruits from a longstanding intellectual region 
that spans most (but by no means all) of the Western Sahara and its southern 
edge. (ii) This region provides Islamic movements in the area with their own 
historical and geographical framework that consciously predates contemporary 
nation-states, creating its own form of historicity and historical legitimacy. 
(iii) Within it, operative distinctions are not those of ‘local’ or ‘foreign’, but ra-
ther expressed in terms of status, kinship, and alliance. (iv) Lastly, religious 
|| 
3 See Thurston and Lebovich 2013, Briscoe 2014, Raineri and Strazzari 2015, Benjaminsen and 
Ba 2019, Grémont 2019, Théroux-Benoni et al. 2016, Yahaya Ibrahim 2017, and Dowd and Ra-
leigh 2013, respectively. 
4 The tendency to explain religion through other factors has been built into the social sciences 
since Durkheim. Such explanations are important, but never quite sufficient (Schielke 2019). 
5 As Prud’homme (2015, 131) notes, most academic analysts are wary of this distinction, which 
is clearly an etic (colonial), rather than an emic category. Given its current political force (Mar-
zouki 2011), however, it is difficult not to play into it, willingly or not. 
6 I carried out long-term ethnographic field research in northern Mali (mostly Gao and Tim-
buktu) in 2008 and 2009, but have not been back to the area since 2012, although I have spo-
ken to people there on the telephone or met them elsewhere. This chapter is thus based on 
personal communications, written sources, and media and expert reports, in addition to my 
own background knowledge.  
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differences, including those with people from southern Mali, do not necessarily 
indicate incompatibility, but potentially stake out new grounds for debate, there-
by creating shared terms of references whose impact might be much greater in 
the long run than that of militant jihad.7 
The conflict 
In January 2012, fighters from the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Aza-
wad (MNLA) successfully attacked several army garrisons in northern Mali. 
They met with little resistance as they advanced, taking Gao on March 31 and 
Timbuktu on April 1. On April 6, they announced (from Paris) the creation of the 
independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. By then, rebel forces controlled 
two thirds of Malian territory, although much of this was desert and home to 
less than ten per cent of Mali’s overall population. In the meantime, the national 
government in southern Mali had collapsed following a military coup. 
‘Tuareg’ rebellions have been an integral part of the country’s history since 
independence from France in 1960.8 But they had never been quite as success-
ful. This was partly due to the MNLA’s much greater firepower compared to 
earlier rebel movements, which in turn was connected to Qadhafi’s demise in 
neighbouring Libya, host to a substantial number of Malian Tuareg labour 
migrants. It can be partly explained by reference to the quasi-absence of state 
institutions in the North, which has long been governed by proxies.9 The MNLA, 
moreover, was not fighting alone in northern Mali, but was first seconded and 
then rapidly displaced by groups fighting under an Islamic banner. These in-
cluded al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, a transformation of the Algeria-
based GSPC), but also a number of more local groups, such as Ansar al-Din, and 
the Movement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), who 
together seemed to be able to draw on a much more extensive pool of resources 
and recruits than the MNLA. After a short-lived alliance with the MNLA, these 
groups expelled MNLA officials from Timbuktu in April and from Gao in June 
2012 and started to administer both towns and their hinterlands according to 
|| 
7 As Li (2015, 12–7) notes, ‘jihad’ is a slippery term. However, the term and its derivatives are 
now widely used in Mali, including as a self-definition (Théroux-Benoni et al. 2016, 2), and I 
will follow this usage here. 
8 See Boilley 2009 and Lecocq 2010. 
9 Hüsken and Klute 2015. 
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sharī‘a. In November 2012, the MUJAO also captured Menaka, thereby putting 
all major towns in the North under Islamist control. 
On January 10, 2013, Ansar al-Din launched an attack on Konna, a town in 
central Mali south of the boundaries of ‘Azawad’. Following a demand for help 
by the then Malian president Dioncounda Traoré, the French army intervened 
on January 11. Officially, this was an emergency intervention to stop ‘jihadi 
terrorists’ from reaching southern Mali, although their intervention had clearly 
been prepared beforehand, waiting for an opportunity to deploy.10 By the end of 
the month, the French army, with the help of Chadian troops, controlled all 
major settlements in northern Mali. They were gradually, but never totally, re-
placed by MINUSMA, a United Nations ‘peacekeeping’ mission, from April 25, 
2013 onwards.11 At the time of final revisions (spring 2021), French troops were 
still on the ground in Mali, although resistance against their presence was 
mounting nationwide.12 Although external military intervention was swift in 
removing Islamist control from towns, and in killing perhaps a third of the esti-
mated 2,000 fighters in the area,13 its control never extended to the countryside. 
Islamist groups of various labels and affiliations have since proliferated, includ-
ing further south. Today, they control most of the rural areas in central and 
northern Mali, where they have implemented their own forms of territorial and 
legal administration, centred on wells, quranic schools, and Islamic courts.14 
For international analysts, these events came as a shock. Mali had long 
been presented as the “poster child for African democracy”;15 a “donor darling”;16 
poor, but friendly; a priced destination for tourists; culturally sophisticated, 
present on the international music scene; and, although Muslim, “tolerant” and 
|| 
10 Henke 2017, 13. For more information on how and why the French intervention came about, 
see Henke 2017, and Boeke and Schuurman 2015. For an analysis of French military interven-
tions in its former West African colonies more generally, see Charbonneau 2017. 
11 ‘Peacekeeping’ is a clear misnomer, as there was (and still is) no peace to be kept. On the 
MINUSMA, see Cold-Ravnkilde, Albrecht and Haugegaard (2017), who note internal structural 
inequalities between Western and non-Western soldiers. Soldiers from African countries ac-
count for 67% of military personnel on the ground, and for 90% of casualties so far. 
12 See, for instance, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbPaij78Owo, accessed May 13, 
2020. Also “Frappes sur Bounti (Mali): des associations demandent une enquête indépendan-
te”, RFI January 2, 2021; and “Mali: polémique autour d’une frappe de la force Barkhane vers 
Talataye”, RFI March 26, 2021. 
13 Boeke and Schuurman 2015, 1. 
14 Klute, personal communication, Bayreuth, March 4, 2019. See also International Crisis 
Group 2016 and 2019, 5 and 13. 
15 Benjaminsen and Ba 2019, 5. 
16 Bergamasci 2014. 
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“open-minded”; “a peaceful republic with a pleasant air of democracy and 
secularism”.17 As part and parcel of this image, ‘Malian Islam’ tended to be por-
trayed as inherently different from, and more ‘tolerant’ than, its Middle Eastern 
counterpart, in a rhetoric that echoed colonial distinctions between ‘moderate’ 
(‘Sufi’) and ‘radical’ (‘Wahhabi’), ‘local’ and ‘global’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ Islam.18 
‘The Tuareg’, meanwhile, have long been seen by French audiences in particu-
lar as inherently ‘un-Islamic’, and open to friendship with France.19 There is no 
need to reiterate here that corruption had in fact been rife in pre-conflict Mali; 
that government in the North had been “mafia-like”;20 that Malian society was 
riven by generational, educational, regional, linguistic, and class tensions; that 
Islam in the country was as diverse and ‘orthodox’ as elsewhere; that Islamist 
groups from Algeria had long found a sanctuary in the north of the country, 
tolerated because Malian government officials collected a share of AQIM ran-
soms, much as they did with the profits of international smuggling in the area.21 
That, in fact, Mali’s golden international image was part of the problem, as Ma-
li’s dependency on foreign goodwill made it necessary to play up to whatever 
image ‘the West’ (or indeed, ‘the East’) wanted to see, instead of addressing 
political tensions in the country head-on.22  
Media portrayals 
Mali’s golden image, including its alleged subscription to ‘moderate Islam’, 
however, was too deep-seated to be discarded quite so lightly. Initially, events 
in northern Mali were described primarily, in the media but also some expert 
reports, as sparked by external factors, by a heady cocktail of Algerian jihadis, 
Colombian drug-smugglers, and Libyan guns.23 Some of this might have been 
|| 
17 Holder 2013. 
18 ‘White’ here refers to speakers of Tamacheq and Arabic. Triaud (2014) describes the colonial 
creation and the longevity of the notion of an ‘African’ or ‘black Islam’ that was perceived to be 
less ‘pure’ and therefore less threatening to European rule. Needless to say, this distinction is 
historically unfounded, as is the idea of a specifically ‘Malian’ or even ‘African Islam’ (Kane 
2012). 
19 Casajus 1995. 
20 Bergamasci 2014, 355. 
21 Dowd and Raleigh 2013, 506. 
22 Bergamasci 2014, 348. 
23 Briscoe 2014. 
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due to the impact of French military propaganda.24 It is important to note here 
that the French military intervention in northern Mali resulted in a “war without 
images”,25 or rather, one in which almost all information was produced or at 
least controlled by the French army. Subsequent analyses of the situation in 
northern Mali often read as if the French army itself were not themselves among 
the ‘foreign actors’ in the area, and the best-armed of them all.26 Whatever its 
origins, the image of an essentially external threat was endorsed by official 
Malian rhetoric pleading for foreign military intervention, and also by local 
actors who positioned themselves as bulwarks against ‘global Islam’. Prominent 
among them was the late ‘supreme chief’ of the Touareg Kel Adagh in Kidal, 
Intallah ag Attaher, who, in 2013, asked “all armed movements from outside the 
Azawad” to leave;27 one of Intallah’s sons, Alghabas, is currently administering 
Kidal based on sharī‘a. Beyond the control of major towns, foreign military in-
tervention hence aimed primarily at the removal of foreign fighters and the 
closure of the border with Algeria and Niger, although these measures were 
rewarded with little success, beyond the increase of food prices for the local 
population.28  
The image of jihadis as inherently alien to Mali also pervades popular por-
trayals of the current conflict in northern Mali, especially in Europe. Take, for 
instance, the 2014 film Timbuktu, a Franco-Mauritanian co-production directed 
by the Mauritanian filmmaker Abderrahmane Sissako. Timbuktu was acclaimed 
in French media as the “greatest success in the history of African cinema”.29 It 
obtained seven Césars in 2015, including that of best film and best director, and 
it was the only African film officially selected for the 2014 Cannes film festival. It 
was filmed in Mauritania with funds from the Mauritanian government, and 
under protection and with logistical help from the Mauritanian and French 
armies.30 The film tells the story of a Tuareg couple and their daughter whose 
lives are torn apart as the husband, Kidane, accidentally kills a local fisherman. 
The fisherman’s mother refuses to grant pardon, even though she is offered 
compensation. Kidane is condemned to death and executed by an Islamic legal 
|| 
24 Henke 2017, 10. 
25 Boeke 2016. 
26 Grémont 2019, 49. 
27 Lecocq et al. 2013, 11. 
28 Bensassi et al. 2015, 19; see also “Entretien avec Alghabas ag Intalla, chef du Mouvement 
Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA)”, Malijet avec Andy Morgan Writes, February 1, 2013. 
29 According to Radio France Internationale (RFI), February 3, 2016. 
30 On Mauritania’s ambivalent stance towards ‘global Islamic terror’, see Ould Ahmed Salem 
2013. 
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court. This story is based on the real execution of Moussa ag Mohamed, a Tuareg 
member of Ansar al-Din, judged and executed by his own friends and colleagues 
in November 2012.31 In the film, however, Kidane is a Tuareg herd owner and 
occasional musician unknown to, and inherently different from, the Islamists 
he confronts. The latter are mostly portrayed as foreign – the lead actor is Tuni-
sian – and relying on interpreters to communicate with the local population. Or, 
they are ‘up-rooted’ locals who returned from exile in Libya and work in subor-
dinate positions. No further mention is made of the refusal of the fisherman’s 
family to forgive the murder and the way it probably contributed to the long-
standing racial and ethnic tensions in the area. 
This storyline is interspersed with re-enacted scenes from the Mauritanian 
journalist Lemine ould Mohamed Salem’s (2016) documentary Salafistes, which 
condenses nine months of events across northern Mali into a few days in Tim-
buktu, and from news coverage.32 In the film’s opening sequence, for instance, 
wooden statues looking generically ‘African’ are shot at by invisible mujahidin 
and ultimately destroyed. This seems to draw on “exclusive footage” broadcast 
by the French news programme Journal de 20 heures in June 2012, where local 
Tamacheq-speaking mujahidin are seen breaking small and rather badly made 
wooden statues and haranguing the local population.33 The status of these stat-
ues is unclear – “they probably took them from a tourist shop”34 – but the news 
commentary describes them as “traditional African divinities, broken one by 
one, just like the Taliban did with the famous Buddhas of Bamiyan, blown up 
with dynamite”.35 (Timbuktu has been a centre of Islamic scholarship with an 
almost entirely Muslim population for centuries). 
While there can be no common ground between 20 heures’ statues and the 
Bamiyan Buddhas outside of Western perceptions of a universal threat, the 
parallel is significant. It feeds into the same underlying rhetoric about ‘global 
jihad’ that has been put forward since 2001 to justify the ‘global war on terror’ 
(GWOT). Namely, to blame it on a few inherently external agitators whose ‘sur-
gical’ removal would return things back to normal. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria, as it used to be in Chechnya and Bosnia Hercegovina, ‘foreign fighters’ 
|| 
31 Lemine ould Mohamed Salem, “Dans le nord Mali, la charia s’applique aussi aux soldats de 
Dieu”, Libération, November 25, 2012. 
32 Joan Tilouine, “‘Salafistes’: le documentaire qui a inspire ‘Timbuktu’”, Le Monde, Decem-
ber 10, 2015. 
33 Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfheY-IGffQ, accessed March 11, 2019. 
34 André Bourgeot, commentary on Timbuktu, available from https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UNJQxU7__7A, accessed March 11, 2019. 
35 “Tombouctou, le carrefour des Salafistes d’Aqmi de par le monde”, 20 heures, June 9, 2012. 
166 | Judith Scheele 
  
tend to be represented as the most dangerous and ‘fanatical’ of all mujahidin in 
Western media. They are described as footloose and rootless, and hence without 
scruple and limitations; men without family nor women to bind them. They are, 
in Li’s pithy phrase, “Muslims out of place”, and in most cases in fact ‘Arabs out 
of place’; they ought to be removed at all cost, and much of the worldwide mili-
tary and punitive apparatus of the GWOT targets them as a priority.36 A story of 
‘Arabs out of place’ in northern Mali is thus one that greatly resonates with 
Western and perhaps also some Malian audiences. It is, however, doubly perni-
cious as northern Mali is home to a small, but important, minority of Arabs, 
who, although Malian, are understood by many southerners to be inherently 
‘foreign’, or at least, of questionable allegiance and loyalty to the Malian na-
tion.37 Defining northern Malian Islamists as primarily Arab, and Arabs as for-
eign, feeds into a potentially explosive history of already fraught community 
relations. 
Islam as a façade for local conflicts 
Explanations emphasising the ‘foreignness’ of jihadis also stumble over empiri-
cal evidence showing that the majority of fighters were recruited locally and 
that local jihadi organisations occupied centre stage in the conflict. The more 
visible of these are Ansar al-Din, founded by Tuareg from Kidal but which also 
attracted a following among Arabs from Timbuktu, and MUJAO, said to be set 
up as a reaction against ‘foreign’ dominance of AQIM. It seems that the more 
spectacular jihadi activities dwelled on by foreign media, such as the destruc-
tion of saints’ tombs, public flogging, amputations, and the prohibition of 
games, were carried out by local organisations and fighters, while the AQIM 
leadership attempted to calm their overzealousness in favour of a “progressive 
application” of sharī‘a. AQIM in fact repeatedly cautioned their fighters against 
the “fanaticism” (ta‘assub, which is perhaps better translated as ‘factionalism’) 
of their Tuareg allies “which is only useful when it is well directed and ruled by 
law”, admonishing them to be as inclusive as possible in their recruitment and 
counsel.38 As a result, more thoughtful analyses conclude that the conflict in 
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northern Mali was and is primarily local.39 Such analyses stress several ele-
ments: the long history of rebellion in northern Mali, the accumulated grievanc-
es this has led to, and the Malian government’s repeated failure to address 
these; conflicts between groups considered to be a different status, ranging from 
‘noble’ via ‘client’ to ‘former slave’; competition over resources, both in the form 
of transnational smuggling and of pastoral and agricultural productive regimes; 
and local needs for protection, in an increasingly violent social and political 
environment. 
 Northern Mali has its own long and complex history of rebellion and bloody 
suppression by the Malian army. This in turn has created hostilities and a deep-
seated mistrust against the regime in Bamako and populations associated with 
it, as probably all ‘white’ inhabitants of the area – that is to say, Arabic- and 
Tamacheq-speakers of a higher status – have personal memories of brutal exac-
tions committed by Malian soldiers, and lost close relatives in the struggle.40 It 
has also shaped the lives of many who are now prominent in armed conflict, 
such as, most famously, Iyad ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar al-Din and current 
leader of the JNIM, Mali’s currently most influential Islamist movement, who 
had been an influential figure in earlier ‘secular’ rebellions. The rebellion of the 
1990s and its aftermath was marked by scissions between different Tuareg 
groups, protesting against the dominant role played by ‘noble’ families in the 
1990s rebellion and its aftermath.41 This was also the time when formerly subor-
dinate groups started bearing arms.42 Similar explanations are now being put 
forward for the current conflict. Ansar al-Din is seen by some as an attempt, by 
former ‘nobles’, to re-ascertain their political leadership in the area. The crea-
tion of MUJAO tends to be interpreted as a reaction of ‘southern Saharans’ and 
former clients against the arrogance of the Algerian leadership of AQIM.43 In 
central Mali, the katība Macina initially challenged the exclusive control of 
pasture by high-status local elites.44 More generally, cleavages often seem to 
follow divisions between status groups, although alliances remain unpredictable. 
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Here as elsewhere, equality before God provides a persuasive argument for 
former lower-status people wishing to better their social position. Nonetheless, 
these explanations are only partly correct, as, true to the many cross-cutting ties 
that have long shaped the history of this region,45 leading regional figures tend 
to move from one group to another, to the point where “local people in northern 
Mali are themselves unable to determine which group is which”.46 Islamists, 
meanwhile, put forward a message of inclusivity: “Our battle is in the name of 
Islam, it’s not Arab or Tuareg, black or white, it’s in the name of Islam”.47 This 
might be propaganda, but it is also, realistically, the only path to long-term 
military and political success in the area. The AQIM leadership at least are clear-
ly aware of this – indeed, as seen above, excessive ‘tribalism’, or ta‘assub, is one 
of their recurrent bugbears. Meanwhile, factional readings of events tend to 
become self-fulfilling prophecies, as the Malian government pursues its long-
standing strategy of arming some groups against others, or of creating ‘local 
militias’ that, statistically speaking, have by now killed more people than any 
other actor in the Malian conflict, including the Malian and French armies.48 
Again, this strategy has a long and brutal history in the area. 
 Another related set of analyses, which have gained increased traction in the 
past few years as jihadis have successful spread into central Mali, draw on polit-
ical economy. After interviews with sixty-three “previously involved” young 
men in central and southern Mali, Théroux-Benoni et al. conclude that 
in most cases documented by this study, youth engagement did not hinge on religious fac-
tors and was not the result of religious indoctrination. Religion seems to play a marginal 
position in the motivations of the youths interviewed in this study.49  
Rather, what mattered most to people was a desire to protect themselves and 
their livelihoods, especially in the area around Mopti, where membership in a 
jihadi group was seen as effective protection against cattle rustling. 
In a similar vein, Poupart explains the constitution of the MUJAO in Gao as 
an attempt by locals to protect themselves against MNLA exactions: all political 
groups in the area “act like entrepreneurs and propose different types of rhetoric 
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that mobilise to different degrees and according to their own strategies, identi-
ty, and political and religious aspirations”.50 Grémont traces the history of con-
flicts and alliances open to local groups in north-eastern Mali and concludes 
that those who opt for Islamist allegiances “certainly do not primarily aim to 
carry out universal jihad”, but rather draw on them “as a resource in struggles 
for local power”, much as others might draw on privileged links with the French 
army.51 For Benjaminsen and Ba, who also work on central Mali, “alliances and 
conflicts are structured by material interests with deep historical roots in con-
trolling land and resources, rather than by a radical Islamist agenda”.52 Local 
Fulani join Islamist groups because they provide reliable, quick, and relatively 
cheap solutions to struggles over land-rights, because they fight against extor-
tion by noble groups traditionally backed by the state, and because they protect 
members against attacks by sedentary Dogon self-defence groups trained by the 
Malian army. 
Arabs out of place? 
My aim here is not to show that this point of view and the analyses that it in-
forms are substantially wrong (they are not), but rather that because of the need 
to counterbalance media reports on ‘foreign contamination’ they may be wilful-
ly blind to regional connections and universal ideas that also matter. As Gré-
mont himself notes, as soon as the parties to local conflicts refer to their oppo-
nents as ‘mujahidin’ or ‘collaborators with the French’, simply speaking of 
inter-community conflicts “is perhaps not wrong, but certainly reductive”.53 
Indeed, attempts to avoid the narrative of ‘global jihad’ at all cost might implic-
itly strengthen it, by endorsing the conceptual division between ‘local’ and 
‘global’ factors, while weighing them differently. In northern Mali (as else-
where), local conflicts are rarely experienced as just local. To say that they 
might be phrased in, or rather experienced through, universal religious terms, 
and sincerely so, does not invalidate their local impact, on the contrary: both 
levels mutually reinforce each other, and give each other additional meaning. 
Quranic notions of injustice, tyranny, and the abuse of power strike chords with 
people who suffer from these daily, and gain clarity and traction from universal 
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language. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine what a ‘radical jihadi agenda’ 
that could not feed on local conflicts and specific resentments would in fact look 
like. It is thus this articulation of different levels, rather than the assumed pre-
ponderance of one over the other, that should catch our attention. This kind of 
‘scaling’ has a long history in the region. Today, it is employed on all sides of 
the Malian conflict, although the universal values invoked vary. 
On August 22, 2016, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, member of Ansar al-Din, was 
brought to trial before the ICC, accused of war crimes by the Malian government. 
He was indicted for leading the destruction of nine shrines and parts of the Sidi 
Yahya mosque in Timbuktu, one of which was a UNESCO-certified World Herit-
age site.54 He was sentenced to nine years in prison and to pay € 2.7 million in 
compensation to his victims. According to the then director general of UNESCO, 
Irina Bokova, “[w]hen a World Heritage site is destroyed, because of stupidity 
and violence, the whole of humanity feels that it has been deprived of part of 
itself; that it has been injured.”55 
Islamic groups are thus not the only ones to invoke universal values to describe 
local events. And, for UNESCO also, the universal always necessarily takes place 
somewhere, and hence partakes in local socio-economic and political conflicts. 
By 2015, the shrines had been re-built with UNESCO funding, and “a ceremony 
was held… to reconsecrate [sic] the sites and hand back the keys to their tradi-
tional owners”.56 Buildings that, from a UNESCO point of view, look like univer-
sal heritage were, in Timbuktu itself, closely associated with particular families, 
descendants of the saints; UNESCO therefore intervened – unwittingly but un-
avoidably – in power relations on the ground. 
These families still exercise influence and claim superior status in the area, 
a claim that is resented by many. Thus, local Islamists reject the veneration of 
saints both in terms of a universal principle and in terms of a personal relation-
ship of expected subordination to a particular family, and a hierarchical system 
associated with their high status. Most (but by no means all) jihadis or other 
kinds of Islamists recruited in Timbuktu are from groups that cannot claim priv-
ileged access to prestigious religious ancestry. This does not mean that we can 
reduce their motivation solely to local status struggles. Nevertheless, aspira-
tions for universal value systems tend to appeal to people on the basis of their 
own experience. Similarly, Algerian Islamist who settled in the area from the 
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1990s onwards tended to intermarry with families of lower status. Their in-laws 
thereby gained access to other forms of wealth, but also to a different kind of 
religious legitimacy — a different kind of universalism than that represented by 
the saints and their tombs and descendants. This can be read both as an attack 
on a social system based on genealogical status, and as an attempt to diversify it 
by introducing new sources of prestige. We are, then, not dealing with the op-
position of local to global, but rather with the tensions between different claims 
to universality. 
Timbuktu saints, moreover, tend to be internationally recognised Islamic 
scholars, and are therefore by definition never just local. A brief look at the 
names of the saints whose tombs have been destroyed gives us an indication of 
their heterogeneity, as well as of their ambivalent geographical status. They are: 
Sīdi Mahmūd b. ‘Umar Aqīt (al-Walātī, from present-day Mauritania); Shaykh 
Muhammad Mahmūd al-Arawānī (just north of Timbuktu; the family claims 
Moroccan and ultimately sharifian origin); Shaykh Mukhtār b. Sīdi Muhammad 
b. Shaykh al-Kabīr (al-Kuntī, from present-day southern Algeria); Alpha Moya; 
Sīdi Mahmūd b. ‘Ammār (al-Walātī, from present-day Mauritania); Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Makkī (from the Hijāz); Shaykh ‘Abd al-Kasim al-Tuwātī (from 
present-day southern Algeria); Ahamad Fūlān; Bahaber Babadié; Sīdi Yahya (al-
Andalūsī). Their status as ‘saints’ owes much to their distant origins. It derived 
from their ability to reinvent the local through universal categories of value, and 
to inscribe the city into regional networks of scholarship, religious legitimacy, 
and mobility. Put together, their places of origin sketch out a region of religious 
connectivity that still has significance today, and indeed echoes contemporary 
jihadi talk, activity, and recruitment. 
Ahmad al-Faqi, meanwhile, described himself as “a Tuareg born in a village 
near Timbuktu”57 — one of the many lower-status ‘whites’ who, since the 1990s, 
felt excluded from the urban centre of Timbuktu.58 Rather than a foreign jihadi 
attacking local saints, he is a local, or rather suburban, jihadi attacking ‘foreign’ 
saints in the name of the same universal religion that grants the latter their local 
precedence. Meanwhile, those saints and their contemporary descendants have 
found an unlikely backer in UNESCO, another universalist moral body, but one 
that comes with finance and court orders attached. In other words, Ahmad 
al-Faqi’s opposition to the local saintly families was probably simultaneously 
religiously, historically, socially, and politically motivated, and Bokova’s “whole 
of humanity” was only one of his targets. Similarly, when MUJAO destroyed a 
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shrine 330 km north of Gao, it was a Kunta shrine.59 This could be read as an act 
of religious purification, but also as the last instalment in the ‘Kunta war’, 
waged by formerly lower-status Arabs against their Kunta ‘lords’.60 The over-
whelming historical reference underlying many of these conflicts makes their 
religious scaling eminently plausible, but it would be wrong to privilege one 
level over another. 
In-laws and out-laws 
What, then, if we stepped away from oppositions between local and global, 
national and foreign, or even from formulations that try to dodge the question 
through neologisms, such as “glocal”?61 It is not merely the empirical inadequa-
cy of this opposition that is at stake here, but also its conceptual limits. “The 
global” is all too often used “lazily as a catch-all appellation for things that are 
not readily understood in local or national terms”.62 The local raises just as 
many questions, especially when it comes to Islam, which, as a revealed reli-
gion, by definition implies some reference to the outside. This is true every-
where, but perhaps even more so in places like northern Mali, where people 
tend to be mobile, intermarry and trace relationships in other than national 
categories; where indeed mobility and a certain degree of externality tends to be 
at the root of local influence.63 As a result, distinctions between ‘local’ and oth-
erwise are gradual, contextual, and might change over a lifetime. Within the 
current conflict also, it is difficult to distinguish between local and global organ-
isations. As noted above, people change allegiance, acronyms develop, and the 
exact interrelation between different groups remains obscure, perhaps even for 
those within them. Many, if not most, prominent fighters and politicians in the 
area have been members of at least three, and sometimes even four or five dif-
ferent groups that analysts might locate on different sides of the local and global 
(or indeed the ‘religious’ and ‘secular’) divide.64 They also tend to speak several 
languages, and have a wide set of family connections to choose from. 
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The second problem with the categorical opposition between the local and 
the global is that it does not allow for intermediate levels of analysis. It is telling 
that Islamist references to regional projects are often transformed into a “global 
agenda” by analysts,65 true to Li’s observation that there is a general “blind-
ness” among analysts “to the possibility that others may pursue substantively 
different cosmopolitan or transnational projects”.66 On closer examination, 
however, groups like AQIM, notwithstanding their claims to a ‘global jihad’, are 
neither local nor global in their activities, recruitment, and intellectual and 
historical references, but regional. The region they operate in pre-dates not only 
their existence, but also that of the nation-states they are fighting against. It is, 
in fact, similar to the one staked out by the nisab of the saints listed above, and 
replicated in generations of exchange, pilgrimage, travel, and intermarriage 
since their demise. 
AQIM and other jihadi groups in the area have mostly fought and claimed 
attacks carried out within a territory ranging from Algeria to Mauritania via 
northern Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Their recruits, if they are ‘foreign’, simi-
larly stem from that area, more precisely from Algeria, northern Mali and Mauri-
tania, with the occasional Nigerian and Tunisian put in for good measure. This 
is not for lack of trying to attract people from elsewhere, but few international 
jihadis really want to go and fight in Mali when there are more attractive and 
prestigious options elsewhere. AQIM hence attempted to encourage more Tuni-
sians to join them, but although Tunisians constituted the second largest con-
tingent of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, and the majority in Libya, few were 
willing to travel to Azawad.67 Libyans and Moroccans similarly have never 
shown much interest in AQIM, which retained close links with its Algerian ori-
gins.68 Moreover, their “Saharan brigade” does not seem to be recruited from the 
whole country, but rather from the northern edge of the deserts, a region that is 
historically closely connected to the deep south of Algeria and Azawad.69 Abu 
Zeid, for instance, was born in the Illizi region, while Mokhtar Belmokhtar is a 
Sha‘anba from near Ghadaïa, a group prominent among the regional trading 
elite since colonial times. When MUJAO fighters resented the influence of 
‘northern Saharans’, these were perhaps the people they meant, and their re-
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sentment was thus historically complex: they had long known the people they 
were dealing with, or at least their families, as regional traders, patrons, and in-
laws. 
If this seems anecdotal, it is striking that until 2012, the most common idiom 
used by Arabic-speakers in northern Mali when talking about ‘jihadis’ were 
those derived from kinship and alliances, rather than from categorical distinc-
tions between local and foreign: “they came and got married to Arabs and Tua-
reg of no account out in the desert”. The local AQIM leadership followed suite, 
getting married to families of somewhat more account. Or, as Lecocq put it, the 
Saharan “foreign fighters” were “not so much foreign as they are simply choos-
ing between nationalities, while sometimes holding multiple ones”.70 This rhet-
oric is worth pursuing, not only because it replaces absolute categories (foreign 
and local) with relative ones (in-laws), and categorical oppositions with nu-
anced histories of alliance and rivalry, but also because it underlines the role of 
women who, as a result, act as indispensable mediators and conduits for exter-
nal ideas and agents, and their moral evaluation, and vice versa.71 
Different cosmopolitan projects 
This region of jihadi involvement and recruitment is also reflected in its his-
torical references. These need to be taken seriously as the expression of a par-
ticular way of making sense of the world, steeped in regional history and geog-
raphy. This is apparent in the names chosen for local katā’ib (brigades, singular 
katība), which include (among others) AQIM’s katība Tāriq b. Ziyād, named 
after the Umayyad commander (of Berber or Arab origin) who led the conquest 
of Visigothic Hispania in the 8th century, and katība Yūsuf b. Tashfīn, third Al-
moravid imām and founder of Marrakesh in the 11th century; AQIM’s splinter 
group al-Murābitūn (the Almoravids, a reformist movement of Berber origin); 
and MUJAO’s katība Usman dan Fodio (a militant 18th-century Islamic reform-
er).72 In central Mali, the Front de Libération du Macina (FLM, or katība Macina) 
refers, in name but also in its internal jurisprudence, to the Dina (jihadi state) of 
Hamdallahi that governed the area in the 19th century; conflicts over pastures 
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are regulated with reference to Dina precedent, adapted to suit many of their 
followers’ more egalitarian ambitions.73 
In their internal correspondence, AQIM leaders describe the population of 
Azawad as eminently qualified for jihad, despite contemporary shortcomings, 
because this people has distinguished itself by its commitment to the Islamic conquest 
under the Almoravids who have long preserved and defended the umma. It is one of the Is-
lamic fighting people and will defend Islam and bear the responsibility for this region in 
the future.74 
This telescoping of history also influences AQIM’s sociology, viewing the “peo-
ple of Azawad” as divided into minor and major tribes and “social layers”. This 
might strike us as anachronistic, but it is in the nature of political projects to 
impose their own historicity and thereby their own conceptual frameworks 
through which action is made meaningful. In northern Mali, this historical and 
sociological vision – and also the apparent anachronism or “self-conscious 
archaism” that underpins it75 – might be off the mark at times, but is partly 
shared locally, and in fact results in a political programme that corresponds 
more closely to local political realities than Malian nation-state visions ever did. 
Tribes matter locally, as do genealogies and quranic history;76 they do not fix 
people’s relations in time, but provide a powerful grid of interpretation that 
cannot easily be rejected out of hand – names, categories, moral judgments and 
causal relations borrowed from it have much resonance. 
The historical regions thus described by different groups and actors do not 
necessarily overlap. Reference to historic Sahelian jihads imply a different vi-
sion of space than reference to the Almoravids and al-Andalus (as AQIM’s media 
outlet is called). But they are regions of a similar kind. They have no borders, 
but shared reference points, and establish a “new political geography (...) orga-
nized around sites of militancy and Muslim suffering”77 and more visibly in this 
context, around sites of former glory and triumph. The absence of borders, and 
the associated free circulation of goods and people is indeed one of the positive 
aspects of jihadi rule that people emphasise locally. It is exactly the opposite to 
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international interventions whose main goal, as seen above, often seems to be 
to close borders and immobilise people. Both of these statements are ideological 
rather than empirical, as borders are never completely closed, and circulation is 
never free for all; but their ideological and symbolic impact matters. One of the 
first things MUJAO did was to abolish import and export tariffs, and while this 
might be a windfall for traders, it indirectly benefitted everybody in the region. 
Jihadis, moreover, are not the only Islamic organisations to function in a re-
gional transnational space that is broader than the nation-state (and might in 
fact exclude parts of it), without thereby being global. Holder describes the 
geographical reference relevant to the southern Malian reformist association 
Ançar Dine (not to be confused with the northern Ansar al-Din), which ends at 
Mopti – not coincidentally on the former border of Azawad – but extends across 
Mandé-speaking areas in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Holder labels this “a 
West African umma”.78 Such regional distinctions do not preclude dialogue, and 
their boundaries are fluid over time. As Li noted (with Afghanistan in mind), 
they might in fact generate pan-Islamism: everybody who defines themselves as 
a Muslim can choose to gather under the banner of Islam in certain circum-
stances, and the important question is not how uniformity remains necessarily 
elusive, but how differences are dealt with.79 Even disputes can bring people 
together, as they might be grounded in shared assumptions and thereby rein-
force them. 
In the same way, the boundaries of ‘Azawad’ in no way indicate those of re-
ligious debate. Commentators have made much of the fact that Mahmoud Dicko, 
head of Mali’s Haut conseil islamique du Mali (HCIM) and himself a native of 
Timbuktu, initially welcomed the instauration of sharī‘a in northern Mali, be-
fore retracting his statement under international pressure.80 It is difficult to see 
how he could be against sharī‘a (although he can of course be against its 
‘abuse’, or against jihad, which he has since described as a “French creation”).81 
Dicko himself is an Islamic reformer, one of many, and there has been a general 
shift in the Sahel towards a changed understanding of Islam, a “Salafi revolu-
tion” in Sounaye’s words, which has led not so much to (yet another) split 
between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ Islam, but to a change of generally accepted 
|| 
78 Holder 2012, 405. 
79 Li 2012, 19. 
80 On Dicko’s consummate negotiation skills with Western media, see Prud’homme 2015. 
81 https://mondafrique.com/le-chef-religieux-du-mali-denonce-le-djihadisme-comme-une-
creation-francaise/, accessed March 11, 2019. 
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Islamic rhetoric and standards.82 Or, in Alghabas ag Intallah’s terms, “whoever 
speaks here now, in this territory, cannot say that they are against Islam”.83 This 
means that people might emphatically condemn the violent means employed by 
jihadis in northern Mali, without rejecting their underlying principles, many of 
which have in fact become common sense. This is why, in Bamako, the term 
‘terrorist’ is more often applied to ‘Tuareg separatists’ than Islamists, and many 
feel that it would be easier to negotiate with Islamist groups – who are Muslim 
after all – than with, say, ‘the Tuareg’.84 Conversely, Dicko has been named 
recently by the leader of the katība Macina in central Mali as one of three prom-
inent Malian Muslim figures with whom dialogue might be possible.85 
Conclusion 
Much has been written about Islam in northern Mali since 2012. This chapter 
has attempted to summarise some of this literature and to point to a number of 
common assumptions that seem to underpin much of it. ‘Radical Islam’ tends to 
be portrayed either as alien to Mali, brought by ‘foreign fighters’, familiar to 
Western audiences from conflicts elsewhere. Or it is seen as a stratagem adopt-
ed by locals to give greater resonance to their own interests. Many of the latter 
explanations are valid, but they seem insufficient to fully explain the appeal of 
Islamic rhetoric in the area. Nor do oppositions between local and global (and 
‘political’ or ‘religious’) factors necessarily exhaust possibilities on the ground. 
This chapter argued that tensions between local and universal principles have 
always been part of Islam in the region, and indeed account for much of its 
vitality; and that they have contributed to shaping an intermediate, regional 
level that is most relevant to contemporary jihadis. This region is not necessarily 
one bound by peace and harmony, or indeed by perceived homogeneity. In-
stead, it is held together by genealogical links and the many possible shades of 
kinship and status that they imply. In such a context, a vocabulary derived from 
kinship and alliance, rather than from national and international politics, might 
be more in tune with the empirical evidence. Those people locally who most 
|| 
82 Sounaye 2017. Holder (2013, 149) speaks of a “strategy of normalisation of Salafism”, Øste-
bø (2015, 15) of the emergence of a “Salafi moral economy”. 
83 Alghabas ag Intalla, chef du Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA). Malijet avec Andy 
Morgan Writes, February 1, 2013. 
84 Whitehouse 2018, 172 and 175. 
85 International Crisis Group 2019, 16. 
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fully master these complexities, and can partake in them all, are in fact those 
who have most benefitted from the current situation. The late Intallah’s family 
in Kidal are perhaps the best example of this. Due to their judicious involvement 
in the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, combined with negotiations with the French and 
the Malian government, they are now by all accounts running the place –  
according to their own version of sharī‘a.86 
|| 
86 Georg Klute, personal communication March 4, 2019, Bayreuth. 
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Brahim El Guabli 
Islamist and Islamised Memories in 
Moroccan Testimonial Prison Literature 
Abstract: The Moroccan ‘Years of Lead’ were a period of rampant state violence 
between the country’s independence in 1956 and the passing of King Hassan II 
in 1999. Although a robust scholarship has probed its multifaceted aspects, the 
impact of state violence on specific groups, such as Bahais, Jews, and Islamists, 
has yet to be included in discussions about the collective memory of post-
independence Moroccan. Most importantly, however, in the midst of a relentless 
glocal war on terror, Moroccan Islamists continue to be marginalised or exclude 
themselves from the cultural and social memory of state violence. Drawing on 
al-Mufaḍḍal al-Maghūtī’s memoir Wa ya‘lū ṣawt al-ādhān min jaḥīm Tazmamart 
(2009) and Muṣṭafā al-Ḥasnāwī’s memoir Sujūn wa ashjān (2018), this article 
provides a conceptualisation of Islamist and Islamised memory of state vio-
lence. The distinction between Islamist and Islamised memory demonstrates 
their different, and even oppositional, stakes in terms of politicisation, religiosi-
ty, and partisanship. The article also shows how the publishing media resigni-
fies memories and inscribes them in frameworks of meaning that may not even 
be relevant to the survivors’ experience or concerns. 
Introduction 
Moroccan Islamists have been given short shrift in discussions of the ‘Years of 
Lead’. The Years of Lead, a period of authoritarianism and rampant state vio-
lence which lasted between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the advent of 
King Mohammed VI’s reign in 1999, gave rise to an abundance of testimonial 
prison literature between 1998 and 2018.1 Authored by survivors (sometimes 
with professional co-writers),2 Moroccan testimonial prison literature has been 
dominated by two groups of prisoners: Marxist-Leninists, who were persecuted 
from the 1970s through the early 1990s, and the soldiers and officers who, as a 
|| 
1 This periodisation does not take into account the books published in the 1980s, which, for 
instance, include Abdellatif Laâbi’s Le chemin des ordalies (1982) and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Shāwī’s 
Kāna wa-khawātuhā (2010), among others. Al-Ḥasnāwī’s memoir is a post-years-of-lead record-
ing of state violence. 
2 El Guabli 2020a, 238–44. 
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punishment for their participation in the coups d’état against King Hassan II in 
1971 and 1972, were held incommunicado in the desert prison Tazmamart be-
tween 1973 and 1991. Tazmamart prisoners and Marxist-Leninist activists, who 
bore the brunt of state terror, have since 1999 been at the centre of the memory 
of state violence, which has become synonymous with their tribulations in arbi-
trary detention. The pervasive memory of these two categories of survivors has 
overshadowed the experiences of a sizable number of their contemporary Islam-
ist activists who were similarly repressed.3 Even the Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission (ERC), which was put in place in 2004 to investigate the violations 
committed during the Years of Lead and provide reparations to the victims,4 
counted no Islamist members among its seventeen commissioners, and its transi-
tional justice process did not spend significant time on the suffering of Islamists.5 
I argue that, as a result of the silencing of Islamist experiences of state vio-
lence, an effort has emerged to co-opt and Islamise some memories of the Years 
of Lead. This desire to Islamise memory stands in contradistinction to an al-
ready existing, albeit overlooked, Islamist memory. My conceptualisation of 
“Islamist memory” and “Islamised memory” draws on a comparative study of 
the al-Mufaḍḍal al-Maghūtī’s memoir published by Bilāl al-Talīdī under the title 
Wa-yaʻlū ṣawt al-adhān min jaḥīm Tazmāmart: mudhakkirāt al-muʻtaqal al-
Mufaḍḍal al-Maghūtī (And the call to prayers rises in Tazmamart: al-Mufaḍḍal 
al-Maghūtī’s memoirs, 2009) and Muṣṭafā al-Ḥasnāwī’s testimony Sujūn wa-
ashjān (Prisons and griefs, 2018).6 Based on a series of interviews which Taz-
mamart survivor al-Maghūtī gave to Islamist journalist al-Talīdi, Wa-ya‘lū was 
first serialised in the al-Tajdīd Islamist newspaper before its publication in book 
form.7 Sujūn wa-ashjān, on the other hand, is a collection of essays and autobio-
graphical writings in which former political prisoner al-Ḥasnāwī recounts his 
experience in prison for what he alleges was a false accusation of terrorism. 
Obviously, the circumstances and outcomes of these two carceral experiences 
are different, but both books are rooted in Islam and a distinct Islamist ideology. 
Notwithstanding this shared Islamist ideology, the degree of politicisation, 
religiosity, and partisanship varies depending on whether the memoirs portray 
an Islamist or an Islamised memory. 
|| 
3 Slyomovics has a very informative chapter on Islamists in her book The Performance of 
Human Rights in Morocco, 165–94. 
4 Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2009, 14–16. 
5 Mohsen-Finan 2007, 336. 
6 al-Talīdī 2009, al-Ḥasnāwī 2018. 
7 El Guabli 2017, 214. 
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Islamism is a convoluted concept, one that requires both a nuanced defini-
tion and a critical approach to avoid the pitfalls of Islamophobia and facile gen-
eralisations about Islam. For political scientist Muḥammad Ḍarīf, the adjective 
“Islamist” refers to a person or a group of people whose political ideology is 
based on a form of political Islam, with the goal either to establish an alterna-
tive regime or integrate the structures of one that already exists.8 Sociologist 
Abdessamad Dialmy has defined Islamism as “any social movement that is 
based on the exploitation of Islam in order to achieve a political gain and which 
precisely attempts to achieve power in the name of religion.”9 Dialmy goes on to 
demonstrate, albeit in less restrained terms, that “Islamists are obsessed with 
political power; they are either formerly disillusioned leftists or pan-Arabist 
activists or members of Sufi brotherhoods who are dissatisfied with Sufism’s 
apoliticism and indifference to power.”10 Islamism, therefore, is an all-encom-
passing political project that draws on politicised interpretations of Islam in 
order to seize power in the name of religion. Dialmy’s definition agrees with 
Ḍarīf’s, but moves beyond it in drawing attention to the fact that Islamists hail 
from a variety of social and ideological backgrounds, shedding light on the fact 
that Islamism is a societal phenomenon that cuts across social classes and intel-
lectual backgrounds. Moreover, Malika Zeghal, a scholar of Islam, has argued 
that Islamist movements are also “related to state policies and institutional 
arrangements”, cautioning that their existence should not always be construed 
in opposition to the state.11 Zeghal’s observation has the advantage of underlin-
ing the crucial fact that Islamism and the state are not always in conflict be-
cause of the many overlaps that exist between them. In Morocco, the pro-state 
positions of Ḥizb al-‘Adāla wa-al-Tanmiyya (Justice and Development Party, 
JDP) Islamist party and the Salafi groups during the Arab Uprisings in 2011 were 
the clearest example of the convergence of interests that Zeghal pointed to in 
her analysis.12 
If Islamism is the use of Islam to wield political power, then even the Mo-
roccan monarchy itself is an Islamist entity.13 For, in addition to tracing its line-
age to the house of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Alawite dynasty, which has 
|| 
8 Ḍarīf 1999, 11. 
9 Dialmy 2000, 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Zeghal 2008, xxviii. 
12 Hānī 2011. 
13 A debate raged in Morocco in March 2020 when Abdellatif Wahbi, the new general secre-
tary of the Authenticity and Modernity Party, declared that “imārat al-mu’minīn islām siyyāsī” 
(The leadership of the faith is political Islam). See Wahbi 2020. 
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been ruling Morocco since the seventeenth century, has monopolised religious 
affairs and used Islam as a marker of its legitimacy against both the left and the 
recalcitrant Islamist movements since 1970s.14 Anthropologist Abdellah Ham-
moudi has situated the monarchy’s religious shift at the end of the 15th century, 
when Sufi and Sharifian legitimacy began to mix with political authority.15 Other 
scholars have shown how Morocco’s institutional memory gradually consoli-
dated around the monarchy, Islam, and Islamic calendars after the country’s 
independence in 1956.16 For example, King Mohammed V’s death began to be 
commemorated according to the Islamic calendar, thus placing the monarch “in 
the chronology of Islam,” which reinscribed him in the “holy history”.17 Fur-
thermore, Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution, drafted in 1962, defined 
Morocco as an Islamic state and conferred the title of Amīr al-Mu’minīn (The 
Commander of the Faithful) on the monarch, thus conflating the religious and 
temporal functions of government in the person of the king.18 As a consequence, 
the persona of the Moroccan monarch is presented as an embodiment of the 
Islamic past in the present. In the spirit of this continuity, the king’s Friday and 
‘īd prayers, as well as charity activities, are commemorations of his ancestors 
and a constant reminder that Islam is constitutive of Morocco’s political identi-
ty.19 Various other ritualised practices have consecrated this royal Islamism, 
such as al-Durūs al-ḥasaniyya al-ramaḍāniyya (Ramadan Ḥassanian Seminars), 
which bring together Muslim scholars from all over the world to give lectures in 
the presence of the king, and institutions, such as Lajnat al-Quds (al-Quds 
Committee), which aims, among other things, to keep the Islamic characteristics 
of the holy city of Jerusalem. Most recently, the creation of Mu’assasat 
Muḥammad al-Sādis li-al-‘Ulamā’ al-Afāriqa (Mohamed VI Foundation for Afri-
can ‘Ulama) has given this Islamist function a continental dimension.20 
Given the Moroccan monarchy’s quasi-arrogation of Islam, the emergence 
of Islamist and Islamised memory of state violence poses a challenge to this 
royal monopoly of religion. Specifically, testimonial prison literature that 
demonstrates that the state violates the basic human rights of those who work 
to implement an Islamist vision of the state complicates an area where institu-
|| 
14 Ḍarif 1999, 11, El Ayadi 2015, 37. 
15 Hammoudi 1997, 54. 
16 Valensi 1990, 288–91. 
17 Ibid., 291. 
18 El Ayadi 2015, 102. 
19 Waltz 1995, 106. 
20 Mu’assasat Muḥammad al-Sādis lil-‘Ulamā’ al-Afāriqa, 2015. 
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tions and language have been shaped by the monarchy since independence.21 
The monarchy finds itself in an aporetic position between its discursive defence 
of Islam and its values, on the one hand, and its use of state violence to repress 
those groups or individuals who attempt to apply these values to government, 
on the other hand. While it claims Islam and ritualises it to bolster its grip on 
power, the monarchy also thwarts the endeavours of those Islamists who pro-
pose a different societal and political project for Morocco. As a result of this 
contradiction, both what I conceptualise as Islamist and Islamised memory 
have wider implications not only for the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy’s 
uses of Islam in politics,22 but also for the Equity and Reconciliation Process 
(ERC) that was launched in 2004 to turn the page on past human rights viola-
tions in Morocco. The fact that hundreds of Moroccan Islamist activists were 
subjected to extrajudicial processes after 2003 because of terrorism accusations, 
in an echo of the Years of Lead, revealed how state violence has not really dis-
appeared, but shifted to target the Islamists as the new enemies of the state.23 
Islamist memory and Islamised memory of state 
violence in Morocco 
Islamist memory: Reclaiming the memory of political 
imprisonment 
Despite the different levels of its exclusion from Moroccan cultural memory, 
Islamist memory of state violence can be defined as a form of collective memory 
that highlights the human rights violations suffered by Islamist activists as 
such. Islamist memory recalls the countless punishments, such as political 
disappearance, torture, and imprisonment, meted out to activists for no other 
reason than their commitment to establishing a polity that abides by Islamic 
law. This memory is Islamist because its carriers were chiefly targeted because 
of their competition with the state over political Islam. As an experience that 
was constitutive of Morocco’s memory of the Years of Lead, Islamist memory, 
like all other memories of this violent period, emerged as part of the Moroccan 
|| 
21 Zeghal 2008, xii. 
22 My first attempt at conceptualising ‘Islamised memory’ can be traced back to my book 
chapter “Testimony and Journalism: Moroccan Prison Narratives.” See El Guabli 2017, 130. 
23 Human Rights Watch 2005a, 13. 
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people’s political struggle against the monarchy’s authoritarianism. Hence, 
Islamist memory is an essential part of Moroccan society’s social and cultural 
memory. Nevertheless, the lack of substantial Islamist cultural production on 
these experiences has hampered the creation of an Islamist cultural memory. As 
De Cesari and Rigney have written, cultural memory “involves the continual 
production, remediation, and sharing of stories about a past that changes in 
relation to the new possibilities of interpreting it within shifting social frames 
operating at different levels.”24 The absence of a systematic documentary effort 
among former Islamist prisoners has been detrimental to the creation of an 
Islamist dimension of Moroccan cultural memory and obstructed the possibili-
ties that it could open up about the Moroccan past. Nevertheless, the very few 
Islamists who have published memoirs continue to create possibilities for con-
versation among different memories of political imprisonment in Morocco. 
These memory-based dialogues are all the more crucial because they show 
that no organised or potentially threatening opposition group was safe from 
state violence during the Years of Lead. Nasserists, Islamists, Jewish activists, 
Berber activists, Marxist-Leninists, Sahrawis, and the putschists involved in the 
coups against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 were all subjected to inhumane 
treatment and lengthy prison terms as a consequence of their involvement in 
politics.25 Given their functions within the army, Tazmamart detainees were 
probably the least politicised of all these groups, but their arbitrary detention 
and lengthy enforced disappearance transformed them into political prisoners. 
Islamist activists were also subjected to state violence, as a direct result of 
their efforts to put in place an Islamic state. Despite the state’s facilitation of the 
emergence of the Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya al-Maghribiyya (The Moroccan Islamist 
Movement, MIM) as a natural ally of the Moroccan state in response to the exist-
ence of the Moroccan Marxist-Leninist Movement in 1969,26 the state turned 
against the MIM. Although it is referred to as a single movement, the MIM was, 
in fact, not homogeneous because it was permeated by different currents that 
shaped its very existence. To explain the different trends and the external and 
internal factors that governed their emergence, political scientist Muḥammad 
Ḍarīf has coined the phrases al-sharṭ al-‘āmm (the general context) and al-sharṭ 
al-khāṣṣ (the specific context) to elucidate the circumstances that governed the 
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appearance and evolution of the different uses of Islam in politics by al-Shabība 
al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic Youth), al-‘Adl wa-al-Iḥsān (Justice and Charity 
Group), al-Badīl al-Ḥaḍārī (The Civilisational Alternative), al-Ḥaraka min ajl al-
Umma (The Movement for the Umma), and Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Iṣlāḥ 
(Movement for Unicity and Reform).27 The decision to legalise the existence of 
al-Shabība al-Islāmiyya in 1969 was determined by, on the one hand, “the gen-
eral context” of the Moroccan state’s fight against Nasserism in the Arab world 
and, on the other hand, by the “specific context” of struggle against the atheis-
tic Marxist-Leninist movement.28 Parallel to its cooperation with the state,  
al-Shabība al-Islāmiyya developed a secret agenda of jihad against the infidel 
state, which fostered and supported its existence.29 For example, Ḥakīmī 
Bilqāsim, one of its former adepts, has underlined the fact that he belonged to 
al-Shabība al-Islāmiyya because of its call to take up arms against the Moroccan 
regime.30 Because of al-Shabība al-Islāmiyya’s propensity to violence, most  
Islamists, including those who later moved on to create other more inclusive 
and peaceful organisations,31 have carried the stigma of violence with them and 
became easier targets when the government passed more stringent terrorism 
laws after the Casablanca bombings on May 16, 2003. 
By 1975, Moroccan Islamists of different backgrounds paid a high price for 
their disagreements with the state. Once the general and the specific contexts 
that allowed their existence to be tolerated came to an end with the end of Nas-
serism and the clampdown on Marxist-Leninists, the state seized the next op-
portunity, offered by the assassination of lawyer and trade union activist Omar 
Benjelloun by members of al-Shabība al-Islāmiyya, to persecute Islamists.32 
Although there is much speculation about the state’s own involvement in Ben-
jelloun’s assassination,33 what is certain is the fact that the state security 
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complex exploited his death to repress the Islamist movement, especially its 
jihadist offshoot. Under King Hassan II, the onslaught on Islamists lasted from 
the mid-1970s to the 1990s, but the global war on terror in the early 2000s and 
the terrorist attacks in Casablanca on May 16, 2003 intensified the security cam-
paigns against this nebulous entity that is usually referred to as Islamism. For 
instance, after the Casablanca attacks in 2003, some 8,000 supposed Islamists 
were arrested immediately, but only 1,000 of them were officially tried and 
found guilty of terrorism. The sheer number of people arrested and the harsh 
treatment of the accused posed crucial questions about the scale, as well as the 
legality, of the arrests. For example, Taoufik Moussaif Benhammou, a lawyer 
who has defended many Islamist defendants, declared that “violations of hu-
man rights continue. The state kidnaps and interrogates Salafis outside the 
purview of any law.”34 Political scientist Ahamed Chaarani wonders “What’s 
happening in Moroccan society? In two years, between 2001 and 2003, 5,000 
were arrested for the accusation of being Islamist. 3,600 were released, whereas 
1,400 were put on trial.”35 Using what they called the “sieve strategy”,36 which 
means targeting larger numbers of suspects than necessary to find the real cul-
prits, the Moroccan internal intelligence services adopted a process of elimina-
tion to release those whom they thought were not guilty of terrorism. The prob-
lem with the sieve strategy is that it suspends the presumption of innocence, in 
requiring suspects to prove their innocence instead of requiring police to gather 
evidence to prove their guilt. Many innocent people were arrested as a result of 
this strategy, and political scientist Mohamed Tozy concluded that the state 
“manages this dossier blindly”.37 Up until 2018, the Committee of the Defense of 
Islamist Prisoners had registered the existence of 1,067 Islamist prisoners in 
Moroccan prisons, including a fifteen-year-old girl accused of being part of a 
terrorist cell.38 
The weak presence of Islamists’ memory of state violence in Moroccan col-
lective memory of the Years of Lead is detrimental to institution-building and 
democratisation. After any period of authoritarianism, memory is a rampart 
against the repetition of human rights violations. However, it seems that the 
social and cultural amnesia regarding the violations of Moroccan Islamists’ 
human rights created the conditions for both the continuity and repetition of 
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these violations. The Moroccan ERC downplayed the repression of Islamists and 
overlooked their memory in its final report.39 Worse still, Islamist activists were 
being rounded up and mistreated by the Moroccan security apparatus even as 
the ERC process was underway.40 For Drīs Wld al-Qābla, a journalist and politi-
cal commentator, the massive arrests of Islamist activists on accusations of 
terrorism “show that the mechanisms that allowed the past violations (police 
impunity, lack of judiciary independence, and the existence of repressive laws) 
are not merely a memory of the past”,41 but rather a practice that survives in 
present day Morocco. As a result, we can talk of a variable geometry application 
of the notions of reconciliation and transitional justice from which Moroccan 
Islamists were excluded. 
In the absence of any institutional structure that recognises and sustains Is-
lamist memory of state violence, individual survivors have shown their aware-
ness of the need to uphold the memory of their activism. For instance, Muḥam-
mad Haqīqī, a former Islamist prisoner, started an illuminating discussion of the 
status of Islamist memory in Morocco in 2015. Seizing the opportunity offered by 
the funeral of a former cellmate, Haqīqī wrote a letter in which he brought atten-
tion to Islamist survivors’ miserable conditions, writing: 
The situation of former Islamist prisoners, who spent the prime of their youth in secret 
prisons during what is known as the Years of Lead in Morocco [incomplete]. As I was look-
ing at the faces of some of the people present, I felt all the emotions of marginalisation, 
disregard, and injustice. [Also,] I read in the expressions of their faces and heads, which 
grey hair has already covered, burning questions about their place in the accelerating 
events and what role [they can] play in order to sign their life contract and confirm their 
presence and [think about] how to navigate their social life and its challenges.42 
Ḥaqīqī then asked whether former Islamist prisoners deserved their tragic fate. 
Ḥaqīqī contrasted Islamists’ activism with the disproportional violence the state 
unleashed on them: 
[A]ll we did was do something that we believed in [,] to the marrow of our bones, but we 
were kidnapped as a result and torture was meted out to us, and the courts did not refrain 
from sentencing us to death, life in prison, and other cruel verdicts in presence or in ab-
sentia during unjust trials.43 
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He went on to pose the difficult question of the place former Islamist activists 
have in Moroccan memory. He wondered if their greatest accomplishment was 
simply being released from jail, or whether their past sacrifices have qualified 
them to play a role in today’s Morocco. Ḥaqīqī asked again whether former Is-
lamist prisoners have “buried the past and turned [the page of] the violations of 
the past?”44 In answer to this question, Ḥaqīqī urged Islamist political prisoners 
to hold fast to their duty and seize the opportunity to shape Morocco’s present 
through their experience of its carceral past. Ḥaqīqī also lamented the disinte-
gration of ties among former Islamist prisoners, a trend which has turned their 
“sacrifices into mere talk about the past as well as agonies of memories that 
have no extension in the present.”45 
 The funeral is a symbolic space where the Islamist memory of the Years of 
Lead can be addressed. A moment of memory par excellence, the funeral is 
situated at a crossroads between the life that comes to an end and the afterlife 
narrative, that will outlast the deceased and shape his memory. It is this mo-
ment, which serves as a nexus between life and death, that Ḥaqīqī chose to urge 
those with memories of Islamist oppression to put an end to Moroccan society’s 
erasure of their sacrifices. Also, the funeral is a space in which loss takes its full 
tangible form, thus amplifying the effect of his speech about memory and am-
nesia. In urging his former colleagues to take pride in their contribution to Mo-
roccan collective memory after 1956, Ḥaqīqī seemed to encourage them to estab-
lish rituals around their memory of the Years of Lead, both to combat their 
disunity and to guarantee that their contribution to political change in Morocco 
would be lasting. 
 Ḥaqīqī did not merely sound the alarm about the disastrous situation of Is-
lamist memory in Morocco, he also proposed a project that would allow former 
Islamist detainees to harness their collective energy to rehabilitate their Islamist 
memory. Rehabilitating Islamist memory of the Years of Lead would allow those 
who were imprisoned for their Islamist ideology to “play a role in what is hap-
pening in Morocco”.46 If Islamists do not promulgate their memories of state 
violence in the public space, Ḥaqīqī argued, they would be “folded in forgetful-
ness” and others – he was probably alluding to the leftist parties – would collect 
the fruits of the “sacrifices and struggles that changed Morocco’s political tra-
jectory”.47 In this regard, Ḥaqīqī prodded his colleagues to either revive the 
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“stillborn” Committee for Solidarity with Islamist prisoners or establish a new 
structure – all within an Islamist framework – in order to achieve four intercon-
nected objectives: preserving the memory of grave violations of human rights 
during the Years of Lead, ensuring the state ends its violent practices, working 
toward the socio-economic rehabilitation of the victims of the Years of Lead and 
their families, and resolving the outstanding cases of Islamist exiles and victims 
of the Years of lead.48 Although Ḥaqīqī’s propositions are clearly addressed to 
his Islamist colleagues, the order in which they are presented suggests a priori-
tisation of collective memory above the specific interests of his fellow Islamists. 
This insistence on portraying Islamist activism during the Years of Lead as a 
part of a larger political project that was repressed by the state is significant. It 
shows a desire to find a place for Islamists’ memories within the broader Moroc-
can collective memory, instead of defining a unique memory that distinguishes 
them from the rest of society. Rather than removing the Islamist experience 
from the generalised experience of state violence, Ḥaqīqī exhorts his former 
colleagues to place their memory in the public sphere, which should not be left 
to non-Islamists alone to occupy. In the final analysis, Ḥaqīqī warns former 
Islamists that if nothing is done to redress the Islamist memory of the Years of 
Lead, “death will cover us all up, one by one, in silence.”49 
Ḥaqīqī’s intervention would not have been necessary if it were not for the si-
lencing of Islamist memory in Moroccan social and cultural memory. Social 
memory here refers to various social institutions, including school, families, 
civil society organisations, and media which, to paraphrase Maurice 
Halbwachs, serve as a frame of memory, shaping how individuals remember the 
past as members of a given society.50 In contradistinction to social memory, I 
use cultural memory in reference to the various media and rituals that facilitate 
access to and transference of memories in a society. Although Aleida and Jan 
Assmann have a restrictive definition of cultural memory as operating in the 
long-term at the level of myths and symbols undergirded by institutions,51 cul-
tural memory in this article refers to the myriad forms of cultural production 
that reconstruct past experiences or events that are relevant to a wider society’s 
sense of identity and shared ethos. Under this definition, memoirs, biographies 
and autobiographies of former Moroccan state victims, which I subsume under 
testimonial prison literature, are part of Moroccan society’s collective memory 
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of the Years of Lead. As already mentioned, Islamist prisoners have not found 
their way into Moroccan social and cultural memory with the same ease as other 
categories of state victims and survivors of arbitrary detention. This exclusion 
means that Moroccan society has yet to acknowledge Moroccan Islamists’ con-
tributions to the political struggle in the country. The previously mentioned 
Muḥammad Ḥaqīqī has movingly articulated how Islamists have lost their “so-
cial role as political activists” and how Islamist survivors of the Years of Lead 
are being excluded from “national institutions, such as the National Council for 
Human Rights”.52 This complaint demonstrates how amnesia in social and cul-
tural memory could curtail civil rights. 
However, rather than placing all the blame for the exclusion of Moroccan Is-
lamists from institutions and social memory on their political opponents, it is 
important that we also recognise the existence of a certain degree of self-
exclusion. As has been previously explained, the lack of publications from Is-
lamist survivors has diminished their presence in the public sphere and has 
been detrimental to their place in collective memory of state violence, which 
other stakeholders have successfully associated with their suffering. Although 
there is nothing that prevents Islamists from contributing to cultural and social 
memory, two factors can be cited in explaining their absence. First, the fraught 
atmosphere that both state and partisan media created after the March 16, 2003 
terrorist attacks in Casablanca. Media campaigns against them pushed Moroc-
can Islamists underground and made them increasingly distrustful of the me-
dia, which has the power to convey their message to the wider society. Second, 
the prevalence of the metaphysical concept of al-ibtilā’ al-ilāhī (divine trial) 
among Islamists might also explain their avoidance of the limelight, a phenom-
enon which has consequently produced an anecdotal and insufficiently chroni-
cled record of the ordeals of various generations of Islamist activists at the 
hands of the Moroccan state. As a result, Morocco is a country with a vibrant 
Islamist movement, but with no commensurate presence in social and cultural 
memory. 
Islamised memory: Reorienting the memory of state violence 
In contradistinction to Islamist memory, Islamised memory, as I conceive of it, 
reclaims experiences of state violence that were not directed at an individual or 
a group because of their belief in, or activism on behalf of, a political, Islamist 
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entity. In fact, Islamised memory recovers tangentially Islamist experiences for 
political and predicatory purposes, in order to advance the interests of a narrow 
partisan community. I suggest that while Islamist memory is a result of experi-
ences of political violence at the hands of the state, Islamised memory is a bor-
rowed memory that fits originally non-Islamist experiences of state violence into 
an Islamist mould or discursive practice that is geared toward the pedagogical 
and spiritual advancement of the followers of Islamism. As was previously stat-
ed, this Islamisation of memory has taken advantage of the quasi-absence of 
Islamist testimonial writings about arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, 
and torture that targeted them as Islamist activists. Thus, Islamised memory not 
only fills the void left by Islamist activists in cultural memory, but also inter-
prets political events from an Islamist perspective. 
Al-Tajdīd, the weekly newspaper of Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Iṣlāḥ (Move-
ment of Unity and Reform), which is the religious wing of the JDP, provides an 
excellent embodiment of my theorisation of Islamised memory. This newspaper 
was the platform that al-Talīdī, a well-known Islamist journalist, used to pub-
lish his interviews with al-Muffaḍḍal al-Maghūtī, a Tazmamart survivor, in 
2009. Even al-Tajdīd’s title for al-Maghūtī’s narrative interview-testimony indi-
cates a forceful focus on religiosity in Tazmamart. Foregrounding how the call 
to prayers arose in Tazmamart is the peak of Islamisation. Both the serialised 
version and the book version of al-Talīdī’s recorded conversations with al-
Maghūtī demonstrate how the lens of the al-Tajdīd Islamist newspaper appro-
priated Tazmamart memory to suit the newspaper’s Islamist ideology. Astrid 
Erll and Ann Rigney have shown that media “are more than merely passive and 
transparent conveyors of information. They play an active role in shaping our 
understanding of the past, in “mediating” between us (as readers, viewers, 
listeners) and past experiences, and hence in setting the agenda for future acts 
of remembrance within society.”53 This media effect is clearly at work in al-
Tajdīd’s refashioning of al-Maghūtī’s lengthy prison sentence in Tazmamart to 
suit al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Iṣlāḥ’s agendas. 
Moroccan Islamists’ testimonial prison literature is both scarce and margin-
al to discussions of memory and literature. Apart from Ḥakimī Belqāsm’s 
Kitābāt bada’at min ḥayy al-i‘dām (Writings Started in the Death Sentence Quar-
ter, 2005),54 Ṃuḥammad Ḥaqīqī’s dairies Yawmiyyāt sajīn (A Prisoner’s Journal, 
2002),55 and Musṭafa al-Ḥasnāwī’s Sujūn wa-ashjān (Prisons and Griefs, 2018), 
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Islamist prison literature is almost non-existent.56 Additionally, the very few 
copies of these books, most often printed at the authors’ expense, are limited in 
reach and difficult to procure. Unlike the survivors of the Tazmamart, among 
whom iconic survivors such as Muḥammad al-Rāys and Aḥmad al-Marzūqī have 
emerged over the years to become literary celebrities thanks to their writings 
about prison, the Islamists lack identifiable literary figures who can be associat-
ed with the Islamist struggle as a political movement in Morocco. These short-
comings are exacerbated by the media vilification of Islamists, which pushes 
them into a voluntary silence outside their circles of trust, and impacts their 
willingness to offer their memories of suffering at the hands of the Moroccan 
state. The end result of these various factors is the failure of Moroccan Islamists 
to leave their imprint on debates about state violence in Morocco. Although it 
may serve the monarchy’s as well as some leftist parties’ short-sighted interests, 
this weak presence of Islamist memories of state violence leaves the Moroccan 
collective memory of the Years of Lead incomplete. Foregrounding Islam in 
experiences of imprisonment that were not initially due to Islamist activity is 
only one response to this memory vacuum. This Islamisation of memories com-
pensates for the absence of narratives by Islamists who lived the ordeal of polit-
ical detention. 
The process of the making of Wa-ya‘lū embodies how the medium in which 
a work is published creates Islamises memory. In his introduction to Wa-ya‘lū, 
Bilāl al-Talīdī does not hide his Islamising endeavour; instead he takes pride in 
the process that led to the memoir’s publication. In his preface, al-Talīdī ex-
plains that even though he was well-aware of the existence of Tazmamart, it 
never piqued his interest as a writer until his teacher, Sheikh al-Muqri’ al-Idrīsī 
Abū Zayd, one of the ideologues of the Islamist movement in Morocco and a 
member of the national council of the JDP, advised him to use the Ramadan 
series in al-Tajdīd to publish “prison writings and literature of death”.57 Abū 
Zayd guided al-Talīdī to probe “faith positions and psychic thoughts the prison-
er and the ailing express in their deathbed.”58 Abū Zayd was even more specific 
in recommending that his disciple use the newspaper to serialise al-‘Arabī 
Bāṭma’s al-Raḥīl (departure/death, 1995) and Muḥammad al-Rāys’s Min Skhirat 
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ilā Tazmamart (2000),59 “highlighting the religious aspects [of these works] and 
recognising them”.60 Neither Bāṭma nor al-Rāys were known to have any Islam-
ist affinities. The former was a popular singer with the legendary band Nās al-
Ghiwān whose profession would have been eradicated by any strict application 
of sharia law, while the latter was a soldier who assassinated an officer in cold 
blood at the instigation of his superior during the first coup d’état against King 
Hassan II in 1971. Under Islamic law, al-Rāys would have been executed in just 
retribution (al-qiṣās) for his crime. However, Abū Zayd found their memories of 
illness and imprisonment instructive and inspiring enough to be worthy of be-
ing relayed to al-Tajdīd’s Islamist readership. 
Abū Zayd’s recommendation was only acted upon two years later. Although 
al-Talīdī never explained why he did not serialise al-Raḥīl and Min Skhirāt ilā 
Tazmamart,61 one wonders how this conservative and predication-focused me-
dium would have reshaped the two books. Most importantly, however, it would 
have illuminated the nature of the edits and adjustments al-Tajdīd might have 
imposed on these literary works in order to shape them to the expectations of 
the Islamist readership. Nevertheless, instead of republishing al-Rāys and 
Bāṭma’s memoirs, which clearly did not fit al-Tajdīd’s tradition of religious edu-
cation and preaching, al-Talīdī found his ideal candidate in al-Maghūtī. A per-
fect candidate because of his religious upbringing (and because he memorised 
the Quran at an early age), al-Maghūtī was predisposed to fare better among 
Islamist readers than the two previous candidates. Although these facts about 
al-Maghūtī’s life were widely known, al-Talīdī feigned ignorance about them in 
writing: 
I knew nothing about this man except the fragments that were interspersed in the books 
that were published about the ordeal of Tazmamart. And his picture in my mind did not go 
beyond the character of a man who was the most consistent among the prisoners in his 
commitment to doing his prayers.62 
Unlike al-Rāys and Bāṭma, who were ordinary Muslims, al-Maghūtī stood out for 
al-Talīdī as a man of prayer and extraordinary faith. Al-Rāys has indeed record-
ed the various ways in which prayer and memorisation of the Quran helped him 
and his colleagues to survive the plight of enforced disappearance to Taz-
mamart, but his religious commitment remained within the realm of reason, 
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without any excess or exaggeration. Because al-Maghūtī had not spoken to any 
media, nor did he write his memoirs during the height of interest in stories of 
human rights violations in Morocco, he was a discovery of sorts in 2009 and his 
own religious upbringing lent itself to the kind of Islamisation espoused by al-
Tajdīd. Indeed, the potential for Islamisation of al-Maghūtī’s memoirs was al-
ready contained in both al-Marzūqī’s and al-Rāys’s respective memoirs. Both 
Tazmamart survivors emphasised al-Maghūtī’s memorisation of the Quran and 
spoke well of his religious manners.63 
Al-Talīdī, however, did not acknowledge these elements because he needed 
to reinvent al-Maghūtī and present him as a paragon of Islamic faith. In a very 
dramatised rendering of his encounter with al-Maghūtī, al-Talīdī writes 
when I met the man, and he told me about his experience from start to end, I didn’t feel 
that he was repeating the scenes and the events that have been narrated in those books 
[other memoirs about Tazmamart]. I found out that he is recounting from another angle – 
it was the same angle that professor al-Muqri’ al-Idrīsī Abū Zayd insisted on me to write 
about. But this time around I will not be researching in the authors’ writings in order to se-
lect from them [elements] that relate to the faith aspects, but I will be writing a story that 
is woven in this spirit from start to end.64 
There is a process of exclusion and confirmation at work in this quote. First, al-
Talīdī reduces religiosity in Tazmamart to al-Maghūtī’s person. Second, al-
Maghūtī’s existence confirmed the prescience of al-Idrīsī Abū Zayd’s suggestion 
to publish works that demonstrate the power of faith in the face of death or 
extreme suffering, such as political imprisonment. Consequently, both the ex-
clusion and confirmation processes place faith at the centre of uncovering 
memories of the Tazmamart ordeal. 
Yet foregrounding faith and religiosity is not enough to Islamise the 
memory of political violence. This Islamisation of memory also requires the 
creation of a single symbol who can speak for and represent the experience of 
the group, particularly from a religious point of view. Although there are multi-
ple accounts of prisoners who deepened their faith and became practicing Mus-
lims during their incarceration,65 al-Talīdī presented al-Maghūtī as the perfect 
model of religiosity. Religion was so instrumental for survival and resistance in 
Tazmamart that over the years the formerly non-practicing officers and soldiers 
imprisoned in this jail were transformed into deeply pious individuals who took 
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comfort in reciting and memorising the Quran, fasting, and regular prayers.66 
Even the daily schedule and resistance to carceral conditions in Tazmamart 
were organised around the Quran. Survivor Aḥmad al-Marzūqī has captured the 
importance of religion in the prisoners’ life in writing that the disappeared sol-
diers “never felt closer to God than [they did] in Tazmamart”.67 For his part, Aziz 
BineBine, another Tazmamart survivor, has written that “religion helped [him] 
to surmount madness and death that always lurked around my illusions and my 
naiveté.”68 Even Muḥammad al-Rāys, who admits to having had a loose faith 
before his imprisonment, has highlighted the fundamental role of religion in his 
survival in Tazmamart.69 In al-Rāys’s assessment, enforced disappearance 
taught him and his colleagues the real worth of their life, leading him to con-
clude that “[i]t is in darkness that a human being can see themselves in their 
internal mirror.”70 Confined to jail cells that offered nothing but stench and 
death, Tazmamart detainees clung to God as their last connection to life. Religi-
osity was a collective experience that all prisoners in Tazmamart shared, but al-
Talīdī chose to downplay other prisoners’ experience of religious renewal in 
prison and elevate al-Maghūtī as a role model of faith, showing the risks associ-
ated with the Islamisation of memory. Islamising memory requires religious 
iconicity, which al-Maghūtī was able to give to al-Tajdīd’s readers. 
A comparative discussion: Sụjūn wa-ashjān and 
Wa-ya‘lūṣaw al-‘ādhān min jaḥīmi Tazmamart 
Now that I have made these crucial distinctions between Islamist and Islamised 
memory, I draw on Sụjūn wa-ashjān and Wa-ya‘lū to analyse how these two 
types of memory are different in terms of politicisation versus depoliticisation, 
intense religiosity vs ordinary Islam, and addressing collective memory vs parti-
sanship. 
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Politicisation vs depoliticisation 
The above distinction between Islamist and Islamised memory has emphasised 
how Islamised memory grew out of a normal desire to fill the void left by the 
suppression of Islamist memory in Morocco. Most importantly for literary stud-
ies, however, is the effect that the medium of publication has on both mediating 
and shaping memory as is demonstrated in al-Tajdīd’s creation of al-Maghūtī’s 
religious persona. Despite this distinction between the two types of memory, 
there is an even more consequential difference between them in terms of their 
degree of politicisation. While Islamist memory is forged from political struggle 
that pitted the state against Islamist activists, Islamised memory only co-opts 
memories that are likely to lend themselves to Islamisation. The condition of 
struggle politicises Islamist memory, whereas the predicatory, educational, and 
spiritual outcomes of Islamised memory depoliticise it. 
Muṣṭafā al-Ḥasnāwī’s Sụjūn wa-ashjān and al-Muffaḍḍal al-Maghūtī/Bilāl 
al-Talīdī’s Wa-ya‘lū exemplify the differences between these two types of 
memory in terms of politicisation. For instance, Sụjūn wa-ashjān stakes out 
strong political positions vis-à-vis the security apparatus, the justice system, the 
state, and even the king. Starting from the first chapter entitled ‘Asal laban 
karmūs hindī (Honey milk prickly pears), al-Ḥasnāwī asserts that his memoir 
represents “that which we experience living in a big prison named Morocco.”71 
The narrator demonstrates the political nature of his arrest by underlining the 
role that the triumvirate of intelligence, judiciary police, and the media played 
in orchestrating his arrest on charges of terrorism.72 To give a more political tone 
to his arrest and its consequences, al-Ḥasnāwī wonders about the significance 
of being summoned to the police station on May 16. Since 2003, May 16 has been 
associated with the terrorist attacks in Casablanca. Al-Ḥasnāwī cannot stop 
wondering: “I don’t know why they chose May 16 to summon me to al-Ma‘ārīf 
police station. Is this related to a desire to keep this date alive by keeping this 
dossier open or is it just a coincidence?”73 The date gives a strong political 
charge to al-Ḥasnāwī’s arrest. To further depict the politics of his charge, al-
Ḥasnāwī includes a reimagined version of Scheherazade’s story in his book. The 
story, this time, includes an incorruptible journalist whom “the sultan decided 
to imprison for forming a terrorist cell and leading an invisible criminal gang.”74 
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The journalist and the accusations resemble al-Ḥasnāwī and his experiences 
with the Moroccan state. The political nature of Sujūn wa-ashjān is expressed 
throughout in the critical tone it takes towards Moroccan authorities. 
Al-Maghūtī’s biography, Wa-ya‘lū, on the other hand, is oblivious to politics 
and refrains from making any critical statements about the political situation in 
the country. For instance, al-Maghūtī declares “I believe that the army should 
be at the service of the nation. The questions of reform, change or even the revo-
lution, if they were justified, are the province of politicians and the army has 
nothing to do with them.”75 Even forty years after the events, al-Maghūtī still 
reiterates “my simple conviction that I believe in is that the protection of the 
monarchy in Morocco is equivalent to the protection of the nation.”76 Rare are 
the occasions when al-Maghūtī expresses a strong political opinion. One such 
occasion occurs when he talks about his unjust trial and underlines that he 
“didn’t know Dlimi and [he] was not his enemy either, but [he] didn’t know how 
he intervened at the last minute, changed the panel of judges, and transformed 
[his] innocence into twenty years.”77 The closest al-Maghūtī’s memoir comes to 
voicing a critical opinion occurs in his description of how Nancy Touil, an Amer-
ican citizen and wife of al-Maghūtī’s cellmate Commandant Mbark Touil, lob-
bied the American authorities to release the prisoners. Al-Maghūtī’s says 
the political moment was opportune for us to reveal the injustice inflicted on us, and it 
was the moment we chose to write the famous letter that Colonel Touil smuggled out of 
jail and that reached his American wife. This was the inconvenient letter that stripped na-
ked the ‘democratic’ and ‘human rights’ pretences of the official parties.78 
Apart from these moments of lament, Wa-ya‘lū is a depoliticised memoir that 
focuses on al-Maghūtī’s introspective journey through the catastrophe of arrest, 
trial, and disappearance after his participation in the second coup d’état against 
King Hassan II in 1972. However, even this minor criticism of the state is neutral-
ised by the statement that “King Hassan II was brave when he liberated us. He 
was generous when he ordered the Ministry of Human Rights to grant us all our 
rights.”79 Thus, al-Maghūtī and al-Talīdī, who co-authored the memoir, chose to 
absolve the king of his responsibility for the unjust decision to send fifty-eight 
soldiers and officers to their certain death in Tazmamart. While the memoir 
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confers questionable praise on King Hassan II, it criticises the Advisory Council 
on Human Rights, taking pains to avoid addressing direct criticism to those who 
were really responsible for human rights violations. This reluctance to politicise 
further demonstrates that it was more important for the Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa-
al-Iṣlāḥ to teach Islamist disciples perseverance and true faith than to denounce 
the misconduct of the Moroccan state during the Years of Lead. 
While al-Maghūtī is politically passive, al-Ḥasnāwī uses his Islamist memoir 
to depict the security machinations behind his imprisonment and trial for terror-
ism. Al-Ḥasnāwī foregrounds the conjunction between his Islamist belief and 
his struggle for political liberation, writing that 
[i]t’s true that I am not a salfī jihādī (jihadist Salafi) as some intelligence newspapers ac-
cused me falsely. However, I am a journalist with a combative spirit: I am combative be-
cause of my interest in my country’s issues and my people’s anxieties and demands.80 
He comments on his exchanges with his interrogators and writes: “[B]eyond the 
respectful treatment and the good intentions, let’s delve into some details that 
were only the visible part of the iceberg of a vile conspiracy woven by the intel-
ligence services” and the press subservient to them.81 For al-Ḥasnāwī, although 
it was less brutal physically, authoritarianism continues to function in the same 
manner it did during the Years of Lead. The pervasive fear of the authoritarian 
system is evident in the behaviour of the lawyers and civil society activists who 
refused to support him in his effort to prove his innocence of terrorism. To hear 
al-Ḥasnāwī tell it, Morocco has become a veritable prison. In his letter to a 
friend, who is also a journalist, he compares prohibitions in prison with the 
prohibitions that hit Moroccan society outside prison and writes that 
you live in a big prison with a long list of prohibitions, but do you know that the difference 
lies in the fact that you are on probation and that you enjoy things that are prohibited for 
prisoners, but only temporarily because this nation is a big prison, and all the children of 
my country are prisoners.82 
Ordinary religiosity vs contrived religiosity 
Although both Wa-ya‘lū and Sujūn wa-ashjān make references to Islam, there is 
a fundamental difference between their approaches to religiosity. While Islamist 
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activism was the cause of al-Ḥasnāwī’s arrest on charges of terrorism and im-
prisonment, Islam was never a factor in al-Maghūtī’s eighteen-year plight in 
Tazmamart. And religiosity plays out differently in the two memoirs. Wa-ya‘lū’s 
investment in depicting al-Maghūtī as an embodiment of Islam is evident from 
the use of the word Allah over one hundred and eighty times in the book. This 
repetition is meant to demonstrate al-Maghūtī’s deep faith as well as his destiny 
to serve as a role model for the true Islamic belief. For instance, Wa-ya‘lū lays 
emphasis on al-Maghūtī’s memorisation of the Quran, which he recited at an 
early age during Friday prayers in his village of Bāb Tāza. The fact that he made 
the call to prayer during his childhood – a habit that he continued in Taz-
mamart – is also used to depict al-Maghūtī as a ‘super-believer’. To reveal al-
Maghūtī’s extraordinary faith, the memoir describes how this deep religiosity 
stayed with him throughout the years he spent as a student in the northern city 
of Tétouan, away from his family’s village, as well as during his training in 
France and the United States to become a pilot in the Moroccan Air Force. Even 
as an adult, religion was pivotal for al-Maghūtī, as this account shows how he 
spent the month of Ramadan away from non-fasting colleagues before the coup 
in 1972: 
So, I spent almost a month in Bāb Tāza. Between the company of the family and taking 
care of their affairs, between the mosque and reading the Quran, I recovered reciting the 
Quran and calling for prayer at the mosque as well as the sweetness of collective evening 
prayer.83 
Al-Maghūtī’s religiosity is manifested in his absolute adherence to Islamic die-
tary restrictions, such as abstaining from alcohol and pork, even during his 
extensive stays abroad, which is meant to show his profound commitment to 
Islam regardless of any social and cultural pressure.84 Moreover, al-Maghūtī’s 
chastity figures prominently in Wa-ya‘lū’s depiction of his abstention from pre-
marital relationships, both sexual and sentimental, in Morocco and abroad. 
These strategies paint al-Maghūtī as a role model for Muslims to emulate, espe-
cially given the ordeal that he would survive in Tazmamart. The story that Wa-
ya‘lū tells aims to demonstrate that faith gave al-Maghūtī the necessary strength 
to survive in captivity for eighteen years. 
Contrary to Wa-ya‘lū, Sujūn wa-ashjān depicts a normal political activist 
who records the ups and downs of being unjustly imprisoned. Instead of any 
self-aggrandisement, al-Ḥasnāwī approaches his carceral situation realistically, 
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without exaggeration. In a very telling scene, al-Ḥasnāwī informs his readers 
that he completed the recitation of the Quran twice while he was in police cus-
tody, but he also declares that the Quran could not substitute his love for writ-
ing because, in his words, “my pen was the only thing I wished I had in my 
cell.”85 Rather than mulling over Islam or trying to show how his faith relieved 
him of the burden of physical imprisonment, al-Ḥasnāwī proceeds to build an 
intersectional network of human rights activists of all backgrounds to defend 
his innocence. Instead of relying solely on faith and spirituality in jail, al-
Ḥasnāwī puts much emphasis on action that draws on a universal understand-
ing of human rights. For instance, he reaches out to former Marxist-Leninists, 
Islamist lawyers, as well as human rights activists, to convince them to join the 
committee established to defend him. These connections are not always smooth 
or productive, but they demonstrate how al-Ḥasnāwī was able to transcend the 
limitations of Islamism to enter into conversation with all sections of society. 
When he sensed an attempt to misrepresent his statement about his Islamist 
background by a former Leninist-Marxist prisoner he had reached out to, 
al-Ḥasnāwī responded 
I informed you that I am an Islamist so that you understand that I have no problem of 
communication with leftists, Jews or atheists. I informed you that I am an Islamist to 
demonstrate to you my openness, [my readiness for] communication and [my wish for] 
dialogue, in order to talk to you about my complaint. It’s us who feel the condescension, 
marginalisation and exclusion in the other’s talk with us.86 
Al-Ḥasnāwī’s memoir does not try to depict the life of a hermit or a spiritual 
man. It is instead the story of an Islamist activist’s pragmatic journey inside an 
authoritarian state’s carceral system. Unlike al-Maghūtī, for whom the Quran 
was “the treatment for all psychological ills that could befall a human being”,87 
al-Ḥasnāwī does not slip into any idealistic representations of Islam. For exam-
ple, his description of the dangers inherent in the various Jihadist misinter-
pretations of Islam is a potent example of his critical approach. Al-Ḥasnāwī 
does not shy away from describing Jihadist Salafis as suffering from a “very 
complex ignorance and calcified stupid thought and dry stubborn character”.88 
Additionally, al-Ḥasnāwī sheds light on the lack of even the most rudimentary 
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education among Salafis,89 harshly criticising their misinterpretations of Islam. 
As a result, al-Ḥasnāwī is an Islamist activist whose memoirs are a critical 
account of both the state and flawed offshoot of Islamism. 
Partisan memory vs collective memory 
Their varied degrees of partisanship form another important distinction be-
tween Islamist from Islamised memory. A comparative analysis of the motiva-
tions underlying the publication of Wa-ya‘lū and Sujūn wa-ashjān indicates that 
Islamised memory is partisan because it addresses a group of adepts or disci-
ples, whereas Islamist memory is more open to addressing an entire society. 
Wa-ya‘lū made use of an individual memory of state violence to educate the 
followers of Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Iṣlāḥ. The now-defunct al-Tajdīd was only 
read by the followers of Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Iṣlāḥ who also happened to be 
sympathisers of the Justice and Development Party, and this partisanship was 
fundamental to the way al-Maghūtī’s memoirs were narrativised in a style that 
depicts an overly pious al-Maghūtī. The impact this Islamist newspaper intend-
ed with the publication of Wa-ya‘lū was not an end to Morocco’s abysmal hu-
man rights situation, but a larger moralisation of society and politics through 
the ‘ibra (lesson) that al-Maghūtī’s life story represents. For instance, at no time 
does al-Talīdī, in his long introduction, say anything about human rights, but 
he seizes every opportunity to remind his readers about the religious angle the 
book takes.90 This bias is made even clearer by al-Talīdī’s pre-emptive dismissal 
of criticism in claiming that it is sufficient for him that he “pioneered writing 
from this new angle or added to the credit of the Islamic literature other writings 
in addition to the writings of Najīb al-Kilāni and Aḥmad Rā’if, among others.”91 
As such, Wa-ya‘lū is already enmeshed in a system of references to Islamist 
prisoners and Islam-focused objectives that narrow both its readership and its 
effects after publication. That said, it should not be assumed that these are al-
Maghūtī’s goals or choices, because the media outlet that serialised his mem-
oirs, and the journalist to whom he entrusted his memories, had a clear partisan 
point of view, which al-Maghūtī may not have shared. 
Another way partisanship manifested itself in Wa-ya‘lū is through the eras-
ure of the political context that made human rights violations in Morocco possi-
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ble. Wa-ya‘lū makes no reference to the political situation in Morocco during the 
Years of Lead, and the entire book is detached from the struggles that took place 
in the country in the 1960s and the 1970s. Not even the Equity and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, which was put in place in 2004, garners any mention in the 
memoir. This is not surprising, however, given how vehemently the founder of 
the Justice and Development Party, Dr. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭīb, reacted to the 
establishment of the ERC.92 Al-Tajdīd refocused the Tazmamart story on the 
mystical and faithful dimension in a way that did not clash with the party’s 
position toward the Years of Lead. Partisan memory presents al-Maghūtī as 
someone who survived unjust incarceration thanks to his extraordinary faith. 
His experience was only serialised because it demonstrates the cruelty of the 
violations of human rights that took place in Morocco during the Years of Lead, 
and because it reinforces the Islamist readership’s belief and trust in God. 
However, unlike al-Talīdī’s Islam-focused rendering of al-Maghūtī’s experi-
ence, al-Ḥasnāwī’s Sujūn wa-ashjān is oriented towards a future collective 
memory, which documents the injustice and criticises the dysfunctional system 
in Morocco. The uniquely personal or spiritual journey of Wa-ya‘lū is replaced 
by an analysis of various state injustices and abuses in Sujūn wa-ashjān. For 
example, when he was denied royal pardon, al-Ḥasnāwī writes that he had “to 
be born French, Spanish, ‘Israeli’ (...) or even a supporter of the POLISARIO 
Front (…) to be granted royal amnesty.”93 The generalisation that al-Ḥasnāwī 
makes from his own case reveals a lot about the way he draws on his experience 
of imprisonment to demonstrate that the majority of Moroccans are subjected to 
this injustice: “Despite loneliness, I find myself lucky inside this cell because 
thousands of this nation’s children are crammed with their children in similar 
cells or even smaller, and some of them don’t even have one.”94 He takes on 
“corruption, authoritarianism, and bleakness”, which “remind [him] that the 
prison is outside these walls.”95 For him, the entire Moroccan society was a vic-
tim of imprisonment. In al-Ḥasnāwī’s words, despite all the abuses they com-
mit, Moroccan officials 
still find time to talk about human rights and freedoms, welcome the High Commission for 
Human Rights, refute international human rights reports, and raise their voices in their 
clubs [to extol] the great reforms. They contrive to talk about new generations of [human] 
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rights in the meantime as new generations [of Moroccans] are being deprived of their 
rights.96 
Al-Ḥasnāwī draws attention to the disconnect between the state’s discourse on 
human rights and the constant violation of these rights in the lived reality of the 
Moroccan population. Through and through, Sujūn wa-ashjān recounts the story 
of an abuse of judicial and security authority to raise broader questions and 
critical reflections on Moroccan society’s suffering from social injustice, exclu-
sion, corruption, and authoritarianism. The memoir makes a crucial point about 
injustice as a mechanism of governance in Morocco. Memory, for al-Ḥasnāwī, 
serves as a space for challenging human rights abuses. State violence, such as 
that suffered by al-Ḥasnāwī, does not simply come to an end by itself, but re-
quires multiple remedies, including reminding both abusers and society of the 
fact of their abuse. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed the conceptualisation of two types of Islam-
related memories that emerged in post-1999 Morocco. Using two memoirs of 
former political detainees, Wa ya‘lū and Sujūn wa-ashjān, I have demonstrated 
that Islamist memory, on the one hand, is oriented toward an inclusive collec-
tive memory, and that Islamised memory, on the other hand, is a partisan 
memory that places predication and spiritual improvement of disciples above 
the needs of the larger society. Islamist memory is an advocating memory 
whereas Islamised memory is a hermitic memory, which has dire implications 
for democratisation and societal transformation. 
 Morocco’s rich social memory has been primarily shaped by remembrances 
of the monarchy, Marxist-Leninists, and Tazmamart prisoners. These three 
gatekeepers of the past have succeeded at using all the advantages offered by 
various media, including writing and film, to shape cultural and social memory, 
even to the point of pushing Moroccan Islamists to the margins of the Moroccan 
memory landscape. This conceptualisation of Islamist and Islamised memory 
will further complicate our understanding of the presence of these memories in 
cultural memory and draw attention to the intersections between state violence, 
religion, and Islamism in the country. Although the literary corpus I have exam-
ined is limited, it is important to emphasise that more Islamist testimonial prison 
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literature can be expected in the coming years due to the ongoing security cam-
paigns against Islamists, mainly on terrorism charges or other politically moti-
vated accusations. Only the future will show how deeply these Islamist and 
Islamised renderings of state abuses will seep into the larger social and cultural 
memory, or whether they would remain under the embargo of unavailability to 
the majority of non-Islamist Moroccan readerships. Either way, the conceptuali-
sation of these two types of memory will help to chart a different path for other 
scholars to explore the complexities of inventing, redirecting, and reshaping 
Islam-based memory in post-colonial Morocco, where the relationship between 
politics, Islam, and memory is a deeply neglected area in need of critical exami-
nation. 
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(Re-)Configurations of Islam in the 
Development of the Arabic Novel 
Case Studies from Egypt and Kuwait 
Abstract: The existence of Islam in the Arabic novel is bound within epistemo-
logical constraints inscribed in the very form of the genre, and therefore trans-
cends the contents of specific works. As one of the most distinctive expressions 
of modernity in the Arab world, the novel constitutes a meaningful locus to 
study the way Islam has been re-configured in relationship to some of the major 
intellectual debates that have swept through the Arab territories during the 20th 
and the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter examines the synchronic, 
diachronic and translocal dimensions of this process of reconfiguration, with a 
particular focus on the relationship between Islam and nationalism in Egypt 
and Kuwait. 
Introduction 
In 1997, at the beginning of a brief stay in Cairo as an exchange student at the 
University of al-Azhar, I was asked by the university administration to specify 
the aspects of Arabic studies that fascinated me most. When I mentioned my 
interest in the Arabic novel, I was assigned an individual supervisor who intro-
duced me to a book that had been published only a few years before by the 
League of Islamic Universities based at al-Azhar: al-Adab al-islami darura (The 
Islamic literature is a necessity) by Ahmad Muhammad ‘Ali.1 In this work, the 
author argues that modern narrative genres in Arabic literature have been the 
vehicle of anti-Islamic values, and that only the rise of an authentic Islamic 
literature can effectively contrast their pernicious influence. It is meaningful, I 
believe, that ‘Ali’s essay was the first book that an influential institution such as 
al-Azhar provided to a foreign student eager to deepen his knowledge of the 
Arabic novel. The author’s project of establishing an “authentic Islamic litera-
ture” can easily be discredited as illusory, based as it is on a normative ideal of 
authenticity. However, ‘Ali’s acknowledgement of the problems that the narra-
|| 
1 ‘Ali 1991. 
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tive genres of the novel and the short story pose to ideas of Islam promoted by 
traditional institutions of religious learning deserves more thoughtful attention. 
Since the early 20th century, the novel has become the most reputed genre of 
Arabic narrative among wide sectors of the reading public. One of its distinctive 
aspects is the way it served to spread the national ideal, not only as an imagined 
community but also as an all-encompassing paradigm. The novel was accepted 
within the Arabic literary canon only when the individual destiny of the charac-
ters intersected with the making of the modern nation,2 or, in other words, when 
Bildung narratives came to coincide with national narratives.3 Writing the nation 
through the Arabic novel has also meant that Islam was inscribed within the 
time-space of the nation-state, often in opposition to understandings of religion 
that the writers deemed incompatible with the imagined community projected 
by their narratives. Popular religiosity was re-signified as part of the national 
ethos while doctrinal visions of Islam were usually represented as alien to the 
national community. 
This chapter examines the process of reconfiguration of Islam in the Arabic 
novel by focusing on three different dimensions: synchronic, diachronic and 
translocal. At the synchronic level, this process is analysed in reference to the 
specific time-space or chronotope4 embodied in the form of the realist-
nationalist novel as it emerged in Egypt during the early 20th century, where it 
became a reference for other literary traditions in the Arab world. The diachron-
ic dimension takes into account the transformation of ideas of nationalism and 
modernity in Egypt and its impact on literary texts. Finally, through the notion 
of translocality,5 this study investigates the effects of the circulation and trans-
fer of the same literary topoi across the Arab world, and on their resignification 
in the light of different social-historical circumstances. With this aim, the last 
section of the chapter focuses on the relationship between Islam, nationalism 
and the novel genre in contemporary Kuwait. 
In order to provide a synthetic description of these interrelated issues, a 
limited number of primary sources are considered: Muhammad al-Muwaylihi’s 
neo-maqama Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (What ‘Isa Ibn Hisham told us, 1907), a 
narrative article published by Muhammad Husayn Haykal in 1925, the novels 
‘Awdat al-ruh (The Return of the Spirit, 1933) and Zuqaq al-midaqq (Midaqq 
|| 
2 Selim 2004. 
3 Casini, Paniconi, and Sorbera 2012, 39–152. The note refers to the first part of the book on the 
apprenticeship novel in Egypt. This part was written by Maria Elena Paniconi. 
4 Bakhtin 1981. 
5 Freitag and von Oppen 2010. 
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Alley, 1947), written by the Egyptian authors Tawfiq al-Hakim and Najib Mahfuz 
respectively, and the novel Fi’ran Ummi Hissa (Mama Hessa’s Mice, 2015) by the 
Kuwaiti writer Sa‘ud al-San‘usi. 
Ordering Islam within the bounds of modern 
narrative genres: From the neo-maqama to the 
‘formal realist’ novel 
One of the basic assumptions of the sociology of literature is that a narrative 
genre is not a mere container in which meaning is solely produced by “diegetic 
events and speech acts”, i.e. the content of each text.6 The form itself produces 
content because it conveys a particular way of structuring knowledge and a 
specific interconnection of time and space, or chronotope. The classical study 
The Rise of the Novel by Ian Watt relates the genesis of this genre in England to 
the spread of a philosophical current – epitomised by the work of René Des-
cartes – which was “critical, anti-traditional and innovating”.7 Descartes did 
much “to bring about the modern assumption whereby the pursuit of truth is 
conceived as a wholly individual matter” and the novel can be regarded as “the 
form of literature which most fully reflects this individualist and innovative 
reorientation”.8 
In his pioneering study on the genesis of modern Arabic narrative dis-
course, Sabry Hafez elaborated a socio-critical approach modelled on Watt’s 
analysis of the English novel.9 He was thus able to overcome the dominant ge-
nealogist interpretations of the rise of the Arabic narrative genres founded on 
the dichotomy between the Arabic classical heritage and the European literary 
tradition. He related the appearance of these genres to the deep social changes 
that had transformed the relationship among the individual, society and the 
inherited cultural tradition in several regions of the Arab world. According to 
Selim, this split between the subject and society was reflected in the new role 
assigned to the narrator as an individual observing society – the putative 
national reality – from an external and hegemonic viewpoint: 
|| 
6 Bemon and Borghart 2010, 4. 
7 Watt 1957, 12. 
8 Ibid., 13. 
9 Hafez 1993. 
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In the same way that society came to be understood as a distinct and abstract field of hu-
man knowledge constructed around a subject/object relationship, so the act of narration 
itself came to reproduce the split implied in this new ontology. The narrator was no longer 
the custodian and transmitter of an accumulated civilization or turath (…). The new narra-
tor was rather an individual standing ‘outside’ the collectivity, observing it, describing it, 
narrating it, not as a communal historian but from a position that embodied a subjective 
but nonetheless authoritative and hegemonic point of view (…). The act of narration thus 
came to embody a slippery relationship between the narrating subject and the ambiguous, 
abstract collectivity defined as ‘society’ which represents a putative national reality.10 
Muhammad al-Muwaylihi’s neo-maqama Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (What ‘Isa Ibn 
Hisham told us, 1907) can be regarded as the last great literary attempt to “con-
tain”11 the representation of the modern world within the formal constrains of 
the classical genre of the maqama.12 The author’s appropriation of the maqama 
form to represent modern Egyptian society stemmed from his particular under-
standing of Islamic Reformism which was inspired by the ideas of Muhammad 
‘Abduh. While the latter reinterpreted key categories of the Islamic tradition in 
the light of modern debates, al-Muwaylihi charged a traditional narrative form 
with new meaning. Both endeavours, however, led to unintended results: 
To show that Islam can be reconciled with modern thought, and how it can be, was one of 
‘Abduh’s major purposes. (…) In this line of thought maslaha gradually turns into utility, 
shura into parliamentary democracy, ijma‘ into public opinion; Islam itself becomes iden-
tical with civilization and activity, the norms of nineteenth century social thought. (…) 
Once the traditional interpretation of Islam was abandoned, and the way open to private 
judgement, it was difficult if not impossible to say what was in accordance with Islam and 
what was not. Without intending it, ‘Abduh was perhaps opening the door to the flooding 
of Islamic doctrine and law by all the innovations of the modern world. He had intended 
to build a wall against secularism, he had in fact provided an easy bridge by which it 
could capture one position after another.13 
What Albert Hourani noted about the possible implications of ‘Abduh’s ap-
proach to Islamic reformism, as providing an easy bridge to “all the innovations 
of the modern world”, can be transferred to the narrative strategies of Hadith 
‘Isa Ibn Hisham. Once the maqama was charged with a modern conception of 
time and space, the way was paved for the genre’s very dissolution. 
|| 
10 Selim 2004, 13. 
11 Jameson 1981. 
12 Casini 2011, 29–45. 
13 Hourani 1983, 144. 
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The main difference between Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham and the traditional 
maqama is the particularising approach to the representation of time and space, 
as it is testified also by the subtitle A Period of Time (Fatra min al-zaman) which 
was given to the work when it was first published in serialised form between 
1898 and 1900, in the newspaper published by the father of the author.14 Where-
as in the pre-modern maqama the setting and the historical time of the events 
do not constitute a relevant feature of the narrative, al-Muwaylihi’s neo-
maqama is devoted to scrutinise the transformations undergone by Egyptian 
society – and the city of Cairo in particular – in the specific time-span of the 
second half of the 19th century. 
The choice of the historical figure of Ahmad Pasha al-Manikali (Muhammad 
‘Ali’s Minister of War) as the hero of the maqama, serves as the text’s key narra-
tive device to compare and evaluate the initial and final moments of the period 
of time under scrutiny. The Pasha is made resurrect after fifty years from his 
death and immediately meets the narrator (‘Isa Ibn Hisham), a fictional charac-
ter presented as a writer of al-Muwaylihi’s generation who conveys the voice of 
the author. During the first part of the text, the Pasha’s bewilderment towards 
the new social-political order and its institutions generates irony and serves to 
emphasise the depth of the transformations occurred between his death and 
resurrection. In the early episodes of the narrative, the Pasha exhibits a tradi-
tionalist orientation and rejects every aspect of the modern society. Conversely, 
the narrator, while displaying a critical attitude towards the Egypt of the time, 
does not manifest any nostalgia for the past and invokes a reformist approach 
based on an innovative interpretation of the Islamic shari‘a. 
This reformist role assigned to literature, which permeates ‘Isa’s focalisa-
tion and the text as a whole, is made explicit in a passage in which the narrator 
identifies journalists as exemplary Muslims and defines their function by refer-
ring to the Koran. This parallel is all the more significant when one bears in 
mind that al-Muwaylihi himself was a journalist and that Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham 
was first serialised in a newspaper: 
[Newspapers] are one of the aspects of Western civilizations that we have imported into 
our society. The purpose of issuing papers is to publish articles which give due credit for 
value and merit, and to rebuke depravity; to criticise bad actions and encourage good 
ones, to draw attention to points of imperfection and to urge people to correct mistakes 
|| 
14 The text was published in the newspaper Misbah al-sharq funded by Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi. 
See Roger Allen’s detailed introduction to his critical edition of the English translation of 
Ḥadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (al-Muwaylihi 1992a). 
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(…). To sum up, those who run the press occupy the position of “those who command 
good deeds and rebuke bad deeds”15 as referred to in the Islamic Shariah.16 
The crisis of the maqama form and the recognition of the novel as a genre of 
high literature can only be properly understood in the context of wider histori-
cal and cultural developments, which contributed to a redefinition of the social 
and symbolic role of Islam. In Egypt, in particular, the weakening of Pan-
Islamism as a viable political option – especially after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire – boosted the rise of the ideological current of modernism which re-
placed Islamic reformism as the dominant discourse among the local élite. The 
intellectual whose articles mostly contributed to shaping the new modernist-
nationalist discourse is Muhammad Husayn Haykal, who is significantly also 
the author of Zaynab (1913), which a long critical tradition identified as the “first 
Arabic novel”.17 In the period between the outbreak of the First World War and 
the mid-1920s, Haykal developed an intense journalistic activity.18 His newspa-
per articles rooted Egyptian nationalism in the Pharaonic past and popularised 
environmental determinism as a key notion to define “the Egyptian national 
personality”. Haykal’s Pharaonist articles caused a radical break with the Islam-
ic tradition. However, like the writings of the European anti-Lumières,19 these 
articles recognised the importance of religion as a tool of governance and un-
derscored its mediating role between the new national élite and the masses. 
Haykal’s vision of the social role of religion is articulated in unequivocal 
terms in an article on the Pharaonic cult of the Apis calf, written in a narrative 
style and published in 1925. The author’s ideas are expressed by the character of 
a middle-aged man who counters the criticism of a younger person on the sub-
|| 
15 Sura 9 verse 112. 
16 al-Muwaylihi, 1992b, 136–37. 
17 Gibb was the first to propagate the view of Zaynab as the first Arabic novel in 1933. His 
views, however, echoed the opinion of other Egyptian critics and of Haykal himself who con-
tributed to popularise this view (Hassan 2017, 43). 
18 On this aspect see in particular the contributions by Charles Smith (1983), Israel Gershoni 
and James Jankowski (1986). 
19 With this term, Zeev Sternhell refers to an intellectual tradition that spans from Herder and 
Burke in the second half of the 18th century to the present day, and includes thinkers such as 
Taine, Renan, Carlyle, Le Bon and Spengler, all of whom had a direct influence on Haykal. In 
Sternhell’s view, the anti-Enlightenment cannot be described as a counter-revolution but is 
hereditary of another revolution that opposed the universalism of the Enlightenment, and 
nourished conceptions of modernity that were in contrast to the generalisation of rights and 
the primacy of the individual (Sternhell 2009). On Haykal’s anti-Enlightenment modernity see 
Casini (2019). 
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ject of the religion of the Ancient Egyptians. This latter character observes that 
in modern eyes worshipping a calf seems a patent ingenuity if not a collective 
hallucination. The middle-aged man, however, provides a rational justification 
for worshipping the calf: Apis was a splendid intermediary with the masses of 
Ancient Egypt, who had attached their “good fantasies” to the calf. He adds that 
these fantasies (awham), albeit despised today, are the basis of “the latent eter-
nal strength” (al-quwwah al-kaminah al-khalidah)20 that guides their activity 
towards beneficial achievements (al-salih al-mufid). 
Having listened to these arguments, the young man remarks that there is no 
harm in believing in the values venerated in Ancient Egypt, such as peace, good 
and prosperity. He is unable to understand, however, why these values cannot 
be worshipped per se but have to be associated with idols such as Apis or Osiris. 
The middle-aged man explains this to him, drawing on an example from the 
modern world. Anyone who visits a power station and sees the machines that 
produce a gigantic amount of energy cannot but feel a sense of wonder. If, on 
the other hand, a power station is described to people whose lives depend on it, 
they will undoubtedly begin to worship those who realised it. He concludes that 
“the same happened to the mass (al-sawad) of our ancestors with what their 
cultural élite (dhawu al-ra’y minhum) told them about Isis, Osiris, Apis and the 
rest of the deities”.21 In the final part of the article, the middle-aged man draws a 
parallel between Islam and the religion of Ancient Egypt. At the time of the 
Pharaohs, he asserts, priests and other men of religion believed in a single God. 
Deities such as Apis and Osiris were merely symbols that embodied heavenly 
meanings easily understood by the masses. In his view, the same happens in 
Islam, where men of religion profess there is only one God but the masses wor-
ship the symbols of their faith, not unlike the calf in antiquity.22 
The general vision of Islam and religion that the article on Apis conveys, 
bears few resemblances with the Islam of al-Muwaylihi’s neo-maqama and Is-
lamic jurisprudence. Religion is no more conceived as an end in itself but as a 
|| 
20 The middle-aged man’s utterance here is reminiscent of the final words in the following 
passage from The Crowds by Gustave Le Bon: “As far as the majority of their acts are consid-
ered, crowds display a singularly inferior mentality; yet there are other acts in which they 
appear to be guided by those mysterious forces which the ancients denominated destiny, 
nature or providence, which we call the voices of the dead and whose power it is impossible to 
overlook although we ignore their essence. It would seem, at times, as if there were latent 
forces in the inner being of nations which serve to guide them [emphasis added]” (Le Bon 
2001, 6). 
21 Haykal 1968, 277. 
22 Ibid., 280–87. 
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tool of governance which is inscribed within an elitist project of modernisation. 
It is this vision of Islam that shapes the early phase of the Arabic nationalist 
novel, which in turn finds its most coherent expression in the 1933 work by 
Tawfiq al-Hakim ‘Awdat al-ruh. 
Islam, modernity and the nation: From ‘Awdat al-
ruh by Tawfiq al-Hakim to Zuqaq al-midaqq by 
Najib Mahfuz 
The novels ‘Awdat al-ruh (The Return of the Spirit) and Zuqaq al-midaqq 
(Midaqq Alley), published in 1933 and 1947 respectively, are two classics of 
modern Arabic narrative. Their divergent configurations of the relationship 
between Islam, modernity and the nation document how diachronic transfor-
mations in conceptions of modernity and Egyptian nationalism impacted the 
representation of Islam. ‘Awdat al-ruh can be regarded as the most coherent and 
influential national allegory of Egypt. Set at the time of the national revolution 
of 1919, this work redefines the Egyptian community on the basis of the envi-
ronmental determinism theorised by Hippolyte Taine in the 19th century and re-
elaborated by Haykal as the key foundation of Egyptian territorial nationalism. 
The “spirit” (al-ruh) to which the title refers to, is the one of Pharaonic Egypt 
and its “return” coincides with the re-birth of the nation. The new imagined 
community is rooted in the myths and religion of Pharaonic Egypt – with explic-
it references to Isis, Osiris and The Book of the Dead – but also in a ‘culturalised 
Islam’ conceived as one of the main ‘glues’ of the nation, together with the envi-
ronment of the Nile Valley and the cultural inheritance of Ancient Egypt. 
Awdat al-ruh is the only case of a prototypical and accomplished Bildungs-
roman in the early stages of the development of the Egyptian novel. While in 
previous and later works the social conditions of Egypt are represented as im-
pediments for the full development of the hero’s personality and his accommo-
dation within the existing social order, in this work the protagonist finds a 
meaningful existence within the Egyptian society thanks to his involvement in 
the nationalist movement. The hero (Muhsin) lives in Cairo in the house of his 
uncles, as part of an extended family which represents the national microcosm 
allegorically, and is significantly referred to as al-sha‘b (the people). The pro-
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logue emphasises the extraordinary unity of al-sha‘b,23 their rural origin and 
their present apathy and weakness. The story begins when the male members of 
the family become infatuated with a girl (Saniyya) with whom the protagonist 
identifies the Egyptian goddess Isis. The passion that Saniyya arises among the 
men of the family allows “the people” to overcome their apathy although it also 
produces feelings of envy, competition and division. The unity of the family is 
only restored after the heroine/Goddess marries a neighbour and leaves Cairo. 
When the national revolution of 1919 erupts, the male members of the family 
join the protests and redirect their passions towards the nationalist cause. 
The figurative dimension of the narrative as a national allegory becomes 
explicit in the brief sequence of chapters that opens the second part of the novel 
and which is mostly set in the estate of Muhsin’s parents, near the city of Da-
manhur. The first chapter of this part performs the ambitious task of redefining 
the social role of Islam in radically new terms. It takes place in the train that 
brings the protagonist from Cairo to Damanhur and consists of a conversation 
between the passengers of the compartment in which the protagonist is seated. 
The conversation begins when a Coptic effendi praises the spirit of solidarity 
among the Egyptian people and contrasts it with the prevalent individualism of 
the Europeans. When a religious shaykh seated next to him observes that Eu-
rope “is a country without Islam”, a third passenger (who notes the embarrass-
ment of the Coptic passenger) corrects him: “You mean, Mr. Shaykh, it is a land 
without hearts, not like our country where we are all brothers whether Copts or 
Muslims”.24 At this point a fourth passenger, “an enlightened man” intervenes 
in the conversation and redefines Islam as a cultural component of the Egyptian 
nation. The rest of the passengers – Copts and Muslims, the shaykh and the 
effendis – agree on this definition: 
Another passenger, an enlightened man, noticed the same thing. He entered into the dis-
cussion and began adroitly to amend the statement until he showed those present that the 
word “Islam”, which was current in Egyptian use at all levels of society, really had no reli-
gious or sectarian stamp. Its meaning and import were, rather, the emotion of mercy, a 
goodness of hearth, and a union of hearths. These were emotions to be found in Egypt and 
not in Europe. There, the poison of utility had spread to the souls of the Europeans. A dog-
eat-dog strife prevailed with emphasis on the personal welfare of the individual. Every-
|| 
23 The exceptional unity of the Egyptian nation is one of the tenets of Egyptian territorial 
nationalist as theorised by Muhammad Husayn Haykal. This unity, which supersedes that of 
other nations, is traced back to the extraordinary uniformity of the natural environment of the 
Nile Valley. On this respect see in particular the four articles on Qasim Amin initially published 
by Haykal in 1916 (Haykal 1968, 91–127). 
24 al-Hakim 2019, 171. 
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one, both the turbaned and the befezzed, pondered this statement and this gloss. He 
seemed to have disclosed to them a reality that had previously been concealed under the 
cloak of that word. They liked what he had said and appreciated it. The topic was closed.25 
Published only fourteen years after al-Hakim’s work, Zuqaq al-midaqq offers a 
very different image of the Egyptian nation. In contrast to the cohesive and 
organic representation of the community in ‘Awdat al-ruh, Mahfuz’s novel cen-
tres on the lacerating effects of modernisation in the context of the British con-
trol of the country. These lacerations are represented through the juxtapositions 
of two different chronotopic microcosms. On the one side stands medieval Cai-
ro, of which Midaqq Alley functions as a synecdoche, and on the other the mod-
ern city. The alley is subjected to the ordering principle of Islamic tradition and 
a cyclical time epitomised by the character of a storyteller who keeps re-
elaborating on his limited centuries-old repertoire. Besides being used as a syn-
ecdoche of the national culture, the alley is also represented as a residual cul-
tural universe engulfed in the evenemential temporality of the modern city. The 
latter exerts an uncontrollable attraction over the young residents of the alley, 
although the exit from the boundaries of medieval Cairo is traumatic for all. 
In the characterisation of Midaqq Alley, Islam is identified with a fatalistic 
approach to life that binds the subject to the social world and prioritises adher-
ence to traditional values over individual will. This understanding of Islam is 
expressed in several passages of the opening chapter: the narrator describes the 
misery brought by the War as the natural outcome of “our own wickedness”; the 
several haemorrhages caused by the surgeries of an improvised dentist (named 
“Dr. Bushi”, despite not being a doctor) are interpreted as a sign of the divine 
will, while the leitmotiv of the pious character of Sayyid Ridwan al-Hussayni is 
that “He gave and He has taken back; all things are at His command and all 
things belong to Him. It would be blasphemous to sorrow”.26 The lack of indi-
vidual will which distinguishes life in the alley is symbolised by the sweet seller 
Kamil. The first character to appear in the novel, Kamil is described as an obese 
man who can barely move and whose life is no more than “a prolonged sleep”. 
The novel genre is not conceivable within the conception of life which per-
meates the chronotopic universe of the alley. Time is “viscous” and “sticky” and 
does not know any movement forward. In this sense it is an “ancillary” time 
which resembles the one of the provincial town that Bakhtin describes with 
reference to Flaubert’s Madame Bovary: 
|| 
25 al-Hakim 2019, 171–72. 
26 Mahfuz 1992, 9. 
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Here there are not events, only doings that constantly repeat themselves. Time here has 
no advancing historical movements; it moves rather in narrow circles (…). Time here is 
without event and therefore almost seems to stand still. There are no meetings and no 
partings. It is a viscous and sticky time that drags itself slowly through space. And there-
fore it cannot serve as the primary time of the novel. Novelists use it as an ancillary time, 
one that may be interwoven with other noncyclical temporal sequences (…). It often serves 
as a contrasting background for temporal sequences that are more charged with energy 
and event.27 
If Zuqaq al-midaqq exists as a novel it is only because the evenemential time of 
modernity embodied by the new city intrudes into the space of the Alley. The 
story takes place in a particular moment in the history of Midaqq Alley, en-
dowed with symbolic significance: Some workers are fixing a radio at the local 
café, a device which brings the events of the outside world to the Alley. The 
character who changes the destiny of the heroine – a pimp – also comes from 
the modern city. He is able to gain access to the closed universe of the Alley by 
joining the celebration of an electoral campaign which temporarily subverts the 
cyclical rituality of life. 
The case studies of ‘Awdat al-ruh and Zuqaq al-midaqq exemplify how the 
narrative existence of Islam in the Egyptian novel – in terms of functions, imag-
es and representations – is strictly interrelated with the texts’ general narrative 
strategies. Specific images of Islam do not convey the religious beliefs or actual 
perceptions of the authors but are deployed strategically, often in relationship 
to the construction of alternative representations of the national space. Al-
Hakim’s vision of the harmonic integration of the subject within a rising nation-
al community shaped by a ‘renovated’ understanding of Islam (‘Awdat al-ruh), 
was replaced, in the aftermath of the Second World War, by Mahfuz’s pessimis-
tic vision of the modernising process, and the association of Islam with a resid-
ual chronotopic universe (Zuqaq al-midaqq). 
From mid-20th century Egypt to contemporary 
Kuwait: Fi’ran Ummi Hissa by Sa‘ūd al-San‘ūsī 
The final section of this chapter moves from the Egyptian context of the early 
and mid-20th century to contemporary Kuwait. This jump in space and time 
allows us to tackle the question of the translocal dimension of the reconfigura-
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tions of Islam in the Arabic novel. In the descriptive sense, translocality “desig-
nates the outcome of concrete movements of people, goods, ideas and symbols 
which span spatial distances and cross boundaries” and, as a research perspec-
tive, “aims at highlighting the fact that the interactions and connections be-
tween places, institutions, actors and concepts have far more diverse, and often 
even contradictory effects than is commonly assumed”.28 As the following sec-
tion will show, the case of the contemporary Kuwaiti novel is particularly mean-
ingful to exemplify the possible outcomes of the circulation of the novel genre 
across different Arab territories. 
Kuwait has a young, but well-established, tradition of novelistic writing 
with authors such as Isma‘il Fahd Isma‘il (1940–2018) and Layla al-‘Uthman 
(b. 1945) who gave a significant contribution to the development of the genre 
during the 1970s and 1980s, respectively.29 However, it was the traumatic expe-
rience of occupation of the country during the Iraq-Kuwait war of 1990–1991, 
and the ensuing wave of Kuwaiti territorial nationalism, which led to a wide 
social recognition of the genre and to its identification as an important means to 
inscribe religion within a renovated national imaginary. This social significance 
attributed to the novel in the aftermath of the war, empowered the Kuwaiti au-
thors of the generation of the 1990s, and placed them in a similar situation to 
that of the Egyptian pioneers of the genre during the first decades of the 20th 
century. It is not by chance, therefore, that Kuwaiti authors such as Sa‘ud al-
San‘usi30 found inspiration in classic Egyptian novels and in their literary topoi. 
In al-San‘usi’s novel Fi’ran Ummi Hissa (Mama Hessa’s Mice, 2015), Islam enjoys 
a complex narrative existence as both a unifying trait of the national culture 
and (in its sectarian articulations) as a threat to the very existence of the nation. 
Through the allegory of the plague spread by mice, al-San‘usi represents the 
uncontrollable proliferation of religious sectarianism in Kuwait from the late 
1980s to the imminent dystopic future of 2020, and the way sectarian violence 
undermines the very existence of the nation.  
In a private conversation that I had with the author in February 2018, he 
explained to me that Mahfuz’s realist novels had influenced his style more than 
the works of other Arab writers of younger generations. These words are con-
firmed in Fi’ran Ummi Hissa by the way the text handles the representation of 
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28 Freitag and von Oppen 2010, 1–5. 
29 Tijani 2017, 283–84. 
30 Sa‘ud al-San‘usi, born in 1981, won the Arabic booker prize in 2013 with his second novel 
Saq al-bambu (The Bambu Stalk) centred on the themes of migration and citizenship rights. 
Fi’ran Ummi Ḥissa is his third novel. 
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space and describes the old quarter of al-Surra in Kuwait City. The dialectic 
between the Alley and modern Cairo in Mahfuz’s Zuqaq al-midaqq is paralleled 
in Fi’ran Ummi Hissa by the relationship between al-Surra and Kuwait City. Like 
the Alley in Mahfuz’s novel, al-Surra lives a double narrative existence. On the 
one hand, it stands as a timeless microcosm of the nation, endowed however 
with a mythical dimension which is absent in Zuqaq al-midaqq. On the other 
hand, this neighbourhood is depicted as part of the wider urban space of Kuwait 
City and subjected to the flow of an evenemential temporality. 
The elderly character of mama Hissa is the emblem of al-Surra as a mythical 
and unitarian synecdoche of the nation. In her house and courtyard, the pro-
tagonist spends the most significant moments of his childhood in company of 
his close friends: the Sunni Fahd – mama Hissa’s grandchild – and the Shia 
Sadiq. 
Although she is an illiterate woman, mama Hissa possesses a deep wisdom 
rooted in the cosmopolitan history of the country. Hissa’s popular religiosity is 
part and parcel of the national culture and permeates the education she conveys 
to the children of the neighbourhood through proverbs and the ritual of story-
telling. Another distinctive aspect of this microcosm is the presence of inhabit-
ants of foreign origin, who are represented as an inner component of the social 
texture.  
Next to this image stands that of al-Surra as a district of Kuwait City, a space 
undergoing important transformations that affect the whole capital during a 
time span of forty years that goes from the end of the Iran-Iraq War to the imag-
inary civil war that takes place in 2020. This historical-dystopian temporality is 
associated with the characters of the Sunni Salih and the Shia ‘Abbas, fathers of 
Fahd and Sadiq, respectively. Through their contrasted relationship, they bring 
into al-Surra the ‘fire’ of religious sectarianism which undermines the unity of 
the three friends and, by extension, the unity of the nation. 
The novel consists of four parts, each of them bearing the name of a mouse: 
sharar (spark), laza (flame), jamar (ember) and ramad (ashes). The sequence of 
these names conveys the allegorical sense of the story as the development of a 
fire that reduces the country to ashes. The spread of sectarian discourse, how-
ever, is actively contrasted by mamma Hissa and, once she passes away, by the 
protagonist. The most faithful heir of Hissa’s cultural legacy, the hero becomes 
a writer of short stories for children and convinces Fahd, Sadiq and some other 
friends to establish Awlad Fu’ada. The purpose of this organisation, which 
stands as a microcosm of the nation, is to fight the plague of sectarian discourse 
through a radio, a website and a Twitter account. As a means of resisting the 
lacerating forces of religious sectarianism, the protagonist also writes an auto-
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biographical novel whose title, Irth al-nar (The inheritance of fire), refers to the 
long-lasting effects produced by sectarian discourse. This text is incorporated in 
Fi’ran Ummi Hissa as a novel within the novel, and its editorial trajectory inter-
sects with that of the work by al-San‘usi. While writing his book, the hero is 
pressured by his Lebanese publisher to cut some chapters in order to avoid 
censorship. This is a fictional anticipation of the actual fate of Fi’ran Ummi 
Hissa whose sale is still forbidden in Kuwait at the time of writing. The fate of al-
San‘usi’s novel echoes the work’s thematic concern with the collapse of the 
nation and testifies how the inscription of Islam within the national paradigm is 
being increasingly disputed. 
Conclusions 
As one of the most distinctive expressions of modernity in the Arab world, the 
novel constitutes a meaningful locus to study the way Islam has been reconfig-
ured in relationship to some of the major intellectual changes that have swept 
over the Arab territories during the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. 
The study of Islam as an intrinsic narrative element of the novel genre does not 
entail describing the novels under scrutiny as Islamic, or overemphasising the 
religious dimension of the texts. In the three novels that have been examined, 
Islam permeates the national paradigm in several ways: as a distinctive trait of 
the new imagined community, as a pervasive presence of a residual social-
cultural entity, or as a threat to the very existence of the nation. 
These interconnections with nationalism have been qualified as “synchronic” 
insofar as they can be traced back to a constitutive and structural dimension of 
the Arabic novel. The comparative analysis of ‘Awdat al-ruh and Zuqaq al-
midaqq, however, has highlighted the importance of the diachronic develop-
ment of territorial nationalism as well as the structural transformations that 
have occurred within the very form of the novel. Finally, the analysis of Fi’ran 
Ummi Hissa shows how different novelistic traditions are shaped by local dy-
namics and the specific historical experiences of different Arab territories. In the 
case of the young generation of Kuwaiti writers, the novel has become a bul-
wark of the nation against the divisive drive of religious sectarianism, but also a 
tool to renegotiate the national space. 
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‘Reconciliation’ Problems in Post-War 
Sri Lanka 
The Anti-Muslim Movement and Ulema Council Responses 
Abstract: This chapter deals with Sri Lanka’s Muslim council of theologians – 
the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema (ACJU) – and their response to Sri Lanka’s anti-
Muslim movement. The anti-Muslim movement emerged after the end of Sri 
Lanka’s ethnic war and flourished when Sri Lanka was exploring post-war re-
conciliation measures. The ACJU responded to the anti-Muslim movement using 
the language of the reconciliation process. Analysing the manner in which the 
ACJU responded to challenges faced by the Muslim community in Sri Lanka 
during the past decade, this chapter will argue that given the attacks that the 
anti-Muslim movement is mounting on Muslims’ religious and cultural life, Sri 
Lankan Muslims require a less vulnerable institution to provide leadership 
when engaging with religious others. The anti-Muslim movement’s undermin-
ing of ACJU’s authority limits their ability to intervene. This moment also expos-
es weaknesses of the ACJU approach to reconciliation and offers an opportunity 
for the emergence of an alternative leadership. 
Introduction 
The All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema (ACJU) – or the Council of Theologians – in Sri 
Lanka claim to be the spiritual guides of Sri Lanka’s two million strong Muslim 
population.1 During the past several decades when Sri Lanka was buffeted by a 
protracted civil conflict destroying thousands of lives, the Islamic reform 
movement transformed Sri Lanka’s Muslim communities’ religious practice. The 
ACJU expanded its activities and its stature among the Muslim population of Sri 
Lanka during this time. The organisation became a significant community insti-
tution, organising the Ulema across the country, providing halal certification to 
businesses for a fee, and operation of a Maktab school system that provided 
religious instruction to children after school every day of the week. The civil war 
ended in 2009 with great devastation in the northern and eastern provinces and 
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thousands of civilian casualties. In the aftermath of the civil war a strong anti-
Muslim movement has grown and established itself in Sri Lanka. The identity of 
Muslims in Sri Lanka is currently under threat as all assertions of an exclusivist 
piety seem to trigger violence and hate. The ACJUs ascendency as the vanguard 
of reformist Islam has thereby been undermined. 
In 2015 the government instituted a post-war ‘reconciliation process’ jointly 
proposed at the UN Human Rights Council by Sri Lanka and the United States.2 
The reconciliation process targeted the war and recovery in the aftermath. The 
‘reconciliation’ work mainly targeting Sinhala and Tamil communities, was 
carried out in a context where a virulent anti-Muslim movement was raging on 
social media with sporadic outbreaks of violence against local Muslim groups. 
The government’s post-war reconciliation work did not prioritise either the Mus-
lims affected by the war or the more recent anti-Muslim movement. The crisis 
brought about by the actions of this movement has compelled Muslim groups to 
respond. The ‘reconciliation’ and ‘coexistence’ language, generated by the gov-
ernment’s transitional justice process, have served as an entry point for a re-
sponse. 
The ACJU, modelling itself as leaders of Sri Lanka’s Muslims, has used the 
discourse generated by the government’s reconciliation programmes to re-
spond to the anti-Muslim movement. This chapter will examine the ACJU’s 
history of addressing conflict among Muslims, managing relations with non-
Muslim entities and comment on the limitations of their location in carrying out 
‘reconciliation/coexistence initiatives’ on behalf of Sri Lanka’s Muslim popula-
tion under the conditions of the anti-Muslim movement. Politics in Sri Lanka 
shifted substantially with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired 
bombings on Easter Sunday 2019. The discourse on politics in Sri Lanka shifted 
from one where good governance and reconciliation had currency to one that 
emphasised security alone. This chapter will argue that these difficult times 
signalled a substantial shift in how Muslims in Sri Lanka related to the world 
around them, and that the ACJU and – by extension – the reformists monopoly 
on being an ethical Muslim is currently under attack. This attack emerged not 
just from the strengthened and enabled anti-Muslim movement, but from mid-
dle class activist Muslims’ own despair and difficulty in coming to terms with 
the bombings. 
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was addressing its past through a human rights framework. 
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The ACJU’s declining popularity can be traced back to the emergence and 
impact of the anti-Muslim movement. However, their responses to the many 
crises faced by Muslims in recent years were framed in an idiom, devoted only 
to appeasing elements of the Muslim community and maintaining their own 
position as community leaders. Their approach, therefore has proven to be inade-
quate to address the challenges of a Muslim population under siege. Arguably, 
the bombings brought some finality to the ACJUs declining status. As the chap-
ter will discuss, however, there were several moments since the emergence of 
the anti-Muslim movement and a few years prior that were already indicative of 
the ACJU’s inability to give leadership to the Muslims’ current crises. 
The discussion of the ACJU’s community engagement in the chapter will be 
carried out through an analysis of three moments: the ACJU’s attempt to man-
age issues that emerged with reformist clashes, the response to the halal label-
ling crisis, and the ACJU’s handling of the reforms to the Muslim Marriage and 
Divorce Act. These will be discussed as emblematic of their imagining of a par-
ticular Muslim world. The chapter will propose that such a Muslim World – 
inadequately responsive to the requirements of a Muslim population living in a 
tensely plural polity – is no longer tenable in contemporary Sri Lanka. 
Transitional justice and ‘reconciliation’ in  
post-war Sri Lanka 
In 2009, Sri Lanka emerged from a brutal and debilitating three decades long 
conflict between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 
LTTE were a militant group claiming to represent the country’s minority Tamil 
population. The war was ended by a military operation that killed thousands of 
civilians. The transitional justice discourse did not emerge at the end of the war 
in 2009 but only after a change of regime in 2015. The government of Mahinda 
Rajapaksha, which ‘won’ the war in 2009, was defeated in both the 2015 presi-
dential and parliamentary elections. The 2015 elections brought to power the 
short lived Yahapalanaya or ‘good governance’ regime of Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremasinghe of the United National Party (UNP) and President Maithripala 
Sirisena of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). This regime was in turn defeat-
ed in 2019, bringing the Rajapaksha family back to power. During the period of 
Yahapalanaya rule Sri Lanka saw the difficult and often debilitating coexistence 
of two different political parties in parliament, but also an unprecedented time 
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of progressive change in governance and human rights in the country. The 
growth of reconciliation programmes in the country was one such development. 
In December 2015, the Yahapalanaya regime committed to a ‘reconciliation’ 
process supported by the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution 
30(1).3 The resolution committed the government to institute “a judicial mecha-
nism with a special counsel to investigate allegations of violations and abuses 
of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law”,4 as well as 
“a commission for truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence, an office of 
missing persons and an office for reparations”.5 
The government’s commitment to the UN process brought about many pro-
grammes by NGOs and ‘reconciliation’ initiatives flourished in the country. 
Further, there were government-mandated institutions like the Office of National 
Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) and the Ministry of National Integration carry-
ing out different programmes. With the support and endorsement of the state 
and NGOs, the language, if not the spirit, of reconciliation began to have cur-
rency throughout the country. Besides sanhindiyava, meaning reconciliation, 
the term ‘coexistence’, sahajeewanaya, was also used widely, especially by 
those working on Muslim issues. The country’s transitional justice discourse 
provided a language through which prevailing problems – not necessarily taken 
up by either the official mechanisms or the many NGOs and quasi-governmental 
institutions – could be addressed. 
The reconciliation programme of the Yahapalanaya government, that fol-
lowed from the defeat of the Rajapaksas, was carried out in the context of the 
bourgeoning anti-Muslim movement led by an organised group of Buddhist 
monks, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, the army of Buddhist power), and supported 
by Sinhala nationalist politicians. The reconciliation work and the discourse – 
while accepted and popular among the communities of the north and east that 
had been affected by the war – found little acceptance among the larger Sinhala 
Buddhist communities of the south. The Yahapalanaya regime did very little to 
make the need for reconciliation acceptable among Sinhala constituencies in 
the south. The political factions that were defeated in 2015 continued their anti-
minority incitement by supporting the anti-Muslim movement. An additional 
failure of the reconciliation project was practitioners’ inability to link anti-Tamil 
sentiment that led to the war, and the anti-Muslim movement that emerged in 
the aftermath of the war. While attempts were made to ‘heal wounds’, little was 
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done to change the structural preconditions that maintained the majoritarian 
character of state institutions.6 
In April 2019 local Islamic militant suicide bombers, inspired by ISIS, deto-
nated themselves in six locations — three of them churches and three of them 
five star hotels. Two hundred and fifty persons lost their lives and many hun-
dreds more were injured. After that, the prevailing discourse regarding security 
in the country – that was critical of the reconciliation programmes of the gov-
ernment – won out. ‘Reconciliation’ as a project was undermined and ‘security’ 
became the overwhelming requirement. Immediately after the bombings, the 
press in India and Sri Lanka revealed that the security apparatus and political 
leaders had intelligence about the bombings several days before the attacks but 
did not act on it. This revelation added to the already existing narrative that the 
Yahapalanaya government had neglected and even undermined the country’s 
security sector by focusing on alleged wartime human rights abuses. 
The current regime has abandoned the reconciliation discourse. The gov-
ernment publicly announced that it was withdrawing from the UNHRC resolu-
tion 30(1).7 President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election manifesto emphasised 
security and the president constantly references the fact that he was primarily 
voted in by the Sinhala Buddhist majority. Under the current presidency, minor-
ities are under pressure with both symbolic and actual preference for the per-
spectives and interests of the majority institutionalised by the regime. For the 
first time in the country’s independent history, there were no Muslim represent-
atives in the cabinet of ministers proposed after the presidential election, and 
only one (Ali Sabri, Minister of Justice) after the general election. The practice of 
singing the national anthem in the country’s two main languages at Independ-
ence celebrations was suspended and in 2020 it was sung only in Sinhala.8 To-
day the military presence in the Tamil speaking, formerly war affected North 
has increased substantially under the guise of the COVID lockdown. Check-
points have remerged as part of COVID measures, curiously only in the north of 
the country. New structures are undoing much that was achieved under the 
previous regime and most governmental and quasi-governmental institutions 
addressing reconciliation issues are being disbanded. 
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8 All India Radio News 2020. 
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Sinhala nationalism, ethnic relations and the 
legacy of the conflict 
Sri Lanka is home to four major ethno-religious communities. The majority of 
the population is Sinhala-Buddhist, with substantial Hindu, Muslim and Chris-
tian (mainly Catholic) minorities.9 Sri Lanka was engaged in a civil war from the 
late 1970s to 2009, in which the state engaged in a protracted struggle with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant organisation claiming to 
represent the Tamil minority fighting for a separate Tamil homeland in the 
north and east of the country. Sri Lanka’s Muslims are demographically dis-
persed throughout the island with significant concentrations in the western, 
southern central and eastern provinces. Since the 1980s, Muslim communities 
have been influenced by reformists such as Tablighi Jama’at, the Jamaathi 
Islami and Salafi/Tauheed groups.10 
Sri Lanka’s nationalist state project that emerged during colonial rule, and 
solidified with independence in 1948, eschewed the claims of minority ethnic 
Tamils for equal opportunities in education and language usage. The state then 
waged a 30-year long war against Tamil claims to sovereignty and nationhood 
in the Northeast of the country. While religious freedom is enshrined in the 
country’s constitution, it also provides Buddhism the ‘foremost place’. This 
language in the constitution permits a sense of entitlement for Buddhist organi-
sations. Buddhists monks and laypersons and allows for countless transgres-
sions against which the state uses almost no counter measures. Even when post 
war transitional justice and reconciliation projects were ongoing during the past 
five years, ‘religious’ tensions continued to be rife. 
The war in Sri Lanka ended with great brutality in 2009. The government of 
the time remains under investigation for war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty. Both state forces and the LTTE perpetrated violence against civilian popula-
tions during the final weeks of the conflict. The military control of formerly rebel 
held areas was total and civilian movement was limited. The civilian population 
of the region was interned pending security checks. Sections of the LTTE that 
surrendered to the military subsequently disappeared. LTTE leaders that sur-
rendered with white flags were allegedly shot down. The Sinhala speaking areas 
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Catholic, 0.015% Other Christian. See: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/page.asp?page=Popula
tion%20and%20Housing [no longer accessible]. 
10 See Haniffa 2008a, Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam 1997, 7–46. 
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were awash with celebratory rhetoric regarding the regime’s military victory and 
the bravery of the army who were presented as saviours of the Tamil people. The 
entire campaign was termed a ‘humanitarian operation’, manushika meheyuma, 
and the victory was touted as being without any unwarranted casualties. The 
regime mobilised the military victory as a way of ensuring the dynastic power of 
the ruling family, the Rajapaksas.11 
The new government that defeated the Rajapakshas in 2015 committed to 
setting up four institutions for reconciliation as mentioned above over a two-
year period. The ‘reconciliation’ discourse, however, functioned within a nar-
row ambit. It foregrounded, as it should, the groups of victims – the most affect-
ed persons – for redress. However, even in this targeting of the affected, more 
recent losses were prioritised over those that had been obsolete for a few dec-
ades. Therefore, the issues of Muslims affected by the conflict – mostly from the 
early 1990s – fell by the wayside. Additionally, the anti-Muslim movement, that 
emerged and continued to thrive with little state opposition in the aftermath of 
the war, featured only marginally in NGOs reconciliation programmes. Today, 
after the Easter Bombings and the violence against Muslim communities in the 
Northwest of the country, there are initiatives to also include issues related to 
Muslims. 
Muslims in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka’s two million strong Muslim population is 9% of the country’s, and 
are classified as both an ethnic and religious group. Muslims’ relationship to 
past violence from the conflict and the threat of recurring violence can be un-
derstood as twofold. The ideology of Tamil nationalism that undergirded the 
LTTE’s liberation struggle attempted to integrate the Muslim – fellow Tamil 
speakers –into their community of Tamil speaking peoples.12 Muslim leaders 
periodically resisted this idea, especially given that 70% of Sri Lankan Muslims 
lived outside the Tamil speaking areas of the North and East. Therefore, at one 
point, when some Muslims’ resistance translated not just to a refusal of the 
LTTE ideology but to cooperation with the military, the LTTE expelled all Mus-
lims from the northern province. They also carried out several violent attacks 
|| 
11 The president Mahinda Rajapaksha had made his brother defence secretary, another broth-
er ran the IDP rehabilitation programmes in the north, the speaker in parliament was yet an-
other sibling, and the president’s son was a parliamentarian. 
12 McGilvray and Raheem 2007. 
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against Muslim communities in the East.13 The year 1990 is considered pivotal in 
terms of the acts of violence perpetrated by the LTTE against the Muslims and 
the state’s failure to prevent the occurrence of such violence. The transitional 
justice mechanisms proposed by the state mainly addresses the horror of the 
final months of the war. They have not prioritised acknowledging or providing 
justice to affected Muslims and have provided little space for the inclusion of 
Muslim experiences.14 
As mentioned above, the end of the war saw the emergence of the anti-
Muslim movement in Sri Lanka. The BBS spearheaded the movement country-
wide in the Sinhala speaking areas, through large-scale public meetings, mobi-
lising temple networks and on social media.15 In June 2014 there was an attack 
against Muslims in villages along the country’s southern coast, in Aluthgama 
Beruwela and Welipenna. Several billion rupees worth of property owned by 
Muslims in the area were looted and burnt, and three people lost their lives. 
Government support and collusion in the violence was evident.16 The Ra-
japaksha regime’s commitment to a new project inciting ethno-religious ani-
mosities, in the aftermath of the war victory, became evident. Politics based on 
such incitement have been standard fare in the Sri Lankan electoral system 
since before independence from the British. A decade of anti-Tamil violence – 
similar to the violence that Muslims are facing today but with far greater target-
ing of lives – preceded the break out of war in the 1980s.17 The defeat of the 
Rajapaksas in 2015, assisted by widespread Muslim support for the opponent, 
seemed to augur an end to that brief but intense period of anti-Muslim mobilisa-
tion. However, the occurrence of further events of violence in Galle in 2017 and 
in Amapara and Kandy in 2018 meant that the structural preconditions that 
made violence a possibility, and lackadaisical state response to such violence 
an inevitability, were still in place. It also indicated the extent to which anti-
Muslim sentiment had become normalised within a few years. 
In the aftermath of the ISIS-inspired bombings in April 2019 everything 
changed. The Rajapaksas were able to legitimately claim that their agenda of 
nationalism and security was an urgent necessity. There were attacks against 
Muslims in May 2019 in the north-eastern districts of Kurunegala and Halawa-
tha in a pattern that is now familiar. And as this chapter emphasises, the Ra-
|| 
13 Hasbullah 2001. Also see Haniffa 2011, 49–62. 
14 Mihlar 2018. 
15 See Haniffa 2016a, Holt 2016, Nuhman 2016. 
16 See Haniffa 2016b. 
17 Manor 1984. 
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japaksa family is back in power and their Sinhala supremacist politics are now 
state policy. 
Recent analyses describe the Easter Sunday 2019 events as emerging from 
and as an inevitable outgrowth of the ‘Wahabi’ infiltration of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim population.18 Some writers emphasise the diversity within the Muslim 
population and warn against using the terrorist label on all Muslims. However, 
all commentators seem committed to the narrative of Muslims’ now decades-old 
transformation through religious reformism19 as the necessary contextual de-
terminant of ‘radicalisation’.20 
The All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema 
The ACJU website claims that the organisation was founded in 1926, while M.M. 
Mahroof, a scholar exploring the history of the Ulema in Ceylon and Sri Lanka. 
dates the initiative to organise the Ulema to 1945.21 The ACJU was officially 
recognised by the state in 2000 by an act of parliament. While initially the 
membership consisted of Ulema located in and around the city of Colombo, 
later the organisation incorporated Ulema from other regions, and now it is an 
umbrella group with branches in all districts in the country. Currently they 
boast 134 branches throughout the country and 5000 members. The head office 
consists of 15 committees that are run by members of the ACJU together with a 
few professionals and many volunteers. In addition to the community level 
interventions, the ACJU has also been periodically consulted and mobilised by 
the state as a representative institution of Muslims. The ACJU spoke in support 
of the government delegation to the UNHRC sessions in 2011 when the regime 
was pressured to investigate war crimes allegations.22 Currently, in the after-
math of the Easter bombings, the government is in conversation with the Ulema 
concerning ‘deradicalisation’.23 The ACJU has also been a representative body in 
meetings with the UN and bilateral and multilateral donors. 
|| 
18 Gunasingham 2019, 8–13. 
19 See Haniffa 2008a, Nuhman 2007, Mihlar 2016, and Faslan and Wanniasinkam 2015. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mahroof 1995, 25–50. 
22 See ACJU website: https://acju.lk/en/. 
23 Interview with ACJU at head office, January 2020. 
238 | Farzana Haniffa 
  
ACJU and reconciliation 
As stated earlier, the language of the transitional justice discourse, and espe-
cially its least controversial terminology of coexistence and reconciliation, has 
become thoroughly integrated into the Sri Lankan NGO and civil society lan-
guage. Substantial amounts of money were spent on the government pro-
gramme, and also for NGO programmes that support the process. The ACJU uses 
the term ‘reconciliation’ as a matter of course in all of its statements on Muslims 
and their dealings with ‘religious others’. This work included producing a series 
of publications in the Sinhala language addressing the racist assertions of the 
anti-Muslim movement. The ACJU also issued a statement on coexistence that 
offers an analysis of the current problems and provides the country’s Muslim 
population with instructions on how to maintain coexistence.24 The ACJU proc-
lamation is entitled Declaration (...) Regarding Coexistence among the Communi-
ties of Sri Lanka.25 In making this declaration the ACJU draws from the examples 
of the prophet and the Sahabas and the manner in which they treated the mi-
norities under Muslim rulers.26 In an interview in January 2020, ACJU represent-
atives stated, that they engaged in reconciliation activities through carrying out 
welfare work with low income multi-religious communities. 
However, as already stated, the reconciliation discourse was constantly un-
dermined by the Yahapalanaya government’s political opponents and its popu-
larity in the South was not uniform. Additionally, the fact that the anti-Muslim 
movements’ main target is Muslims’ too obvious religiosity, the ACJU as repre-
sentatives of the religious leadership are constantly under attack. 
|| 
24 ACJU 2016. 
25 The document lists activities that Muslims should engage in to ensure coexistence. In 
listing such activities the ACJU document mirrors the accusations of the anti-Muslim move-
ment. While the ACJU can perhaps be commended for being reflexive regarding Muslims’ own 
way of life, the uncritical acceptance of the terms of the anti-Muslim movement are troubling 
and require further analysis. ACJU 2016, 9. 
26 Examples of court rulings among the early Muslim community with evidence of fair treat-
ment of religious others in litigation, the case of early Muslim leaders providing sustenance for 
the weak, etc., were cited. All of the examples quoted were about the benevolence of Muslims 
when in a position of power over minority communities under their rule. The fact that in Sri 
Lanka Muslims functioned as a minority, affected by two sets of majoritarian ideals, did not 
inform the declaration. 
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ACJU attempts at mitigating conflict among 
Muslim piety groups 
One of the most significant interventions of the ACJU in recent years was its 
attempt to pull together the differently affiliated Muslim piety groups under one 
coordinating body to minimised the conflict among such groups in the country 
due to their respective da’wa projects (to bring ‘straying’ Muslims back to the 
fold). This section illustrates an intervention by the ACJU that was brought 
about in a context where its authority was not under attack. 
During the conflict years, reformist groups experienced great success and 
were able to substantially transform the country’s Muslims’ relationship to prac-
tice. During the more than 30 years of the war, when the reformists flourished, 
violence often broke out among different groups who would demonise one an-
other as part of their propagation strategies. The most significant of the disa-
greements have been documented as being between the Salafis and Tarika 
groups.27 However, the Muslim religious field in Sri Lanka involved not just 
Salafi and Tarika groups, but the Tabligh Jamaat, and the Jamaathi Islami, and 
more recently as documented by Rasiah,28 newly formed Shia groups as well. 
The majority representation in the ACJU is from the Tabligh Jamaath, and the 
Tabligh networks are arguably the most widespread and influential among 
Muslim communities across the country. The Jamathi Islami has significant 
influence in particular communities. The Tauheed Jamaat, a Salafi group, is 
smaller but has mobilised urban working class communities and is vocal and 
public in its interventions.29 The ‘Sunnat Jama’at’ is an umbrella term used to 
refer to members of different Tarika groups that are relatively well organised. 
The reformists of all hues have historically carried out their particular da’wa 
activities by positioning themselves as different from the Tarika affiliated 
groups and through denigrating beliefs and practices of such groups as shirk 
(engaging in idolatry) and bidat (unsanctioned innovations). 
In 2009, there was an incident in the town of Beruwela along the island’s 
southern coast. The South of Sri Lanka has been the centre of the Muslim elite 
|| 
27 The term ‘Tarika group’ is one that is commonly used among the middle class Muslims in 
Sri Lanka to refer to those who are members of Sufi Tarikas. These groups identify as members 
of the All Ceylon Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ath. See Spencer et al. 2015. 
28 Rasiah 2020. 
29 Their public interventions are somewhat muted in the aftermath of the Easter Bombings 
since they have been identified as the ‘Sunnat Jama’at’. 
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and the concentration of Muslim economic, social and political power. It is a 
place where the Muslims pride themselves on having been entrenched since the 
first Arab settlers of the 6th century and where Tarikas have long antecedents. 
There is also a concentration of Muslim gemstone trading wealth in Beruwela. 
The gemstone trade, for which Sri Lanka is internationally renowned, was a 
Muslim monopoly since the time of the British colonial administration. Alt-
hough that has now shifted, a considerable percentage of the trade continues to 
be in Muslim hands located to a large extent in the village of Beruwela. 
An altercation occurred between the congregation of a Tauheed Jamaat 
mosque established in 2002, called the Masjidul Rahuman, and members of the 
Alaviya Tarika. The Alaviya Tarika had their annual feast at the Beruwela 
Ketchimalai mosque with the participation of a crowd of close to 80,000 people. 
The next day, on July 24, 2009, the Quadiriya Tarika, organised around the 
Buhari mosque across the road from the Masjidul Rahman, were to have their 
kanduri (feast). The Masjidul Rahman Jumma sermon that day stated that the 
feasting, carried out by the Alaviya Tarika and planned by the Quadiriya Tarika, 
was not permitted in Islam and those carrying them out were kafirs (nonbeliev-
ers). The Masjdul Rahman was attacked by a large crowd that same day and it 
resulted in the death of two persons. The event sent shock waves across Muslim 
communities in the south of Sri Lanka. 
Such altercations between Tarika and Tauheed groups had been previously 
reported from the war-affected eastern province. The Tariqathul Mufliheen (TM) 
had been excommunicated by the ACJU in 1989 on the basis that their beliefs 
were ‘un-Islamic’.30 The group took the ACJU to court, and in 1996 the ACJU 
withdrew the fatwa that declared them murthads (apostates from Islam) and 
deemed the proclamation as not having been made. In 2004, and later in 2007, 
there was widespread violence in the town of Kattankudi against the group by 
groups known as ‘Tauheed’. An added indicator of the bad relations in the 
community was the distribution of handbills prohibiting the “Muslim” people in 
the village from having any social or economic relations with the ‘murthads’.31 
In December 2006 and January 2007, the newspaper The Sunday Leader 
reported that, in the aftermath of the revocation of the Fatwa in 1996, the mem-
bers of the TM were denied the registration of births and were prevented from 
burying their dead in Kattankudi. There were two incidents reported where the 
leader of the group and a follower, who were buried in Kattankudi, were ex-
|| 
30 Handunnetti and Wamanan 2007. 
31 ACJU 2006. The distribution of the handbill occurred in the aftermath of the incidents of 
December 19, 2006. 
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humed by the Tauheed group, and in the case of Payilwan (the leader), his body 
was burnt and buried elsewhere.32 The ACJU did not intervene to manage the 
conflict. In fact, an ACJU representatives had stated to newspapers that the 
ideas of Abdulla Payilwan, the head of the Tarika group, were ‘un-Islamic’.33 
The Eastern Province is far away from the political and social centres of Colom-
bo, and Kandy in the Western and Central Provinces. It was also a time when 
the war was being fought in the area. The political and economic power that 
was wielded in a southern town like Beruwela was not comparable to the dis-
tant and war-torn Eastern town. 
The violence in Beruwela, happening two and a half years after the last in-
cidents in the East, was indicative of a trend that required intervention and 
management. Additionally, internal Muslim community altercations were al-
ready being written about in terms of the global discourse of a Wahhabi inva-
sion threatening terrorist violence.34 
The Declaration of Unity 
In 2009, in response to the violence in Beruwela, the ACJU organised a structure 
under their leadership that would work to resolve differences between the many 
Muslim groups. It was the first time since the advent of such different groups 
that an attempt was made to bridge differences and to acknowledge their exist-
ence as something positive, and as having antecedents in Islamic history. The 
ACJU published a document entitled The Declaration of Unity, in which it stated 
its position on unity among the various Muslim groups, listed the groups that 
had joined together, and outlined the principles on the basis of which an ad-
justment of differences were made.35 
Asserting that “our Imams as well as Islamic Scholars have given us ample 
guidance on how to act during disagreements”, the statement calls attention to 
the fact that “prominent Ulema who represent Tarikas, All Ceylon Tabligh Ja-
ma’ath, Jamathi’ Islami together with other Thowheed institutions will be the 
members of this council”.36 The council was to be called “The Council of Coop-
|| 
32 The incident was aired repeatedly in the press as indicative of the spread of Wahhabism 
among Muslim communities in the East and its terrifying consequences. 
33 Handunnetti and Wamanan 2007. 
34 Haniffa 2008b. 
35 ACJU n.d., 2. 
36 Ibid. 
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eration and Coordination”. The document also references the fact that the vari-
ous Tarikas, as well as the Daa’wa organisations, have a long history in the 
country and have always worked for the “spiritual fortification of the communi-
ty”. The document stated: 
Although few minor disagreements do exist over different views and interpretations 
among these factions, their overall objectives had been identical and hitherto, there were 
no serious conflicts among them that could impede the general accord of the Muslim 
community.37 
The document further stated that 
[d]uring several sittings the council agreed that it is of paramount importance to reestab-
lish the unity of the Umma” and established “certain guidelines” so that “no similar un-
pleasant incidents occur in the name of the religion in the country.38 
The importance of the manner in which differences are incorporated into a 
common Islamic heritage cannot be emphasised enough. In the 1990s, when the 
reformist ideologies were being consolidated among Sri Lanka’s Muslim com-
munities, substantive damage was wrought on middle class’ kin networks 
through the different da’wa groups’ insistence on different realms of practice. 
The recognition of the possibility of difference, which informed the bedrock of 
the faith here, is a significant shift. However, as many subsequent develop-
ments indicated, the shift required much greater engagement to provide tangi-
ble results. 
This assertion of equanimity was also a fundamentally male exercise, the 
rhetoric regarding tolerance of different ideas and approaches was not trans-
posed to address issues that emerged with regards to women (more on this be-
low). The agreement also further consolidated the leadership and authority of 
|| 
37 ACJU n.d., 2. Their lack of reference to the violence in the East is disingenuous and must be 
recognised as such. 
38 ACJU n.d., 3. The justification that the ACJU produces for the inclusion of the various groups 
draws from what they claim are accepted Islamic principles. For instance, the Declaration of 
Unity states that the Imams, and Sahabas too, had differing opinions and that there were “four 
main reasons” for such differences. These are differing views on the authenticating Hadith 
narrations, the differences of views in Hadith narrations that are considered authentic, linguis-
tic ambiguities, and the different criteria for establishing laws. The declaration also states that 
therefore these differences should be treated as blessings of the Almighty and it should be 
further understood that each of them are just “practical, logical, natural, as well as unavoida-
ble in their own rights” (ibid.). The acceptance of this position is of central importance to the 
management of theological differences in the future. 
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the ACJU. While the composition of the council is said to be made up of mem-
bers from all organisations, the leadership is held by Sheikh Agar Mohamed, the 
long serving deputy head of the ACJU. The statement is presented by the ACJU 
and the signatories are Sheikh Rizwi Mufthi, the head of the ACJU, and Sheikh 
Agar Mohamed. The names of representatives of other groups are not included. 
There are still groups – like the Tauheed Jamaat, for instance – that are left 
out of the ACJU’s council, and who question their legitimacy. 39 After the advent 
of the anti-Muslim movement in 2013 the Tarika groups found a new champion. 
They branded themselves the ‘traditional’ sampradayaka Muslims of the coun-
try, following the rhetoric of the BBS monks. They call themselves the Muslims 
of Sri Lanka who have resisted ‘Arabisation’ and who were in fact victimised by 
the anthavadi (extremist) Muslims.40 They in turn have provided the Ven. 
Galabodaththe Gnanasara with language through which to depict non-Tarika 
groups as ‘extremist’.41 Representatives of the Tarikas have appeared before 
commissions investigating the April bombings and have given evidence regard-
ing Muslim ‘extremist’ excesses. 
Resolution of the halal issue 
Anti-Muslim messaging began to increase across social media in 2010 and 2011, 
and the monk-led Bodu bala Sena (BBS) organisation emerged as the move-
ment’s public face in 2012.42 The BBS’ first countrywide campaign in early 2013 
was against the ACJU’s halal certification programme. Halal certification be-
|| 
39 Faslan and Wanniasinkam 2015. 
40 Quotation marks indicate the prevalence of these terms in the language used by known 
anti-Muslim activists. 
41 Haniffa 2019a, 2019c. 
42 As a result of the groups’ emergence, messages criticising Muslim women’s dress practices 
as ‘Arabisation’; halal meat production as inhumane; halal-labelling practices as illegitimate 
and as exploitative of non-Muslim consumers, became widespread. Additionally, rhetoric 
regarding the ‘backwardness’ of Muslim women, Muslims’ businesses as deliberately under-
mining Sinhala ventures, Muslims’ tendencies to buy up land and ’colonise’ neighbourhoods, 
and a Muslim conspiracy to procreate and become the majority population in the country, 
attained the status of fact throughout the island. The movement’s initial method of dissemina-
tion was to hold large-scale public meetings using the trappings of Buddhist ritual gatherings. 
The meeting rhetoric was supported by a media campaign that mirrored the same language. 
Today, the hate rhetoric has become part of common-sense knowledge and Sinhala Buddhist 
groups have been mobilised for violence against Muslims quite frequently. 
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came a requirement when multi-national food companies arrived in Sri Lanka, 
and Sri Lankan companies began to export consumer goods to Southeast Asian 
and Middle Eastern markets.43 The BBS accused the ACJU of implementing a 
‘Muslim extremist’ plan through the halal certification process. 
The ACJU involvement with halal certification began in 1999, and the first 
certification was granted in 2000 to two companies providing poultry products. 
The ACJU engaged professionals in food science, agriculture and chemistry, 
prior to beginning to certify food-processing establishments in 2004. In a bid for 
greater professionalisation, ACJU representatives visited halal certification bod-
ies in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Africa in 2005. There had been 
an institution issuing certifications prior to the ACJU, but with the increasing 
influence of reformism and Muslims’ preoccupation with authenticity and au-
thentication44 the ACJU, as a more authoritative entity with ‘gatekeeper’ aspira-
tions, was considered to be best suited by sections of the Muslim community 
(and endorsed by the political leadership). 
The chief ideologue of the anti-halal campaign, the Ven. Gnanasara, stated 
that halal was a process of sanctifying goods for the worship of Allah, and that 
these goods were then given to Buddhist monks in temples. He claimed that 
non-Muslims were being forced to consume halal-labelled goods and to pay for 
a process that they did not require. He argued further, that the ACJU was insist-
ing on having access to secret product recipes prior to providing certification, 
and thereby forcing Sinhala businesses to reveal trade secrets. The ACJU was 
also accused of controlling the market by asking Muslim consumers not to use 
uncertified products. He argued further, that the money raised through halal 
was funding jihadist violence.45 
Ultimately the issue became identified as one about the legal basis for 
ACJU’s certification process and critiqued for not abiding by prevailing market 
logic. In 2006, the ACJU attempted to acquire state recognition as the only legal-
ly entitled body for providing certifications. According to the government’s 
commitment to market principles, however, the state could not endorse a mo-
nopoly even for the provision of religious authentication. 
|| 
43 Field work in Sri Lanka in 2013. This is also documented in my essay of 2017 (Haniffa 2017). 
44 Deeb 2006. 
45 While the BBS focus was on the certification process, other commentators also discussed 
the issue of halal slaughter and the meat industry. This issue, however, was not foremost in the 
discussion regarding the halal certification process. For a fuller discussion of the halal crisis, 
see Haniffa 2017. 
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When the halal controversy erupted in early 2013, there was no directive on 
halal by the Consumer Affairs Authority, or any other government body. The 
ACJU was accused – by the then-leader of the opposition, among others – of 
having no legal basis to provide certification. The opposition leader echoed 
sentiments that were widely expressed in both traditional and social media: 
halal was said to be ‘immoral’, ‘illegal’ and an ‘unethical trade practice’.46 The 
ACJU’s claim that it was issuing certification on the basis of its religious authori-
ty, and the endorsement they received for their processes from international 
halal certification bodies, was considered inadequate without state authorisa-
tion. 
The ACJU failed to control the narrative regarding Halal in any way. Their 
usual means, the pulpit, backed up by the formidable organisational strength of 
their mosque network, could not meet the challenge first posed by the BBS and 
later by proponents of the market logic. Initially no media outlet would give 
them time to tell their side of the story. They could not even buy space. Then, 
when they did have time, their assertions of authority as members of the Ulema 
council had little purchase on the Sinhala media. Their lack of experience in 
speaking with anyone who was not a Muslim and who did not question their 
authority, was immediately apparent. Their attempt to claim that they were not 
carrying out halal certification for profit but as a service to the community was 
dismissed. In February 2013, the ACJU attempted to offer the government own-
ership of the halal certification process. The ACJU, as mentioned earlier, had 
good relations with the regime in power, but those relationships were not ade-
quate to withstand the momentum generated by the anti-Muslim movement’s 
campaign. The government refused to entertain the ACJU’s request. The state 
appointed a Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the issue, but the 
mandate of the committee was framed in the logic of the anti-Muslim move-
ment. Its objective was to investigate “whether locally- or internationally-
funded religious extremism had infiltrated Sri Lankan society.”47 
In order to diffuse prevailing tensions and to preserve the halal certification 
process the loosely organised Muslim Business Council came together with the 
Chamber of Commerce and formulated a transition plan. The main aim of the 
initiative was to preserve certification for export purposes, as required by the Sri 
Lankan economy, and erase any gratuitous religious signage linked to the pro-
cess. Halal labelling on consumer goods was suspended, giving in to the anti-
Muslim movement’s call. The ACJU was to give up the halal certification to an 
|| 
46 Documented in Haniffa 2017. 
47 Khabar South Asia 2013. See also Thirupathy and Nathaniel 2013. 
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independent company. Until the setting up of the company, halal certification 
was provided at no cost for export purposes. The Halal Accreditation Council 
(HAC) was registered according to the Companies Act and branded itself as a 
‘market responsive’ and a ‘market friendly’ institution. The halal label was 
changed from the mosque and Arabic lettering, used by the ACJU, to the initials 
HAC, the Halal Accreditation Council. Muslim consumers could check certifica-
tion through a website and there was an app they could download.48 
The ACJU’s inability to adequately represent the perspective of the country’s 
Muslim population during conflicts with religious others was laid bare with the 
halal crisis. Given that they were running a fee levying enterprise in monitoring 
and providing halal certification, it was possible for commentators to critique 
them in keeping with a notion of ‘market ethics’ and deemphasise their role as 
religious leaders. Additionally, the anti-Muslim racism prevailing in the country 
provided licence for the media as well as for politicians to show no respect to 
ACJU members’ identity as religious leaders. The ACJU seemed surprised by this 
reaction and unable to navigate the dismissal of their authority. The Muslim 
Business Council’s intervention indicated that the larger Muslim community, 
too, would work to limit the role that the ACJU should play in the future. 
Reforms to the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 
(MMDA) of 1951 
Another arena in which the ACJU has made its presence felt has been the debate 
on reforms to the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA). A committee ap-
pointed by the Ministry of Justice in 2009 under Justice Saleem Marsoof was 
mandated with producing a report with suggestions to amend the current 
MMDA (1951)49 Unfortunately, the report released in 2018 (after nine years of 
deliberations) was a split report, with the group led by the Ulema objecting to 
some key recommendations made in the main report. Permitting women to 
become quazis (judges), specifying the age of marriage to 18 years in keeping 
with the general law, removing the reference to ‘sect’ and thereby rendering a 
particular Madhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence) that a person belongs to as 
irrelevant in the application of the MMDA, are some of the provisions that the 
ACJU is rejecting. 
|| 
48 Interview with Ali Fatharali of the HAC. 
49 See Hamin and Cegu Issadeen 2016.  
 ‘Reconciliation’ Problems in Post-War Sri Lanka | 247 
  
Under the Yahapalanaya government, and in tandem with its reconciliation 
programme, the government instituted a committee to entertain public repre-
sentations on constitutional reform – The Public Representations Committee 
(PRC). Muslim women activists organised at the regional level and asked for 
either a reform or a repeal of the MMDA. 
In response to the activism around the PRC, and given the delays of the 
Marsoof committee, the government announced the appointment of a Cabinet 
Sub-Committee to make proposals to amend the MMDA of 1951.50 
In March 2017, the Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU) after sitting on the Marsoof 
committee since 2009, stated in a confidential submission to this subcommittee 
that the MMDA was perfect as it was and required no change. The statement 
contained justifications based on hadith for leaving the age of marriage unspeci-
fied and women barred from being quazis. It was leaked to the media and was 
published in the Colombo Telegraph. 
Justifying their opposition to the amendment that permits Muslim women 
too, to become quazis under the MMDA, the ACJU document states: 
With regards to the appointment of female quazis[,] the majority of the Ulema are of the 
opinion that there is no basis for this in the Shariah. 
It is not permissible for a woman to be appointed as a judge, and if she is appointed, the 
one who appointed her is sinning (…) her appointment is invalid and her judgements car-
ry no weight[,] no matter what ruling she passes. This is the view of the Malikis, Shafies 
and Hanbalis and some of the Hanafis. 
Rationale behind this view is based on Quran and Sunna which states: Men are the protec-
tors and maintainers of women (4:34), [m]en have a degree of responsibility over them 
(2:228), and Hadeeth says [that] no people will ever prosper who appoints a woman in 
charge of their affairs.51 
The statement further reads: 
The majority of the community will also not accept the appointment of female quazis due 
to practical reasoning. One should not consider this as injustice to women but rather as 
protection of the rights, [the] honor and [the] modesty of women. However[,] the appoint-
ments of females in the advisory board and also as members of the [j]ury is recommended. 
That would support the quazi court system in a valuable manner.52 
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50 Minister of Justice, Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe was quoted in the Daily News saying that “he 
was compelled to appoint the Cabinet Sub-Committee as the previous committee appointed in 
2009 to look into MMDA reforms had not submitted their report even after seven years of delib-
erations” (Imtiaz 2016). 
51 Colombo Telegraph 2017a. 
52 Ibid. 
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The ACJU had discussed its position in Friday jumma sermons utilising its for-
midable network across the country, and claimed to have the support of the 
wider community. However, there was strong opposition from fellow Muslims in 
the English press. It must be noted at this point that Sri Lanka already has many 
Muslim women magistrates, and one president’s council who is Deputy Solicitor 
general. The ACJU’s position on refusing women to adjudicate on matters of 
personal laws made little rational sense. 
In an unprecedented intervention Justice Marsoof, head of the Committee 
on recommending reforms, also came out strongly against the ACJU, and made 
a statement on his Facebook page that was subsequently published. He accused 
the ACJU of acting in bad faith and attempting to influence the committee. Ac-
cording to Justice Marsoof: 
Mufthi Rizwie and Mubarak Moulavi[,] both of ACJU[,] are members of the Committee 
chaired by me. According to news reports, a delegation of ACJU have gone around meet-
ing Muslim Members of Parliament and handed over various documents including work-
ing drafts prepared by me for consideration of the Committee under confidentiality.53 
He went on to say: 
Already Jumma sermons and signature campaigns have been conducted to object to any 
amendments to the MM&D Act on the purported basis that it is of divine origin, and some 
members of my Committee feel intimidated and may tow the ACJU line.54 
The Women’s Action Network (WAN) – that had given leadership to the activism 
around the PRC – also responded strongly to the ACJU statement. They released 
a statement entitled “Religious Leaders Cannot be Trusted to reform the MMDA” 
and urged the government to intervene to protect women’s rights.55 According to 
WAN: 
The ACJU’s extreme and rigid position on legal reform shows the regressive nature of their 
perspectives. WAN is of the firm belief that actors who are unable to win the trust and con-
fidence of [their] own community should be disqualified from serving on a Committee 
meant to usher in positive changes.56 
|| 
53 Colombo Telegraph 2017b. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Colombo Telegraph 2017bc 
56 Ibid. 
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They concluded by stating: “It is time for the State to act like the State and pro-
tect the rights of all Sri Lankans, including Muslim women and girls, from those 
who seek to allow injustice in the name of religion!”57 
It seemed as if the statement from the ACJU had pushed the WAN to ask for 
the state to intervene, overriding the concerns of the Ulema. In the wake of the 
ACJU submission, stating that the reforms were unnecessary, there was an out-
pouring of ‘angry’ articles criticising the ACJU and questioning their scholarly 
competence to decide legislation. 
In an article entitled “MMDA: Angry Civil Society Demand Radical Changes 
to the ACJU”, veteran Muslim journalist Latheef Farook stated the following: 
(T)he ultimate question has never been raised; what is the credibility of the ACJU and 
Rizvi Mufti? What are the criteria for scholarship to legislate in Islam, and do the members 
of the ACJU meet those criteria? Are they really scholars? As an intellectual body that is 
also granted the privilege to legislate, what knowledge does the ACJU have regarding law? 
Can a scholarly institution that refuses to acknowledge and accommodate female intellec-
tuals be trusted to demonstrate equality?58 
What the ACJU demonstrated through their concerted attempt to stall MMDA 
reforms can be explained in several ways. First, their lack of awareness as to the 
developments with regards to Muslim women’s participation in the labour force 
and, particularly, educated elite Muslim women’s presence in the legal profes-
sion as well as in professional and academic sectors was apparent in their in-
sistence on the limits of women’s leadership. 
The ACJU seemed to be wedded to a norm with regards to women’s behav-
iour that was propagated by reformist groups with little understanding of how 
to accommodate the many women who negotiated those norms on a daily basis. 
For instance, the strict segregation of spaces as male and female was insisted 
upon by most reformist groups and generally practiced in Muslim social spaces 
across class and region. However, such segregation was not possible in public 
spaces or in common work contexts, that Muslims shared with others. In the 
normative context of legislation, the ACJU found itself unable to shift the norms 
to be in line with general practice. Their inability to compromise or find a solu-
tion in the scripture, as they did in the case of conflicts between the reformists 
and the Tarikas caused much distress and confusion. Furthermore, the specta-
cle of religious Muslim men ‘oppressing’ Muslim women was a favourite trope of 
the anti-Muslim movement and the ACJU, and their supporters were emblematic 
|| 
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58 Farook 2017. 
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of this trope. Unfortunately and perhaps for good reason it was a position that 
Muslim women activists also amplified in their activism. 
With the release of the split report the MMDA reform process stalled. In the 
aftermath of the Easter Bombings talk emerged again to expedite the reform, 
partly as a process of bringing the Muslim community in to line. As I have doc-
umented elsewhere,59 the bombings were spun as entirely and solely being the 
fault of ‘extremism’ in the Muslim community, and as a direct consequence of 
reformist-led transformations. Muslims performance of religiosity was seen to 
be the problem, and there were calls to abolish the special status given to Mus-
lims by way of the MMDA. One country one law was the slogan under which the 
MMDA was to be either reformed or done away with. Today, the current authori-
tarian government that profits from the demonisation of Muslims has stated that 
it will reform the MMDA, despite opposition from the ACJU. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed three instances where the ACJU has attempted to 
provide leadership in the context of difficulties faced by the Sri Lankan Muslims 
who are a minority located in a tensely plural polity. The stories speak to the 
complexity of the circumstances Muslim communities in Sri Lanka are com-
pelled to navigate. The Sri Lankan state’s long history of anti-minority politics – 
the emergence of an organised anti-Muslim movement in the war’s aftermath 
and, more recently, the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019 – impact Muslim lives 
in various ways. The Muslim leadership is compelled to negotiate these influ-
ences on a daily basis. This is in addition to the linguistic, regional, class, sec-
tarian and political party divisions among the two million strong Muslim popu-
lation. The ACJU gained strength from the reformist movement that has been 
active in Sri Lanka for decades, but became visible through transformations of 
dress and other everyday practices among Muslim communities since the 1980s. 
This period –coinciding with the ethnic war in Sri Lanka – led to reformist in-
fluence and the ascendance of the ACJU in keeping with reformist ideology. 
After the end of the war in 2009, Sinhala nationalist groups were in search of a 
new enemy whom they could scapegoat for the many ills afflicting the country 
in general and the Sinhala Buddhist population in particular. Sri Lanka’s Mus-
lims, a minority, are being targeted, and specifically the changes embraced by 
|| 
59 See Haniffa 2019b. 
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Muslims as a result of reformism are now being discussed as leading to extrem-
ism. This chapter has argued that the ACJU is not capable of addressing the new 
challenges that the Muslims of Sri Lanka face, due to the following reasons. As a 
product of the reformist sensibility and ideology – as represented by the 
Tablighi Jamaat – the ACJU marginalised sections of the Muslim population that 
did not follow their line. In relation to reforms to the MMDA the ACJU – by 
adopting a position that is contrary to the requirements of most Muslims and a 
position that feeds anti-Muslim stereotypes – is proving itself to be lacking fore-
sight in the current context. Additionally, as religiosity is the main target of the 
anti-Muslim movement the ACJU, as a religious organisation, is not tactically 
equipped to address the challenges they pose. Therefore, regardless of the fact 
that they are one of the few organised institutions among the Muslim popula-
tion, their acceptance as community mediators is unfortunately dwindling. 
The dwindling acceptance of the ACJU has been recognised by many within 
the Muslim community, and there are organised groups that are moving forward 
with an agenda tailored to meet the many challenges that are emerging. The 
strident Sinhala nationalism, laced with hatred of Muslims, has state support. 
Since March 2020, the government has prohibited burials of COVID dead, there-
by severely distressing the Muslims. In addition, Sri Lanka faces an economic 
crisis with a looming balance of payments issue exacerbated by the pandemic. 
There is unrest throughout the country and militarisation is on the rise. Ad-
dressing the interests of Muslim communities in the midst of such challenges 
will be a task that will requires great organisation and vision. It will need the 
ACJU, but it will also need the mobilisation of all of the intellectual resources 
that the Muslim political and civil society leadership can muster without being 
constrained by the perspective, working requirements, and limitations of a sin-
gle organisation. 
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Claude C. Kempen 
“We Don’t Need to be Saved” 
An Investigation of My.Kali Magazine and its Related LGBTQIA+ 
Community in Amman, Jordan 
Abstract: This chapter investigates the positioning of Islam within the various 
debates and articles that appeared in the Jordanian LGBTQIA+ online magazine 
My.Kali. I will build on two statements taken from an interview with the maga-
zine’s founder, Khalid Abdel Hadi, published by Süddeutsche Zeitung: “Religion 
is not the problem” and “We don’t need to be saved”. This text will then add 
other voices from the magazine to his perspective and embed them within 
broader discussions around being Muslim, queer, and Arab. This will touch on 
ways Muslims are embracing their religiosity at the same time as their queer-
ness, as well as debunking the twin myths of the “Western queer paradise” and 
the “Muslim homophobe”. This also includes Muslim awareness of racism, 
Islamophobia, and heteronormativity in so-called Western countries. Juggling 
local and global activism, the concepts of queerness, histories, and languages 
makes visible the complex nature of Arab LGBTQIA+ communities. 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on two statements taken from a 2020 interview with Khalid 
Abdel Hadi, the founder of the Jordanian LGBTQIA+ online magazine My.Kali: 
“Religion is not the problem” and “We don’t need to be saved”.1 These state-
ments will serve as a frame to the wider discussions around being Muslim, 
queer, and Arab that are taking place at My.Kali. I will draw in particular on 
eight English-language2 articles published in My.Kali between 2013 and 2020 
that speak to Abdel Hadi’s interview. Some of them are based on personal 
|| 
I would like to thank Hinemoana Baker for her support and much appreciated input on this 
chapter. 
1 Abdel Hadi 2020, 2. Translated from German by Claude Kempen. The interview was original-
ly conducted in English and translated into German for Süddeutsche Zeitung. The original 
quotes were requested but not received by the time of this chapter’s publication. 
2 This chapter marks only the beginning of possible research around My.Kali magazine. Ex-
panded research could take the Arabic articles into account as well. 
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LGBTQIA+ experiences or memories, others are (self-)critical of the magazine’s 
work, and some discuss academic concepts such as Joseph Massad’s “Gay In-
ternational” or Jasbir K. Puar’s “Homonationalism”3 – concepts which will be 
discussed at length below. 
 
Fig. 1: My.Kali cover, featuring Rashed, no. 64 (Arabic version). With friendly permission by the 
editor: My.Kali 2018. 
Further, I will investigate how some of these individuals are embracing their 
religiosity at the same time as their queerness, debunking the twin myths of the 
“Western queer paradise” and the “Muslim homophobe”. The chosen articles 
also demonstrate a heightened awareness of racism, Islamophobia, and hetero-
|| 
3 See, for example, Nasser-Eddin and Abou-Assab 2018, Shadeedi 2018 or Hanna 2019.  
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normativity in so-called4 Western countries. This juggling of local and global 
activism, the concepts of queerness, histories, and languages makes visible the 
complex nature of Arab LGBTQIA+ communities. The question of positionality is 
omnipresent in the articles: Who are we addressing? Who are we as a communi-
ty? What knowledge do we draw on? How independent are we in making our 
own choices about the ways in which we are queer? I consider these questions 
inspirational and important for queers as well as non-queers, no matter their 
nationality or religiosity. 
I have an uneasy feeling writing this chapter. As a white,5 Franco-German 
queer I am personally involved with the topic, while also wanting to disrupt 
academic writing practice about the ‘Muslim Other’ that has been constructed 
as the opposite to a ‘Western Self’ since the end of the first millennium.6 The 
crusades, the military confrontations with the Ottoman Empire, European Impe-
rialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the more recent events since 9/11 have 
been further used to reproduce these religious demarcations of ‘Western-
Christian’ and ‘Eastern-Islamic’, marking one as ‘good’ and the other as ‘bad’.7 
The academic tradition of Orientalism has substantially contributed to this for-
mation of the ‘Other’, as Edward Said has very poignantly shown in his 1978 
book “Orientalism”. Orientalism is the “discipline by which the Orient was (and 
is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery and practice”.8 I 
powerfully believe in the need to interrupt this Orientalist tradition, while ac-
knowledging that it has inevitably left its mark on me, as powerful hegemonies 
do. My aim in this chapter is not to talk over or overwrite existing activist voices, 
but rather to try and amplify their discourses in this academic context.9 In this 
way, I hope to give an additional platform to diverse ideas around being Mus-
lim, Arab, and queer. 
|| 
4 I am using “so-called” here to remind myself and the reader of the constructedness of geo-
graphical references. Not only do ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ limit our thinking to unnecessary and 
prejudiced binaries, they are also inaccurate and create only seemingly logical entities. For an 
interesting discussion on the naturalisation of the Middle East see Culcasi 2010. 
5 When referring to a person, the term white is written in italics to deconstruct race as a natu-
ral category and to indicate the structural privileges that come with being white. 
6 Attia 2009, 71. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Said 2003 [1978], 73. For further reading, see Amir-Moazami 2018. 
9 Sarah Hamdan calls this practice “reconceptualizing agency and exposing colonialist/ 
secular discourses in the Arab world (...) located primarily in a Western geopolitical context.” 
Hamdan 2015, 69. 
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The My.Kali magazine is a bi-monthly online magazine founded in Amman 
in 2007 by then 17-year-old Khalid Abdel Hadi. Today, it has about 15,000 sub-
scribers and 100,000 website visitors per month.10 It tackles topics of gender 
and its (non-)binarity, sexualities, politics, and pop culture.11 Furthermore, it 
functions as an informant for policymakers, other activists, and media outlets.12 
The magazine promotes itself as an important platform for and from queers of 
the North African and West Asian region. Most users come from Algeria, Tuni-
sia, and – before the war – Syria. In countries where the magazine is blocked, 
i.e. Qatar, Jordan, and Gaza, users can access the content via social media.13 The 
staff at My.Kali is also very aware of the fact that some subscribers and users 
need to read and receive the articles and pictures privately via mail, rather than 
being able to follow the magazine’s activities on social media. Initially, English 
was the only language of the publication; this changed in 2015 when it was 
decided that Arabic should be added. The magazine has full-time employees, as 
well as guest writers, editors, stylists, photographers, and models. Most of them 
are locals with an Arab background, while the magazine is mostly open to in-
ternational contributions if the content is deemed relevant to the main reader-
ship. They form a close and discreet network in the city of Amman, working 
hard to maintain safety around the places and offices where they meet. Many 
friendships have formed around the magazine. 
Besides the underlying value of the reflections within the My.Kali communi-
ty, there is more to discover. In the first section of the text which follows, I 
demonstrate that by engaging with the religious Islamic tradition, Muslim 
queers make religion their support system. In Abdel Hadi’s words: “Religion is 
not the problem”. This statement, and the wider work that My.Kali does, togeth-
er disrupt ‘Western’ ideas that Islam is intolerant towards queerness, amplifying 
queer Muslim voices for those who need to hear them. In the second section, I 
will debunk the illusion of a ‘Western’ paradise that either serves as an example 
for queer Arabs and Muslims, or offers them refuge. Either way, religion and for 
the scope of this chapter Islam, is always part of their considerations, whether 
as part of a religious queering practice or through awareness of Islamophobia –
the latter because in ‘Western’ countries, Islam is ascribed to them regardless of 
their religiosity and they are most likely be stigmatised for it.14 
|| 
10 Abdel Hadi 2020, 1. 
11 Leach/My.Kali n.d. 
12 See, for example, Abdel Hadi 2017. 
13 Abdel Hadi 2020, 4. 
14 Keskinkilic 2019. 
 “We Don’t Need to be Saved” | 259 
  
 
Fig. 2: My.Kali Cover, featuring Khalid Abdel Hadi, first My.Kali issue. With friendly permission 
by the editor: My.Kali 2007. 
Islam is not the problem: Engaging religious 
tradition 
Yes, there are many people here that have suffered from attacks coming from religious 
camps. We are being told, though, that Islam is the problem. Religion is not the problem, 
there are many gays that are believing Muslims and Christians.16 
Abdel Hadi’s words mark an important counter-argument to an essentialist and 
orientalist notion that Islam and those who believe in it are inherently homo-
phobic. Jasbir K. Puar has very poignantly analysed the mechanisms of sexual 
|| 
16 Abdel Hadi 2020, 2. Translated from German by Claude Kempen. 
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othering in her 2007 book “Terrorist Assemblages – Homonationalism in Queer 
Times”. She points out that because of the assumption that homosexuality is 
naturally secular “gay- and lesbian-identified Muslims (...) [become] inconceiv-
able”.19 In ‘Western’ countries today, Islam thus seems to be identified as the 
opposite of homosexuality which becomes part of a “racializing technology” 
that marks Muslims as ‘Others’.20 It should be noted at this point that Christiani-
ty is less likely than Islam to be seen as a contradiction to homosexuality or 
queerness, precisely because a certain secularity and enlightened character is 
attributed or granted to it.21 Islam, however, is thought of as a monolith, as the 
most homophobic religion of all, more homophobic than the “white mainstream 
queer communities are racist”.22 This leads to “a collective vilification of Mus-
lims”.23 Non-Muslim gays and queers are integrated into the white patriotic pro-
ject, an ‘us vs them’, while also being constructed as victims of the homophobic 
‘Muslim Other’.24 In Puar’s analysis on the US, this in turn serves the nation 
state’s domestic and foreign interest, when the idea of gay rights is being used 
to legitimise war and military aggression.25 Puar calls this dynamic ‘Homo-
nationalism’,26 a concept mainly developed with her analysis of the torture 
scandal of Abu Ghraib in 2003. 
In support of deconstructing such an essentialised vision of Muslims, I 
would like to quote the Jordanian activist and writer Maher Al-Haj. He was in-
terviewed in 2013 by the My.Kali reporter Julijan Rahaleh about his project “to 
educate and advocate on the permissibility of homosexuality within the Sharia 
Law of Islam in our Muslim and Arabic surroundings”.27 Al-Haj felt there was 
no-one and nowhere he could turn to as he grew up questioning his sexuality. 
He describes his upbringing as “culturally conservative”,28 rather than religious, 
and says he felt rejected by the people around him who deemed his “abnormal” 
sexual preferences disgusting. After many difficult years, he came to terms with 
himself: “I finally arrived to the only truth about my sexuality that matters: that 
homosexuality is a beautiful creation from Allah that needs to be respected, 
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protected, and celebrated.”29 Al-Haj himself felt religiously drawn to Islam, even 
more so than his average relative: “I felt an affinity to the religion Islam since a 
very young age. And as soon as I became aware of my sexual differences, I sought 
refuge, peace, and comfort in it.”30 He turned towards God, his religion, and found 
safety within, rather than without, religious practices. It is important to him to 
dismantle the idea that what he calls “traditional Islam” forbids homosexuality. 
In his opinion, homosexuality is part of God’s intentions “that should be 
acknowledged and celebrated”.31 He is aware of the existence of many homosexu-
al, queer Muslims to whom Islam is very important and wishes to support them on 
their quest for self-acceptance and piety. 
These kinds of possibilities and this adaptability in reading and interpreting 
the Qur’an are also demonstrated by what is known as the feminist or women’s re-
reading of the Qur’an, a movement associated with scholar-activists Amina 
Wadud, Margot Badran, and Asma Barlas, among others. Their goal has been to 
recover sexual equality within an Islamic paradigm by adding a women’s perspec-
tive to what they think is an androcentric Qur’anic interpretation.32 They concep-
tualise theological premises that would suspend certain misogynist interpreta-
tions of the Qur’an. For example, thinking of God’s unity, tawḥīd, and exclusive 
divine sovereignty over humans, would rule out men’s authority over women.33 
Furthermore, if God is understood as inherently good, incapable of doing bad, 
then bad things cannot be taught by God’s speech.34 These scholars also contex-
tualise and historicise the Qur’an as a text of its time: Wadud distinguishes “uni-
versal and particular norms”,35 meaning that there are some verses that apply to 
seventh century Arab society, while others can be applied to today’s circumstanc-
es. The universal meaning of verses must be hermeneutically filtered out. If the 
“original intention”36 intended advances for women compared to the former sta-
tus quo, the essence of this verse is progress.37 We can identify a similarly fresh 
and daring new approach to interpreting the Qur’an regarding homosexuality in 
what Al-Haj says about God’s nature and creative intentions: God is loving and 
wholesome which rules out a homophobic reading of religious sources. 
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The Liberal Islamic Association in Berlin (Liberal-Islamischer Bund e.V., 
LIB) has positioned itself in a similar way regarding the standing of homosexu-
ality in Islam. To them, the individuality and independence of every believer 
outweighs unquestioned traditions and obedience towards authorities.38 The 
key to their understanding of Islam is a person’s relationship to God, a relation-
ship that can only be expressed when their full individuality is respected and 
valued.39 Similarly to Al-Haj, the LIB considers homosexuality as part of God’s 
creativity and love of diversity; a diversity that should encourage us to get to 
know one another.40 Historically, the LIB states, Islamic Law has proven its 
potential to re-evaluate rulings on sexuality and love, listing rape within mar-
riage, sexual relationships between slaves and masters, and intercourse with 
minors as examples of outdated practices.41 
In his book Living Out Islam: Voices of Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender 
Muslims, Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle contributes to the debate about the compati-
bility of Muslim piety and queerness. He states that the opinion of many West-
ern observers, that “transgender, lesbian, and gay Muslims must leave Islam in 
order to live with dignity and pursue social reform”,42 is wrong since “[m]any 
activists retain their loyalty to their religion, pursue deeper knowledge about it, 
and practice its rituals to the extent of their capacity. Others mine the Islamic 
tradition for resources for a progressive religious interpretation.”43 One such 
example that Kugle came across during his interviews and research with 
LGBTQIA+ Arab activists concerns Muslims’ history as a formerly oppressed 
minority which was marginalised and vulnerable.44 They remind their fellow 
Muslims that the Qur’an calls on protecting the “downtrodden”, numbered 
among which are disabled, poor, and queer bodies:45 “This is an example of 
activism in a mode that can be called ‘engaging religious tradition’.”46 
Engaging religious tradition as queers often means having to address the 
biblical and Qur’anic story of Lot that takes place in Sodom and Gomorrah (see 
the Qur’anic verses 7:80–84, 11:77–83, 15:58–77, 26:160–175, 27:54–58, 29:28–
35, and 54:33–39). Contemporary scholars are divided when it comes to the 
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interpretation of these verses. Khalid Duran defends that the Qur’an “is very 
explicit in its condemnation of homosexuality, leaving scarcely any loophole for 
a theological accommodation of homosexuals in Islam”.47 Kugle, in contrast, 
sees no explicit discussion of homosexuality or homosexuals at all.48 In order to 
promote a more inclusive reading of this Qur’anic segment, scholars and activ-
ists have interpreted the story of Lot as being about other issues than homoerot-
ic acts.49 The LIB assumes instead that it speaks of sexualised violence, assault 
and a lack of hospitality.50 One of Kugle’s interviewees 
believes that the Qur’an does not directly address homosexuality. (...) It does speak about 
male assault and rape of other men in the story of the Prophet Lot (at Sodom and Gomor-
rah), but (...) does not address homosexuality as sexual orientation or homoerotic rela-
tionships as expressions of emotional commitment and care.51 
Another voice out of Kugle’s text, Omar Nahas – founder of the Islamic and educa-
tional Yoesuf Foundation – explains that in his understanding “the Qur’an con-
demns sodomy as the act of anal penetration rather than homosexuality as sexual 
orientation, while the Islamic legal tradition mistakenly conflates the two”.52 This 
would mean that the “culturally specific social formations of same-sex desire as 
they are articulated in the West”53 are considered foreign while the practice itself 
is not. It problematises homosexuality as a “‘European identity category’ which 
has been imposed by the West upon gays and lesbians of color”.54 By distinguish-
ing practice from identity, the supposed universality of sexual identities is ques-
tioned. Whether that is helpful to sexually active gays is an unresolved question. 
When it comes to engaging religious tradition, Ludovico Mohammed Zahed 
is a force to be reckoned with.55 One of ten openly gay Imams worldwide, Zahed 
grew up in Algeria and France. In 2012, in Paris, he founded a mosque which 
welcomes people of all sexual orientations and gender identities. Zahed holds a 
PhD in Anthropology and Psychology and advocates globally for a liberal inter-
pretation of the Qur’an.56 He approaches the Qur’an in similar ways to Kugle, his 
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interviewees, the LIB, and activist Maher Al-Haj. Zahed similarly interprets the 
story of Lot as being not about homosexual practices, but rather about rape: “In 
the Qur’an nothing is written of homosexuality being reprehensible.”57 He goes 
on to describe that Muslims need to get to the core of the Qur’an’s spiritual es-
sence, which he says is one of tolerance and peace, ruling out the kind of hom-
ophobia and marginalisation that comes about when Muslims blindly follow the 
sharia.58 Besides the text-based disputes, an important place is of course given 
to the figure of Prophet Muhammad and his actions. Zahed tells the story of the 
prophet welcoming men into his house who were described as mukhannath, 
meaning effeminate, or feminine.59 One of Kugle’s interview partners argues 
that we do not know of any incident “when the Prophet Muhammad punished 
any woman or man for homosexual orientation or same-sex acts”.60 
In this section, I have pointed out some of the strategies used by Muslim in-
dividuals to reconcile their religiosity with their homosexuality and queerness. 
Activist Muslims across Jordan, France, and Germany are engaging with reli-
gious sources to find refuge and acceptance within them. Alternative and new 
interpretations of the Qur’an, for example the story of Lot in Sodom and Gomor-
rah, are essential to this activism which in turn might remind us of related rein-
terpretation movements, such as the women’s rereading of the Qur’an. Believers 
are highlighting God’s generosity, acceptance, and love towards Muslims of all 
stripes. They point to this welcoming of diversity as part of God’s inherent inten-
tion to merge different identity affiliations. This questions the orientalist and 
racist notion of intrinsically homophobic Muslims and demonstrates the diversi-
ty of Islamic practice. In Zahed’s words: “We are Islam, we create our faith our-
selves.”61 
What paradise? We don’t need to be saved 
Western media portrays LGBT-people from Muslim Middle East and North Africa as vic-
tims of their society. That they are tortured and longing for a life in the West aka Paradise. 
Oftentimes this is wrong. We don’t need to be saved.62 
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Puar’s “racializing technology” of pre-supposed Muslim homophobia has a 
close relative, that is the notion that Muslims need to be saved from their homo-
phobic environment, saved into the ‘Western Paradise’ where queers can find 
happiness, and where tolerance reigns.63 Similarly to the white Western wom-
en’s movement, “which had sought to universalise its issues through imposing 
its own colonial feminism (...) in non-Western countries”,64 the Western way of 
being gay becomes the inevitable and universal modus operandi that must be 
internationally imposed. Joseph Massad calls this missionary state of mind the 
“Gay International”.65 It includes transforming same-sex practice into an identi-
ty that comes with a set of rights and practices, such as coming out of the closet, 
being visible, and living life out and proud.66 When it fails to see gayness per-
formed the right way, the Gay International assumes heterosexuality. Gay iden-
tification as performed in these ways is seen as somehow more legitimately gay 
than same-sex practices and behaviours in and of themselves. Queer represen-
tation or ‘outness’ is considered the only way to achieve “social justice, equali-
ty, cohesion, diversity, multiculturalism, etc.”67 In his 2018 My.Kali article 
“Globalizing the Closet”, Musa Shadeedi writes: 
[T]he concept of the closet has become more than just a personal decision, or an individu-
al process of discovering one’s identity, but rather a standard according to which LGBTQI 
rights are measured in various cultures. It determines whether this culture is civilized, 
modern[,] or backward and intolerant of homosexuality.68 
He states that Western experiences have been framed as the only way to go, 
ignoring “other LGBTQIA+ communities, their choices, privacies, cultural con-
texts[,] and their right to choose”,69 while maintaining the notion of imprisoned, 
closeted, and tortured queers in the Middle East. There’s only one solution: 
come out and leave the country.70 At the same time, protection is only granted to 
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those who can perform and “demonstrate their gay-ness, either through ap-
pearances or using ‘western’ terminologies”71 while, in turn, being perceived 
by their own communities as ‘westernised’, ‘traitors’, and ‘anti-nationalist’. This leads to 
even more discrimination against other non-normative people in their home countries 
[because] homosexuality and gay lifestyles [are] perceived as ‘western’ and related to im-
perialism.72 
That homosexuality was seen to be complicit with colonialism was also found 
by Ramzi Salti in 1997, this being a very 
problematic assumption that has most notably led to the dual marginalization of the Arab 
homosexual by both the native (who now sees him as complicit with colonialism) and the 
colonizer (who still views him as a native and consequently as Other).73 
In the meantime, it is often forgotten that ‘Western’ countries are far from being 
safe havens for queers. In a twist that is as ironic as it is damaging, the very 
homophobia that was imported to the Middle East from ‘Western’ countries 
through imperialism is now cited when those countries are presented as the safe 
alternative – as the gay place-to-be.74 In his 2008 book Die Vertreibung aus dem 
Serail. Europa und die Heteronormalisierung der islamischen Welt,75 Georg Klau-
da argues that Western queer communities have forgotten about their own soci-
eties’ heteronormativity in the process of constructing Islam and traditionally 
Muslim countries as the cultural enemy.76 Samer Owaida, a Chicago-based activ-
ist born in Palestine, attests to this in an interview with My.Kali in 2019: 
It’s an illusion to think you’re completely free once you move here [to the West, and that] 
you will have a fantastic queer life, because of, for example, gay marriage. There is still a 
lot of violence against queer bodies in the USA, as seen in the high rate of homelessness 
among queer youth and murder [of] trans people.77 
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Fig. 3: Digital My.Kali cover, featuring Juliana Yazbeck, no. 68. With friendly permission by the 
editor: My.Kali 2019. 
The culturalisation of homophobia and the illusion of a Western queer safe 
space also conceal the racism that Muslim or Muslim-identified bodies endure 
in predominantly white countries. Amir Ashour, founder of IraQueer, was raised 
in Iraq and now lives in Sweden; he affirms that he struggles mostly because of 
the racism in Sweden.82 Bo Hanna, who interviewed Samer and Amir, is of Coptic-
Egyptian descent living in the Netherlands. Hanna feels similarly excluded from 
both the Dutch LGBTQIA+ community, and his ethnic community: “I feel stig-
matised within both and am constantly trying to balance in between them.”83 
Soumia Akachar has investigated the situation in the Netherlands further, 
noting that Muslim migrants are blamed for the increase in violence directed 
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against queers, which in turn has led to the problematisation of Islam and mul-
ticulturalism overall:84 “Such understandings of sexuality and ethnicity tend to 
disregard the location of gay Dutch Muslims, embodying intersectional identi-
ties (e.g., ethnicity, religion, sexuality).”85 Akachar stresses that an intersection-
al approach is essential to expose the various forms of oppression and erasure 
that this minority is affected by.86 
Many queers decide to stay in their home communities and search for local 
solutions precisely for the reasons mentioned above. They are aware of the con-
sequences of moving to other countries where they will suffer from racialised 
stigmatisation and bemoaning the universalisation of queer identity that they 
experience as “cultural imperialism imposed by the ‘[W]est’ on the ‘[E]ast’”,87 
feeling that local histories are erased by foreign stories. As a means to move 
away from this hegemony and to open up spaces at home, some queers appeal 
to local homoerotic history, same-sex desires, and practices. Rather than uni-
versalising or projecting homoeroticism onto the past, they seek to “illustrate 
the sources of cultural capital”88 to recover past knowledge in order “to under-
stand the possibilities of alternative sexualities and social arrangements”.89 
Through the process of “mobilizing histories, reappropriating languages, and 
other cultural strategies, we may be able to gain affirmation and support”.90 El 
Dob Al-Akbar’s 2018 article in My.Kali outlines his upbringing in a neighbour-
hood usually associated with violence and gangs. One might think, the article 
states, that such an area would be very conservative and condone only “‘legiti-
mate’ sexual relations and the historic bilateral division of sexual orientation. 
But the truth is the exact opposite.”91 Al-Akbar tells us about the freedom he 
witnessed while growing up: 
So, this article is about lost memories, or memories intentionally forgotten by our society 
that became lost in the state of denial. Memories that were lived by my generation and 
those who were born in the 1980’s too, those who dared to explore their sexual orientation 
and practices in the late 90’s.92 
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Al-Akbar explains that relationships between young men were often more than 
platonic, often involving physical affection such as holding hands, hugging, kiss-
ing, or sitting on a friend’s lap. He remembers that films with homosexual story-
lines were rare but not frowned upon. Of his friends, many had either fantasised 
about homosexual encounters or experienced them first-hand.93 Hence, Al-Akbar 
goes back in time to remind us of lived sexual practices outside of imperialist 
ideas and identity categories. Similarly, Ahmed Afzal found that Pakistani Gay 
Men in Houston, Texas, are searching for “South Asian epistemologies of same-
sex sexual eroticism”94 as well as for “a religiously conceived transnationality, 
and appropriations of Western epistemologies of gay identity”.95 
This search goes hand-in-hand with finding a language that disrupts what 
Sahar Amer calls the “almost exclusive reliance by Arab activists on Western 
terminology and Western paradigms of same-sex sexuality”.96 Amer objects to 
the language used by some Arab queer activists: 
By adopting foreign terms and gender categories that mimic Western sexual politics and 
by dressing sexual preference in foreign linguistic garb, Arab gay activists unwittingly end 
up supporting a culture of shame that ultimately undermines Arab identity and leads to 
the further isolation of Arab gays and lesbians from their own socio-historical and literary 
traditions.97 
My.Kali magazine has been advocating for a local queer language since Arabic 
was introduced as a publication language alongside English in 2015. Abdel Hadi 
is overwhelmed by the response: “the readership of our Arabic content is three 
times the size of the English version.”98 Adding Arabic to the magazine was 
initially sparked by the accusation that My.Kali was serving a ‘Western’ agenda 
when the magazine’s creators got involved with organising the International 
Day Against Homo- and Transphobia, mostly associated with US activism and a 
universalist mindset.99 Abdel Hadi states that the language was an important 
symbolic move towards their people after that incident: 
We gradually learned the importance of the language through which we communicate. 
We pursued an Arab identity in order to reach a wider base of readership. We realized that 
|| 
93 Al-Akbar 2018, 3. 
94 Afzal 2015, 124. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Amer 2012, 387. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Abdel Hadi 2020, 3. Translated from German by Claude Kempen. 
99 Al Shadeedi 2018, 3. 
270 | Claude C. Kempen 
  
we had previously deprived our non-bilingual keen Arab readers from access to our con-
tents, and, consequently, from communicating with us too.100 
In this section I have shown My.Kali’s intense engagement and related activism 
with ‘Western’ cultural imperialism around identity, sexuality, sexual expres-
sion, and lifestyle. The so-called ‘West’ does not stand as a queer paradise for 
all, but rather for ‘white’ bodies that participate in constructing Muslims as the 
intolerant enemy, consequently erasing LGBTQIA+ Muslims from our imagina-
tions. Queer Arabs and Muslims that live in the West experience racism, Islam-
ophobia, and exclusion from both the queer and their own communities. Many 
decide to remain in the countries where they grew up, sifting through religious 
sources, historical archives, and memories to find a language for their love, 
desires, and experiences. Whether they live in Jordan, the Netherlands or the 
US, they are navigating their lives at “the intersection of local socio-cultural 
vocabularies and the language of international gay rights activism”.101 
Conclusion: Agency, archives, and hyphens 
My.Kali magazine gives an invaluable platform to Arab LGBTQIA+ voices and 
debates around so-called ‘Western’ forms or concepts of being queer or sexually 
non-normative vis-à-vis local and Arab ways of living those sexualities and sexual 
identities. Some articles question homonationalism, others reflect on being dis-
placed as queer Arabs (“Neither Here Nor There”102) as well as on the racism and 
Islamophobia outside their own communities. Further articles explore (ho-
mo)sexuality in Islam and local homoerotic histories and practices. Some Arab 
queers have come to terms with the fact that leaving their home countries will not 
give them the freedom that they imagine – ‘Western’ countries’ rampant Islam-
ophobia reads all Arab bodies as Muslim, no matter their level of religiosity (and 
their actual confession). Islam therefore becomes a factor considered when it 
comes to decisions of location and living situations as well as finding acceptance 
within the religious realm. Arab and Muslim queers are hence intersectionally 
affected by oppression and must work harder to create safer spaces for them-
selves, no matter which country they find themselves living in. 
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This creation of safer spaces is reflected in a very active search for solutions 
on the part of people that are in the My.Kali community as well as the other 
queer and Muslim voices discussed in this chapter. Activists are aware of the 
local and global tools that are available to them and put them to use, mining 
their own archives for inspiration.103 Sometimes the magazine and its staff are 
criticised for being westernised, secularised, elitist, or tone deaf. This perhaps 
goes some way towards explaining why they are so inclined to discuss diverse 
approaches to living queer lives. In a (self-)critical article on their website, Al 
Shadeedi and Abdel Hadi interrogate themselves: “[W]ere My.Kali’s means of 
activism affected by The Gay International, and if so, how?”104 and “[d]oes the 
Gay International really hurt those whom it seeks to liberate?”105 In order to find 
an inclusive and locally sensitive tone My.Kali’s writers prove that several 
things can be true at the same time: the magazine can be published in both 
Arabic and English; queer history is local and global; and queer Jordanian his-
tory can be marked by cultural imperialism and colonialism as well as anti-
imperialist activism and pre-colonial imaginings. These writers and activists 
can identify as LGBTQIA+ as well as “problematising the way [‘Western’ catego-
ries] are being used and utilised to serve the agenda of cultural imperialists.”106 
Their ways of engaging with global, local, Arab, and Muslim histories, lan-
guages, and forms of self-expression are intrinsically plural. Bettina Dennerlein 
has named it “the hybridity and interculturality of Arab LGBTQIA communities 
and identities”107 and also – with reference to Sahar Amer – the “necessarily 
hyphenated character” of these communities.108 This could remind us of Audre 
Lorde’s “hyphenated people”.109 a term she used to describe the heritage and 
plural identity of Afro-Americans, which she later introduced to the Afro-
German community during her Berlin years from 1984 to 1992. The diversifica-
tion of identity and the idea of a “yes” rather than an “either or” is deeply in-
grained in this hyphenation: Lorde herself is known as a “black lesbian feminist 
mother poet warrior”.110 This hyphenated character in turn enables “an open 
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assemblage that permits of multiple convergences and divergences without 
obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure”.111 Butler suggests here 
that identity is not an essence or a goal, but rather something we do or affilia-
tions we accumulate. A close reading of My.Kali magazine reveals the fact that 
Muslim queers don’t need saving, and shows the ways in which they find refuge 
in religion. However, it also makes clear that activism which centres on identity 
categories “in essence beats the purpose of queerness, which is meant to disturb 
identities rather than reinforce them”.112 
 
Fig. 4: Digital My.Kali cover, featuring Mehdi Bahmad, no. 72. With friendly permission by the 
editor: My.Kali 2021. At the time of writing, this was the most current issue. 
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Representation and Ethics 
The Making of the Islamic World from a Place of Exile 
Abstract: I use Edward Said’s metaphor of exile to identify an archive that offers 
an alternative discourse in the study of Islam. By drawing on Western and Mus-
lim traditions, this archive occupies a place of exile that does more than con-
structing a representation of the Muslim world. Like Said’s work, it continues 
the critique of Orientalism. In addition, it includes a deliberation on ethics that 
has generally eluded the dominant discourse on the making and unmaking of 
the Islamic World. I contrast this archive with a post-Orientalist discourse that 
sometimes takes a deconstructivist approach to Islam, and sometimes one that 
emphasizes agency. The use of agency draws attention to Muslim imbrication in 
the social, political, and religious fields, but fails to account for political and 
economic hegemonies. Such strategies side-step the continuing dominance of 
Western political power games in Muslim societies and states. I therefore turn to 
scholars in exile and propose that their interest in critique and ethics offers a 
different way of imagining the Islamic world. Their questions and concern offer 
a different perspective to ‘post-Saidian’ Islamic Studies. 
Introduction 
In his Reith Lectures, the late American-Palestinian writer Edward Said pro-
posed that exile offers a metaphor for the intellectual to represent the Other. If 
Orientalism was a critique of representation, the lectures were pointing to an 
ethical place from which to take up the task of representation. The exile refuses 
to take up a home that invariably needs to be defended with ideology. For Said, 
exile provides a vantage point from which to represent the unequal relation of 
power in the social world.1 Said distinguished the critique of the exile from the 
postmodernist critic, and remained hopeful for the academic and intellectual to 
make a difference. I use the metaphor of exile in this chapter to examine the 
work of intellectuals who offered an alternative set of questions to imagine the 
Islamic world. Drawing on Western and Muslim traditions, their work occupies 
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a place of exile that does more than constructing a representation of the Muslim 
world. Like the work of Said, their work continued the critique of Orientalism. In 
addition, they include a deliberation on ethics in the study of Islam that may be 
seen in Said’s lectures for the exiled intellectual. 
The aim of this chapter is to present an outline of frameworks for the study 
of Islam that remain marginal to a dominant discourse. I begin with a critical 
reading of a recent post-Orientalist discourse on the study of Islam and Mus-
lims, showing that this literature is aware of Said’s critique of the way the 
Islamic world continues to be made in scholarship and public spheres. In re-
sponse, it sometimes offers deconstruction and sometimes the agency of Muslim 
actors as alternative forms of representation. Both theoretical strategies general-
ly downplay unequal power relations that permeate the contemporary political 
and economic map of the world. They particularly fail to bring into question the 
dominance of Western political power games, with or without the collusion of 
local actors. The use of agency turns attention to Muslim imbrication in the 
social, political, and religious fields, while political and economic hegemonies 
remain on the margins of analysis. 
But these reflections point to another trajectory of representation that offers 
alternative ways of thinking about the Muslim world. In the second part of the 
chapter, I turn to intellectuals whose work may be seen as representations of 
exiles in the Saidian sense. These intellectuals challenge the representation of 
Islam in the key disciplines of Islamic Studies, offering ways of imagining Islam 
beyond the dominant frames of deconstruction and agency. 
Post-Orientalist Islamic Studies 
The impact of Said’s thesis has been widespread in the academy and continues 
to be felt in publications, meetings, and presentations. I turn to two anthologies 
and the extensive work of Armando Salvatore, that have adopted Said’s thesis 
on the problem of representation. They reveal a tendency to find an alternative 
way of representing the Muslim world, and an attraction to deconstruction. But 
they reveal what postcolonial scholar Mudimbe has called the hegemony of a 
Colonial/Western Library.2 They struggle to find a vantage point beyond the 
dominant trends in Western scholarship in general, and its representation of the 
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other. Moreover, they tend to minimise global hegemonies that constitute the 
world and a scholarship that represents it. 
In an edited volume dedicated to Bruce Lawrence, Carl Ernst and Richard 
Martin call their project ‘post-Orientalist’, drawing on critical insights devel-
oped in the social sciences since the publication of Said’s book. They specifical-
ly refer to new approaches in religion,3 tradition, violence, and identity. Most of 
the articles in the edited volume deconstruct terms and tropes used in the 
scholarly construction of Islam and the Muslim world. These include modern 
political narratives,4 Sufi biographies in the past and the present,5 modern Mus-
lim subjects,6 and textual practices.7 This critical analysis stands side by side 
with Muslim contributions in the volume that address ethical dilemmas and 
challenges of Muslim political and religious subjects.8 In the study of religion, 
these might be dismissed as insider voices. They are included in the volume, but 
do not receive special comment or engagement. 
In addition to critical theory, the volume addresses dichotomies created by 
Orientalist representations of Islam: Arabic and the Middle East in the centre, 
while other Muslim experiences are on the periphery; Islamic Studies set apart 
from Religious Studies; and an emphasis on the nation-state rather than global 
and regional connections.9 In another recent volume on the study of Islam, 
Buskens refers to another set of dichotomies that pervade the field: texts vs 
practices, classical vs modern, and centres and peripheries.10 Like the Martin 
and Ernst volume, this volume is also dedicated to crossing boundaries that 
have emerged within Western intellectual history in the study of Islam.11 Both 
volumes recognise orientalist representations as normative dichotomies that 
appear to be objective and natural. 
Buskens devotes a chapter that directly addresses Said’s thesis. While rec-
ognising the problem of how Islam has been represented, he tries to salvage 
some of the value of this colonial and 20th-century legacy. He corrects generalis-
ing assumptions made of Dutch pioneers in Islamic Studies and alludes to a 
Japanese Orientalism that may be compared with a Western Orientalism. 
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Buskens seems to tell the reader not to throw the Orientalist baby out with the 
bathwater. He believes that some methods may be salvaged from this tradition.12 
According to Buskens, one way of developing the study of Islam is to use culture 
as a more general concept rather than religion. Taking a different stance from 
the Martin and Ernst volume, Buskens wants to turn away from a dominant 
trope in popular Western discourse that represents Muslims as essentially reli-
gious.13 
With this general view of the field in these edited volumes, I would like to 
look more closely at the work of Armando Salvatore who has produced a library 
on the challenge posed by Edward Said. He, too, readily admits the problem of 
representation that is hegemonic by definition.14 But Salvatore believes that the 
project of representing Muslims can be salvaged by finding a common thread in 
the history of Islam and the West. Not tempted by deconstruction to give up the 
representation of Islam, his work exemplifies an emphasis on Muslim agency 
while unfortunately downplaying the impact of colonial conquests and post-
colonial struggles in this construction. 
Salvatore has analysed many different ways of thinking about Orientalism 
and the representation of Islam. In his earliest work, he argued that the political 
discourse of modernity among Arab intellectuals followed a similar course set in 
Europe. After reviewing the emergence of a discourse on religion in Europe, 
Salvatore identifies a similar construction on the opposite shore of the Mediter-
ranean Sea. “The genesis of an intellectual function and the emergence of a 
public sphere”, he says of the Middle East during the last quarter of the 19th 
century was crucial to “examine the Arab-Islamic path to modernity”.15 This 
Islamic modernity was created in the new public spheres made possible by co-
lonial conquests. In this analysis, Salvatore does not ignore the colonial context 
but does not include it in his analysis of an Islamic modernity. 
In his next project, Salvatore went beyond the construction of a modern Is-
lamic discourse. While his 1997 book placed Europe in the lead, he later 
searched for an earlier historical vantage point from which Islam and the West 
may be compared with each other. This time, his conceptualisation of the public 
sphere does not start with the emergence of European modernity, but with the 
Axial-Age first identified by Karl Jaspers. This period was considered a major 
global change for 
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locating and explaining, in historical-comparative, sociological terms, the type of break-
through that allowed, through the shaping of notions of transcendence, for the emergence 
of a type of human reflexivity conventionally identified as the passage from the narrativity 
of mythos to the rationality of logos.16 
Recalling a 19th-century thesis of the evolution of religion, Salvatore argued that 
religion as transcendence placed Islam alongside the West. He uses this com-
mon ground to focus on “the rationality of logos” that promotes inter-subjective 
reflexivity. From the perspective of the Axial Age, Islam and the West were two 
distinctive instances of a major transformation in human social organisation 
and consciousness.17 In fact, Islam as a civilisation predated the later Western 
manifestation of the Axial Age. Through this analytical move, Salvatore re-
ordered the framework for thinking about modernity, and pointed to a conver-
gence between Islam and the West. Salvatore identified institutions and values 
of Islamic civilisation that were very similar to the modern West. Thus, Salva-
tore found in Islam civilising processes that promoted personhood, civility, 
religious scholars, and non-religious intellectuals.18 This framework represented 
Islam as a modern civilisation very similar to the West. 
By shifting the focus away from the modern period, Salvatore provided a 
long-term perspective on the relation between religion and civilisation. By 
broadening the definition of religion from its construction in the modern West, 
as shown in his earlier work, Salvatore now offered a different perspective on 
the temporality of modernity. Doing so, he rejected a dominant Orientalist view 
that Islam was unable to modernise. He admits that his approach represents a 
minority tradition in the sociology of religion, but argued that it offers a correc-
tive to an Orientalist representation that focuses only on the West.19 
And yet, Salvatore’s sociological perspective is led by insights from the in-
tellectual archive of Western modernity. The convergence between Islam and 
the West was always constructed in the image of the West. The choice of terms 
and social processes followed Weber’s thesis, fine-tuned by Weberian scholars. 
While Salvatore claims convergence, his analysis marked Western civilisation in 
the lead, with the experience of Islam following a close or parallel trajectory. In 
his work, one hardly finds any reference to theorisation in Muslim intellectual 
discourse, in the past or the present, without first finding it in Western social 
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theory. One hardly finds any other concept worthy of note in Islamic civilisation 
that is not in the West. 
More significantly, Salvatore side steps the power and hegemony of the new 
Axial civilisation represented by Western modernity. His model regularly refers 
to the hegemonic power of the West that has transformed the rest of the world 
through politics, economics, and values. But he hardly brings this hegemony 
and its effects on the Muslim formulation of social life from the 18th to the 21st 
centuries into his analysis. He is keen on showing that whilst Europe was 
emerging as a powerful global actor, Muslim actors were agents in their own 
right. Salvatore, however, ignores the military responses put up by Muslims in 
this period, and places emphasis on organic intellectuals who responded with 
modern ideas. Salvatore is consistent in rejecting Orientalist tropes of Muslims 
as stuck in an unchanging tradition.20 But his model says little about features of 
Western modernity through which Islamic civilisation lost power. The critique 
of Orientalism as power and hegemony that creates the world in its image, as 
argued by Said, is downplayed until it disappears completely. 
Scholars of Islam, then, have risen to the Saidian challenge of representa-
tion and its hegemony. The pitfalls of representation are now generally 
acknowledged, and attempts made to address its negative effects in the public 
sphere and in academia. In post-Saidian Islamic studies, critical theory is used 
to unmask representations that create regimes of knowledge, identities, and 
subjects. Side by side with a deconstructive stance, agency seems to provide 
relief to social theorists. It is readily embraced in critical theory that argues that 
the agency of the dominated should and cannot be ignored. Against dominant 
structures of power led by political, cultural, and economic hegemonies, indi-
viduals formulate resistances or alternative cultural worlds and outlooks.21 In 
post-Saidian Islamic Studies, however, this focus on agency is accompanied by 
under-theorising hegemony. As I have shown in Salvatore by way of example, 
the agency of the Muslim is elevated to such an extent that the effect of old and 
new hegemonies is left under-theorised. The emphasis on agency provides a 
rather feeble analytical response to global hegemony in the past and present. 
But there is another problem posed by agency in the presence and role of 
insider intellectuals and academics in the representation of the Islamic World. A 
post-Orientalist study of Islam struggles to conceptualise the agency of insider 
intellectuals and academics. The latter are represented in the edited antholo-
gies, but their work stands apart from post-Orientalist reflections that I have 
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identified. This problem may have deeper roots in the role of the social scientist 
who, according to Paul Rabinow, is said in theory “to refuse all social action, all 
interest in the meaning and/or stakes of social life”.22 But from an exilic perspec-
tive, this disinterest cannot be sustained. And so I turn to a different archive in 
the representation of Islam from that vantage point. 
Islamic Studies from a place of exile 
In this second part of the chapter, I want to turn to Said’s metaphor of exile from 
which a different representation of Islam may be identified. There are two broad 
lines of inquiry in this tradition. The first is a continuing critical reflection of the 
study of Islam as representation, exemplified in the work of Talal Asad, Mo-
hamed Arkoun, and Shahab Ahmed. Another line of inquiry is constituted by a 
much larger group that extends beyond the Western academy, but I will focus 
on the work of Ismaʿil al-Faruqi (d. 1986) and Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) to appre-
ciate the significance of ethics that they bring to the representation of Islam. In 
the following, I present short vignettes of these scholars’ work with a particular 
emphasis on their critical reflections on representation in their respective fields, 
and their suggestions for an alternative framework. I will also attempt to show 
either an explicit connection among the various protagonists or bring out an 
implicit one. My purpose in this chapter is to point to an archive that is animat-
ed by these intellectuals through a different set of questions than those driven 
by representation, agency, and critical deconstruction. 
Mohammed Arkoun, Talal Asad, and Shahab Ahmed have made critical in-
terventions in the study of Islam in their respective fields. Asad offers a discur-
sive approach in place of representation for anthropology, while Arkoun chal-
lenges Islamic Studies to take seriously the intellectual history of Islam and new 
insights from the social sciences. In his posthumously published book, Ahmed 
offered a tour de force that challenged representations of Islam in multiple 
modern disciplines. 
Asad argued that the Islam discovered by scholars like Wilfred C. Smith, 
Clifford Geertz, and Ernest Gellner was theoretically problematic from a post-
colonial perspective. In particular, Islam as a faith, symbolic system or 
worldview did not allow for debate and deliberation. Asad’s criticism of Gellner 
captures this tendency in the field: “Islamic actors do not speak, they do not 
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think, they behave”.23 And the academic observer identified an essence and 
function of Islam from this behaviour through carefully chosen dramatis perso-
nae. Asad’s use of theatre aptly represents the gaze that works in the service of 
representation. Moreover, Asad argues that these representations were created 
from unquestioned theoretical assumptions and political movements, first de-
veloped or identified in the West, and then applied to Muslim contexts. 
As an alternative, Asad offered Islam and religion generally as discursive 
traditions “that connect [sic] variously with the formation of moral selves, the 
manipulation of populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appro-
priate knowledges”.24 Asad brings important insights of Wittgenstein, McIntyre, 
and Foucault to the discourse of Islam. With discourse, he offers another way of 
thinking of religion as disciplinary and disciplined practices. Asad’s formula-
tion of religion as a discourse has been used extensively in the anthropology of 
Islam to recognise the formation of Muslim subjectivities. These subjectivities 
have generally focused on religious movements on the politics of the self. Whilst 
drawing on the later Foucault, they have rejected the dominant assumptions of 
subject formation rooted in European philosophy and public spheres.25 
There have been criticisms levelled against these studies for emphasising 
only the religious aspect of Muslim societies. It is argued that Muslims are also 
determined by class, nation, leisure, and a deep ambiguity in their devotion to 
religion. The ‘Asadian’ tradition in the anthropology of Islam, it is claimed, has 
confirmed an Orientalist trope that Muslims are essentially religious.26 This 
critique is mainly addressed at continuing Orientalist tropes that dominate a 
Western public imagination of Muslims. Scholars of Islam in the West are con-
fronted by generalisations of Islam and Muslims in often hostile Western public 
spheres. One of those generalisations is that Muslims are completely deter-
mined by religion. Scholars of Islam are at pains to show that not all Muslims 
are religious. But this corrective does not address the nature of a religious dis-
course and how it is used by Asadian scholars. Moreover, it has not displayed 
any sensitivity to how these social and political terms are translated from the 
experience of the centre to the periphery, as Asad cautioned in his inaugural 
lecture. 
And yet, the Asadian tradition applied in Western anthropology has not 
been able to address the nature of Muslim discourse in its complexity, and its 
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longer spatial and temporal elaboration. And this is what Mohamed Arkoun 
addresses to the temporal limitation of the anthropological gaze. Arkoun has 
not been as extensively appreciated and debated in Western academia as Talal 
Asad, but he has made a significant impact in the Muslim world. Many of his 
books have been translated into Arabic and became part of a renewed critical 
interest in the heritage (turāth).27 Arkoun appealed to scholars in Islamic Studies 
(Islamwissenschaft) not to ignore critical social science theories. He asked them 
to give up the positivist legacy inherited from the 19th century. Emphasising 
what he calls “emergent reason”28 as a heuristic tool, he asked scholars to exam-
ine the epistemic regimes created in the past and the present: 
Removed from a strictly theological perspective, religion is studied in its historical, socio-
logical, and anthropological context, thereby setting the stage for a theory of religion as a 
socio-historic, universal phenomenon. In this perspective, Islam is but one example 
among others that can be studied via the social sciences as part of a global theory of 
knowledge.29 
‘Emergent reason’ is to be differentiated from scientific positivism and religious 
reasoning. Addressing himself to scholars of religion, Arkoun hopes that emer-
gent reason will “cultivate the humility of the saints and sages, the generosity of 
the greatest witnesses of the spiritual life, and the philosophical disquiet of the 
most fertile thinkers”.30 
Arkoun’s goal of “a global theory of knowledge”31 points to the value of 
studying Islam as part of studying religions in truly comparative ways. Accord-
ing to Arkoun, a universal approach to the study of religions will offer a more 
insightful and valid study of religious experience and its total history. Arkoun 
strived to point out that this modern discipline has barely absorbed Islamic 
intellectual history. Even perceptive scholars like Paul Ricoeur are guilty of this 
neglect.32 The intellectual history of Islam, he argues, offers a set of concepts 
and terms that may be supplemented to the existing canon in religious studies. 
For example, Arkoun has gone to great lengths to suggest that terms like ‘au-
thority’, ‘person’, ‘reform’, ‘revelation’, and ‘people’ are subject to critical anal-
ysis. Some of the terms match those encountered in the study of religions, but 
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others point to very different modalities and questions that may supplement 
existing theories.33 
Against “a strictly theological perspective”, Arkoun prefers a self-reflexive 
secular analysis. The application of “emergent reason” includes a critique of 
modern secular regimes and ideologies in the West and in Muslim countries. 
According to Arkoun, secularism had become an ideological blindness that 
matches religious blindness. It, too, needs to be subjected to critical review: 
“from the point of view adopted in this essay, secularism, as a source and do-
main of intellectual freedom [emphasis added] to initiate a new theory and prac-
tice of authority, must also be undertaken in Western societies today”.34 Arkoun 
suggests enlightened secular thinking against positivistic or religious intellec-
tual regimes. His criticism is levelled at premodern and modern regimes of truth 
which obscure and render unthought and unthinkable key issues in society and 
in intellectual traditions.35 
Asad and Arkoun offered different reflections on how Islam has been 
(mis)represented. Using critical theory, they suggested that paying close atten-
tion to discourse pays attention to how religious worlds are created and to what 
effect. They have pointed to the pitfalls and limitations of representations driv-
en by culture and religion that are limited to a European experience and theori-
sation. We can better appreciate this critical discourse by considering the wide-
ly-read book of Shahab Ahmed as part of this trajectory.38 Ahmed’s book builds 
on this scholarly discourse that questions Orientalist representations, but one 
that offers an alternative. 
The distinctive merit of Ahmad’s book lies in his review of the major epis-
temological trajectories of the representation of Islam in the academy. More 
specifically, he has shown how the search for an essence of Islam has pervaded 
modern disciplines. He begins with the classical Orientalist tradition criticised 
by Said, which Ahmad shows has defined Islam as law or politics.39 This demar-
cation of a distinctive practice or disposition was locating an essence in the 
historical trajectory of Islam. It was a way of separating the essential from that 
which was extraneous and derivative. In contrast to law or politics, Sufism and 
philosophy were thus considered non-essential to Islam. Ahmed next turns to 
scholars of religion who focus on Islam’s essence around the Qur’an and Had-
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ith, captured around piety or devotion.40 Again, the essence of Islam is guided 
by the authors’ assumptions of the religious. Ahmed follows this by a close 
analysis of culture in the anthropology of Islam. Here, he also finds an implicit 
prescription of what Islam ought to be in its essence (Chapter 4). In this review, 
Ahmad showed the long shadow of a major preoccupation that dominated the 
study of Islam. This preoccupation of finding an essence was introduced in the 
study of religions in the 19th and 20th century until it was displaced by a critical 
deconstructive turn.41 Ahmad’s critical review of the study of Islam in various 
disciplines shows how the study of Islam was following this trajectory. Each 
discipline, from Orientalist philology to anthropology, looked for and found a 
different essence in Islam. 
Following this critique, Ahmed dedicates two chapters to an alternative rep-
resentation of Islam. He focuses on what Muslims between the Balkans and 
Bengal have done with texts as hermeneutic gestures. Drawing on a vast re-
source of religious texts, philosophy, mysticism, and poetry, he presents strate-
gies of reading among Muslims that were not led by essence and function but by 
complexity and ambiguity. His conclusion is that Islam has been deeply en-
gaged in a hermeneutic that thrives on ambiguity, contradiction and complexi-
ty: “[S]omething is Islamic to the extent that it is made meaningful in terms of 
hermeneutical engagement with Revelation to Muḥammad as one or more of 
Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text”.42 
Asad, Arkoun and Ahmad represent a form of questioning that has extend-
ed the critique of Said in Orientalism. Working across various disciplines en-
gaged in the study of Islam, they offer alternatives to the major concepts of reli-
gion and culture that emerged in the 19th century in the academy. They have 
also shown how these frameworks dominate the academy in spite of strong 
deconstructive trends. Asad shows the uncritical application of theory from a 
Western gaze, Arkoun points to a blindness to key terms in the history of Islam, 
while Ahmad points to a hegemonic search for essence. But they go beyond 
critiques by offering alternative way of representing Islam. Asad offers discur-
sive theory to include deliberation and debate among Muslims, Arkoun points 
to the intellectual history of Islam for conceptual tools, while Ahmad points us 
to unpredictable hermeneutical practices that have dominated Muslim dis-
course for a long time. It is possible to discern or invent a conversation between 
the three proposals. Arkoun appeals to a discourse of Islam like Asad, and ex-
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tends it into the history of Islam, but does not reject the insights to be gained 
from modern critical social sciences. Ahmad introduces a more complex herme-
neutic to the discourse of Islam than that offered by Asad, one derived from the 
practices of poets, mystics, and philosophers. 
There is another group of scholars that have been deeply engaged in this al-
ternative trajectory. They are a much larger group of Muslim intellectuals in 
Western academies that have also been engaged with Orientalist and post-
Orientalist scholarship. But in their concern for and engagement with political 
and social developments outside the West, they have promoted different strate-
gies for studying Islam. Space does not permit me to outline in detail the range 
of scholarship that has engaged with diverse theories – from Kant to feminist 
ethics – that constitutes this line of inquiry. But what is clear is that the main 
question guiding this trajectory is not limited to representation, but moral and 
ethical questions that guide Muslim societies. Such work includes a representa-
tion of Islam, but its main preoccupation is an ethical dimension that one hard-
ly finds in post-Saidian Islamic Studies. 
Ismaʿil Raji al-Faruqi (d. 1986) and Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) lay the ground 
for two very different kinds of ethical frameworks for the study of Islam and the 
Muslim world. Al-Faruqi was professor of Islamic Studies at the Department of 
Religion, Temple University, while Rahman was professor of Islamic Studies at 
the University of Chicago. Al-Faruqi developed a framework for the study of 
religions rooted in ethical values. In the 1960s, when the study of religion em-
phasised the essence of religion as the experience of the numinous, al-Faruqi 
argued that this preoccupation betrayed a modern, Protestant, and Romantic 
bias.43 In place of experience, al-Faruqi proposed that values should lead the 
study of religious manifestations: 
[T]he civilization as such becomes both a structured whole of meanings and a whole with 
a meaning. Every religious datum, whether it is an expression of an idea, an attitude or 
feeling-state, refers to something that is the content expressed, the meaning intuited or 
felt, the purpose realized or violated, or the object of inaction if no action whatever has 
taken place other than inaction. This something is a value.44 
According to al-Faruqi, the study of religions should be focussed on values 
expressed in its institutions, histories and practices. Moreover, these values 
constituted a meta-religion which was manifested in the religious history of 
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humankind.45 But he believed that not all religious manifestations produced the 
highest or most desirable values for human societies. Religions, as reflections of 
a meta-religion, should also be approached with critical evaluation. Al-Faruqi’s 
framework was closely related to the search for natural religion that inspired the 
study of religions since Kant. Like Kant, he was interested in the values that 
informed and shaped religious life, rather than experience as its sine qua non, 
as developed by Schleiermacher and those who followed him.46 In al-Faruqi’s 
view, experience was fundamentally inaccessible to the scholar who could only 
study what was available for testing and theory-making. He chose to study val-
ues. 
With this framework, al-Faruqi proposed that the world of Islam after colo-
nialism was rediscovering the values of meta-religion that it had lost. Islam, he 
continued, had expressed this meta-religion in the past and had the capacity to 
rediscover it. He studied various trends in Islamic history as approximations or 
claims to meta-religion. These claims ought to be studied, but also critiqued on 
ethical grounds. Using values and ethics for a theory of religion, al-Faruqi pro-
posed a distinctive representation of Islam in the modern world. It was not a 
world trying to catch up with modernity, or one following a different path of 
modernity.47 In his view, the Muslim world was rediscovering the values of me-
ta-religion. Critics have pointed to the bias in al-Faruqi’s analysis of religions 
and of Islam, but they have ignored his alternative recommendation for the 
study of Islam and of religions.48 They have also generally ignored the pivotal 
role played in his critique of religious studies before it became fashionable to do 
so. 
Al-Faruqi debated with another scholar who has left an equally important 
legacy of ethics for the study of the Muslim world. Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) was 
forced to leave his native Pakistan when he proposed changes in Islamic law for 
the new post-colonial state.49 He went on to the University of Chicago where he 
refined and articulated a model for the study of Islam and Muslim societies for a 
new generation of intellectuals. Rahman began his work in Islamic philosophy 
where he demonstrated how Muslim philosophical thinking had made a signifi-
cant impact on theologians in spite of their opposition to Greek ideas and cate-
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gories.50 It is this contextual insight that sets him apart from al-Faruqi. Rahman 
saw history as “contextual ethics [which] engages transcendent revelation in 
order to create a new consciousness and new values for the emerging age”.51 
Change and variety were undeniable in history as he had shown in Muslim theo-
logical work, but the task of the scholar was to recognise and promote some 
fundamental values. Rahman proposed that such a set of core values may be 
found in a reading of the Qur’an:52 
Qurʾanic legislation in the field of private and public life, even the ‘five pillars’ of Islam 
that are held to be religion par excellence, has social justice and the building of an egali-
tarian community as its end.53 
In the history of Islam, according to Rahman, such values had often been be-
trayed. In the development of Islamic law, for example, a stable framework for 
deducing values was developed by the great jurist al-Shafiʿi (d. 820) and accept-
ed by subsequent generations. In service to stability and tradition, however, the 
new framework lost the central value of justice.54 
Rahman believed that the study of values in society demanded a double 
hermeneutical analysis. The first was an analysis of Islam exemplified through a 
reading of the Qur’an from which its values could be identified, while the sec-
ond was an analysis of new historical conditions that demanded a response on 
the basis of such values. In each case, Rahman’s vision demanded a representa-
tion of a Muslim condition. But in each case, that representation was guided by 
ethical critique. 
Rahman’s approach to the discovery and promotion of values in different 
contexts has inspired a large number of modern scholars addressing challenges 
in the sphere of gender, human rights, and economic development.55 In particu-
lar, scholars working on human rights for marginalised groups in the Muslim 
world have further developed his framework as an alternative to those who 
claim that Islam is inherently traditional, patriarchal or unable to incorporate 
modern values. In each, the representation of Islam is explicitly placed against 
a set of desirable values. In contrast to Orientalist and post-Orientalist values of 
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modernity and deconstruction, these representations critically reconstruct val-
ues in the history of Islam and in the contemporary world. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has pursued two interlinked goals. Firstly, it has critically exam-
ined post-Saidian reflections for the study of Islam. Recognising the pervasive 
power of the Orientalist gaze and academic disciplinary apparatus, these reflec-
tions show a desire to escape dominant Orientalist tropes and assumptions that 
pervade Western societies and its academy. Secondly, this chapter has pointed 
to a discourse of Islamic Studies pursued by insider exiles that are often 
acknowledged, but hardly incorporated and appreciated into dominant reflec-
tions in the Western academy. Using two aspects of Said’s oeuvre, the fact of 
Orientalism and the place of exile, this chapter has shown that this discourse 
deserves to be appreciated for a different perspective on the representation of 
Islam and the Muslim world. 
Post-Saidian scholarship was critical of the dominant representation of Is-
lam in the Western academy and in Western public spheres. And various at-
tempts have been made to overcome the legacy of Orientalism. The results, 
though, have been mixed. The representation of Islam, regarded as a modernist 
project, has been replaced by deconstructive critique and the agency of Mus-
lims. The study of Islam remains locked in an interminable battle to build and 
break down frameworks. Moreover, alternative representations are rooted in 
theories of agency that fail to take seriously the continuing hegemonies that 
dominate the Muslim world. And potentially insightful attempts to build alter-
native representations remain Western-centric. One Western model (decon-
struction) replaces another (Orientalism), or the West and its political and theo-
retical experiences lead the academic discourse. The colonial library has not 
been seriously challenged. 
But this chapter is not limited to critique. Its second goal has pointed to an-
other archive that has emerged from the work of scholars in exile. Those whom I 
have identified have been part of the modern academy, but their work has gone 
beyond deconstruction. Two lines of inquiry may be identified. The first has 
continued the work of Said, pointing to the pervasiveness of Orientalism in the 
Study of Islam. It has offered important insights on overcoming Orientalism and 
offered constructive suggestions on doing Islamic Studies after Said. These 
scholars suggest discourse as a trajectory but offer different understandings and 
insights into what discourse means for the study of Islam. Another line of in-
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quiry has introduced ethical questions in the field. This line of inquiry has fo-
cussed attention on values that constitutes the Muslim world. I have pointed to 
two overlapping frameworks from Al Fārūqī and Rahman. This second line of 
inquiry has challenged a dominant stance in the modern academy that claims 
an objective, outside perspective for the researcher against an insider position 
of commitment and belief. In this dominant view, the insider can never be as 
objective as the outsider. Contrary to such fears, this chapter has shown how 
scholarship in exile has brought important questions to the study of Islam. It 
has shown how disciplinary critique and ethical reflections offer alternative 
questions and futures. 
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